JOURNAL FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK
herausgegeben vom Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik
an den österreichischen Universitäten

vol. XXIX 4–2013

SOUTHERN AFRICA
20 Years Post-Apartheid

Schwerpunktredaktion: Joachim Becker, Koen Smet

mandelbaum *edition südwind*

Journal für Entwicklungspolitik (JEP)
Austrian Journal of Development Studies

Herausgeber: Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik an den österreichischen Universitäten

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Umschlaggestaltung: Bettina Köhler
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Journal für Entwicklungspolitik XXIX 4-2013, S. 4-29

Joachim Becker, Koen Smet

Southern Africa: 20 Years Post-Apartheid

1994 marks one of the most important years in the history of South Africa and, more generally, the African continent. The first general elections of South Africa did not only end apartheid as a political system and state doctrine, which lasted for almost half a century, but also a history of racial exclusion extending over three centuries. Structures of inequality, ideologies and mentalities, which had been formed by many decades of institutionalised racism have, however, not disappeared with a stroke of a pen. In addition, the end of the apartheid rule in South Africa did not only have a significant impact on South Africa alone, but also on the entire African continent, especially the southern African subcontinent. Considering both the long history and the regional dispersion of racial segregation in the southern African subcontinent, this JEP issue extends the existing analyses on the inheritance of apartheid and discusses the relevance of apartheid today for the southern African region, 20 years after its end as a political system in South Africa. Although this issue offers only limited space to discuss such a broad topic, the reader will undoubtedly find food for thought.

1. Apartheid: 1948–1994

What was apartheid? At first sight this appears to be an easy question to anybody with knowledge of South Africa's recent history. The answer is, however, not quite as straightforward as one would expect. The term 'apartheid' is generally used to describe South Africa's political system from 1948 to 1994. The apartheid era starts with the election of the Nasionale Party (NP), covers more than four decades of NP-rule, and ends in 1994 with the

first general democratic elections. As a consequence, apartheid can also be defined as the philosophy of the ruling NP government (Arnold 2006: 331). As discussed by Leibbrandt et al. (2001a: 3), Seekings/Nattrass (2006) and Feinstein (2005), apartheid policies were racist and secured racial domination. In addition they resulted in systemic inequality between whites and non-whites.

Racial segregation was, however, not new to South Africans. Since the discovery of minerals (especially gold and diamonds), "the economic history of South Africa becomes, in essence, a story of how this unique combination of the indigenous population, European settlers, and mineral resources was brought together in a process of conquest, dispossession, discrimination, and development to promote rapid economic progress" (Feinstein 2005: 3). In 1910, when the Union of South Africa was founded, a colour bar was part of the constitution (Arnold 2006: 330). The apartheid period is, however, characterised by an orchestrated government approach to create racial segregation at different levels. On a macro level attempts were undertaken to create (dependent) black nation-states (Leibbrandt et al. 2001a: 3). The creation of bantustans, i.e. homelands, was the first step in this direction. This policy also implied that blacks were to lose their South African citizenship. On a meso level restrictions on the free movement of people were implemented. By means of influx control, urban settlement patterns, separate schools, etc. possible interactions between racial groups were minimised. In addition the criminalisation of interracial marriages and sexual relations as well as the creation of separate amenities guaranteed at a micro level that individuals of different race groups were segregated (Leibbrandt et al. 2001a: 3). For all South Africans apartheid was a political system which defined their political, economic and social rights and which had a significant impact on their daily lives.

It should come as no surprise that apartheid was also subject to change. Over the four decades, on both the domestic and the international level, events occurred which caused shifts in policies. Different periodisations have been proposed. Seekings/Nattrass (2006) as well as Leibbrandt et al. (2001a) distinguish between the apartheid period before the 1970s and the subsequent late-apartheid period until 1994. These two sub-periods can be distinguished in terms of the composition of the power bloc. From 1948 to the 1970s, the NP regime rested on an alliance between an emerging Afri-

kaner bourgeoisie whose interests were actively promoted by the apartheid state, the white petty bourgeoisie and white workers. Big mining capital saw its interests well promoted by the guaranteed supply of cheap black labour while manufacturing industries produced for the white high income market. In the 1970s, the underlying economic model entered into crisis and, within the ruling bloc, the power shifted increasingly to the big capital groups (O'Meara 1983). The apartheid regime was not only supported by local business, but also by foreign companies. As Arnold (2006: 337-343) shows, South Africa provided profitable investment opportunities to transnational capital.

Arnold (2006: 332-333) depicts three periods, which he defines primarily according to political criteria. The first period (1948–1961) he calls grand or classical apartheid. During this period every sphere of life became subject to apartheid. At the same time, however, conflicts and problems were exacerbated. This became clear with the Sharpeville massacre (1960), in which 69 Africans were killed and another 128 were wounded, because they demonstrated against the introduction of a new pass system (Arnold 2006: 50). During this period South Africa's international reputation worsened and as a result it left the Commonwealth in 1961. In the second period (1961–1976) South Africa became more isolated on a global level, which was also due to the decolonisation of the African continent and the diplomatic efforts of the South African liberation organisations. At the same time, apartheid became increasingly more brutal. Repression and violence were more often used as policy instruments. On 16 June 1976 some 15,000 school children protested in Soweto against the introduction of Afrikaans as compulsory language of education. Once again the police reacted with brute force and opened fire (Arnold 2006: 593-596). This event is a hallmark and a turning point in South Africa's history. In the third period apartheid governments were holding on to their power while facing a steady erosion of their political power. In a way, Arnold's periodisation is closely linked to different phases of resistance. The African National Congress (ANC), the oldest liberation movement, was founded as early as 1912, mainly by black intellectuals. It was revitalised in the late 1940s by the leaders of its youth league. The 1950s witnessed strong mass resistance campaigns by the Congress movement, centered around the ANC. With the banning of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the early 1960s, the libera-

tion movements were forced underground and started to develop first guerrilla activities. However, they suffered very severely from repression in the 1960s. It was in the 1970s that resistance forces re-emerged in renewed force (cf. Lodge 1983; Meli 1989).

Most scholars familiar with South Africa are aware of the fact that apartheid geopolitics stretched far beyond the South African territorial borders. On the international stage South Africa profiled itself not only as an important minerals supplier but also as an anti-communist stronghold on the African continent (Arnold 2006: 336). Notwithstanding the fact that some neighbouring countries gained independence during the 1960s, the Southern African region formed an effective buffer against independent Africa well into the 1970s. The small independent states of Botswana (1966), Lesotho (1966) and Swaziland (1968) did not pose a threat to South Africa. This situation changed dramatically in 1975 with the independence of Angola and Mozambique, two former Portuguese colonies and in 1980 with the independence of Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia). In the wake of these decolonisation and independence struggles the apartheid regime actively intervened in the domestic politics of neighbouring countries. This resulted not only in weak political systems within these countries, but also caused violent conflicts and wars.

2. From crisis of apartheid to negotiated transition

In the 1970s, apartheid South Africa entered a deep economic, social and political crisis, in the words of Saul and Gelb (1981) an "organic crisis". "Racial fordism" (Gelb 1991: 2), which had been based on mineral exports and import substitution industrialisation geared towards the white high income domestic market, reached its limits. The racially segregated labour market stunted productivity growth and domestic demand. Export earnings did not keep pace with soaring imports. Thus, the accumulation model encountered both domestic and external constraints. The regime reacted to these constraints by even further accentuating the role of the mining industry, facilitating financialisation and relaxing the labour market constraints for an upper stratum of the black population (Gelb 1991: 25ff). Within the dominant bloc and the ruling NP, the balance of forces shifted

in favour of Afrikaner business, which forged a closer alliance with other capital factions, while the white petty bourgeoisie and workers were increasingly sidelined (O'Meara 1983: 253ff).

Resistance to apartheid re-emerged with renewed force in the 1970s. The 1973/74 strike wave marked the beginning of the re-emergence of a militant trade union movement that culminated in the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985 as a large non-racial trade union federation with close links to other anti-apartheid forces. Many students who had been involved in the Soweto uprising in 1976 had often initially been inspired by ideas of Black Consciousness, later joined the ANC or organisations politically close to the Congress movement. The ANC proved to be able to integrate a new generation of activists into its organisation and to strengthen its underground structures in South Africa. Its military activities remained primarily confined to 'armed propaganda'. Intensifying material hardships led to the setting up of a myriad of township organisations. In August 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed as an umbrella body of anti-apartheid forces. Politically, its national leadership was dominated by veteran ANC activists. In terms of social class, the national and regional UDF leadership was mainly drawn from "radical, middle class intellectuals and professionals" (Marais 1998: 52). The UDF resembled the idea of a broad popular front bringing together a broad range of anti-apartheid forces which had already been formulated by the ANC in the late 1970s. Mass mobilisation by a myriad of (often local) organisations proved to be essential to weakening the apartheid regime. Locally, resistance activities could at times assume an insurrectionary character. Township administrations were partially paralysed. In addition to these internal activities of the resistance movements, the ANC orchestrated an international boycott campaign against South Africa which scored some important successes.

The regime responded to strengthening resistance by enhanced and more systematic repression on one hand and by attempts to co-opt parts of the black middle strata on the other. It created a National Security Management System as a parallel state structure. This highly militarised arm of the state aimed both at stifling resistance by harsh repression and by defusing socio-economic hotspots. In spite of the increasing level of repression, these counterinsurgency policies proved to be unsuccessful. The attempts

to co-opt sections of the black middle class were severely constrained by the regime's unwillingness to contemplate full voting rights for the black majority.

South African resistance was encouraged by developments in the neighbouring countries. Mozambican independence and the victory of the Mozambican liberation movement Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) was greeted by 'Viva Frelimo' rallies in South Africa's townships. The way to Mozambican and Angolan independence had been paved by the revolution on April 25th, 1974 in Portugal. Putting an end to the Portuguese colonial wars was one of the main motives that made left-wing officers move against the Caetano regime. In both Angola and Mozambique, the governments proclaimed that they intended to move in the direction of socialism. In both countries, key industries were nationalised – often in response to the hasty retreat of the Portuguese settlers. The Mozambican government launched a programme to found *aldeias comunais* (communal villages) that were to transform the countryside and which challenged existing rural power relations. While this radical transformation was relatively successful in some parts of the country (e.g. in the South), the challenge to the so-called traditional authorities was more badly received in other regions (Sumich 2008: 330). These conflicts in parts of the countryside opened a space for military destabilisation by military forces that were nurtured by colonial Rhodesia and later by South Africa. In Angola the government neglected the rural areas almost completely. In both countries, attempts to restructure economic relations and structures encountered many obstacles and had only a limited early success, while vigorous initiatives in education and health brought enormous improvements. Both governments rendered substantial support to liberation movements in the region (cf. Becker 1988, 2009). Mozambican support permitted ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) to significantly step up its rural guerrilla campaign in Rhodesia. Strong military resistance and severe economic crisis made the Rhodesian settler regime finally agree to a negotiated settlement. In 1980, Zimbabwe became independent. Its socio-economic transformation policies and support for the South African liberation movements was more cautious than in Angola and Mozambique.

After Zimbabwean independence, the independent states of the region formed the South African Development Co-ordination Confer-

ence (SADCC) as a regional institution which helps to reduce the inherited economic dependence on South Africa (Schwank 2006). SADCC was consciously conceived not as a liberal trade integration group, but as an organisation that should facilitate sectoral cooperation. "Production is the first goal. And reliable transport links precede lower tariffs", Seretse Khama (1981: VII), the then president of Botswana, pointed out. Indeed, establishing respective rehabilitating regional infrastructure that would bypass South Africa was the key component of SADCC. However, efforts to increase independence from South Africa depended heavily on external funding (Mkandawire 1985).

The apartheid regime responded to the changing regional balance of power by devising systematic destabilisation policies against its neighbours (cf. Davies/O'Meara 1985; Hanlon 1986; Johnson/Martin 1986; Becker 1988; Minter 1994). Destabilisation was particularly directed against the governments of Mozambique and Angola which were perceived by the securocrats in Pretoria as the most serious regional challenge. The destabilisation policies encompassed both military destabilisation – ranging from direct military intervention (primarily in Angola) to the support of armed groups (mainly Unita which had pretended to be an anti-colonial movement, but had covertly cooperated with the Portuguese colonial power in Angola (Sotto-Maior 1985) and Renamo in Mozambique which had been originally created by the Rhodesian secret service for destabilising Mozambique) – and applying economic pressure. West European countries, particularly the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, complemented these South African policies through their own set of destabilisation policies, which were particularly directed against Angola and Mozambique (cf. Becker 1988: 45ff; Minter 1994: 142ff).

These destabilisation policies resulted in massive destruction, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. The governments of these two countries abandoned their attempts at socialist transformation in the mid-1980s. The external pressures were an essential cause for bringing about this change of socio-economic direction. However, they were not the only factor at play. Within the governing parties Frelimo and MPLA, particularly in Angola, there existed currents that favoured rather an emphasis on building a domestic bourgeoisie and which increasingly prevailed (cf. Hanlon 1984: 195ff, 263ff; Abrahamsson/Nilsson 1995: 191; Pestana 2005).

Under the extreme South African pressure, the Frelimo government consented in the 1984 Nkomati agreement to severely curtail the support for the ANC. The MPLA government in Angola, which could rely on high revenue from oil exports and enjoyed military support from Cuba since the South African military intervention in 1975, preserved a more substantial room for manoeuvre in its external policies. Its support for the ANC and the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) remained quite substantial. In 1988, South African troops suffered a decisive defeat against joint Angolan/Cuban troops in Southern Angola. This defeat opened the way for a negotiated settlement for Namibia, which had been under South African rule since World War I. Namibia's negotiated transition to independence in 1990 was in a way a trial run for South Africa itself.

3. Negotiated transition – triple transition

The South African regime finally acknowledged in the late 1980s that a political stalemate had been reached. For the major South African capital groups, the main aim was to preserve capitalism, not its racist features. With the weakening of the Soviet Union and the implosion of state socialism, they rated their chances much higher than before to keep the transition to democracy within the confines of a capitalist socio-economic order. And the hand of big business had been strengthened in NP. The ANC and the mass democratic movement had to realise that they lacked the force to take power outright. It was in this context that the way towards a negotiated settlement was eventually paved (cf. Marais 1998: 67ff). Its first essential step was the unbanning of the ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) as well as the release of prominent political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, in 1990. Negotiations took place in an international constellation that was unfavourable to the ANC, given the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the weakening of the non-aligned countries. And these negotiations were far from smooth. The regime continued to fan violence in order to weaken its adversaries. It was with good reason that Jo-Anne Collinge (1992: 1) stated that the negotiations for a new South Africa were "launched on a bloody tide". Arnold

(2006: 782) refers to over 7,000 deaths from violence in townships between 1990 and the first half of 1992.

According to Von Holdt/Webster (2005: 4) the end of apartheid can be regarded as a triple transition. First, there is the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This did not only include the political empowerment of all citizens but also guaranteed democratic and social rights to trade unions and workers. The NP, however, achieved succeeding in ensuring, during the negotiations, that a Government of National Unity representing all forces which won more than five per cent of the votes would be installed until 1999. Thus, the transitional phase and the formalised influence of the NP on government policies were prolonged for another five years (cf. Marais 1998: 90ff). State structures in the rural areas were one of the most contested issues of state reform and democratisation. Particularly during the final phase of apartheid, the position of so-called traditional leaders, who often collaborated with the apartheid regime, had been challenged by the militant youth. Conflicts were particularly fierce in KwaZulu. At the beginning of transition, the ANC tended to favour full democratic governance at the local level, including rural areas where the apartheid regime had bestowed considerable powers on so-called traditional authorities. However, the ANC afterwards increasingly tried to co-opt traditional leaders and by increasing their powers. As early as the late 1990s, "the government was backtracking on its previous commitments to democratic local government in favour of what it described as 'cooperative governance'" (Southall 2013: 200). The latter ceded substantial local powers to traditional authorities,which meant marginalising women. One of the most controversial issues has been the issue of allocating land rights. This increasing role of traditional authorities did not go uncontested. Mainly gender and land activists protested strongly. In the field of industrial relations, cooperative governance had different implications. The newly elected ANC-led government acted cautiously in order to build a non-adversarial industrial relations climate. As a result, labour policy became based on the principles of consensus and cooperative governance (e.g. Bhorat et al. 2002). Secondly, the economic transition aimed at reorientation. As shown in previous sections, the apartheid growth model was inward oriented and in a state of crisis. At the same time, the new government faced some direct macroeconomic challenges. As discussed by Gelb

(2005) it saw itself confronted with an immense budget deficit. Thirdly, social transition occurred, i.e. social inclusion and exclusion became deracialised and instead organised according to democratic principles. The contribution of Peberdy in this issue shows how inclusion and exclusion has changed with respect to (im)migration. It should, however, be noted that the general political constellation was rather unfavourable to the more radical forces of the liberation movement. This had an obvious impact on the result of the negotiation process and the eventual policy option open for post-apartheid South Africa.

Although the ANC was able to achieve a non-racial democracy, economic issues were left largely outside the political settlement, whose main elements were negotiated over three years up to the end of 1993. During this prolonged transitional phase, both international financial organisations and domestic capital strived to entrench basic features of neo-liberal policies (cf. Marais 1998: 146ff; Bond 2000: 171ff). The more progressive visions for economic policies, such as those of the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG 1993), which advocated democratisation of economic policies, redistribution, and selective industrial policies, came to be increasingly sidelined within the ANC. This shift became obvious when in 1996 the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy replaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Whereas both programmes were based on a mainstream economic policy, the RDP also envisioned an important redistributive and welfare role for the government. The political adversaries of even a mild version of Keynesianism invoked the relatively high level of inherited public debt as an impediment to the RDP and won the day. As a result the GEAR strategy focused more on macroeconomic stability, i.e. debt reduction, liberalisation and low inflation, and reduced the government's redistributive capacities (Seekings/Nattrass 2006: 347-349).

This confinement of the official negotiations to political and juridical-institutional issues implied that the basic traits of inherited economic and social structures have remained in place. The economic model has remained highly reliant on mineral exports and finance. It has proved to be highly vulnerable to the present global crisis (Ashman et al. 2010). Socio-economic continuities are well described with respect to inequality by Leibbrandt et al. (2001b, 2012) as well as by Seekings/Nattrass (2006: 340-341). Whereas

during the post-apartheid period inequality between different racial groups was reduced (but remained amongst the highest in the world), inequality within these groups increased. The same authors stress the importance of employment, i.e. wage income, to overcome poverty and reduce inequality. At the same time, notwithstanding a complex restructuring process of work and workplaces since 1994, Von Holdt and Webster (2005) show that elements of inherited apartheid structures continue to exist (informally) in workplaces and that great numbers of households are excluded from labour market participation. They even go so far as to describe this situation as "generating a crisis of social reproduction" (Von Holdt/Webster 2005: 32) as it became increasingly more difficult for many households to make a living. Seekings/Nattrass (2006: 346-356) argue that structural inequality, created and inherited from the 1970s onward, cannot be tackled by the government's current economic policy. This policy of deracialisation only benefited a relatively small share of South Africans. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) promoted a black economic elite and middle class. Changes in labour market legislation, public education and the social welfare system (e.g. a very strong increase of transfer payments; cf. Leubolt 2013: 377 ff) have not fundamentally modified the social structures responsible for inequality, though they have brought partial improvements. In a similar vein Delgado/Lühl (in this issue) discuss the persistence of structural inequality with respect to housing in Namibia. Though persistent high inequality and external economic vulnerability have given rise to pressures to adopt a more developmentalist strategy giving more emphasis to industrial development and redistribution, and while social protests have been strong, the ANC government has not substantially modified its development strategy (Marais 2011: 346ff, 394ff, 434ff).

4. Transition in Southern Africa

In Namibia, the potential space for progressive socio-economic changes was much more limited than in South Africa. The mineral sector, which is controlled by foreign capital, is even more economically dominant than in South Africa. Commercial agriculture faces adverse agro-ecological conditions. The arid climate that prevails in the areas of (mainly white) commer-

cial agriculture poses an extra challenge to any land reform initiative. Although the extremely unequal colonial distribution of land had been one of the main socio-economic grievances during the anti-colonial struggle, land reform has been quite limited (Kaapama 2007). Outside the TNC-controlled mineral sector, the white settler bourgeoisie is still economically predominant. The emerging black (petty) bourgeoisie is still limited in scope and highly dependent on the Swapo-led state (Melber 2007). Apart from democratisation, the expansion of social services has been the major achievement of the post-independence period. The economic structure has hardly been changed. It is an indication of the limitations of the economic model that a lot of money has been channelled to real estate. This has resulted in hefty price increases for real estate and a deepening of the housing crisis, as Guillermo Delgado and Phillip Lühl point out in their article on financialisation in Namibia.

In the early 1990s, Zimbabwe's policies of 'reconciliation' and limited reform were often presented as a possible model for South Africa and Namibia. While redressing the extremely skewed colonial distribution of land had been a central issue of 'chimurenga', the rural-based liberation war, the ZANU-PF government proceeded very cautiously on the issue. Although there was some redistribution of land due to strong popular pressures in the early 1980s, the government tried to accommodate white settler agriculture in the new order and to deflect these pressures (cf. Moyo 1986). Changes in the urban areas were more limited. While workers' rights were extended, ZANU-PF, which had lacked any serious links to trade unions before 1980, tried to control the trade union movement (cf. Sachikonye 1986). Black businessmen who usually were linked to the governing party gradually built up their economic base. The economy continued to rest on raw material exports and a rather diversified inward-looking industrial sector. The balance of payments continued to be a constraint on development. During the 1980s, the government dealt with recurrent external debt problems with creatively designed heterodox policies (Becker 1988: 279ff). However, regulatory controls which had been central to the 1980s economic policies were slowly eroded. The 1991 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) dismantled key controls and liberalised foreign trade and foreign exchange dealings. Aggravated by drought, ESAP decisively destabilised the economic model and the manufacturing sector began to

shrink. At the same time, ESAP led to severe cuts in social spending and an accelerated switch to neo-liberal concepts in social policy, which induced higher levels of poverty (Bond/Manyanya 2003: 35; Bond 2007: 216f; Hendricks 2007: 132ff). During the 1990s trade unions became increasingly autonomous again and started to spearhead a more broadly based urban protest movement (Bond/Manyanya 2003: 74ff). And the ruling ZANU/PF faced a serious political challenge from the war veterans who took up the land issue again (Sandomba 2011: chap. 5). The two protest movements, with their very distinct social and historical roots, did not find the road to co-operation. On the contrary, they even turned (or were turned) into adversaries. Being faced with the rapid erosion of its urban base, ZANU-PF tried to shore up at least its rural base and took up the issue of land reform. As part of its strategy to retain its rural stronghold, the ZANU-PF government consciously co-opted chiefs, whereas it had promoted elected local structures in the 1980s (cf. Southall 2013: 196f). In addition, it stepped up its rhetoric of the indigenisation of business (Andreasson 2010: 135). Instead of forging an alliance with the war veterans, the trade unionists joined hands with some manufacturing interests and white famers in forming the very heterogeneous Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Bond/Manyanya 2003: 91ff). Similar to ZAPU – ZANU-PF's rival and temporary ally during the independence struggle in the 1980s – MDC faced massive repression from the ZANU-PF government.

Extremely rapid land redistribution and heightened social conflict produced massive economic dislocation and hyperinflation. Mass emigration to South Africa (see Peberdy in this issue) ensued. Because of the breaches of property rights and the moves against white farmers and the urban opposition, Western governments imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe. While COSATU took sides with its repressed Zimbabwean colleagues, the South African government tried to broker a deal between the contending political forces. In 2008, a tense coalition government was formed between ZANU-PF and MDC. Harassment of MDC activists and sympathizers has, however, continued.

The coalition government was finally able to end hyperinflation – by abolishing the Zimbabwe dollar. A certain economic recovery has begun. The manufacturing sector has suffered severely from the policies and turmoil of the last two decades. Field research shows, however, that despite

the adverse economic circumstances and quite limited infrastructural support, a very significant share of beneficiaries of the land reform has been able to expand their production and make some investments (e.g. Scoones et al. 2010; Matondi 2012; Hanlon et al. 2013). In the biggest African land reform, 6,000 white farms have been replaced by 245,000 black farmers (Hanlon et al. 2013: 209). "So there has been a huge increase in the number of people working on the land, but two issues remain outstanding: tens of thousands of people have lost jobs, and the working conditions and wages of farmworkers appear to have deteriorated", conclude Hanlon et al. (2013: 194). From the redistribution of land, women have profited much less than men, partly due to the hasty implementation of the land reform and partly due to subtle forms of bureaucratic discrimination (Matondi 2012: 186ff). Matondi (2012) underlines that the "control of land by men has not been widened just by access, but also through the importation of customary systems."

Mozambique and Angola had initiated the most radical transformative attempts in the 1970s and had suffered most from military destabilisation by apartheid South Africa. The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo), which had been founded as an armed group by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation and later adopted by the South African regime, had to agree to disarmament and integration into the Mozambican political order as a political party during the transition phase in South Africa. In 1992, multiparty democracy was introduced in Mozambique. Frelimo was transformed from a mass-based state party into an increasingly electorally oriented formation which has won all subsequent elections. For Renamo, which originated as an armed group initiated by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation, the transformation into a political party proved to be cumbersome (Hanlon/Smart 2008: chap. 9). It has continued to threaten with the resort to violence. Beyond that, it attracted mainly rural voters by propagating regional and ethnic peculiarities and by propagating the restoration of so-called 'traditional', i.e. patriarchal practices (Saul 2005: 77f; Buur/Kyed 2005; Florêncio 2008: 381ff). Whereas women's representation at the national level has continued to be considerable, rural developments have been rather politically detrimental. Saul (2005: 104) argues that Frelimo is less responsive to the demands of peasants and workers than was the case in the phase of socialist orienta-

tion. Granjo (2010: 182) quotes a widely shared perception of democracy among the Mozambican urban poor: "In democracy, you say what you think, but nobody pays attention to what you are saying." The widening social gulf, precarious living conditions and the lack of attention for the poor produced large-scale rioting in Maputo in 2008 and 2010. However, Frelimo proved to be responsive to inputs by peasant organisations to a country-wide consultation on the new land law, which was passed in 1997 (Palmer 2003: 10ff).

In Angola, the war proved to last longer. Though multiparty elections were held as part of the Bicesse accord in 1992 in Angola, Unita resorted to renewed violence after its electoral defeat and only conceded military defeat after its leader, Jonas Savimbi, had been killed during a military operation in 2002. Because Unita had persisted so long in continuing the war, its image has been permanently tarnished. The party has shown weak results in subsequent multiparty elections. Like Frelimo, the governing MPLA has increasingly transformed into an electoral formation. Power inside the MPLA has, since the late 1970s, been increasingly centralised in the hands of the party and state president, José Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in office since 1979. The marginalisation of the party left went hand in hand with this process (Hodges 2001: 47ff). MPLA was much more heavy-handed in dealing with internal conflicts than Frelimo, even during the liberation war. A repressive tendency in dealing with political and social conflicts has persisted until today. The MPLA has historically been weaker in the countryside than Frelimo. Its historical stronghold has been the capital, Luanda. Due to an increasing social polarisation, its support base in the shanty towns of Luanda has been eroded (Conchiglia 2012: 44). Large urban development projects have produced conflicts over urban land. Ahead of the 2012 elections, left wing intellectuals, urban middle strata and popular musicians expressed a strong social critique of the MPLA's policies (cf. Vicky 2012: 13).

In both Angola and Mozambique, transition towards "wild capitalism" (Mosca 2005: 465) commenced due to massive external pressures and to internal changing balances of forces in the 1980s. The IMF has heavily conditioned Mozambique's way back into peripheral capitalism (cf. Hanlon 1996). Due to high oil revenues, the MPLA government enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy than Frelimo in Mozambique. Nevertheless, the results

of transformation have not been too dissimilar. In both cases, privatisation became a key element of economic policies. In Mozambique, the largest and most promising firms went mainly to external capital. The emerging local bourgeoisie, which had strong links to Frelimo, had to content itself usually with small and medium-scale enterprises (Hanlon/Smart 2008: 106ff). Under conditions of war, a very opaque process of privatisation and utilisation of oil revenue took place (Hodges 2001: chap. 5, 6). In both countries, an "alliance of foreign capital with (re-)emerging entrepreneurial classes" as Mosca (2005: 465) characterises it for Mozambique, emerged. However, this alliance has not been without conflicts. The core of the emerging domestic bourgeoisie is intimately linked to the ruling party and the state, as Pestana (2005: 201) points out. In Mozambique, the emerging local bourgeoisie was partly rentier in character, while the other part tried to build up productive capacities. Both fractions were represented in Frelimo and respectively coalesced into partisans of a 'predatory state' and a 'developmental state'. In the early 2000s, power shifted somewhat away from the 'predatory' fraction (Hanlon/Smart 2008: 106ff).

The Angolan economy is highly dependent on the oil sector. Oil revenue has permitted a flourishing real estate business (particularly in Luanda) and a reconstruction of the infrastructure that was devastated during the war in Angola. High foreign exchange revenue likewise permitted the emergence of flourishing import business, while recovery of productive sectors remains slow. Nevertheless, the government belatedly took some measures to protect local industries (Salomão 2008: 44ff). In Mozambique, the government has promoted some large-scale projects. The focus on big projects has some parallels with some elements of the socialist construction efforts of the late 1970s, though the socio-political context has changed. In a way, central features of the colonial economic structure – raw material exports and servicing the South African economy – have not been really overcome during the brief socialist phase and have indeed re-emerged with renewed force over the last two decades in Mozambique (cf. Mosca 2005: 451ff). However, the Mozambican government has tried to protect at least some inward-looking industries. Social inequality is high in both societies, particularly in oil-rich Angola (cf. Pestana 2005: 201; Hanlon/Smart 2008: chap. 7).

Since the early 1990s, building a local black bourgeoisie has increasingly become a priority of former liberation movements in power, particu-

larly so in the two former settler economies of Zimbabwe and South Africa. In South Africa, this has been accompanied by strong initiatives in the field of social policies. The ANC government has made substantial strides in service provision (though often with a neo-liberal policy design) and has very significantly expanded transfer payments to the poor. In Zimbabwe, expansion of social services was limited to the first decade after independence. A massive decline in living standards and the emergence of strong social movements as well as a serious political opposition party made the ZANU/PF governments undertake a very radical land reform in order to shore up its rural support base. Generally, a retreat of the governing liberation movements from transformative approaches can be observed. This trend can be attributed both to the unfavourable international balance of forces as well as to tendencies of embourgeoisement within the liberation movements in power.

5. Asymmetrical regional relations

The ANC has pursued a rather outward looking economic strategy based on the liberalisation of trade and capital movements. Driven by the agro-export interests, South Africa initially joined the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the run-up to the Cancun Conference in 2003, South Africa joined a newly emerging group in the WTO, which counted Brazil, China and India among its members. Contrary to the Cairns Group, with its focus on trade liberalisation and the phasing out of subsidies, the new G20 argued in favour of a differential treatment of so-called developing countries (Wellmer 2007: 229f). Thus, the change of grouping in the WTO signalled a change in the international negotiation strategy. With the more assertive stance of the new emerging powers and peripheral states in the WTO, WTO negotiations have reached a standstill since 2008. Beyond the WTO, South Africa formed a South-South trade coalition with Brazil and India (IBSA) from which bilateral trade agreements have emerged (cf. Dupas 2006: 356ff). In 2011, South Africa joined the BRICS group. During its 5th summit in Durban in Spring 2013, the BRICS countries had the creation of a joint development bank on the agenda. Thus, the forms of

South-South co-operation among these emerging powers have evolved in spite of the socio-economic and socio-political differentiations in the group (Abdelkrim-Delanne 2013: 68). The ANC government is actively reacting to the power shift from core capitalist countries to emerging semi-peripheral powers, a shift which has accelerated with the present crisis.

More generally, a certain change of emphasis can be observed in the realm of bilateral trade negotiations, where relations with core economies had a high priority in the 1990s, whereas South-South relations have received increased attention in recent years. In the 1990s, it was a top priority of the ANC to negotiate a trade agreement with the EU, which accounted for 31.8% of South Africa's exports from 1998 to 2003 (Wellmer 2007: 211). Initially, the South African government tried to join the ACP group and join the Lomé agreement. However, the European Commission blocked this attempt in 1995. Subsequently, the EU and South Africa negotiated a reciprocal trade agreement, which was signed in 1999. This agreement posed some limited constraints on South Africa's policy space, had direct negative implications for South Africa's partners in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and had at least indirect negative consequences for SADC (cf. Wellmer 2007: 211ff; Nölke/Claar 2012: 86f).

In its attempts to orient Southern African countries as exclusively as possible to the EU and confine them to a role of commodity exporters, the EU has taken a particularly obstructive course towards Southern African regional integration (Lee 2009; Qobo 2012). In particular, the EU did not want that the SADC, as the most political regional grouping, lead the negotiation process (Lee 2009: 94). The EU carved out its own concept of regional negotiation patterns for the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements, a concept that does not fit with the existing regional structures. While the EPAs, with their extremely far-reaching liberalisation agenda, have been met with strong reservations by the ACP countries, the EU has tried to at least coerce the most vulnerable negotiation partners into interim agreements. In Southern Africa, some countries bowed to EU pressures while others remain steadfast (Qobo 2012: 258). Thus, the EU has deepened already existing tensions within the SADC.

6. Limits to liberation

In his recent comparative study on South African, Namibian and Zimbabwean liberation movements in power, Roger Southall (2013: 331) concludes: "Notwithstanding the liberation movements' capture of state power and their commitment to transformation, the transitional arrangements with the global shift to neo-liberalism to induce them to implement economic strategies which, whilst facilitative of economic growth, placed severe limitations upon the ability of governments to overcome the structural inequalities of the past and planted the seeds of subsequent social and political crisis." In South Africa, the mineral-energy complex and the finance sector have continued to be lead sectors of the economic model. Within the confines of the growth model, with its strong continuities with the past, labour rights have been strengthened and social policies, particularly transfer payments, have been expanded. Black Economic Empowerment, rather than transforming the economic and class structures, has become the priority of the successive ANC governments. The basic traits of Swapo's policies in Namibia, where the policy options have been even more structurally circumscribed, have been similar. The main achievements of the ANC and Swapo can be found in political democratisation and in establishing liberal democratic constitutions. The continuing extreme inequalities have created enormous social tensions in South Africa and Zimbabwe, less visible ones in Namibia. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF government suffered from a severe loss of legitimacy in the 1990 due to structural adjustment policies and the ensuing economic and social crisis. A strong, but socially very heterogeneous, oppositional movement emerged, particularly in the urban centres. ZANU-PF responded by fierce repression on the one hand, and by implementing a radical land reform in order to shore up its rural base on the other hand.

Destabilisation policies of the South African apartheid regime caused havoc in the region, particularly in Mozambique and Angola. In both countries, South African policies in the late 1970s and 1980s aimed at destroying alternative socio-economic models. Destabilisation policies, combined with the pressures of Western governments and international financial organisations, achieved this aim. However, the abandoning of socialist orientation cannot be attributed to external pressures alone. These pressures inter-

acted with currents in the liberation movements which wanted to create a domestic bourgeoisie rather than advancing socialist transformation.

A highly asymmetrical relationship between South Africa and the other states of the region has been one of the difficult inheritances of the colonial and apartheid past. It has proved to be a key challenge to post-apartheid regional integration and cooperation initiatives.

7. The structure of the issue

The issue explores how the legacy of apartheid has affected the wider Southern African region, and particularly the relationship between South Africa and its neighbours. Chris Saunders and Dawn Nagar explore this relationship between South Africa and SADC countries in their article in this issue. They highlight the colonially inherited asymmetries in the relations between South Africa and the other SADC countries. They analyse the different actors that shape South Africa's regional integration policies and highlight the prominent role of the South African private sector, particularly multinational corporations, in defining South Africa's 'new regionalism'. They argue that South Africa is likely to derive disproportionate benefits from the formation of a Free Trade Area, which was initiated in 1996, but took 12 years to materialise. Thus, the more liberal approach to regional integration which has guided policies for the last two decades rather accentuates the already existing regionally uneven patterns of development. This has obviously had a negative impact on the cohesion of the regional grouping.

Guillermo Delgado and Phillip Lühl highlight key features of the Namibian growth model. They focus on a key element of the Namibian growth model which has so far been neglected in most analyses of the Namibian economy: financialisation. They analyse how financialisation has contributed to weakening the rather modest productive base and to reproduce and cement patterns of inequalities in housing. They do not confine themselves to a critique of neo-liberal housing policies, but provide some indications as to what might be possible alternatives.

Whereas Delgado and Lühl deal with micro-spatial inequalities, Sally Peberdy's analysis of the continuities and discontinuities of South Africa's

migration policies has macro-regional unequal development as its background. She puts migration patterns and South African migration policies into the context of the changing political economy of Southern Africa and relates them to the constellation of political forces. Immigration into South Africa has turned into a highly contested issue in post-apartheid South Africa and xenophobia has taken a very violent turn. She explores the puzzling question as to why bouts of xenophobic attacks have shaken post-apartheid South Africa. The three studies shed light on the difficulties of transforming inherited structures which bear the imprint of enormous inequalities and of many decades of institutionalised racism and violence.

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Abstracts

The end of the apartheid regime has had highly significant implications not only for South Africa, but for the wider Southern African region. As part of thes colonial heritage, the neighbouring states are closely and asymmetrically linked to the South African economy. The apartheid regime had pursued aggressive policies of destabilisation against its neighbours, particularly against Mozambique and Angola, in order to cut the South African and Namibian liberation movements off from external support and in order to destroy alternative development models, particularly left-wing ones. The difficult heritage of the apartheid era, of asymmetrical regional

relations and past destabilisation policies on the one hand, and the end of state socialism and the global shift toward neo-liberalism on the other, have been conditioning factors for post-apartheid transformations. This introductory article gives an overview on political, economic and social transformations, their structural constraints and main political and social actors.

Das Ende des Apartheidregimes hat enorme Implikation nicht nur für Südafrika selbst, sondern auch für das gesamte Südliche Afrika. Als Teil des kolonialen Erbes, sind die Nachbarstaaten eng und auf asymmetrische Weise mit der südafrikanischen Wirtschaft verbunden. Das Apartheidregime hatte eine aggressive Destabilisierungspolitik gegenüber den Nachbarstaaten verfolgt, um die Befreiungsbewegungen Südafrikas und Namibia von externer Unterstützung abzuschneiden und alternative Entwicklungsmodelle, vor allem linksorientierten Charakters, zu zerstören. Das schwere Erbe der Apartheidära, der asymmetrischen regionalen Beziehungen und der früheren Destabilisierungspolitik einerseits und des Endes des Staatssozialismus und der immer stärkeren Durchsetzung des Neoliberalismus auf globaler Ebene andererseits haben die Transformationspolitiken der Post-Apartheidära erheblich konditioniert. Der Einleitungsbeitrag gibt einen Überblick über die politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Transformation, ihre strukturellen Grenzen sowie die wichtigsten politischen und gesellschaftlichen Akteure.

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Journal für Entwicklungspolitik XXIX 4-2013, S. 30-45

Chris Saunders, Dawn Nagar

South Africa and the Southern African Development Community

As of 2014 it will be 20 years since South Africa became a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is appropriate, then, to reflect on the nature of the relationship between the country that dominates SADC and the regional organisation: what explains the nature of that relationship and how has it evolved over time? What role has SADC played in South Africa's foreign policy since 1994, and how has South Africa's membership shaped the regional organisation? In attempting to answer such questions, this article will first consider political aspects, then economic ones. It begins with some history, for it is only possible to understand the relationship between South Africa and SADC post-1994 by relating it to aspects of earlier history.

When the Union of South Africa was founded in 1910, bringing together four British colonies, its rulers, men of European descent, envisaged that in time neighbouring countries would be incorporated into a much larger, white-ruled South Africa. In the same year as the Union came into being, a Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was created that included, besides South Africa, which has always dominated SACU, three African territories then ruled by Britain, these being today Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Because of South Africa's racial policies, these territories were never incorporated into South Africa. Neither was neighbouring Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), because the white settlers there did not want to become part of a South Africa dominated by Afrikaner nationalists. And although the former German territory of South West Africa (now Namibia) was ruled by South Africa for 75 years, it never became part of South Africa. When it was eventually freed from South African rule in 1990 it joined

SACU, which was by then the oldest customs union in the world. Instead of white South Africa incorporating other territories in the region, it was a South Africa that had just moved from apartheid to majority rule that, in 1994, joined an already existing regional institution, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1994 (Schoeman 2001; Oosthuizen 2006).

SADC was only two years old when South Africa joined it, having come into existence in August 1992 at a conference held in Windhoek, Namibia, of what until then was known as the Southern African Development Co-Coordinating Conference (SADCC). SADCC had been born in April 1980 as the successor to the Front-Line States (FLS), an informal organisation of the leaders of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, countries that worked together from the mid 1970s to decrease their economic and other dependence on white, minority-ruled South Africa (Khadiagala 1994). South Africa was the only country in the region with an industrial economy, but its race-based policy of apartheid was anathema to the leaders of the newly independent neighbouring countries. When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, it joined the FLS, and the grouping was formalised as SADCC. By then apartheid South Africa had embarked on a policy of destabilising its neighbours, to prevent them organising against it, and, in particular, to try to ensure that they did not allow guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC), which was engaged in an armed struggle against the apartheid regime, to move into South Africa. In the 1980s South Africa's war against its neighbours intensified, and involved major raids by the South African Defence Force into southern Angola. With the winding down of the Cold War in the late 1980s, however, an agreement was reached to end the devastating conflict in southern Angola, and in 1990 President R.W. de Klerk of South Africa conceded to the pressures mounting on his country and announced the abandonment of apartheid and his willingness to negotiate with the ANC and others. A negotiated settlement was reached in November 1993, enabling the first democratic election to take place in South Africa in April 1994. That in turn made it possible for South Africa to become a member of SADC in August of that year at the annual meeting of heads of state held in Gaborone, Botswana.

1. SADC and South Africa: the early years

South Africa joined an organisation of governments of territories of vastly different geographies and economies, ranging from the large territory of Namibia, with a small population, owing to the fact that much of it is semi-desert, to tiny Lesotho, entirely surrounded by South Africa. SADC included countries that were not near neighbours of South Africa, such as Tanzania and Malawi, and in 1997 was enlarged further when the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became a member. Although most of those who lived in the SADC countries spoke one or other Bantu languages, their very different colonial experiences had left their governments operating in different European languages, as two had Portuguese as their official language, while the DRC had French. While movement of people across the region had a long history, and the diamond and later gold mines in South Africa had attracted labour from as far north as what is now Malawi, as well as from Mozambique and from the three British colonies adjacent to South Africa which were led to independence in the 1960s, no common set of values bound the very diverse region together.

South Africa had by far the largest minority populations, which had been attracted there by relatively favourable climatic conditions and then, from the late nineteenth century, by the discovery of vast mineral riches. With its relatively large and diverse economy, and a significant manufacturing sector that had developed on the back of mineral exploitation, South Africa immediately became SADC's most important member. South Africa's iconic transition to democracy, moreover, gave it a role on the world stage out of proportion to its size and economic strength.

Concern at South Africa's economic dominance, along with suspicions of its intentions, limited the role the country might otherwise have played in the region after 1994. The headquarters of the SADC remained in Gaborone, Botswana, and the prior history of South Africa's aggression in the region could not simply be swept under the carpet. The new South African government from 1994 was sensitive to the need not to appear as the regional hegemon, or to play a `big brother' role in SADC, asserting its influence in the region. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who had been active in SADCC/SADC since 1980 and was the leading figure in the organisation at the time South Africa joined it, was not happy to see Presi-

dent Nelson Mandela of South Africa usurping his role. There were then, from the beginning, tensions within SADC between South Africa and the other members, while relations between South Africa and its fellow SADC members differed from country to country (Nathan 2012: passim).

On coming to power in 1994, the new government in South Africa had enormous problems to deal with, including threats from right-wing elements unhappy with the country's abandonment of apartheid, as well as significant socio-economic issues arising from the poverty of much of the population. The new government soon stated that the Southern African region was the most important priority in its foreign policy (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004), but there were those in government who thought that the priorities of the country should lie at home, or that its foreign relations should focus on the country's immediate neighbours, rather than the much larger SADC. On the other hand, the ANC had close ties with most other countries in SADC, many of which had hosted it in exile or supported its struggle in other ways, and those ties encouraged the idea that South Africa should engage with the broad southern African region. South Africa therefore assumed its responsibilities in SADC, hosting a summit meeting for the first time as chair of the regional organisation in 1996 and signing most of the many SADC protocols.

2. Mbeki and SADC

Thabo Mbeki, who was an active Deputy President of South Africa from 1994 and then took over from Mandela as President of the country in 1999, believed that South Africa should be actively involved in the continent as a whole, to promote peace and development and to give content to what he called the African Renaissance. Although this sometimes worked against a focus on South Africa's relations with the southern African region, Mbeki played a major role in working for the inclusion of the DRC, a very large country far from South Africa that would long remain embroiled in conflict, into the SADC in 1997. The following year South African forces, along with some from Botswana, moved into Lesotho to restore stability there, and this intervention was post-facto declared to be on behalf of SADC. When Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent their armies into the

DRC in 1998, this was again said to be a SADC operation, but South Africa would not join them (Nathan 2012: 85-91). At this time there was, within SADC itself, a major struggle over the status of its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, which Mugabe, who did not like the idea that he would play second fiddle to Mandela within SADC, tried to make independent within the organisation under his leadership. It was not until the Windhoek summit of SADC heads of state in 2001 that this issue was resolved, when the Organ was brought under the control of SADC itself (Nathan 2012: chapter 5). From then on, relations between South Africa and the other members of SADC were less conflictual.

In the early years of the new century, South Africa, under Mbeki's leadership, played a vital role in bringing peace to the DRC. Since then South Africa has continued to play an important role as mediator for SADC. South Africa was the main facilitator in the internal conflicts in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Mbeki helped bring about the Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change factions in 2008, and after President Jacob Zuma took over as chief 'facilitator', he sought to get the parties to agree to a new constitution as a prelude to the holding of a free and fair and credible election (Matlosa 2012; Zondi/Bhengu 2011). In the case of Madagascar, after the coup that took place there in 2009, South Africa was only one of a number of SADC countries involved in mediation, but it played a major role in persuading both of the leading figures involved to agree that neither would contest the first post-coup election, originally scheduled to take place in mid-2013. Having experienced its own negotiated settlement, South Africa saw itself as well-placed to work to bring together the parties in conflicts elsewhere, but, in the case of Zimbabwe was unable to get the GPA to work effectively; the election there, when it was held in July 2013, was widely believed to have been rigged to ensure a ZANU-PF victory.

3. SADC in South Africa's foreign policy

South Africa has often put its national interests before those of the region. Its policies towards SADC have often been incoherent, in part

because different parts of its bureaucracy – the Presidency, the Department of Foreign Affairs (the name of which was changed to Department of International Relations and Co-operation – DIRCO – in May 2009), the Treasury and others – interact separately with the regional body. South Africa signed a separate trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union (EU) in 1998, with scant regard for either SADC or SACU. In the more recent negotiations on economic partnership agreements with the EU, South Africa has not always taken SADC interests into account. Since 2008 South Africa has taken the lead in pushing for SADC to join with the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in a tripartite agreement (on which see further below). Although the South Africa head of state meets with the other SADC heads of state at summits, now held at least twice a year, bilateral relations often appear to trump those with the region as a whole. South Africa's relations are closest with those governments formed from parties which fought liberation struggles; besides the ANC, these are the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, and ZANU-PF (Southall 2013). Although the head of state of Botswana, Seretse Ian Khama, voiced opposition to the SADC position on Zimbabwe in 2008 and again in 2013, South Africa took the lead in bringing him into line. The view that SADC is little more than a club to protect the interests of those in power in the countries of the region appeared to be validated when the SADC heads of state agreed in 2010 to disband the tribunal it had set up to adjudicate on disputes in the region, after that tribunal had ruled against the Zimbabwe government. The chief judge of the tribunal was then very critical of South Africa for not using "its power as the SADC's largest state and its 'moral authority' to prevent the tribunal being emasculated" (SAFPI 2013b).

Along with other states in SADC, South Africa has remained opposed to the transfer of national sovereignty to the regional body, presumably from a lack of confidence in the latter and a wish to ensure that national interests remain paramount at all times. Laurie Nathan has argued that South Africa and other countries in SADC have been reluctant to transfer any sovereignty to the regional body in part because their sovereignty, acquired relatively recently, remains so fragile (Nathan 2012: passim). In

many respects, South Africa's involvement in SADC continues to appear half-hearted. It has, for example, done very little to ensure that ordinary citizens play a role in SADC, which in turn makes little attempt to inform the wider public of its activities; its website remains poor and its newsletter has a very limited circulation. However, on the other hand, SADC brings South Africa clear benefits. It was only because Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma was put forward as the SADC candidate, and received the support of all the members of SADC, that South Africa was successful in 2012 in getting her elected chair of the African Union (AU) Commission.

Since 1994 South Africa has sought to play a role on the global stage, and SADC has not been one of its main priorities. SADC remains a weak institution, being heavily dependent on donor funding, much of which comes from the European Union (EU). While the EU, which sees itself as a successful example of regional integration, wishes Southern Africa to embrace a similar model, its history and economic position is very different. In Europe regional integration was undertaken largely to avoid any recurrence of a devastating war, which had ended in the defeat of the country which then became the region's economic powerhouse. In Southern Africa there had been war between South Africa, the economic powerhouse, and other states, but with the collapse of apartheid there was no sense that any recurrence of such conflict was likely, and the memory of the apartheid-era wars was divisive and did not promote regional integration. While the benefits of regionalism were evident in tackling such issues as the promotion of economic growth and development, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and dealing with illegal immigration and refugees, as well as narcotics and arms smuggling, South Africa did not wish to subordinate its global ambitions, as a country with close ties to other countries and regions, to the regional project. Given those ties, and its global ambitions, the likelihood is that South Africa's relations with SADC will remain half-hearted and ambiguous. But the economic aspects of the relationship are as important as the political ones, and it is to those that we now turn.

4. Economic aspects of the relationship between South Africa and SADC

Before it joined SADC, South Africa was already the economic giant in Southern Africa, a region rich in mineral resources: South Africa had gold, platinum and other metals; Botswana diamonds; Zambia copper; the DRC diamonds, and Angola oil. Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) have long been a driving force behind South Africa's regional economic policies, including Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers (diamond marketing), and Minorco. A range of other MNCs, such as MTN, Vodacom, and Shoprite/Checkers, mainly South African-based, have been able to develop new markets in other countries in the region (Nagar 2012a).

South Africa has long been seen as of vital geostrategic interest for the United States (US) and Europe. In 1998, the US sought to devise a regional trade policy for sub-Saharan Africa and approved the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Ngwenya 2012) which South Africa became a signatory to in 2000. The EU signed a separate agreement with South Africa, the 1999 EU-South Africa Trade Development Corporation Agreement (TDCA) (Lee 2003). South Africa was widely seen as the ideal entry point into Southern Africa and Africa at large (Nagar 2013). Both the US and Europe pushed for market liberalisation for Southern Africa; the EU sought to enlarge its agricultural market but its Common Agricultural Policy had a very negative effect on Southern Africa (Nagar 2013).

Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994, the post-apartheid government has employed a number of economic policy instruments to deliver on the promise of social development. In 1996 the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy replaced the Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, created to address persistent poverty. When GEAR failed to improve South Africa's weak post-apartheid political economy, the country began to look towards the region to help fast-track its development (Landsberg/Wyk 2012). The New Growth Path (NGP) of 2010 and the National Development Plan (NDP) of 2011 set out an economic growth policy plan that included infrastructure projects across Africa. A National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) seeks to promote trade that is value-added and industrial production that

builds employment and further promotes job creation, while the Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (TPSF) is an industrial policy instrument to support trade in favour of local manufacturing as well as to diversify the economy so that is not so heavily dependent on commodities and non-tradable services (Vickers 2012).

SADC's key regional economic instrument and blueprint, which spearheads its trade agenda, is its 15-year Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003. This set out ambitious goals: to establish a free trade area (to which South Africa belongs) by 2008, a customs union by 2010, a common market in 2015, a monetary union in 2016 and a common currency in 2018 (SADC 2012). The mid-term review of the SADC RISDP is an opportunity to develop an integration agenda for Southern Africa that balances and enhances trade in both goods and services, that generates capital and labour, and that takes into account migration policies allowing for the free movement of people.

South Africa cannot be expected to be consistent in its efforts in region-building, given its severe socio-economic problems. It is inevitable that its economic foreign policy will straddle regional and domestic needs, and at times the pendulum will swing in favour of the latter. As a semi-developing state, South Africa's national interest of building its own economy and addressing the socio-economic inequalities inherited from the apartheid regime remain of paramount importance (Nagar 2013; see also SAIIA 2013). South Africa's contradictory behaviour is explained in part by the fact that it has to balance its relationship with SADC with the smaller regional organisation, the five-nation economic bloc SACU, as well as its own socio-economic inequalities back home.

5. SACU, South Africa and regional integration

There are huge economic disparities between SACU's member states – Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia – and the region's hegemon, South Africa. All five states belong to SADC. Within the confines of a regional institution like SACU, the impact that a semi-developing state like South Africa has on small economies, like Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, and the difficulties of this strained relationship, has been

huge. These difficulties are also linked to the common monetary area (CMA) agreement signed by Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland, which Namibia joined after it became independent in 1990. Huge economic disparities remain between South Africa and both its SACU partners and the other members of SADC (McCarthy 2013; see also Flanagan 2013).

How states deal with the issue of sovereignty is an indication of whether there is genuine political will towards regional integration and a genuine interest to support and boost weaker economies. Unlike South Africa, which benefited from the EU-SA TDCA, Namibia refused to sign trade deals with Europe and only provisionally initialled an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) with Brussels (SAFPI 2012). SACU has become a stumbling block to Southern Africa and Africa's overall regional integration agenda and in particular the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite agreement of 2008. It may be sensible to incorporate these member states into the agenda of SADC or to create a larger merger of all three schemes. However, this is not straightforward and could hamper any efforts at building a viable COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area, given multilateral agreements, such as AGOA and the EU-SA TDCA, and their impacts on economic integration. Swaziland is a member of both COMESA and SADC.

SACU's present revenue-sharing formula provides that South Africa currently contributes 98 percent to the revenue pool, which is shared according to intra-SACU trade or imports. But intra-SACU trade, especially imports, is dominated by South Africa. South Africa's dominant role over the import markets of BLNS states is just over 75 per cent of trade of the market of each state and over 90 per cent of trade in the cases of Swaziland and Lesotho. South Africa's trade with the other SACU states pales in comparison with that of other markets, given South Africa's diversification of exports to, and imports from, global markets. In 2011, Swaziland's disbursements from SACU were reduced by 62 per cent, which brought that country's already ailing economy to its knees. Other important developments, such as AGOA, are positive for SACU, and AGOA will be highly significant for smaller SACU economies such as Swaziland, which depends heavily on the continuation of AGOA beyond its 2015 agreement. It now appears that the Obama administration supports the renewal of AGOA in 2015, when the current agreement is meant to end for the 40 sub-Saharan African countries that receive tariff-free access to US markets (SAIIA 2013).

SACU's present revenue-sharing formula presents a challenge to the admission of new members. Issues centring on allowing South Africa to reintroduce tariffs on certain sensitive SACU products, and debates that centre on the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, have further complicated regional integration and almost resulted in the disintegration of SACU (Nagar 2012a: 140). SACU may have become a stumbling block to Southern Africa's overall regional integration agenda, and in particular to the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite agreement of 2008, which provides for a much larger free trade area (AfDB 2013).

Greater trade and enlarging markets will increase the SACU revenue pool and strengthen the SACU region; for example, South Africa's merger with the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) grouping of the world's fastest-growing economies is potentially positive for Southern Africa as a whole.

However, South Africa joining the SADC 2008 Free Trade Agreement and other accords with COMESA and the EAC, 2008 tripartite agreement, has placed a damper on regional trade for smaller economies, since these accords call for removing all tariff and non-tariff barriers among SADC member states. While South Africa has been reaping the benefits from the 1910 SACU trade agreement (revised in 1969 and again in 2002), in 2012 South Africa's exports made up 80 percent of intra-SACU trade. The tables have now turned, as BLNS countries are now reaping the benefits due to trade generated by South Africa's enlarged market with China, the United States and with the European Union. According to a 2013 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on SACU-generated revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are accruing enormous income from the customs union and do not see the benefit of joining another free trade area such as the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite arrangement. Current account receipts constitute only 28 percent of GDP in South Africa, compared with over 37 percent in Botswana, more than 55 percent in Namibia, and 102 percent in Lesotho (IMF 2013). South Africa has the lowest figure and is nevertheless the main contributor, making up 80 percent of intra-SACU trade (Canales-Kriljenko et al. 2013). With the economic position of the BLNS states increasing, they may be put in a stronger position to decide whether they want to join the COMESA-EAC-SADC grouping, initiated by the Tripartite Agreement of

2008. This initiative aims for a free trade area and a customs union in 2015 that may impact negatively on the BLNS states, which may subsequently lose out on tariff revenues on some sensitive products (such as textiles and sugar) (SAFPI 2013a). Other issues at play for SACU members include agreements that South Africa is exploring to further trade with its IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) partners towards a SACU-Mercosur-India Trilateral Trade Arrangement (TTA) for trade convergence between the parties with a market of 1.2 billion people, GDP of US$1.2 trillion, and foreign potential for trade of US$300 billion. As the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite, with a population of 530 million people and GDP of US$630 billion (averaging only US$1.180 per capita), pales in comparison, BLNS states are reluctant to join the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite (Nagar 2013).

To date, Southern Africa's market integration efforts have been relatively unsuccessful. Though attempts have been made to expand the region's 'periphery' by strengthening weaker economies through robust trade and market integration efforts, about 90 per cent of South Africa's trade is still conducted outside the region (Canales-Kriljenko et al. 2013). As Andre Gunder Frank suggests, the core can be a major obstacle to regional integration when it begins feeding off the periphery in its imbalance of trade (cf. Saunders et al. 2012: 2).

While it was announced by South Africa's Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, in early 2013 that R827 billion was to be spent on domestic infrastructure development, R6.2 billion of this was to be invested by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in projects largely in other SADC member states, in mining, industrial infrastructure, agro-processing and tourism (Gordhan 2013: 15). Efficient, reliable and workable infrastructure is important for trade and to benefit agriculture and industrialisation projects. Of SADC's 15 member states, six are landlocked; six have populations below 10 million, while 10 have economies smaller than $10 billion dollars per annum. Linking emerging economies like those of Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to markets in South Africa would create a larger market. The proposed north-south trade corridor (roads, sea, and rail) will link South Africa with Botswana, the DRC and Malawi. Although Southern Africa's rail transport is well established, more needs to be done. In March 2012, South Africa opened the Ngqura Port in Nelson Mandela Bay in the Eastern Cape to serve as

a major trade conduit in enhancing south-south imports and exports. In the medium term the port will form part of an emerging shipping route between China and Brazil, while in the longer term, it is envisaged that South Africa and the region will establish trade corridors with south-east Asia and South America (Nagar 2012b).

6. Conclusion

Regional integration in Southern Africa remains very much a work in progress. South Africa's relations with the main regional body, SADC, are complex and shift over time, and are now part of broader interactions with other regional organisations, such as SACU, COMESA and the EAC, as well as with the AU. While statements from South Africa's DIRCO suggest that the Southern African region is the country's main priority in foreign policy, in reality SADC has often not been accorded prime attention by South Africa's policy-makers. DIRCO has also often said that it sees South Africa as the gateway into the rest of the continent, but other countries, such as Nigeria in West Africa and Kenya in East Africa, are now increasingly seen as gateways into the continent. While it remains unclear how far regionalism in Southern Africa will be taken, given the unwillingness of countries to surrender their sovereignty, the regional organisation is an important bridge between the national and the continental, for SADC remains a building block in continental integration. It can confidently be predicted that South Africa will continue to be the main driver behind the ongoing Southern African region-building project.

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Abstracts

South Africa became a member of the leading regional organisation, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with the ending of apartheid in 1994. What relationship has evolved between South Africa and SADC in the 20 years since then? This article argues that the relationship can only be understood against the background of some pre-1994 history. The precursors to SADC, which was founded in 1992, had been antagonistic to apartheid South Africa, which in the 1980s had carried

out a policy of destabilising other countries in the region. South Africa's relationship with SADC has also been shaped, from 1994, by its relative economic strength, as well as by the nature of the new multipolar global economy, which emerged in the 1990s. This article firstly discusses political, then economic, aspects of the evolving relationship from 1994. Among the topics examined that help explain the relationship are the hegemonic role of South Africa in the southern Africa region; its foreign policy and economic regional integration strategy; the influence of external actors, such as the European Union (EU); the existence of the Southern African Customs Union; and the role that regional infrastructure projects play in the regional integration process.

Südafrika wurde mit dem Ende der Apartheid im Jahr 1994 Mitglied der führenden regionalen Organisation, der Southern African Development Community (SADC). Welche Beziehung hat sich zwischen Südafrika und der SADC in den zwanzig Jahren entwickelt? Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass die Beziehung nur vor dem historischen Hintergrund der Zeit vor 1994 verstanden werden kann. Die Vorläufer der 1992 gegründeten SADC waren antagonistisch zum südafrikanischen Apartheid-Regime, das in den 1980er Jahren eine Destabilisierungspolitik in anderen Ländern der Region durchgeführt hatte. Südafrikas Beziehung zur SADC wurde 1994 durch seine relative wirtschaftliche Stärke und die neue, in den 1990er Jahren entstandene multipolare Weltwirtschaft geprägt. Dieser Artikel beschreibt zunächst politische, dann wirtschaftliche Aspekte der sich seit 1994 entwickelnden Beziehung. Unter den untersuchten Themen, die bei der Erläuterung der Beziehung helfen, sind die hegemoniale Rolle Südafrikas in der Region südliches Afrika, seine Außenpolitik und wirtschaftlich Integrationsstrategie in der Region, der Einfluss externer Akteure wie der Europäischen Union (EU), die Existenz der Southern African Customs Union und die Rolle, die regionale Infrastrukturprojekte im regionalen Integrationsprozess spielen.

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Journal für Entwicklungspolitik XXIX 4-2013, S. 46–66

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Financialisation and the Production of Inequality in Namibia: A Socio-Spatial Perspective

1. Introduction

"We emerge from Apartheid, the oppression of Apartheid, [...] So this is the new Apartheid. This is the privileged minority versus an unprivileged mass. And so we go from Apartheid at our National level, to Apartheid at the global level. And it has to be challenged."

(Dennis Brutus, South African activist and poet in: Thomas 2012: 4)

The paper aims at establishing a relation between the financialising political economy of Namibia and the perpetuation of apartheid geographies, focusing on the production of housing as a field for the exploration of this point. We start by defining financialisation, its uses and its impact, and through this will explain the formation of a world system with shifting centralities in which financialisation signals the dawn of a cycle. This lens will be used to observe Namibia's uneven development, which we will trace from colonial dispossession to racialised capitalism and further to a liberalised free-market economy. Pointing out Namibia's close ties with South Africa and the shared apartheid past, the observations contained in this work will have a socio-spatial emphasis, which will lead to a critical perspective of Namibia's production of housing as exemplary in the understanding of the socio-spatial production of a financialised economy, and how this in fact perpetuates apartheid geographies. This point will be presented based on a 2012 landmark UN report on 'adequate housing', which exposes the corrosive effects of the 'financialisation of housing' in developing countries in recent decades. The paper concludes with outlining what then could be an alternative production of space or alternative economies in today's

context, arguing that vis-a-vis the intense pressure for economic growth masked by financialised 'solutions', a quest for fully adequate housing will activate the socio-spatial domain into a politically contested ground where issues of class, race, and justice will be decided.

2. On financialisation

"Capitalist development [...] seems, by reaching the stage of financial expansion, to have in some sense announced its maturity: it [is] a sign of autumn."

(Fernand Braudel 1984 in: Arrighi 2010: 6)

Financial mechanisms are a constituent component of capitalist development, yet only recently have we entered a phase in which they have become the preferred device for accumulation at the planetary scale. Financialisation can describe a number of dynamics: the expansion of financial assets in size, the penetration of finance into economic sectors that were not previously affected by it (e.g. education, healthcare), the proliferation of financial innovation (e.g. sub-prime mortgages, microcredit, futures trading), the insertion and ultimate takeover of productive sectors by parasitic finance (e.g. manufacturing companies opening financial arms and gradually deriving more profits from these than from their core operations), among others (Fine 2010). There are different conceptualisations of the term financialisation: some with an emphasis on socio-spatial issues (Aalbers 2008), while others use it to explain larger macroeconomic dynamics at the planetary level (Fine 2010; McNally 2009; Lapavitsas 2009). The broadest interpretation expands it throughout the entire history of capitalism (Arrighi 2010). We will depart from the latter, and elaborate on the extrapolation of a capitalist accumulation cycle over a historical period to attempt to understand our contemporary condition.

In a simple capitalist accumulation cycle (M-C-M'), a certain amount of money (M) is transformed into either a commodity or a service (C) yielding a return higher than the amount initially invested (M'). Financialisation would, in these simplifying terms, be a process of accumulation that does not necessarily involve an actual commodity or a service at

the moment of the transaction, replacing it with the promise of its future realisation (M-M'). While this explanation refers to a single financial operation, Giovanni Arrighi's proposition is to look at this as a pattern being reproduced in capitalist development at the planetary scale and throughout its full history (see Figure 1). Economies undergo periods of growth, many times driven by the insertion of foreign capital, in which accumulation allows for the consolidation of a productive base and development (M-C *cycle*), which is the primary production cycle. Guided by aims of further accumulation, the cycle reaches a point in which financial operations start to yield higher returns and hence become the favoured device for accumulation (C-M' *cycle*). This appears not to happen in a complementary way but in fact the latter causes the unmaking of the former, a process otherwise known as deindustrialisation. This, in Arrighi's analysis, is a cyclical process, with the previous cycle feeding the emergence of the next one and its own ultimate demise, in a process that started more than five hundred years ago. While historically each cycle lasts more than a century, they become shorter every time and shift their core to more populous territories, with increasing global reach, and involving an increasing amount of capital. The four systemic cycles of accumulation he proposes started in Genoa during the 15th–16th centuries; then shifted to the Netherlands for the 17th century; to Britain for the 19th century; and lastly to the United States for the 20th century. It is within this regime of accumulation at a world scale that we can locate our times as undergoing the phase of the financialisation of American hegemony. While it is not certain whether the next stage will be a larger, more populous nation like China, an alliance of nations such as BRICS, or a global regime, it is quite possible that a material limit to financialised accumulation (i.e. through 'fictitious capital', or *credit*) has been reached on the planetary scale. What emerges from this analysis is that we are experiencing 'the autumn' of a stage in the history of 'long centuries' of capitalist development.



Figure 1: Long centuries and systemic cycles of accumulation (SCA); simplified version redrawn by the authors
Source: Arrighi 2010

As the term might suggest, in financialised regimes, financiers represent a de facto ruling class. During these periods, the degree of sophistication necessary to sustain financialisation scales up this sector (banks, rating agencies, and insurance companies); it also empowers a growing and powerful rentier class, and pushes it into deals at the margins of legality, if not beyond. This is, in short, the situation that was exposed in the 2008 'economic crisis', marked by the fall of Lehman Brothers and many other banks elsewhere in its wake. Today still, the damaging effects are devastating not only for 'the poor', but increasingly affecting middle classes as well as actively expanding the number of the privileged few; in other words, this is a process of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2006). So much so, that even the mainstream media has joined the debate on inequality (Foley 2010; Treanor 2011; just to put two examples in English-speaking media). Some argue that these centuries-long cycles of financialisation have led to levels of inequality, which have reached a historical high at the planetary level.

3. Cycles in the production of Namibia's unequal economy

Following Arrighi's 'long centuries' conceptualisation of history, the first insertion of money-form capital into Namibian territory happened during German colonial rule. During the second half of the 19th Century, the German *Kaiserreich* saw the emergence of doctrines like Friedrich Ratzel's (1966) *Lebensraum* theory, which dictates that a nation needs adequate space to survive in order to prosper. This 'space' could be found in the colonies, considering that by that time, industrialising German cities were faced with overcrowded slums and a population boom. The myth of the *Volk ohne Raum* (in German, 'Nation without space') encouraged Germany to expand for the sake of a better *Reich*.

At the end of the 19th Century, the then German South-West Africa had a few scattered settlements with a skeletal colonial administration. Several land deals had been struck between the colonial administration, trading companies and various indigenous leaders, at the expense of the indigenous societies (Wallace/Kinahan 2011). This paved the way for German and South African settler farmers to occupy about half of the territory by 1921 (SWA Administration 1921). The foreign concept of private property was firmly established in favour of the settlers. As the land was parcelled up into large-scale farms, based on its low carrying capacity for livestock farming, the pressure on indigenous nomadic cattle-herding societies grew unbearable. Those dispossessed were forced to move to the fringes of the colonial settlements to seek employment in the colonisers' homes, their farms, or the nascent industries they established. Soon the colonial administration made it its explicit mission to transform the indigenous populations into landless and exploitable wage-labourers (Wallace/Kinahan 2011). The initial capital flows to consolidate a productive base in Namibia thus happened through violent confrontation, not between parties of similar standing, but as the subjugation of an agricultural and sometimes nomadic population by a powerful colonial force. This asymmetry was well understood by Nama Kaptein Henrik Witbooi, who protested strongly against the signing of a protection treaty with Germany by Herero Chief Maharero in 1890 (Lau 1996). Dispossession was the major, albeit not only, reason that led the Herero and Nama to rise up against the German occupation between 1904 and 1907, culminating in the first genocide of the 20th Century, which left

tens of thousands of mainly Herero and Nama people dead. Surviving prisoners of war were interned in makeshift concentration camps by the German troops and subjected to forced labour, following the model the British had established in the Anglo Boer War in South Africa a few years earlier. In addition to force, spatial planning in the form of camps and later separate 'native locations' was instrumentalised to extract labour from the subjected people in order to give form to the colonial space in which Namibia's urban experience today is rooted.

These strategies of divide and rule of German colonial times found their continuation in the apartheid planning after South Africa had taken over as a de-facto colonial power under a League of Nations mandate in 1921 (Wallace/Kinahan 2011). Racial segregation was elevated to official policy through the infamous Natives (Urban Areas) Act in 1924, which required municipalities to build native locations separated and reasonably far from towns. It was required for these areas to be serviced, and segregated, along 'simplified' ethnic lines. Municipalities and large-scale employers were required by legislation to provide workers' housing, often in the form of 'compounds' for single men, who were recruited through an increasingly intricate 'contract labour system' from rural areas. These compounds were effectively containers for surplus labour, with the sole function of social reproduction (Byerley 2013). For most of the first half of the 20th century, commercial farming was the mainstay of the growing colonial economy, absorbing the largest part of contract workers. Only after World War II did extractive economies gain the upper hand with the mining and fishing sectors booming and enabling GDP explosion of 1,200 per cent in 14 years, partly supported by South Africa's stimulus for foreign investment. As much as 40 per cent of GDP was remitted abroad, making Namibia increasingly dependent on South Africa's economy (Wallace/Kinahan 2011). However, creating such dependence was in line with the South African National Party's aim to incorporate South-West Africa as its fifth province.

As apartheid policies, especially those controlling influx to urban areas, were dismantled under internal and international pressure from the late 1970s onwards in anticipation of Namibia's Independence, urban growth increased dramatically. The lack of state subsidies for housing spurred the development of informal settlements following global trends, as succinctly

described by Mike Davis (2007) in his book *Planet of Slums*. Self-enumeration grassroots 'census' projects show that today about one fourth of the Namibian population live in informal settlements, half of them without toilet facilities (Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia 2012).

Figure 2: Illegal 'squatters' dismantling their shack during slum clearance operations in 2012, with the skyline of the Windhoek CBD in the background
Photo: Tanja Bause

Since Namibia's Independence in 1990, municipalities are required to finance urban development for the provision of infrastructure and services on a cost-recovery basis. Cost-recovery methods include the collection of municipal fees, but more importantly the sale of serviced land, thereby inflating market prices, as we will show below. These practices exclude inhabitants who are in most pressing need of benefitting from urban development, and the consequence is that urban development remains driven by the empowered elite: property developers, real estate agents and financial institutions; in other words, the rentier class. The increase of land values and consequential housing shortage has reached levels that make home-

ownership unaffordable even to the middle classes: teachers, nurses and other civil servants are forced to live in shacks. Here, technocratic 'solutions', based solely on service-delivery of the barest necessities, and the perpetuation of apartheid-era urban planning tools, results in continued structural inequality

4. Namibia's autumn

Due to its historical dependence on neighbouring South Africa, the largest economy in the region, financialisation dynamics in Namibia are closely linked to those in South Africa. While financialisation in South Africa has been documented (Ashman et al. 2011), the following part will deal with linking these observations with recent developments in Namibia, and its socio-spatial implications.

The rise to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994 paradoxically marked the full-scale implementation of neoliberal policies initiated in the early 1990s after the crippling last decade of the apartheid regime. The ANC further inherited the previous regime's foreign debt, and along with new loans from the International Monetary Fund embarked on the privatisation of essential services, as well as relaxing capital restrictions that enabled the massive capital flight of the country's largest corporations, including their headquarters, overseas. Such policies were among the causes for South Africa to be the only emerging market to suffer so many currency crashes over the last two decades (Bond 2010). While the majority of the black population remains trapped in low-skilled jobs in the declining productive sectors, a tiny but immensely wealthy elite has formed and joined the ranks of old, white capital. In the words of Moeletsi Mbeki, the new black elite represents "a small class of unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalism... ironically, the caretaker of South Africa's deindustrialization" (Mbeki in: Ashman et al. 2011: 195). This financialised-deindustrialised form of development continues in the form of 'jobless growth' (i.e. economic growth without employment creation) which, during the last decade, was fuelled by consumer and sovereign debt, causing an increase in the debt-to-income ratio, overall bank lending rates, the number of non-performing loans, and full credit defaults. Financialisation in South Africa

coincides with 'classical neoliberal characteristics'. For instance, during the last decade, the construction sector grew by 250 per cent, finance 160 per cent, trade by 150 per cent, and manufacturing by just 13 per cent, while the mining sector lost 40 per cent (Bond 2010). South Africa remains the main trading partner of Namibia, acquiring one third of its total exports, and supplying it with 80 per cent of its fresh produce and 70 per cent of its total imports (WTO 2009). Furthermore, the Namibian Dollar (N$) is pegged to the South African Rand, therefore limiting the role of the Namibian Central Bank to merely adjusting its operations to South Africa's monetary policy. 'National Independence', in these terms, acquires a different meaning.

Namibia, which has even more dominant resource-extraction economy characteristics is, like South Africa, currently undergoing a phase of financialisation. This is visible in the country's everyday life via the widespread availability of cheap credit (i.e. banks offering 'accessible' credit schemes), micro-lending (i.e. retail and other businesses specialising in loans for low-income groups), a decrease in foreign direct investment allocated to productive sectors and increased investments in financial ones (see Figure 3, below), the large proportion of GDP representing financial operations (see Figure 4, below), and incursion into sovereign debt, such as a 'Eurobond' issued at the end of 2011 (Duddy 2011) and a recent N$3bn (€250m) sovereign bond issued at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (RMB 2013). Here the country's limited industrial base is to be considered in terms of the outspoken aim of government to transform the country into 'an industrialized nation by 2030' (National Planning Commission 2004). Namibia, with its 2.2 million inhabitants, 52 per cent unemployment, and vast territory, does not have the economies of scale to guarantee a viable consumer-based local industry, and although an export-led approach to neighbouring countries could be a possible approach, the stagnation of the global economy, and rising labour unrest in both South Africa (Steyn 2012) and Namibia (Grobler 2012), provide bleak prospects for industrialised growth aspirations.



Figure 3: Distribution of foreign direct investment in Namibia by percentage 1996-2003
Source: Redrawn by the authors, from Ikhide 2006



Figure 4: GDP by sector, as percentage
Source: Redrawn by the authors, from OECD et al. 2013

Ultimately, the expansion of the financial sector ought, in principle, to be reflected in the wellbeing indicators, to justify the burden of future debt. However, the opposite appears to be the case. In terms of overcoming the apartheid legacy of inequality, little has been achieved in the 23 years since independence. Annual household income, expressed per capita and according to different language groups, shows that the highest average incomes are generated among German-speaking Namibians with an annual N$158,298 (€13,200) at their disposal, while African (i.e. black) groups vary between N$6,853 (€570) and N$26,696 (€2,230) on average. To put this in perspective, the lowest 25 per cent spends 53 per cent on food and beverages and 24 per cent on housing, the highest 1 per cent spends 7 per cent on food and beverages and 22 per cent on housing (National Planning Commission 2010); this also exposes the asymmetric impact of inflation on households from different income groups, as the heaviest burden is carried by the lower income groups.

A similar trend appears in South Africa, with nominal wages appearing to have increased in almost equal terms for black and white populations between 1995 and 2006; however, real wages (i.e. adjusted to inflation) show that white households have increased their yearly income by 40.5 per cent, while the majority (of black, coloured and other households) have theirs decreased by 1.8 per cent during the same period (Bhorat et al. 2009). This resonates with the reality of a financialising economy: more jobs are required in sectors that demand highly educated individuals, whereas sectors able to employ low-skilled workers show signs of low growth, decline, or a state of crisis (e.g. the agricultural and mining sectors, which have seen a high number of legal and 'wildcat' strikes in the recent years). Through this process of active production of inequality new forms of segregation, sustained in socioeconomic terms, continue and expand many of the fundamentals of apartheid.

This process of uneven development is also taking place in Namibia, as the country's indicators reveal. The poorest 75 per cent of the population receives 37 per cent of annual income, while the richest 4 per cent absorb 30 per cent of annual income. Even starker is the contrast between the poorest 25 per cent's average annual per capita income of N$3,535 (€300) and the richest 1 per cent's average annual per capita income of N$253,138 (€21,160). In other words, the average annual per capita income of the richest 1 per

cent is 71 times more than that of the poorest 25 per cent. Although the exact number seems to be contested, Namibia's GINI coefficient lies somewhere at 0.74 (Sweeney-Bindels 2011), making Namibia compete for the position of most unequal society in the world, with South Africa.

Currently, commercial banks service mainly the upper and middle incomes with credit, and although they've embarked on marketing campaigns to attract lower incomes, new financialised 'alternatives' are now in place to 'democratise finance'. In Namibia, this is exemplified by the recent establishment of the micro-finance bank FIDES, a German-Swiss-Belgian-French-owned initiative of 'socially responsible investors'. Since it first got its licence in 2010, the bank has created about 10,000 borrowers, and plans to expand considerably in the coming years (Incofin 2012). The paradoxes and inherent inequalities of such institutions are not only found within the bank's own operations (Sasman 2012), but also in the practice of labelling the poor as 'risky', and thus penalised, in the form of higher interest rates. This fact becomes clear in the Usury Act of 2004, which stipulates interest rate ceilings for conventional money lending institutions at 1.6 times the prime lending rate, as opposed to micro-credit institutions, which are allowed to lend up to N$50,000 (€4,160), and are set at twice the prime rate (Ministry of Finance 2004). However, such banks are not the only micro-credit institutions in the everyday life of the poor, but are accompanied by plentiful credit, easily available at furniture, clothing, and grocery stores, as well as through non-registered moneylenders, offering so-called 'cash loans'. This status quo is underpinned by stagnant and sometimes decreasing real wages (in 2008, real wages in Namibia decreased 3.2 per cent according to the Labour Resource and Research Institute's 2008 *Wage Bargaining Report*); by inflation levels above average wage increases (with the highest point reached at 10.4 per cent in 2008 according to the World Bank 2013a); by a decrease in foreign aid since Namibia was declared an 'upper middle income country' by the World Bank in 2011 (World Bank 2013b; Heita 2011); and by the state of paralysis of trade unions (in the Namibian context the largest organized group that is best positioned to rally social justice issues) due to internal conflicts (Grobler 2012). The advancement of credit in this context gives William Morris' phrase 'poverty is punished for being poor' (Morris 1889) contemporary validity.

5. Financialisation of housing in Namibia

Examining the contemporary context of financialisation is instrumental in understanding the processes underlying the current production of space. The housing situation in Namibia is characterised by a backlog of about 105,000 houses (First National Bank 2012), at a time in which the yearly housing production reaches less than 1,000 units per year. Housing and land prices stand at a historical high: house prices, as reported by the FNB House Price Index, quadrupled between 2000 and 2010, supported by an increase in the mortgage loans of 100 per cent (Mwilima et al. 2011). Neighbouring South Africa boasted the highest increase in house prices globally (389 per cent) between 1997 and 2008, only followed by Ireland by half a percentage rate (Economist 2009). Currently, the most affordable formal housing schemes in Namibia exclude the overwhelming majority of the population. Government expenditure on housing, currently at 0.3 per cent of national expenditure, is at a historical low (Sweeney-Bindels 2011).

The list of formal mechanisms for access to housing is not long: private individuals developing their own property with or without credit provided by commercial banks and state mechanisms, i.e. the Build Together Program (BT), the National Housing Enterprise (NHE), and, although in practical terms not a 'state mechanism' but certainly a state-supported mechanism, the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia (SDFN). While approximately 70 per cent of the population is not eligible for mortgages, commercial banks realised a 17 per cent annual growth of mortgages from 2001 until 2010, with the share of mortgages of total loans rising from 30.1 per cent 2001 to 52.3 per cent over the same period (BoN 2010). Of the government housing mechanisms, BT targets low-income groups of monthly incomes up to N$3,000 (€250) with loans ranging from N$3,000 to 40,000 (€250-3,330) at four to seven per cent interest rates. In the first phase of the project (1992–1997) a mere 10,244 houses were completed, and in the second phase (1998–2010) another 16,428 houses. NHE provides houses for incomes N$5,000 (€415) or above (representing less than 13 per cent of the population) through mortgages administered via commercial banks at prime interest rate less one per cent. Housing delivery of this model has fallen dramatically short of its 1,200 houses per annum target. Only 253 houses were built per annum during the 2003–2011 period, down from

600 houses per annum between 1990 and 2002 (Sweeney-Bindels 2011). In both cases government subsidies channelled towards these programmes have ultimately been used solely to cover overhead costs, as loans are ultimately repaid by beneficiaries. Only SDFN, through its savings group scheme, its self-construction component and collective land purchase, is able to target incomes below N$2,000 (€166), with 34 m^2 houses worth N$25,000 (€2080) each. Through this programme 366 houses were built in 2009–2010, with a government contribution of (N$3,791 [€315] per house).

The vast majority of projects developed under these schemes follow the model of the individual plot with a detached house, while urban development follows along the embedded patterns of 1960s apartheid planning. These mechanisms for housing production compose the 'formal' sector and, partly excluding SDFN, represent 'financial solutions' to the Namibian housing question.

The regressive character of such financial mechanisms for access to housing has recently been exposed at the planetary scale. 'Housing finance' is defined by the UN-Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as "the financial policies and programmes that aim to finance the cost of housing for individuals and families by providing loans (mortgages or micro loans) or grants (subsidies or tax exemptions) for the purchase, rental, construction or improvement of housing" (Rolnik 2012). The report expands on the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights' inclusion of 'the right to housing', by elaborating on what 'adequate housing' entails: it exposes the limitations of equating 'the right to housing' with 'affordability'. 'Adequate housing' must consider the location within the urban fabric, its proximity to infrastructure, accessibility, the capacity of inhabitants to transform it, and many other factors which compose a full lived experience. Massive financialised housing projects in developing countries, including Namibia, have neglected these many aspects and by doing so turned 'the problem of the homeless' into 'the problem of those with homes', by providing cheaply built minimum-sized houses, more often than not far from desirable areas, with little or no infrastructure, and with little or no nearby job opportunities. Namibia's capital city, Windhoek, is a good case in point; the so-called reception areas for arriving migrants, located in the North and West of town, are planned far away from employment opportunities, urban facilities and services, on the fringes of the apartheid townships, thereby exacer-

bating the marginalisation of the urban poor. The report further condemns 'financing' as inherently discriminatory, as it necessarily divides those who are able to repay loans from those who can't, potentiating the acquisitive power of the empowered, while deeply immersing people into debt, who more often than not end up losing the very home they were promised they would own. The report recommends the need for states to invest more resources into housing and to encourage the supply of social rental housing, as well as other forms of collective and individual tenure, and most importantly, indicates the fundamental need to develop alternatives, in collaboration with groups of low-income inhabitants. In view of this, the field for possible alternatives narrows down to a field which is not only small and marginal, but that is in danger of being seized by market forces, and needs to be defended.

6. Defining the field for alternative housing and urban policies in Namibia

Alternatives operate at different levels; they range from the superficial to the fundamental. Superficial alternatives include those initiatives which provide variations of a current scheme in order to seize a portion of its customer base; in other words, competition. Fundamental or systemic alternatives are concerned with challenging the assumptions on which current approaches are based, aiming to generate alternatives that differ fundamentally from such processes. One such assumption holds that housing prices will rise indefinitely. This has resulted in significant vested interests in property and real estate which municipalities are hell-bent to guarantee at the expense of affordability for the majority. In this respect, Namibian municipalities have done a good job, as housing prices have risen four times in the last decade and mortgage lending has risen from N$1.8bn (€150m) to 20.5bn (€1.7bn) in the same period; concomitantly, rent inflation has risen steadily as well (Mwilima et al. 2011). The second assumption, the myth that homeownership is the most secure form of tenure, has since been debunked after the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, where large numbers of 'homeowners' were foreclosed, leaving a shattered social fabric behind. However, considering the stagnant real wages and high

unemployment rate, a question necessarily arises: where does the effective demand for market products (land and housing included) come from? The answer appears to be in financial mechanisms for the middle and higher incomes which commercial banks currently service, but also in extending this 'solution' to poorer sectors. Despite of the toxicity of this operation, it is nevertheless packed into a positive developmental rhethoric: 'access to banking', 'servicing the underserviced', 'making finance work for the poor'. 'The unbanked' groups form part of the conditions that lead pro-business development organizations to consider Africa as the next (and some even say 'last') 'untapped market' (New Era 2013). The pressure to expand and find new markets to ensure the unquestioned economic growth does not only affect Namibia: it is a planetary condition. Alternatives operating at the fundamental level would in principle need to challenge the previous assumptions. In the Namibian context, with its large housing backlog representing an 'untapped' market for capital to seize, contesting financialisation of space will become an arena for intense class struggle. It is in this way, that the struggle for adequate instead of merely 'affordable' housing, is not just a 'service delivery' issue, but a political battleground.

With falling global demand due to austerity measures in many countries, stagnant growth rates will be pushing markets to seize territories that have already not been commodified or financialised. Worldwide, the housing sector has been a target for market expansion since the post-War period, which was translated into the promotion of the commodification of housing, individual homeownership, privatisation of social housing programmes, de-regulation of housing finance markets, and the dismantling of rental rights. Alternative arrangements, while sometimes well established, have also been either marginalised or eliminated; these include rental housing, cooperative and collective ownership, as well as some savings groups-based schemes (Rolnik 2012), not to mention legalised squatting, as happened in the Netherlands. In this context of desperate search for market expansion, can alternatives to the current financialised mechanisms be expected simply to 'emerge'? The current ruthless quest for economic growth will demand not only the strength for alternatives to sustain themselves, but also to step up and 'fight back'.

What are the margins of potential alternatives to these overall dynamics? Are there currently anti-systemic social processes emerging, and,

if so, who is taking part in them? How are they operating? These questions, after the argument presented, are necessary to imagine urban transformations which offer alternatives fundamentally opposed to the current form of urbanity in crisis. While anti-eviction campaigns, housing bond boycotts, and the well-known Abahlali base Mjondolo shack dwellers' movement are leading a significant socio-spatial struggle in South Africa today, Namibia does not yet show major signs of social discontent. The successful and long-standing SDFN program has been hampered by the City of Windhoek's ban on the collective purchase of land; government housing programs have left applicants more than a decade in waiting; and a large number of inhabitants have endured the hardship of living in informal settlements for too long. This paper does not idealise grassroots movements, but acknowledges that the quest for an alternative production of housing production, educational infrastructure, transportation systems, waste recollection and recreational spaces – simply, the production of an alternative urbanity, will need to contest its right to become. It is the socially relevant role of the many different actors whose fields relate to socio-spatial processes (policy makers, architects and planners, and academics, among a long list) to start not only imagining but testing new collaborative constructions and methodologies which incorporate these social dynamics into renewed or emerging urban practices aiming to fully understand urban ecologies, and through this, trying to overcome the current crisis of urban inequality, of increasing financialisation in general and of space in particular, and exploring alternative paths that do not lead to another 'long century', but rather, potentially, to a 'Southern African spring' of a fundamentally different kind.

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Abstracts

This paper posits that the present is characterised by a planetary condition of financialisation. The paper traces the historical development of Namibia's economy on its journey from colonial dispossession to racialised capitalism and further to a liberalised free-market economy. It proposes that Namibia's economy is increasingly financializing, and thereby is not only dismantling the rather modest national productive base, but actively hindering the prospects of overcoming the legacies of a deeply unequal society and its apartheid geography. In this context, where the quest for economic growth is as desperate as it is ubiquitous, only 'active opposition' will be able to develop and push for alternative economies, and the alternative production of housing, space, and more equitable social arrangements.

Der Beitrag postuliert, dass die Gegenwart durch einen weltweiten Zustand der Finanzialisierung charakterisiert ist. Er skizziert die historische Entwicklung der Wirtschaft Namibias von der kolonialen Enteignung über einen rassistischen Kapitalismus hin zur liberalen, freien Marktwirtschaft. Argumentiert wird, dass Namibias Wirtschaft zunehmend finanzialisiert wird, was nicht nur die ohnehin verschwindend kleine produktive Basis bedroht, sondern auch aktiv verhindert, das Erbe einer tiefgreifend ungleichen Gesellschaftsordnung und seiner Apartheidsgeografie zu überwinden.

In einem Kontext, in dem das Streben nach ökonomischem Wachstum so verzweifelt wie allgegenwärtig ist, kann nur eine „aktive Opposition“ dazu führen, alternative Ökonomien, eine alternative Produktion von Wohnen, Raum und sozial gerechteren Arrangements zu entwickeln und durchzusetzen.

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Journal für Entwicklungspolitik XXIX 4-2013, S. 67–93

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From the Past to the Present: Regulating Migration and Immigration in Post-Apartheid South Africa

"The aim of the Department of Home Affairs is to protect and regulate the interests of the inhabitants of the Republic of South Africa, in respect of their individual status, identity and specific rights and powers."
(DHA 2007a: 7)

Immigration policy, legislation and patterns[1] provide a lens through which changes in the way the state constructs national identity can be seen (Peberdy 2009, 2001; Cohen 1994; Anthias/Yuval-Davies 1993; Gilroy 1987). Immigration policy influences the shape of new immigration legislation, but can also be used to interpret legislation in different ways to suit the needs of the state (Peberdy 2009). Changes in immigration policy can be effected through the use of regulations and other means (e.g., implementation) without changes to the legislation itself. Patterns of immigration follow from the ways that immigration policy and legislation are constructed and implemented. Immigration policy and legislation in the South African context encompass the entry of immigrants (permanent residents), migrants (temporary residents) and contract workers. The entry of immigrants, and the selection of immigrants, is of most concern to nation states as they have most potential to become new citizens of the nation, and if not citizens, permanent residents. Thus, they can be seen to have the potential to re-shape the nation and its identity (Peberdy 2009; Cohen 1994). The filters and gates of the immigrant selection process are usually designed to allow entry to those seen by the state to 'fit' the nation (Peberdy 2009). Migrants and contract workers, because of their temporary status, are usually of less concern but policies relating to their entry still reflect the anxieties of the state. Policies relating to the entry of refugees and asylum

seekers, owing to the circumstances underpinning their movement, may be less related to how the state constructs its national identity, but may still reflect not only how the state sees itself in relation to other states, but its national and international human rights obligations. Thus, changes in immigration policy, legislation and patterns of immigration may reflect the way the state constructs national identity at any one time, as they show whom the state wants to allow in as new members, whether permanent or temporary, of the nation, and whom they think should be excluded.

Since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, every time there has been a significant change in the form of the South African state there has been a concomitant change in the way the state has constructed South African national identity, which has then been accompanied by changes in the immigration regime and patterns of migration (Peberdy 2009, 1999). These changes extend from the formation of the dominion state of the Union in 1910, through its consolidation in the 1920s and 1930s and the subsequent establishment of the apartheid state in 1948, to the formation of the Republic in 1961 and finally the transition to democracy in 1994. This paper begins by providing an overview of changes in migration and immigration policies and patterns in South Africa since the formation of the Union in 1910, placing them in historical context. It then examines post-apartheid changes in immigration legislation, practices and migration patterns. The paper then briefly explores the rise of xenophobia since 1994. In conclusion, changes in the immigration regime, patterns of migration and the rise of xenophobia are explored in the context of the post-1994 nation-building project of the South African post-apartheid state.

1. Contextualising contemporary migration patterns

The advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 came just over 80 years after the introduction in 1913 of the first immigration legislation by the government of the newly formed Union of South Africa. The Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 (Act No. 13) was essentially an exclusionary act whose intention was to allow only white people to enter the country as migrants or immigrants (Peberdy 2009, 1999). It established that (until 1994) South Africa would be a "White man's land" (Smuts 1910 in Kruger

1960: 10) where only white people would be considered as new members of the nation. However, through bi-lateral agreements, it did allow the mining industry and commercial agriculture preferential access to black African unskilled and semi-skilled contract labour from neighbouring states and Malawi (Peberdy 2009, 1998; Peberdy/Crush 2007).

The exclusionary and racist spirit of the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 was consolidated with its amendments in the 1972 Admissions of Persons into the Republic Act. The 1913 Act and subsequently the 1972 Act worked in conjunction with the Aliens Act of 1937. The 1937 Act had been introduced to exclude Jewish immigrants (Peberdy 2009, 1999)[2]. Although the racially discriminatory use of clauses of immigration legislation ostensibly fell away in 1986, the legislation remained exclusionary in intent and largely racially exclusionary in practice. The 1972 and 1937 Acts governed immigration to South Africa until the introduction of the Aliens Control Act of 1991. The 1991 Aliens Act, which has been called one of the 'dying Acts of apartheid' (Peberdy/Crush 1998), combined all existing immigration legislation.

How do the post-apartheid migration legislative regime and patterns sit against those that came before them? Concern about post-1994 migration and immigration patterns and the asylum regime has focused on people arriving in South Africa from the rest of the continent and, to a lesser extent, from South and East Asia (Peberdy 2009; Segatti/Landau 2011). While the arrival of a substantial number of migrants and refugees from East, Central, West and North Africa is a post-1994 phenomenon, people have been migrating to South Africa from neighbouring states and other SADC countries for over a century (Peberdy 2009, 1998; Jeeves/Crush 1997; Crush et al. 1991). Some have entered legally as contract workers through bi-lateral agreements, others irregularly. What is often forgotten is that until 1961 nationals of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia could enter South Africa without limitations and were treated as if they were nationals of South Africa (Peberdy 2009, 1998). Obviously though, this meant black nationals of these countries were subject to the same restrictions as black South Africans on where they could live and how they could move around the country once they had entered, and, like black South Africans, they were not considered part of the South African (white) nation. There were also agreements between the colonial Rhodesian and Portu-

guese East African governments and the South African state, agreements which allowed what was called 'clandestine' migration from what are now Zimbabwe and Mozambique if this was in the interests of both countries (Peberdy 2009, 1998). This has meant that a relatively significant number of black African non-nationals were counted in successive censuses, a fact which in 1962 prompted a Commission of Enquiry into 'Foreign Bantu' (Froneman 1962; Table 1).

1911	**1921**	**1936**	**1951**	**1960**	**1962***	**1970**
229,207	279,650	333,777	605,992	586,043	c.836,000	516,043
1980	**1985**	**1991**	**1996****	**2001**	**2011**	
677,160	315,482	920,913	549,720	577,451	1,569,409	

Table 1: Black population born outside South Africa enumerated in censuses, 1911 to 2011 and the Froneman Commission Report

Source: Peberdy 2009: 145; Statistics South Africa 2003: 29, 2012a: 41; Froneman 1962

* *Froneman 1962*

** *Includes whites born in "SADC countries" and the "Rest of Africa" as well as the rest of the world.*

Although white immigrants were generally welcomed, white immigration was contested at times. So, in the 1920s and 1930s, attempts were made to exclude Jewish immigrants through the Quota and Aliens Acts, as they did not fit the way the South African state constructed white national identity (Peberdy 2009). According to the legal advisor to the Department of External Affairs, "[t]he Jews are unassimilable [...] The importance that will be attached to this consideration in the Union may depend on fundamentally divergent views *regarding the future racial, social and economic structure of White South Africa*" (Broeksma 1936 cited in Peberdy 2009: 69, emphasis orig.). In the years immediately following World War II, bolstered by fears of numerical imbalances between the black and white populations and the demands of a rapidly growing economy, the Jan Smuts government welcomed all white immigrants, the number of which grew rapidly until 1949 (Peberdy 2009). The formation of the apartheid state under the National Party government saw a dramatic change in policy.

Anxious to shift the balance of power from English to Afrikaans speaking white South Africans in order to consolidate power, and reflecting concern over the status of South Africa as a Commonwealth nation, immigration was curtailed (ibid.). Immigrants from Germany and the Netherlands were welcomed as they were seen as being part of the *'stamlande'*, or countries of origin of Afrikaaners. British immigrants were not. From 1948 to 1960 the number of immigrants fell massively, from over 36,700 in 1948 to just over 9,805 in 1960 (ibid.).

During the 1950s capital put pressure on the state to increase the number of white immigrants as a measure to sustain economic growth in the context of the labour colour bar. At the same time, growing resistance to apartheid and the Sharpeville Massacre, combined with the de-colonisation of other African states, was of concern. But it was not until after the yes vote in the 1960 referendum to form a Republic and leave the Commonwealth that the National Party apartheid state felt sufficiently confident to introduce an assisted immigration scheme and promote white immigration (Peberdy 2009). According to H.F. Verwoerd in 1959, it would not be until "there is one state to which everyone owes allegiance [...] one nation with one fatherland and one loyalty, only then will the nation and the country be in a position to receive [white] immigrants on a large scale, and absorb them" (Peberdy 2009: 121). The formation of the Republic therefore shifted national identity. Again, however, not all white immigrants were welcome. The apartheid state remained and saw itself as Protestant, Calvinist and anti-communist. As a result the mid-1960s saw the introduction of new religious requirements for entry and exclusion. People from Madeira, Portugal, Italy and Greece were using the generous assisted immigration scheme to enter. As Catholics and Orthodox Greeks they were deemed unwelcome, along with members of some other religions as well as atheists and agnostics (although German and Dutch Catholics were still welcome) (ibid.). The anti-communist state, anxious about persistent unrest and opposition, also introduced invasive systems to prevent the entry of communists, trade unionists and progressive religious leaders. Whites leaving de-colonising African states were welcomed and comprised a significant proportion of white immigrants to South Africa from the 1960s onwards (ibid.).

Owing to pre-Union migration and the use of indentured labour, South Africa had a substantial Indian population at the formation of the

Union in 1910. It was sufficiently large that in 1911 Indians outnumbered whites in Natal (Peberdy 2009). The population of Chinese immigrants was much smaller but was added to in the 1980s and early 1990s as immigrants arrived from Taiwan. They were allowed entry owing to business ties between Taiwan and South Africa (Peberdy 2009; Park 2005). Taiwan was willing to sell arms to apartheid South Africa and establish businesses and factories on the edge of homeland areas (Peberdy 2009). Since 1994 immigration from Taiwan has fallen and immigration from China has risen, reflecting a change in foreign policy favouring China over Taiwan. Thus, South Africa has a long history of both white and black migration and immigration from what are now other SADC countries, and an Indian and Chinese population whose roots in the country lie in the late 1800s and early 1900s. It seems this history has been forgotten. What is new is the entry of people from other parts of Africa in numbers not seen before, as well as the entry of new migrants from the Indian sub-continent and China.

2. Regulating migration from the past to the present

A century after the introduction of South Africa's first immigration legislation and almost 20 years since the end of apartheid, what has really changed in the migration regime of South Africa? Reflecting the many dilemmas posed by immigration to the post-apartheid state, it continued to use the exclusionary 1991 Aliens Control Act until 2002, when the first post-apartheid immigration legislation was introduced in the form of the Immigration Act (Act No. 13 of 2002) (Peberdy 2009, 1999; Segatti/Landau 2011). To meet Constitutional imperatives it had to be amended in 2004 (Act No. 19), and again in 2007 (Act No. 3) (Peberdy 2009; Segatti/Landau 2011). A third Immigration Amendment Act was introduced in 2011 (Act No. 13). Bi-lateral arrangements, most of which date back to the 1960s, pertaining to the entry of contract workers from neighbouring states to the mines and commercial agriculture remain in place under current legislation (Peberdy/Crush 2007; Crush 1999, 2000). This means that the mining and agricultural sectors continue to have preferential access to unskilled and semi-skilled labour from neighbouring states. Entry through restrictive

bi-lateral agreements which only allow entry to workers for specific periods of time for specific employers are essentially the only way for unskilled and semi-skilled workers to access South Africa. Refugee legislation was introduced for the first time in South Africa's history in 1998, although the Act did not come into force until 2000 (Segatti/Landau 2011; Peberdy 2009). It was subsequently amended in 2008 (Act No. 33) and 2011 (Act No. 12). The Refugee Act conforms to the United Nations and African Union definitions of a refugee. No targeted support is provided by the South African state to refugees and asylum seekers; however, they do have the right to work and study. So what effect have the changes to the legislative regime since 1994 had on the shape of migration to South Africa and do they reflect a reconstruction of South African national identity?

On the positive side, racist legislation, regulations and restrictions have been removed. The introduction of refugee legislation has allowed people to claim asylum in South Africa for the first time in the country's history. The Constitution of South Africa ostensibly protects the rights of citizen and non-citizen with the exception of economic rights, which are reserved for citizens only. Non-citizens (as in most countries) do not have the right to vote, but if documented hold all other political rights such as the right to join trade unions.[3] Notwithstanding constitutional protection, actions of the state and others have at times challenged the human rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (Amit 2011; Human Rights Watch 1998, 2005; Crush 1998). The racist and exclusionary policies of the past, which prevented black Africans from Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries from settling in South Africa were recognised in three 'amnesties' which allowed those who qualified to apply for permanent residence (Crush/Williams 1999; Johnston 2001). The first of 1995, which was not strictly an amnesty, applied to contract mineworkers who had been working on the mines for ten years. The second in 1996 allowed SADC nationals who had been living in South Africa as undocumented migrants for more than five years and who met various conditions to apply for permanent residence. The third, which ran from 1999 to 2000, was for Mozambican nationals who had fled to South Africa during the Mozambican war, many of whom had not applied in the SADC amnesty for permanent residence (Johnston 2001). Under the three 'amnesties', 51,504 mineworkers, 124,073 SADC nationals, and 82,969 Mozambicans

were given permanent residence (Crush/Williams 1999: 6-7; Johnston 2001: 4). The removal of racist restrictions on where people can live and do business (which had started to fall away from 1986) and the opening up of South Africa has provided opportunities for people from the rest of the continent and all over the world to visit, and in some cases to study, do business or work.

There has been some recognition of South Africa's membership of the SADC and obligations to the SADC in legislation and the signing of protocols (Oucho/Crush 2001; Williams 2006; Peberdy/Crush 2007). A year after South Africa joined the organisation in 1994, the SADC produced a draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons. This was vigorously opposed by the post-apartheid South African state, along with Namibia and Botswana. South Africa was instrumental in reconstructing the draft free movement protocol into the SADC Facilitation of Movement of Persons Protocol in1997. The draft Protocol went through several versions and was signed by six countries, including South Africa, in 2005. As of 2013 the ratification by the necessary nine countries still had not happened. The main clause of the Facilitation of Movement of Persons Protocol allows nationals of SADC countries to spend 90 days a year visa free in another SADC country. South Africa was among the first signatories to the Protocol and has put in place the 90 day concession for Zimbabweans. However, it seems the aim of the Protocol is to facilitate the movement of formal sector business people. Other entrepreneurs involved in small and medium scale cross-border trade do not benefit as much, as the 90 day rule does not meet their needs, since many spend longer travelling into and out of South Africa during the course of a year (Peberdy 2009; Peberdy/Rogerson 2003). Through regulations, students from SADC countries are charged a lower rate for study permits as compared to other international students.

Notwithstanding these achievements, the immigration regime of South Africa remains rooted in the past in its exclusionary nature and has largely maintained a security-oriented approach to policing and practice (Segatti/Landau 2011; Peberdy 2009). However, since 1994 and the formation of a democratic non-racial South African state with an ostensible commitment to the human rights of all, there have been changes to immigration legislation, policy and its practice, including the introduction of refugee legislation, changes which are reflected in patterns of migration. Table 2 shows

the impact of changes in immigration policy, legislation and its practice since 1994 insofar as these are largely reflected in fluctuations in the number of permanent residence applications approved since 1994 (Table 2).

3. Changing patterns of migration

The imperatives of an economy in need of skilled labour, in part made worse by the emigration of skilled professionals, ranging from nurses and teachers to engineers and doctors, meant that the 2002 Immigration Act created options for those with skills to enter the country (Segatti/Landau 2011; Peberdy 2009). It introduced 'extraordinary skills' work and permanent residence permits as well as 'corporate' and quota permits (Tables 2 and 3). 'Corporate' permits allow South African and international organisations and businesses to enable the entry of professionals for work purposes for specified periods of time. Quota permits were withdrawn in the 2011 Amendment Act. As in most countries, the entry of those with large sums of money to invest in business is relatively easy. Thus, the legislation is ostensibly welcoming to those with skills and money. Table 1 shows the impact of the 2002 Act, and subsequent amending Acts, on the issue of permanent residence permits, which increased substantially after its introduction. Table 1 does not record the nearly 260,000 SADC nationals granted permanent residence in the three 'amnesties' of the 1990s.

Administrative inefficiency, which may or may not be just inefficiency, has meant that applying for work and permanent residence permits can be a long and time consuming process. Delays in the early 2010s were due to the centralisation of the processing of permit applications in Pretoria in May 2011, in an attempt to reduce corruption. However, the Department was understaffed and unable to cope. A special team of adjudicators was put in place in January 2012, which cleared a backlog of 46,000 applications for study and work permits by the end of August 2012 (Chohan 2012). However, work and study permits were still taking some time to process. The remedial actions of the Department of Home Affairs could have been in response to a court decision in November 2011 which found in favour of the appellants and where the judge found that the Department had "dealt

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net gain/loss
1990	14 499	4 722	+ 9 777
1991	12 379	4 256	+ 8 123
1992	8 686	4 289	+ 4 397
1993	9 824	8 078	+ 1 746
1994	6 398	10 235	-3 837
1995*	5 064	8 725	-3661
1996**	5 407	9 078	-3671
1997	4 103	8 946	-4 843
1998	4 371	8 276	-3 905
1999	3 669	8 487	-4 818
2000***	3 053	10 262	-7 209

*Table 2: Number of immigrants and emigrants and net gain/loss, 1990–2011 **
Source: Peberdy 2009; DHA 2009: 27, 2010: 71, 2011: 43; Statistics South Africa 2012b: 35*

Year	New Work Permits	Renewals	Total
1990	7 657	30 915	38 571
1991	4 117	32 763	36 880
1992	5 581	33 318	38 899
1993	5 741	30 810	36 551
1994	8 714	29 352	38 066
1995	11 053	32 838	43 891
1996	19 498	33 206	52 704
1997	11 361	17 129	28 490
1998	10 828	11 207	22 035
1999	13 163	10 136	23 299

Table 3: Work permits issued: 1990–2000; 2004; 2006–2008; 2010–2011
Source: Crush/Williams 2010: 16; DHA 2006, 2007b, 2008, 2009, 2010

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net gain/loss
2001	4 832	12 260	-7 428
2002	6 545	10 890	-4 345
2003	10 578	16 165	-5 587
2004	10 714	n/l	n/l
2005	17 771	n/l	n/l
2006	2 136	n/l	n/l
2007	9 235	n/l	n/l
2008	3 817	n/l	n/l
2009	4 083	n/l	n/l
2010	5 476	n/l	n/l
2011	10 011	n/l	n/l

* *Immigrants are defined as permanent resident applications approved. The number of emigrants is likely to be underestimated, as people do not have to declare they are emigrating when leaving the country permanently. The table does not include those awarded permanent residence through the three 'amnesties'.*

Year	New Work Permits	Renewals	Total
2000	6 643	9 191	15 834
2001-3	n/a	n/a	n/a
2004	4 185	n/a	n/a
2006	17 205	n/a	n/a
2007	19 601	n/a	n/a
2008	32 344	n/a	n/a
2009	n/a	n/a	n/a
2010	5 926	n/a	n/a
2011	132 577*	n/a	n/a

* *This figure was inflated by the Documentation of Zimbabweans Project, which regularised the stay of Zimbabweans.*

Year	South Africa	Botswana	Lesotho
1990	199 810	14 609	99 707
1991	182 226	14 028	93 897
1992	166 261	12 781	93 519
1993	149 148	11 904	89 940
1994	142 839	11 099	89 237
1995	122 562	10 961	87 935
1996	122 104	10 477	81 357
1997	108 163	9 385	76 361
1998	97 620	7 752	60 450
1999	99 387	6 413	52 188
2000	99 575	6 494	58 224
2001	99 560	4 763	49 483
2002	116 554	4 227	54 157
2003	113 545	4 204	54 479
2004	121 369	3 924	48 962
2005	133 178	3 264	46 049
2006	164 989	2 992	46 082

Table 4: Mineworkers on the South African Gold Mines, 1990–2006
Source: Crush/Williams 2010: 11

with the applications of the applicants' various clients in a manner which can only be described as 'administrative bungling'" (Eisenberg 2011). In 2013 there was still a backlog of 18,772 files of permanent resident applications (which could have contained applications from more than one person), suggesting that, given new applications, the backlog would take some time to reduce and indicates a lack of urgency or commitment to the process (Pandor 2013).

Unskilled and semi-skilled workers from the rest of the continent still struggle to enter South Africa legally. However, the legislation has maintained adherence to the bi-lateral agreements with neighbouring states, agreements which, although some have been amended, have been in place since the 1960s and 1970s. These allow contract workers to enter South

Mozambique	Swaziland	% Foreign	Total
44 590	17 757	47	376 473
47 105	17 393	49	354 649
50 651	16 273	51	339 485
50 311	16 153	53	317 456
56 197	15 892	55	315 264
55 140	15 304	58	291 902
55 741	14 371	58	284 050
55 879	12 960	59	262 748
51 913	10 336	57	228 071
46 537	9 307	54	213 832
57 034	9 360	57	230 687
45 900	7 841	52	207 547
51 355	8 698	50	234 991
53 829	7 970	51	234 027
48 918	7 598	47	230 771
46 975	6 993	43	236 459
46 707	7 124	38	267 894

Africa from Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland to work on the mines and commercial farms for the duration of their contract (Crush 1999, 2000). Due to changes in the mining regime, legislation and hiring practices, as well as declining employment, there has been a significant fall in the number of foreign workers on the gold mines since the mid-1990s (Table 4). Continued undocumented migration, mainly from neighbouring states and other SADC countries, reflects the difficulties that many have in negotiating the existing immigration regime. Undocumented or irregular migration takes up most of the debates on migration in South Africa, where particularly Africans from elsewhere on the continent are all too often assumed to be in the country without papers (Peberdy 2009). There is a consensus amongst many researchers in the field that the number of

irregular migrants in the country at any one time is likely to range between 1.5 and 2.5 million people (Polzer 2010).

South Africa has become a significant destination for asylum seekers and refugees since 1994, attracting people from refugee producing countries across the continent as well as further afield. In 2013, the UNHCR gave the number of refugees in South Africa as 57,899 and the number of asylum seekers as 219,368 (UNHCR 2013). Of the asylum seekers, 63,000 claims were awaiting adjudication and 156,000 cases were undecided on appeal (UNHCR 2013). The majority of recognised refugees were from Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Somalia. The majority of asylum seekers were from Bangladesh, the DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia and Zimbabwe.

Despite ostensibly protective legislation, attempts have been made to reduce the number of people claiming asylum and obstacles have been put in the way of making applications (Amit 2011). In part, this may have been as a result of the use of the asylum system by largely unskilled and semi-skilled people unable to find any other way to get a permit to allow them to stay in South Africa and work. Refugee reception offices taking new applications for asylum were closed down in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth in 2011 and 2012, although court applications initially overturned some of these decisions. In 2013 only three offices remained where new applications could be made, these being Durban, Musina and Pretoria. Economic and political crises and repression in Zimbabwe led, starting in the early 2000s, to an unprecedented outflow of migrants to South Africa. Some were political refugees claiming asylum, others were looking for economic opportunities but could only gain legal access to South Africa through the asylum system. To attempt to clear the backlog, a special programme was put in place in 2010-2011 for Zimbabweans to allow them to apply for work, study and permanent residence permits if they met certain conditions. Some 275,762 applications were received (Hammerstad 2011). Although beneficial to many Zimbabweans, the programme was more an attempt to clear backlogs in the asylum system than an act of consideration for the circumstances of many Zimbabweans in South Africa.

Notwithstanding the legal morass that people must wade through, since 1994, in order to enter South Africa, there has been a significant change in migration patterns and in the number of people passing through

South Africa's border posts and/or ports of entry. This change in migration patterns and numbers of people passing through the country's border posts appears to be more of a revolving door for people spending time in South Africa while doing business (informally or formally), visiting friends and relatives, working and studying than people entering the country permanently. This increase appears to have been accompanied by an increase in the number of people entering the country without documents.

Tables 2 and 3 show the number of permanent residence and work permits issued for selected years between 1990 and 2011. They show that there has not been a significant increase in the number of permanent and temporary residence applications approved as compared to pre-1994 figures. Table 2 indicates that since 1994, where data is available, there has been a net loss in immigrants. However, permanent and temporary residence applications approved through the 'amnesties' and the special programme for Zimbabweans have increased the numbers, but these programmes simply regularised the stay of people already in the country. Table 4 shows the substantial decline in the number and proportion of foreign mineworkers in the gold mines since the mid-1990s. Perhaps the most significant change, although not in terms of numbers, has been the increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees, after South Africa became a signatory to the United Nations and African Union conventions on refugee status. This has increased the range of countries from which new residents of South Africa are drawn.

	African	**Asian**	**Coloured**	**White**
2001	1.6	3.0	0.4	9.3
2011	3.9	7.3	0.4	8.5

*Table 5: Percentage of population group not born in South Africa**

Source: Statistics South Africa 2003: 23, 2012a: 41

* *Note that those not born in South Africa could include people who were or who have become South African citizens. Population group categories are those used by Statistics South Africa.*

Data from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses indicate that there was a noticeable increase in the foreign born population in the decade 2001 to 2011 (Table 5). In part this is likely to be a result of the outflow of migrants from Zimbabwe in the 2000s, but at the time of writing this cannot be confirmed. Census 2011 found that 4.4% of the population of South Africa was born outside the country, with the proportion rising to 9.5% in the most populous province, Gauteng (Statistics South Africa 2012a: 40). This represents an increase from 2.3 % and 5.4 % respectively in the 2001 Census (Statistics South Africa 2003: 22). Reflecting the changing face of migration in South Africa, the proportion of the black African and Asian population born outside the country more than doubled to 3.9% and 7.3% respectively between 2001 and 2011 (Statistics South Africa 2012a: 41, 2003: 23) (Table 5). At the same time, the proportion of the white population born outside the country fell by almost 1 %.

Perhaps where changes in the migration landscape of South Africa are most visible is in the significant increase in temporary migration, including visits (for tourism, family, shopping and trade) to South Africa, which is shown through data recording the number of times the border has been crossed and for which purposes. This to-and-fro traffic is dominated by SADC nationals and other Africans. This data demonstrates the vast increase in border crossings since 1994, and while the data do not show how many people are involved (the same person entering South Africa 10 times in a year is counted 10 times), it does show how the streets and shops of the country may look and sound very different than in the past. Furthermore, the opening of South Africa to refugees, migrants and immigrants from all over the world has meant that people have arrived from countries not previously included and in numbers not previously seen.

4. Xenophobia and post-apartheid South Africa

On 26 February 2013 a Mozambican mini-bus taxi driver, Mido Macia, was handcuffed to the back of a police van by policemen and dragged behind it. It seems that then after being put in the van, he later died of head and internal injuries in a police cell in Daveyton on the East Rand of Gauteng (Mail & Guardian, 28.2.2013). Was this just another case of

police brutality, or was his lack of South African nationality a contributing factor?[4] We may never know but it is certainly a question that should be asked following reactions of the state to the xenophobic attacks of 2008 and the strongly held xenophobic opinions of some South Africans. This incident occurred almost five years after the wave of xenophobic attacks of May 2008 and like the attacks of May 2008 is a reflection of the rise in xenophobia since 1994 which has been an unfortunate, unavoidable and constant feature of the migration landscape in South Africa since 1994.

The rise in xenophobic attacks on foreigners since 1994 in a democratic South Africa is confusing given the history of the country and the commitment of the post-apartheid government to human rights and diversity, and requires interrogation.[5] The increase in the number of migrants may provide some clue, but does not appear substantial enough to provide reasons for the extremity of some reactions to foreigners, particularly given the long history of migration to South Africa. The first attacks seem to have occurred after the advent of democracy at the end of 1994, with a rash of incidents in Alexandra (a formerly black township in Johannesburg) directed at black Africans from neighbouring states. Other than ethnic clashes in the mines between different groups of mineworkers (which appear to have had causes other than xenophobia), attacks on black African nationals by South African black citizens prior to 1994 have not been recorded (Peberdy 2009).

The xenophobic attacks of May 2008 left over 60 people dead and tens of thousands of people displaced from their homes. As many as a third of those killed were South African citizens. All of those who were killed were black Africans. It seems the majority of the South Africans killed and displaced spoke Shangaan, a language also spoken by some Mozambicans. The attacks were concentrated in various parts of Johannesburg and Cape Town, although there were other incidents in the Eastern Cape and Durban. During the course of the attacks, in some cases (at least in Alexandra) people went through communities demanding to see South African ID books, mirroring the actions of the apartheid state and the pass system, i.e., do you have a permit to be here? These were not the first xenophobic attacks on foreigners, nor have they been the last. The targets of most have been black Africans from elsewhere on the continent. Newspapers regularly report on attacks on foreigners whether these be individual cases or more

concerted attempts to remove foreigners from neighbourhoods. What lies behind these attitudes and who holds them?

Research has shown that, compared to citizens of other countries, South Africans harbour some of the most extreme opinions when it comes to foreigners (Landau et al. 2011; SAMP 2008; McDonald et al. 1998). A 2011 study of the quality of life in Gauteng by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory found that over a third of residents said that Gauteng should be for South Africans only and that all foreigners should leave (Peberdy 2012, 2013). Research indicates that race, class and gender do not play a significant role in determining people's opinions regarding foreigners in South Africa (Peberdy 2012, 2013; SAMP 2008; McDonald et al. 1998). However, research subsequent to the outbreak of violence in May 2008 does indicate that where people live, how long they have been living in cities, and their access to services and housing (or perceived access) may play a role; however, these relationships are complex (FMSP 2009; IOM 2009; Peberdy 2012; Peberdy/Jara 2011; Ngwane 2009; Amisi et al. 2011; Hassim et al. 2009). Research in Gauteng suggests that, contrary to what may be thought, people living in informal settlements and in sectors where cross border migrants work were least likely to hold the most hostile views towards migrants (Peberdy 2013).

A study of the role of civil society in responding to the outbreak of violence in May 2008 also provides some valuable insights (see a special issue of *Politikon* 2011 and www.atlanticphilanthropies.org). It was civil society, through faith based (Christian, Jewish and Muslim) and community organisations, that was the first to respond and provide assistance to displaced people. It also has to be said that it was only a small minority of South Africans who participated in the violence and that many others stood up to prevent further attacks and to protect foreigners in their communities. However, this study also revealed the extent of the distance between foreigners and South Africans in civil society (Peberdy/Jara 2011). Few civil society organisations have integrated South Africans and non-South Africans in their work. The trade union movement was slow to respond, and although some workshops were held with shop stewards, there was little evidence of a concerted response to xenophobia and the attacks (Hlatshwayo 2011). This is despite the fact that two of the largest unions in COSATU (the body bringing together most South African trade unions),

namely the National Union of Mineworkers and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, have a relatively substantial non-South African membership.

Although the national government initially decried the attacks as xenophobic, within a week the attacks began to be discussed in terms of criminality rather than as attacks on people because of the nationality they held (Peberdy/Jara 2011; Friedman 2009). Notwithstanding the incident in Daveyton in 2013 and recorded incidences of police harassment, the police provided immediate protection to those forced from their homes in 2008 as people fled to police stations, where they were housed until alternative shelter could be found, initially mostly in community centres, churches and mosques. Although the state eventually stepped in through city governments, municipalities and provinces to provide shelter for those displaced in Gauteng and Cape Town, a number of issues arose in both places. At times displaced people made claims on the state, complained about conditions in the transit camps where they were being housed and questioned the veracity of the state when it said it would protect their children when they returned to school (Peberdy/Jara 2011; Robins 2009). Responses by the state and some civil society organisations to protests by displaced people (which took place mainly in Cape Town) and questions from them regarding living conditions in the camps and their futures suggested they should be grateful and not question or make any demands (Robins 2009).

5. Nation building, migration policy and xenophobia

So where does this leave us? How does immigration policy reflect the post-1994 nation building aspirations of South Africa? Can the post-apartheid nation building process provide clues to ongoing xenophobia? The apartheid and colonial states which, although at times welcoming to all white immigrants to build the (white) nation, were at other times extremely restrictive, as they chose to only allow in white immigrants who fitted their image of (white) South African national identity of the time. The post-apartheid state which, although it has introduced measures to redress past racist immigration policies, nevertheless relied on apartheid immigration legislation for nearly a decade and has maintained a largely exclusionary

immigration policy and introduced exclusionary legislation. This is a policy (like that of many other countries) which prioritises the entry of the skilled and wealthy, has maintained the privileges held by the mining and agricultural sectors in relation to access to unskilled and semi-skilled contract labour, and still excludes many potential African migrants and immigrants. The refugee and asylum seeking policy appears to be increasingly exclusionary, where measures such as the closing down of refugee reception centres can be construed as placing obstacles in the way of people claiming asylum, in order to discourage asylum seekers from seeking refuge in South Africa.

It is not possible to equate the immigration regimes of the apartheid and post-apartheid governments. However, it is worth exploring how the policies of the post-apartheid state may be influenced by the way the state has constructed South African national identity since 1994 and what factors underpin its anxieties about immigration. At this stage it is not possible to explain the seemingly head in the sand approach of the ANC and of the state to xenophobia since 1994. However, the process of building a national identity which has emphasized the rights (as well as obligations) of all citizens regardless of race and that for the first time all South Africans have a right to make claims on the state may be relevant to understanding the rise of xenophobia since 1994.

In 1994 the new ANC led government inherited a country where a significant proportion of the population lacked access to proper housing, water, electricity and sanitation and a high proportion of the population were illiterate or semi-literate. Education, health and other essential services were geared towards supporting the white population and needed upgrading. Inequality between black and white was high. In 1994 the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was introduced, which was essentially a social democratic approach to redistribution and development. It was replaced by the Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) in 1996, which focused more on growth and black economic empowerment through accessing capital (Mushongera 2013). The economic and development strategies of the state have had some success. Successive censuses show that access to housing, water, electricity, education and health services have improved significantly. Despite these successes, in 2013 unemployment remained high, particularly amongst youth, income

inequality between black and white showed little change between the 2001 and 2011 censuses, and many people were still waiting for housing and other services (Statistics South Africa 2003, 2012a).

Pre-apartheid and apartheid patterns of migration reflect the different forms of the South African state, the political and economic imperatives of various governments, the inherent racism of the Union and Republican governments, as well as the way that the state constructed successive national identities (Peberdy 2009). How have the ways that the post-apartheid state constructed South African national identity influenced immigration policy and patterns of migration? The South African state, through the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, has established that the state sees its identity as one with a commitment to human rights. This can be seen in the introduction of refugee legislation and the protection of the basic human rights of non-nationals by the Constitution. The state no longer predicates South African national identity on the racial criteria of the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s; neither does it do so on the primordial ethnic and racial criteria of Afrikaner nationalism of the 1950s, nor on the white anti-communist Protestantism following the formation of the Republic in 1961.

Because the state has been trying to build a nation out of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, sections of which were at war with each other prior to 1994, it cannot rely on a common culture, ethnicity or primordial identities to create its 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991). Instead, emphasis has been placed on forging a nation based on a shared but divided history, on citizenship and loyalty to the state and nation (Peberdy 2009). Thus, the focus is on history, citizenship, and the participation of all citizens, regardless of differences in the rights and obligations of citizenship (ibid.). Those who do not share this history or citizenship are questionable new members of the nation. The amnesties for SADC nationals of the 1990s appear to have wiped the historical slate clean for the South African state. The racist immigration policies of the past, which had disadvantaged SADC nationals, were rectified. The shared history of exclusion of SADC nationals could thus be put aside. The shift from the RDP project to GEAR has meant that there has been a focus, in economic and development policy, on a particular kind of economic growth which opens the borders to people with skills and money to invest. The maintenance of the privileged access of the mining and agricultural sectors to contract migrant labour reflects

current economic policies. However, this does not explain why Africans from elsewhere on the continent are the target of xenophobic violence or are most affected by changes in the immigration regime of the post-1994 democratic South African state. This latter question warrants a study of its own. Nevertheless, the competition for resources amongst a still economically stressed black South African working class, the continued demand for services, and perceptions that African migrants may challenge these, may all play a role. However, it is also true that migrants and immigrants are seen as outsiders, as people who do not belong, because they do not share South Africa's history or citizenship, and if they were to obtain the latter could be seen (whether realistically or not) as a threat to accessing the newly won rights of citizenship.

1 Unless otherwise stated in this paper immigration policy encompasses permanent migration (immigration), temporary and contract migration, as well as refugee policy.
2 The 1937 Aliens Act succeeded the 1930 Quota Act which was designed to exclude East European Jews. The 1937 Act enabled the exclusion of German Jews (Peberdy 2009).
3 Permanent residence allows a person to live permanently in the country. A permanent resident who meets the necessary conditions can then apply for citizenship. As part of the CODESA agreement to regulate transition to a democratic government, permanent residents were allowed to vote in the 1994 elections but not in subsequent elections where only citizens are allowed to vote.
4 In 2011–2012, 720 deaths in police custody were reported to the Independent Police Investigative Directorate of which 'one in five involved police criminality' (The Mercury, 27.3.2013).
5 For analyses of the 2008 violence see Amisi et al. 2011; Everatt 2011; FMSP 2009; IOM 2009; Peberdy/Jara 2009.

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Abstracts

This article deals with the relationship between the changes in the form of the South African state and the concomitant changes in the ways in which the state has constructed South African national identity on the one hand, and changes in the immigration regime and patterns of migration on the other. It starts by providing an overview of changes in migration and migration patterns in South Africa since the formation of the Union in 1910, placing them in historical context. It then examines post-apartheid changes in legislation, practice and migration patterns. It also briefly explores the rise of xenophobia since 1994. In conclusion, changes in

the immigration regime, patterns of migration and the rise of xenophobia are explored in the context of the post-1994 nation-building project of the South African post-apartheid state.

Der Aufsatz setzt sich mit der Beziehung zwischen dem Wandel der Staatsform Südafrikas und der damit einhergehenden Veränderungen in der staatlich vorangetriebenen Formierung seiner nationalen Identität einerseits und dem Wandel des Immigrationsregimes und der Migrationsmuster andererseits auseinander. Er beginnt mit einem Überblick über die Veränderungen von Migration und Migrationsmustern seit der Gründung der Union im Jahr 1910 und stellt diese in einen historischen Kontext. Dazu werden die Veränderungen in der Gesetzgebung, ihrer Handhabung sowie den Migrationsmustern in der Post-Apartheid-Ära untersucht. Nach einer kurzen Skizze zur Zunahme an Xenophobie seit 1994 werden die Veränderungen im Immigrationsregime und in den Migrationsmustern sowie die zunehmende Xenophobie im Kontext des Nation-Building-Konzepts des südafrikanischen Post-Apartheid-Staates diskutiert.

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Arno Sonderegger, Ingeborg Grau, Birgit Englert (Hg.): Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert. Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Wien: Promedia 2011 (= Edition Weltregionen, Bd. 21), 256 Seiten, 24,90 Euro.

Als Nachfolgeband zu dem im Jahr zuvor veröffentlichten *Afrika 1500–1900* (Eckert et al. 2010) führt dieser Sammelband in die Geschichte Afrikas im 20. Jahrhundert ein. Er präsentiert keinen Gesamtüberblick, sondern ermöglicht in zwölf Aufsätzen thematische Einstiege, die zumeist verschiedene Regionen Afrikas behandeln. Der in der Einleitung von den HerausgeberInnen umrissene Ansatz liegt nahe bei Frederick Coopers (2002) *Vergangenheit der Gegenwart* und so stellen sich alle AutorInnen die Frage nach der Bedeutung und den Folgen des Kolonialismus für das heutige Afrika. Die Beschäftigung mit dem Erbe des Kolonialismus – dem „kolonialen Schatten", wie die HerausgeberInnen schreiben (S. 11) – impliziert dabei eine Zurückweisung der auf den nigerianischen Historiker Jacob Ade Ajayi zurückgehenden Einordnung der Kolonialzeit als „ephemere Episode" von relativ kurzer Dauer und mit geringen Auswirkungen auf die Sozialstrukturen Afrikas. Das bedeutet allerdings nicht, dass dieses Buch einer klaren Einteilung der Geschichte in Täter und Opfer, in europäische Aktion und afrikanische Reaktion das Wort redet, vielmehr wird immer wieder die *african agency* hervorgehoben. Die koloniale – wie die nachkoloniale – Geschichte Afrikas ist eine *entangled history*, aber nicht im Sinne einer bloßen gemeinsamen Erfahrung, sondern als „vielfach gebrochene, vermittelte, umkämpfte und ausgehandelte Begegnungsprozesse" (S. 17), die geprägt waren durch Ungleichheit und Machtgefälle, was sich besonders in der asymmetrischen Einbindung Afrikas in die Weltwirtschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts und in den Entwicklungen von Staatlichkeit ausdrückt.

Vor diesem theoretischen Hintergrund beginnt das Buch mit drei Beiträgen zu *kolonialen Grenzziehungen und afrikanischem (National-)Staat* (Henning Melber), *Nation, Staat und Ethnizität* (Andreas Eckert) und zur Einbindung Afrikas in die Weltwirtschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts

(Walter Schicho), die mit unterschiedlichen Formen der Kontrolle durch koloniale bzw. globale Metropolen einherging. Das Thema Panafrikanismus und politische Integration Afrikas ist mit zwei Beiträgen von Arno Sonderegger und Thomas Spielbüchler gut vertreten. Zum Themenbereich Religion und Mission gibt es einen Beitrag über *Muslime in Afrika* (Roman Loimeier) und die Länderstudie *Religion und Politik in Nigeria* (Ingeborg Grau). Weitere Aufsätze beschäftigen sich mit den sozialen und politischen Implikationen von Gesundheit und Heilung (Hansjörg Dilger), der Rolle der jungen Generation in politischen Konflikten (Birgit Englert) sowie mit Urbanisierung und Migration (Susann Baller).

Speziell das südliche Afrika behandelt der zweite Beitrag von Henning Melber *(Die Grenzen der Emanzipation im südlichen Afrika. Befreiungsbewegungen an der Macht)*, der 2009 auf Englisch im *Review of African Political Economy* erschien und der sich auf Südafrika, Namibia und Simbabwe bezieht. Melber beklagt bei den zu Regierungsparteien gewordenen Befreiungsbewegungen ANC, SWAPO und ZANU eine – manchmal sogar mehr als nur mentale – Fortsetzung des Kampfes nach dem Sieg, eine Militarisierung des Politischen. Dies zeige sich nicht nur in politischen Ritualen einer Überhöhung, ja einer Mythologisierung des eigenen Kampfes, wobei die Aufarbeitung interner Gewalt während des Kampfes zu kurz kommt. Auch habe der Überlebenskampf gegen einen militärisch überlegenen Feind, in dem Misstrauen und Angst allgegenwärtig waren, zu Herrschaftstechniken geführt, die in der Nachkriegspolitik wenig Raum für politische Kompromisse ließen. Die Toleranz gegenüber neuen politischen Strömungen sei gering, da politischer Dissens als Verrat verstanden und mit der altbekannten Rhetorik des bewaffneten Kampfes beantwortet werde. Nicht die angeblich übertriebenen Erwartungen der breiten Bevölkerung würden die politische Stabilität gefährden, sondern wohl eher die Enttäuschung einer relativ kleinen Gruppe von AktivistInnen, hier besonders der (vermeintlichen oder echten) Veteranen des Befreiungskampfes in Simbabwe, wo die Gewalt seit Jahren über die Ebene der politischen Rhetorik hinausgehe. Melbers Beitrag ist eine bemerkenswerte Mahnung zur Selbstkritik, die sich nicht nur an die Regierenden richtet, sondern

auch an deren teilweise jahrzehntelang aktiven UnterstützerInnen, das heißt explizit auch ihn selbst.

Das Buch wird abgerundet mit Arno Sondereggers *Nachbetrachtung zur Kolonialgeschichte und Historiographie Afrikas*, ein geschichtswissenschaftlicher Überblick, der die Kritik des Buches an eurozentrischen Perspektiven auf Afrika am Beispiel von Periodisierungen der afrikanischen Geschichte aufnimmt und bündelt. Dem Band fehlt vielleicht ein Beitrag, der die Transformation von Krieg und politischer Gewalt im Laufe des 20. Jahrhunderts untersucht. Abgesehen davon bietet er interessante Zugänge zur afrikanischen Geschichte, die die hoffentlich zahlreichen LeserInnen auch dank der reichhaltigen Verweise auf weiterführende Literatur zu einer weiteren Vertiefung anregen sollten.

Frank Schubert

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Eckert, Andreas/Grau, Ingeborg/Sonderegger, Arno (Hg., 2010): Afrika 1500–1900. Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Wien: Promedia.

Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Gita Dharampal-Frick, Minou Friele (Hg.): Die Interkulturalitätsdebatte – Leit- und Streitbegriffe (Intercultural Discourse – Key and Contested Concepts). Freiburg: Karl Alber 2012, 364 Seiten, 29,00 Euro.

In diesem interessanten ‚Wörterbuch' werden 38 Begriffe von ExpertInnen kenntnisreich diskutiert. Erwartungsgemäß werden dort Begriffe wie „Transkulturalität", „Multiculturism", „Ethnozentrismus" etc. behandelt, aber auch „Neoliberalismus" und „Globalisierung" sind zu finden. Das Problem des Schutzes von „Indigenous Knowledge und Intellectual Property" wurde ebenfalls nicht vergessen. Die Herausgeberinnen haben sich dafür entschieden, 17 Beiträge in englischer Sprache im Original zu veröffentlichen. Nahezu die Hälfte der Beiträge wurde von PhilosophInnen geschrieben, ein Fünftel von PolitologInnen und der Rest von VertreterInnen anderer Disziplinen (Soziologie, Ethnologie, Geschichte etc.).

Clare Palmer, eine junge Philosophin, die in den USA lehrt, hat einen vorzüglichen Beitrag über „Global Warming" geschrieben.

Sie hat sich auch mit dem Thema „Sustainability“ beschäftigt und hätte dazu sicher ebenfalls einen guten Beitrag liefern können, aber leider fehlt dieses Thema in dem sonst so umfassend angelegten Buch. „Generationengerechtigkeit“ (Michael Schefczyk), „Globalisierung“ (Matthias Kettner) und „Terrorismus“ (Georg Meggle) werden ebenfalls von Philosophen sehr kompetent dargestellt. Die Internationalität der AutorInnenschaft ist beeindruckend, es fehlen allerdings Stimmen aus dem frankophonen Bereich.

Die klare Trennung der Begriffsbestimmungen ist sicher ein Vorzug dieses Buchs. Wünschenswert wäre manchmal eine gemeinsame Behandlung konträrer Begriffe gewesen, so etwa bei „Handlungsmacht/Autonomie“ und „Heteronomie“. In beiden Beiträgen wird der Begriff „agency“ erwähnt, aber leider nicht der damit verbundene Begriff „negotiation“. In der einschlägigen Literatur wird immer darauf verwiesen, dass der autonome *agent* sich mit anderen *agents* arrangieren muss, dazu bedarf es des Aushandelns (*negotiation*). Das ist auch für die Interkulturalität ein zentrales Thema und es ist schade, dass er hier nicht behandelt wird.

Ein wichtiger Begriff für alle derzeitigen Kulturdebatten ist jener der „Transkulturalität“, der hier von seinem ‚Erfinder‘, dem Philosophen Wolfgang Welsch vorgestellt wird. Er wendet sich gegen Herders „Kugelmodell“ der Kultur, das auch nach einem in der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts gängigen Begriff als Modell der „fensterlosen Monaden“ bezeichnet werden könnte. Die heutigen Kulturen haben nicht nur große Fenster, sondern sind in vielfältiger Weise vernetzt. Fremdeinflüsse durchdringen die verschiedenen Kulturen. Dies wird durch den Begriff der „Cultural Hybridity“ eingefangen, der in diesem Buch von dem Soziologen Jan Nederveen Pieterse behandelt wird. Pieterse betont, dass der Begriff der Hybridität Grenzen infrage stellt, die bisher fraglos hingenommen wurden. Er spricht auch von einer „intercontinental crossover culture“ und kommt damit dem Anliegen von Welsch sehr nahe. Doch machen die beiden Beiträge auch deutlich, dass es sich hier um zwei verschiedene Diskurse handelt, die nebeneinander bestehen.

Auf religiösem Gebiet hat „Hybridity“ ihre Entsprechung im „Syncretism“, der von Anita Maria Leopold dargestellt wird. Hier

haben wir es mit einem sehr alten Diskurs zu tun, der bis zur Entstehung des Christentums in einem synkretistischen Umfeld zurückreicht. Leopold definiert Synkretismus als einen kognitiven Prozess, der dazu führt, dass Ähnlichkeiten gesehen werden, die zuvor nicht bemerkt wurden. Dieser Prozess führt dann auch meist zu neuen religiösen Praktiken. VertreterInnen der ‚reinen Lehre' bekämpfen einen solchen Synkretismus. Sie werden als „FundamentalistInnen" bezeichnet. Dem Problem des Fundamentalismus widmet Bassam Tibi seinen Beitrag, in dem es in erster Linie um die islamische Variante geht, die er als Islamismus bezeichnet.

Diese punktuelle Darstellung zeigt die Vielfalt – und manchmal auch die Dissonanz – der Diskurse, die den LeserInnen geboten wird. Dies ist ein Verdienst der Herausgeberinnen und AutorInnen dieses Buchs. Das Versprechen, ‚Streitbegriffe' zu thematisieren, wird von ihnen auf eindrucksvolle Weise eingelöst.

Dietmar Rothermund

Hermann Mückler, Gerald Faschingeder (Hg.): Tradition und Traditionalismus. Zur Instrumentalisierung eines Identitätskonzeptes. Wien: Promedia 2012 (=Historische Sozialkunde/ Internationale Entwicklung – HSK/IE 31), 248 Seiten, 24,90 Euro.

Tradition und Identität, Tradition und Instrumentalisierung, Tradition und Globalisierung – bei der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff der Tradition werden unterschiedliche Themenfelder angeschnitten. Im vorliegenden Sammelband beschäftigen sich insgesamt 13 AutorInnen mit verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen von Tradition im Spannungsfeld zwischen Authentizität und Imagination sowie der Instrumentalisierung derselben als Traditionalismus. Hierbei wird nicht der Anspruch gestellt, eine einheitliche, quasi ‚zitierfertige' Definition dieser Begriffe zu geben, sondern anhand von Beispielen deren Vielgestaltigkeit in Bezug auf analytischem Zugang, Verständnis, Kontext und damit verbundene Problematiken aufzuzeigen.

Als grundlegend für die Auseinandersetzung mit Traditionalismen erscheint die Identifizierung von authentischen und ‚erfundenen'

Traditionen. In vielen Beiträgen wird daher auf das häufig zitierte Konzept der „invented traditions“ von Eric Hobsbawm und Terence Ranger zurückgegriffen. Sie entlarven in ihrem 1983 erschienenen Werk *The Invention of Tradition* angeblich uralte nationalistische Traditionen als relativ rezente Produkte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Der Untertitel *Zur Instrumentalisierung eines Identitätskonzeptes* verrät bereits den Fokus auf eben jene ‚erfundenen‘, nicht-intrinsischen Traditionen und deren Vereinnahmung. Die zentralen Fragen sind dabei, wer bestimmt, was ‚Tradition‘ ist und zu welchen Zwecken diese – bewusst oder unbewusst – geschaffen und erhalten wird. Die Analyse der Funktionen von Traditionen, also der Herstellung von Zugehörigkeiten und Legitimierung von Machtverhältnissen steht somit im Mittelpunkt der Beiträge. Abgedeckt wird dabei eine Vielzahl an Themenbereichen: Es erfolgt die theoretische Auseinandersetzung mit Tradition in der Ethnologie bzw. Volkskunde, mit Tradition als Macht- und Klassenfrage, der Ökonomisierung von Tradition oder Tradition im Zusammenhang mit der Produktivität der Sprache. Anhand mehrerer Fallstudien aus verschiedenen Epochen und Regionen werden Beispiele von Traditionalismen verdeutlicht. Diese umfassen etwa den Andreas-Hofer-Mythos in Tirol, die Bedeutung von Traditionalismen im deutschen Kolonialismus, indigene Kunst in Australien oder Traditionalisierungen des Postsozialismus der ex-jugoslawischen Länder.

Dabei befasst sich der Band zentral mit den drei zusammenhängenden Phänomenen Tradition, Traditionalismus und Tradierung. Unter letzterer wird der Prozess der Überlieferung verstanden. Traditionalismus dagegen ist, wie oben bereits erwähnt, die Veränderung und Vereinnahmung von Tradition. Durch Selektion wird diese zu bestimmten Zwecken neu interpretiert, das heißt: instrumentalisiert. Eine eindeutige Definition des Begriffs Tradition selbst ist jedoch gerade nicht der Anspruch des Buches, wie in der Einleitung erklärt wird. Vielmehr legen die AutorInnen verschiedene, sich ergänzende Verständnisse dar und zeichnen damit ein vielfältiges Bild der Facetten von Tradition.

Eine erste, oberflächliche Assoziation zum Begriff Tradition umfasst die Gesamtheit der traditionellen Praktiken, also „Sitten und Bräuche“. Tradition wird dabei häufig mit dem Dauerhaften,

Archaischen verbunden und als Gegensatz zur Moderne dargestellt. Diese Dauerhaftigkeit kann auch zu Legitimierungszwecken imaginiert werden – etwa wenn das Argument lautet, das etwas Qualität habe oder nicht verändert werden könne oder solle, „weil es ja schon immer so war".

In fast jedem Beitrag wird weiterhin die identitätsstiftende Funktion von Tradition betont. Tradition dient demnach zur Konstruktion von (kollektiven) Identitäten, wobei die Gemeinsamkeit der als der gleichen Identität zugehörigen imaginierten Gruppe schon deren gemeinsame Andersartigkeit sein kann (siehe der Beitrag von Marie-France Chevron). Neben der Konstruktion von Identitäten fungieren Traditionen außerdem normativ, indem sie Werte und Verhaltensmuster schaffen, erhalten und weitergeben (Tradierung). In Zeiten des gesellschaftlichen Wandels dienen Traditionen der Selbstbestätigung – etwa in Form des Festhaltens an tatsächlich andauernden traditionellen Praktiken und Werten oder in Form von Traditionalismen, bei denen „Überliefertes […] selektiv verwendet angewandt [wird], um Rezentes zu legitimieren" (S. 19).

Beim wiederkehrenden Bezug der Beiträge auf das Indigene, Religiöse oder Ländliche kann der Eindruck entstehen, Tradition und Traditionalismus seien nur dort Mechanismen der Identitätsstiftung. Der Beitrag von Marie-France Chevron, der sich mit der Materialität von Tradition in sich als „westlich" konzipierenden Gesellschaften befasst, erkennt im Zuge von Globalisierungsprozessen einen vermehrten Bedarf zur Identitätsfindung. Jene könne durch die Ökonomisierung von Tradition erleichtert werden: Identitäten werden beispielsweise durch Kleidung oder Objekte, die nach außen zur Schau gestellt werden können, materiell und erwerbbar. Damit gelingt es Chevron, den Gegensatz zwischen den scheinbar dichotomen Begriffen Tradition und Moderne aufzubrechen: Da Traditionalisierungen überhaupt erst der Moderne bedürfen, um sich davon absetzen zu können, seien sie zugleich auch ein Teil von dieser. Somit fungiert Tradition zum einen als Abgrenzung *zur*, zum anderen aber auch als strukturierendes und sinngebendes Element *in* der (Post-) Moderne.

Eine sich in vielen Beiträgen wiederfindende Interpretation von

Traditionalisierungsbewegungen ist die der Zivilisationskritik. Es erfolgt ein Rekurs auf Traditionen in Umbruchszeiten, die von allgemeiner Unsicherheit begleitet sind und eine Sehnsucht nach vergangenen Lebensumständen entstehen lassen. Jene werden als idyllisch, friedlich, sicher und einfach imaginiert, ohne dass es tatsächlich so gewesen sein muss. Eher rezente traditionelle Werte oder Verhaltensweisen werden dabei durch den Rückgriff auf als ‚zeitlos' empfundene Werte wie Treue, Heimatliebe, Religiosität, Stärke, Mut und Freiheitsstreben überbrückt (etwa im von Andreas Oberhofer beschriebenen Hofer-Mythos). Hingewiesen wird hierbei auch auf den Hang des Traditionellen zum Romantischen.

Interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch die im Beitrag von Gerald Faschingeder über religiöse Traditionalismen angesprochene Paradoxie der „selektiven Moderne" als einer Haltung, bei der zwar die Moderne an sich abgelehnt, zugleich aber etwaige traditionelle oder traditionalistische Praktiken mit den modernen Errungenschaften wie Massenmedien oder Transportmittel durchgeführt würden.

Das Buch bietet eine große Vielfalt an Ansatzpunkten und Beispielen für das Verständnis von Traditionalismen. Das breite Spektrum ist jedoch zugleich seine Stärke und ein Schwachpunkt. Die Zusammenstellung der Beiträge erscheint manchmal etwas lose und der Band gleicht thematisch einem Flickenteppich: Innerhalb der Beiträge ist der Bezug zu Tradition und Traditionalismus zwar immer deutlich, aber einige gegenseitige Bezüge der Texte aufeinander wären durchaus denkbar und wünschenswert gewesen. Die in der Einführung ausdrücklich erklärte Absicht, durch die vielen AutorInnen verschiedener Disziplinen die Vielseitigkeit von Traditionalismen aufzuzeigen, ist jedoch insgesamt durchaus gelungen.

Johanna Rodehau-Noack

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Journal für Entwicklungspolitik (JEP)
ISSN 0258-2384, Erscheinungsweise: vierteljährlich
Heft XXIX, 4-2013, ISBN 978-3-85476-430-4
Preis des Einzelhefts: Euro 11,90
Preis des Jahresabonnements: Euro 42,00
Abonnementbezug über die Redaktion:
Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, Sensengasse 3, A-1090 Wien,
office@mattersburgerkreis.at, www.mattersburgerkreis.at/jep
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1. Auflage 2013
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Satz: Weiderand Kommunikationsdesign, www.weiderand.net, Wien
Druck: Interpress, Budapest

Offenlegung nach § 25 Mediengesetz
Medieninhaber: Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik an den österreichischen Hochschulen, Sensengasse 3, A-1090 Wien
Grundlegende Richtung des JEP: Wissenschaftliche Analysen und Diskussionen von entwicklungspolitischen Fragestellungen und Berichte über die entwicklungspolitische Praxis. Verantwortlich für Inhalt und Korrekturen sind die AutorInnen bzw. die Redaktion.

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

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ISBN: 978-3-89691-990-8

Lässt sich die Diagnose der „Postdemokratie" für eine demokratietheoretische Auseinandersetzung mit Sozialer Arbeit fruchtbar machen? Welche Konsequenzen ergeben sich für Bestrebungen einer (radikalen) Demokratisierung öffentlicher Institutionen im Bereich der Bildungs-, Erziehungs- und Sorgeleistungen?

Widersprüche 130 lotet das Verhältnis professioneller Sozialer Arbeit zur Demokratie kritisch aus.

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

P.Dannecker, B.Englert (Hg.)
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

J.Jäger, E.Springler
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

I. Ataç, A. Kraler, A. Ziai (Hg.)
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F. Kolland, P. Dannecker, A. Gächter, C. Suter (Hg.)
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