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Peacebuilding: A Task for Development Cooperation

1. Introduction

Today almost 50% of all development cooperation partner countries in the world are either suffering from political tensions or armed conflict or else they find themselves in the aftermath of a destructive conflict or war. As a consequence, local and international organizations are working in these zones of armed conflict to reduce the suffering of the population by helping to reinstall security, monitor human rights, build peace or by supporting efforts to rebuild the democratic and economic structures that are essential for sustainable peace.

The involvement of the development community into the peacebuilding discourse started in the early 1990s with the involvement of development actors in tasks to rebuild war-torn societies. In the aftermath of the Rwandan crisis of 1994, a major debate began among development actors about the role of development in conflict affected countries.

In the early debates of the mid 1990s, development actors first claimed that poverty reduction and thus almost all development activities are per se a contribution to peacebuilding in the long run. Towards the end of the 1990s it became evident that poverty reduction alone does not automatically lead to more peaceful societies. However, development can actually contribute to peacebuilding in different ways on different levels.

The objective of this article is to give an overview of the above mentioned contribution development actors can give in support of peacebuilding. The article is structured as follows: In the introduction the issues are sketched, section 2 explains basic concepts and terms used throughout the article, section 3 gives an overview of the history of peacebuilding to better understand the nexus between peacebuilding and development; section 4
and 5 present options for development actors to contribute to peacebuilding on the macro policy, development sector and operational level and section 6 gives an overview of the newly developed ‘Aid for Peace’ approach that enables both development actors to adapt their policies or programmes to conflict situations and can also help peacebuilding actors to better focus their interventions or to evaluate the impact of programmes on peace processes. Finally, section 7 presents conclusions and challenges.

2. Definition and Understanding of Conflict and Peacebuilding

Prior to any debate about peacebuilding it must be clarified what the definitions and understanding of both, conflict and peacebuilding is in theory and practice and how we define them for this article.

Conflict is a divergence of interests, views or behaviours between persons or groups of people. Thus conflict is something normal when different people live together. When dealt with in a constructive way, conflict can lead to tremendously positive developments, both for individuals and the society as a whole. However, conflict can also lead to violence, when dealt with in a destructive way. Since the end of World War II there have been 228 armed conflicts in 148 locations around the globe. In 2004 the number of wars and armed conflicts was counted between 30 (Harbom/Wallensteen 2004) and 42 (Schreiber 2004) depending on the definition used for armed conflict. This paper focuses on armed forms of conflict only.

In the literature we find different definitions of armed conflict depending on the number of deaths involved per annum. The Uppsala conflict data programme (www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP) defines an armed conflict with at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year. Research distinguishes also between armed conflict and war: The differences all centre on the number of deaths involved. In practice the term ‘war’ is rarely used, as this is already perceived as a political statement. Thus ‘armed conflict’ is used more frequently. In our study we mainly use the term ‘armed conflict’.

Theory distinguishes three phases of armed conflict:
- prior to the outbreak of violence,
- armed conflict, and
- post-conflict.
However, armed conflicts and wars do not follow this ideal curve in reality but go up and down in different ways at different times. For example, the armed conflict in Nepal has seen a couple of ceasefire agreements and two negotiation phases that brought the curve down to the bottom, however the conflict always escalated again due to the failure of negotiations bringing the curve up again.

Moreover, in practice these ideal phases can happen in one country at the same time, in other countries the post-conflict phase can already be seen as the phase prior to the next outbreak of violence. For example, in Somalia we find today armed conflict on very different levels in the three regions of the country. While the Northwest of the country, Somaliland is in the post-conflict phase, the South of the country around the former capital Mogadishu finds itself still in the escalation phase on the higher end of the curve with frequent armed clashes between armed factions. The same is true for different regions in Afghanistan.

Peacebuilding is used as an overarching term to describe a long-term process commonly defined as covering all activities intended to prevent or overcome violence and sustain peace. The overall aim of peacebuilding is to prevent armed outbreaks of conflicts or to transform armed conflicts in a sustainable manner into constructive peaceful ways of dealing with conflict. Corresponding to the three phases of conflict, there are three phases of peacebuilding: the prevention phase aimed at preventing armed conflict, the conflict management phase with the objective to end violence and reach for a peace agreement, and the post-conflict peacebuilding phase. The latter can be separated into two sub-phases, the immediate aftermath of armed conflict (1-5 years) and the period after (5-10 years). This newer distinction of the post-conflict phase is a result of post-conflict research that found empirical evidence that there is a high risk (44%) of sliding back into violence within the first five years after the end of hostilities. The risk goes down after a period of five years and even more considerably after a period of ten years (Collier et al. 2003).

However, this understanding of peacebuilding does not bring full clarity with regard to the aim, scope and time frame of peacebuilding. In this article I use the following definition of peacebuilding: the aim of peacebuilding is to prevent and manage armed conflict and sustain peace after violence has ended. This covers all activities that are linked directly to this ob-
Peacebuilding should create conducive conditions for ongoing economic reconstruction, development and democratisation efforts and should not, however, be confused with these concepts.

3. History of the Peacebuilding Debate and Current Trends

3.1 The Birth of Modern Peacebuilding

Since ancient history different actors have made contributions to peacebuilding. But only in the 20th century did peacebuilding become institutionalised in international law as a means of peaceful resolution of conflicts between states. This process started with the Hague peace conference in 1898, followed by the foundation of the League of Nations and resulting in the foundation of the United Nations (UN) at the end of World War II with the main objective to monitor and support world peace through mediation, facilitation, good offices and arbitration between states. The main protagonists involved were nation states and the UN (Paffenholz 2001a).

The involvement of civil society, especially in international conflicts, was considered to complicate the peacebuilding efforts of professional diplomats (Berman/Johnson 1977). Non-governmental actors on the scene such as the Quakers were exceptions at that time (Curle 1971).

3.2 The Establishment of Peace Research as a Discipline in the 1960s

Peace research as a normative interdisciplinary field of research was established in the 1960s. Earlier peace theories focused on the analysis and practice of conflict management as well as on non-violence theories of social change and became institutional in academic institutions mainly in the Anglophone world. During the Cold War a main focus of peace research became the prevention of a nuclear or conventional war between the two antagonist blocks. Moreover, peace research in Europe has always analyzed different causes of conflicts ranging from global, political, religious, cultural, to social and economic issues. One outcome of this type of research is the debate about the so called ‘democratic peace’ that comes to the conclusion that democracies do not fight each other and thus gives justification to
peaceful and military forms of democratisation interventions (Doyle 1983a, 1983b; Russett 1990; Brown et al. 1996; Elman 1997). This discourse links peace with democracy theories and builds on the early works of Kant (Höffe 2004).

### 3.3 Increasing Significance: The End of Cold War and the UN Agenda for Peace in 1992

The practise of peacebuilding only gained significant international momentum at the end of the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990s, and the focus shifted more and more away from conflicts and wars between states to the management and resolution of armed conflicts within states (Miall et al. 1999; Eriksson et al. 2003). These debates were closely linked to the changing reality on the ground which saw a significant increase of inner-state armed conflicts which account for approximately 80 to 90% of all conflicts since 1989 (Eriksson et al. 2003: 594) Initially the interest grew slowly, but in the mid-90s there was a rapid increase of peacebuilding activities. This went hand in hand with an international debate on the need to adapt the international instruments to the new challenges of managing inner-state armed conflict. The UN Secretary General report *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 was the beginning of a still ongoing process (United Nations 1992). Within this important document a new framework to manage international conflicts was established. Not only was the term ‘peacebuilding’ introduced but also the issue of post-conflict peacebuilding started to get into the discourse as a reaction to the new role of the UN and the international community to cope with the challenge of rebuilding societies after wars.

### 3.4 The End of major Wars a Reality? The Short International Euphoria in the Early 1990s

In the early 1990s a number of armed conflicts had been settled successfully such as the wars in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia and El Salvador. It seemed as if the world was about to be a better place free of armed conflict because most of these inner-state conflicts had been proxy conflicts of the Cold War system fight. The war in Somalia and Ex-Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda brought this short international euphoria to a harsh end.
3.5 New Debates After the Rwanda Crisis in 1994

Preventing Armed Conflicts: The Early Warning Debate

From then on the discussion about peacebuilding has intensified: We saw first a discussion centring on the possibilities of preventing another Rwanda situation from happening. This was the beginning of the political early warning discourse (Rupesinghe/Kuroda 1992). In the beginning of the early warning debate it was assumed that within a couple of years there would be quantitative methods available that could precisely predict up and coming political violence and thereby create the preconditions for political early action. However, these hopes were not fulfilled because it became clear that
- quantitative early warning systems will solely not be able to predict political violence, and
- the lack of information was not the main problem but the lack of political willingness to engage in early action.

Thus, the early warning debate lost its momentum and was absorbed into the general debate about prevention culminating in the UN Secretary General’s report on Preventing armed conflict (UN 2001). Nevertheless, today a number of quantitative as well as qualitative political early warning systems exist, for example in the Horn of Africa, the regional organisation Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) runs an early warning system where also civil society organisations have been engaged in planning and implementation (http://www.cewarn.org).

The Nexus Between Conflict and Development

Research that was conducted in the aftermath of Rwanda (Uvin 1998) and in other conflict affected countries (Anderson 1999) clearly pointed out that aid can do harm in conflict situations and inadvertently has negative effects on the conflict situation. Further research explored developing assessment methods and tools for responding to these findings in a constructive way: From 1996 onwards, Mary B. Anderson and her team developed the ‘Local Capacities for Peace’ approach (Anderson 1999) better known as ‘Do No Harm’ with a planning matrix and check lists for finding out the potential effects of aid projects on conflict and peace (www.cdainc.com). In 1998, Kenneth Bush developed a ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment’ (PCIA) methodology comparable to environmental or gender impact assessment al-
so designed for the project level of interventions (Bush 1998). Luc Reychler came up with a similar assessment tool focussing on the macro country level of interventions (Reychler 1999). Meanwhile most of these approaches have been tested and further developed (for an overview see Paffenholz 2005b).

The involvement of the development community into the peacebuilding discourse has had implications on the definition and understanding of peacebuilding. In the early debates of the mid 1990s, development actors first claimed that poverty reduction and thus almost all development activities are as such a long-term contribution to peacebuilding in the long run. Towards the end of the 1990s it became evident that poverty reduction alone does not automatically lead to more peaceful structures but that development can actually contribute to peacebuilding.

1) On the macro political level through targeted policy interventions such as sanctions, conditionality of aid resources, negotiated benchmarks or international measures against war economy (Paffenholz 2005a): here we see a close overlap with tradition diplomacy, thus close cooperation between development and foreign policy actors is required (see chapter 4).

2) On the development sector policy level through inculcating conflict and peace issues into sector strategies (see chapter 4).

3) On the operational level through (see chapter 5)
   a) the way traditional development programmes and projects are working in conflict environments which is nowadays referred to under the label of ‘peace and conflict sensitive development’ (Paffenholz 2005b) or ‘Do No Harm’ (Anderson 1999) or simply integrating the peace and conflict focus as a cross cutting issues into the project cycle; practically this means (see chapter 5.1)
      i. that development interventions try to avoid inadvertently escalating the conflict situation and
      ii. ideally also contribute to peacebuilding for example through providing space for dialogue between rival groups on the district or local level for example with the help of mixed user committees and an inclusive participatory approach;
   b) the support to new types of projects that are directly related to the objective peacebuilding as for example support to local peace networks, peace journalism training, de-mining or demobilisation acti-
vities. Development donors and agencies today fund or implement a wide variety of projects/initiatives; this fact has also enlarged the understanding of the scope and timeframe of peacebuilding (see chapter 5.2).

3.6 The Mushrooming of Peacebuilding Initiatives from the Mid 1990s Onwards

In the 1990s, the main discussion in research was which external actors would achieve the best results with what kinds of approaches to end armed conflicts and wars. The practice of peacebuilding during this time was characterized by testing a lot of different approaches. Research has provided many answers to a variety of detailed issues over the past ten years winding down to the conclusion that only the involvement of a variety of different actors and approaches can finally lead to sustainable peacebuilding, including grassroots organisations or other civil society actors (for the state of debate see the three edited volumes of Reychler/Paffenholz 2001; Crocker et al. 2001; Austin et al. 2004).

Contrary to the discourses in development, the main focus of the peacebuilding research debate until the mid 1990s was still looking into the role of external actors. John Paul Lederach with his important works shifted the focus of attention from external actors to the important role of actors from within the conflict country (Lederach 1998). This research led to a paradigm shift of the international practitioner community: From the mid 90s onwards, the question for external actors was mainly how internal, national actors in conflict countries could be best supported to enhance their peacebuilding capacities. The interpretation of this conceptual framework gave rise to and justification for the mushrooming of international, national and local peace actors.

Today a wide array of non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), associations, religious entities, business and grassroots organisations, communities or individuals are increasingly involved in different activities related to peacebuilding (European Centre for Conflict Prevention 1999; Richmond/Carey 2005; Van Tongeren et al. 2005). Many different approaches and initiatives such as peace funds, dialogue projects, peacebuilding training and capacity building programmes for local actors have been tested during the last decade.
3.7 Stocktaking Experiences and Lessons Learned

The ‘Lessons Learned’ Debate

Since the start of the new millennium, practitioners and researchers have begun to take stock of a decade of practical experiences from countless peacebuilding interventions led by various actors in conflict zones around the world. Of particular concern is the issue of the impact of peacebuilding interventions on macro peace processes vis-à-vis the fact that the world seems no less peaceful. The term ‘lessons learned’ entered the terminology of peace research and practice (Galama/van Tongeren 2002).

Conditions for Successful Peace Agreements

Most of the research findings so far focus on success and failures of peace agreements, e.g. identifying conditions for reaching sustainable peace agreements such as the willingness of rival leaders to compromise (Walter 1997), the ripeness of the conflict for resolution (Zartman 1989), the importance to deal with spoilers and hardliners that could challenge the entire process (Stedman 1997), the need to establish conflict resolution and power sharing institutions (Linder 1994), the need to reach for adequate economic conditions to stabilize peace settlement (De Soto/Del Castillo 1994), the importance of regional power balances, the existence of different mediation channels (Paffenholz 2001a; Fitzduff 2002) and finally the quality of the peace agreement itself (Hampson 1996).

Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

The need to pay attention to post-conflict peacebuilding was already established with the UN Agenda for Peace in 1992. However, only towards the end of the last millennium did research start to look at the experiences made in almost a decade of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. The main focus was the durability of peace agreements, e.g. how can peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of wars be sustained. We find two different discourses here: the first one focuses on researching the conditions for successful implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding (Stedman et al. 2002).

The second discourse criticizes the current international peacebuilding paradigm of ‘liberal internationalism’. Within this paradigm it is assumed that the best way to consolidate peace in war-shattered states is to transform these states as fast as possible into stable market democracies. The line of
critique is that the main reason of the limited success of many post-conflict processes stems from the destabilising effects that the process of fast political and economic liberalisation itself generates in post-conflict societies that do not meet the necessary preconditions (Paris 2004).

Interestingly, both discourses use a narrow definition of the aim, content and timeframe of peacebuilding in line with the understanding of peacebuilding within the UN Agenda for Peace from 1992.

3.8 Current Trends

The above mentioned debates on lessons learned, especially with regard to post-conflict peacebuilding is still an ongoing debate. Currently, there are additional debates that are relevant for peacebuilding:

a) the discourse about aid effectiveness in fragile states that becomes more and more linked to the discourse on conflict, peace and development and

b) the debate about evaluation in peacebuilding that centres around the effectiveness and impact of peacebuilding initiatives on macro peace processes.

Aid Effectiveness and Fragile States/Conflict Countries

The development community is engaged in a debate about aid effectiveness, coming to the conclusion that aid is only effective when recipient countries adopt sound policies and nurtured effective institutions (Paris High-Level Forum 2005). The problem with this finding is how to deal with so called poor performing countries that are mostly countries in fragile contexts. Many fragile states are often also countries with ongoing armed conflicts or find themselves in the aftermath of wars or armed conflict. It has been acknowledged also in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that special attention needs to be given to those countries (Paris High-Level Forum 2005: 7) also in the light that currently almost 50% of all international cooperation countries are fragile countries.

The answer of the donor community so far is ‘staying engaged’ and finding the best ways of continued aid delivery as people should not be held responsible for poor performance of their leaders (Centre for the Future State 2005; Debiel/Terlinden 2005; Leader/Colenso 2005; OECD 2005).
Evaluation: Effectiveness and Impact of Peacebuilding Interventions

Many peace interventions claim long-term impact on peace processes without being able to make the case of these envisaged results. This seems to be of special concern to civil society initiatives in peace processes as so many of them have received funds over the last decade. The donor community is showing signs of fatigue and becomes more reluctant in funding peace interventions, which were not able to prove they made a positive impact on the peace process. For example the Hewlett Packard Foundation, one of the largest donors for research and NGO peace initiatives in the US recently stopped funding for peace initiatives and research. Donor concerns were expressed in numerous conferences and reports on the topic of evaluation in peacebuilding, and by the fact that many donors are currently drawing up evaluation guidelines for peacebuilding interventions (Paffenholz 2005b; Paffenholz/Reychler 2005).

This was the start of the evaluation debate within peacebuilding. Contrary to the development field, the issue of evaluation has only recently entered the field of peacebuilding (Church/Shouldice 2002, 2003; Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Issue on Evaluation, 2005). Different projects have assessed the experiences made in peacebuilding such as the Joint Utstein Study (Smith 2003), which analysed the peacebuilding efforts of different governments and the ‘Reflecting on Peace Project’ (RPP) which evaluated the lessons from NGOs peacebuilding efforts (Anderson/Olson 2003).

A number of proposals and frameworks meanwhile exist how to do peacebuilding evaluations (Fast/Neufeld 2005; Paffenholz 2005b, 2005c; Paffenholz/Reychler 2005). This discourse has not entered academic peace research but is mainly led by the interested research/practitioner community.

4. The Development Contribution to Peacebuilding on the Macro Policy and Sector Level

On the policy level, in addition to diplomatic efforts of peacebuilding such as mediation or good offices (Paffenholz 2001a), bi- and multilateral donors can apply different strategies such as conditionality, negotiated benchmarks, bottom lines, policy dialogue as well as international networks.
against war economies in order to influence the conflict parties by linking aid to conflict and peacebuilding (Paffenholz 2005d; Uvin 1999; OECD 2001; Wood 2003).

Conditionality implies defining certain conditions under which aid will be provided. The objective is to influence the conflict situation through these conditions in a positive way, e.g. stopping a major actor from continuing armed conflict or gross human rights violations by reducing or stopping aid resources and linking their restart to certain political conditions. For example in December 2005 major donors such as the European Union and the World Bank have stopped budgetary support to Ethiopia, because it had committed human rights violations against the political opposition in the country. The same happened in the aftermath of the so-called ‘Royal Coups’ in Nepal in February 2005, when Nepal’s King dissolved parliament and jailed political leaders, human rights activists and journalists.

Negotiated benchmarks are the opposite side of conditionality, operating with positive incentive, e.g. more aid will be provided if certain conditions in the country improve. The donor community in conflict-affected Nepal has for example made clear to the government/king of Nepal that budgetary support to the government will be increased only when major democratic proceedings are reinstalled such as the reopening of the parliament.

Bottom lines define the end of donor engagement, e.g. “if the situation doesn’t improve, we will stop our engagement with the country”. Usually the concrete issues that need to be improved, for example the end of the undemocratic moves of Nepal’s King, will be announced.

Policy Dialogue is the long-term engagement with usually a cooperation partner government. Donors hope through the long-term relationship with a partner country to be able to influence policies in a constructive direction.

International networks against war economies like the fairly successful Kimberly process for banning war diamonds are trying to eliminate the resource base from the conflicting parties through control of the markets. Other current processes such as efforts to make oil revenue in conflict affected countries transparent or create alternatives to the drug trade in Afghanistan or Colombia have so far not proved to be effective.
All (but the last) of these policy measures build on the hypothesis that aid in combination with international reputation is an attractive source for conflicting parties that they do not want to lose. Thus, most of these measures can only have an effect on the situation if a country is donor dependent. For example, oil and diamonds exporting Angola has been more or less resistant towards donor pressure.

The policy level of international cooperation has also become very difficult as it challenges donor/partner relations. Here donors are challenged with a number of critical questions/issues such as the relation to the government as conflicting party, the engagement with so called ‘non state armed actors’ or the linkages between diplomatic and development actors.

Development can also contribute to peacebuilding through inculcating the peace and conflict dimension into development sector policies. This is mainly done through analysing the causes of conflict and addressing them within sector policies. For example, the root causes of conflict in Uganda are to be found in a web of reasons related to discrimination of Northern Ugandan groups with regard to political participation and development. By including the north of the country systematically into development sector planning, a contribution to peacebuilding can be given in the medium to long-term.

The root causes of conflict in Yemen are to be found in the scarcity of natural resources, especially water. Thus the water sector plays a crucial role in supporting conflict or peace. Here the water sector can for example contribute to peacebuilding by enhancing the access to water and at the same time ensuring just distribution policies.

5. The Development Contribution to Peacebuilding on the Programme and Project Level

On the level of programmes and projects development can contribute to peacebuilding in two ways: firstly it can ensure the integration of the peace and conflict dimension into programming, secondly it can directly contribute to peacebuilding by funding or implementing peace projects and programmes.
5.1 Integrating the Peace and Conflict Lens as a Cross Cutting Issue into Development Programmes and Projects

It is now commonly accepted in the development practitioner/expert community that on this level cooperation actors have three choices (Goodhand 2001):
- working around conflict: conflict is seen as a negative risk factor that is to be avoided;
- working in conflict: actors do have a certain awareness that development can influence conflict and try to avoid negative effects on the conflict situation (‘Do No Harm’);
- working on conflict: actors are also aware that all cooperation work can contribute to peacebuilding. They apply peace and conflict sensitive approaches to development that also includes pro-active peacebuilding work.

The overall objective of all concepts is the same, e.g. designing policies and programmes in such a way that it is ensured that development is not inadvertently doing harm and that its peacebuilding potential is possibly used for working in and on conflict. How this can be done, is discussed in chapter 6.

5.2 Implementing Peace Programmes

Today development donors and agencies fund or implement a variety of very different peacebuilding projects or programmes: The most commonly implemented projects/programmes are:
- dialogue projects to rebuild destroyed relationships between conflicting groups on different levels of society; these can vary from student exchange programmes to conflict resolution workshops;
- conflict resolution or mediation training programmes for peace groups or other drivers of change within the peacebuilding process such as women groups, the media, teachers, students, business associations, etc.;
- capacity building for local, national or regional peace organisations or networks;
- security related programmes such as de-mining, disarmament or reintegration for ex-combatants;
- providing expertise for designing or implementing peace processes such as different constitution or governance models for post-conflict societies that show conflict parties alternative models;
- funding for peace process infrastructure such as peace secretariats for the different parties, mediator’s teams, cost for peace mediations and expertise, etc.

6. The ‘Aid for Peace’ Approach

Today, it is common to conduct a conflict analysis on the operational level and a great variety of tools are available (Resource Package 2004). However, many of these analyses are not sufficiently linking the analysis with the actual implementation of the programme or ignore involving the staff of aid organisations into the assessment or planning of peace and conflict sensitive cooperation. Only a couple of approaches are comprehensive. The most elaborated among those approaches are the following:

- Mary B. Anderson’s ‘Do No Harm’ approach and its various applications by organisations some of them under headings of peace and conflict-sensitive development (Anderson 2004);
- Kenneth Bush’s enlarged PCIA approach, ‘Hands on PCIA’ (Bush 2005);
- Thania Paffenholz and Luc Reychler’s ‘Aid for Peace’ approach. The latter also provides separate applications for peace and for development interventions for planning, assessment and evaluation for both, the policy and the programme level (Paffenholz 2005b, 2005c; Paffenholz/Reychler 2005).

In this chapter, I would like to focus on the ‘Aid for Peace’ approach and give an example of its application for peace and conflict sensitive development programmes. The following gives a short introduction into the logic and functioning of the approach. This approach has also recently been taken over by the German Ministry of Development Cooperation’s (BMZ) Strategy for Peacebuilding (Übersektorales Konzept Friedensentwicklung und Krisenprävention) as the methodology to conduct ‘Peace and Conflict Assessments’ (PCAs). Thus all German governmental agencies need to adapt the ‘Aid for Peace’ framework to their organisation’s planning, implementa-
tion and evaluation procedures in order to ensure peace and conflict sensitivity when working in a conflict country (for more information about the approach see: Paffenholz 2005b; Paffenholz/Reychler 2005). Which countries fall into the category of ‘conflict countries’ is defined by the BMZ once a year with the help of a set of crisis indicators analysed by German research institutions in Hamburg (Deutsches Übersee Institut).

The ‘Aid for Peace’ framework consists of four parts (see figure below): Part 1 analyses the peacebuilding needs in a given country, area or region, part 2 assesses the peacebuilding relevance of the intervention, part 3 assesses or anticipates expected or manifest effects of the conflict on the intervention activities (conflict risks), and part 4 assesses or anticipates expected or manifest effects of the intervention on the conflict dynamics and the peacebuilding process (peace and conflict outcomes and impact).

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<td>Analysis of the peacebuilding needs</td>
<td>Assessing the peacebuilding relevance of an intervention</td>
<td>Assessing the conflict risks for an intervention = effects of the conflict on the intervention</td>
<td>Assessing the conflict and peacebuilding effects of an intervention = anticipating or assessing result chains and indicators</td>
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**Part 1: Analyzing the Peacebuilding Needs**

The analysis of the peacebuilding needs in a particular country or area is the basis on which the following parts of the analytical framework are built upon. This part, the peacebuilding needs, comprises four consecutive steps:
1) analysis of the conflict and peace environment, 2) anticipating conflict dynamics and the peacebuilding environment, 3) analysing the peacebuilding deficiencies through defining the envisaged future peace, and 4) specifying the needs for peacebuilding in a general or in a particular sector.

**Step 1: Analyzing the Conflict and Peace Environment**

The objective is to analyse both the conflict dynamics and the peacebuilding process of a country or area. For example, I conducted an assessment of a development programme in Sri Lanka focusing on employment creation for pro-poor growth by supporting small and medium size enterprise development (SME). When we conducted the peace and conflict assessment with the help of the ‘Aid for Peace’ approach, the programme had not started yet, but the initial programme planning had been finalized. We conducted a macro conflict and peace analysis of the situation in Sri Lanka first, followed by an analysis of the conflicts, tensions and peacebuilding potential in those districts where the programme was to be implemented. The two studies were carried out by local research teams. We then discussed the results with the stakeholders involved in a participatory workshop and conducted further field assessment together with the implementing agency, the local researchers and the international experts.

**Step 2: Anticipating Conflict Dynamics and Peacebuilding**

As the situation in a conflict zone is subject to rapid change, it is necessary to anticipate possible changes and developments in the conflict dynamics and the peace process. The understanding of different possible future developments helps intervening actors to flexibly adapt their interventions to new situations and also enhances the capacity to react in a more systematic way to changed situations. A variety of tools exist to support the planning process of aid and peace interventions; a very effective one is scenario building (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In the SME programme example from Sri Lanka, we also developed different scenarios for the near future in order to prepare the programme for possible future developments that were discussed during the workshop.
Step 3: Identifying the Peacebuilding Deficiencies: Clarifying the Vision for Peace

To identify the peacebuilding deficiencies that prevail one has to a) define the peace one wants to achieve, e.g. explain the vision for peacebuilding, b) specify the conditions that enhance the peacebuilding process, and c) compare the reality with this envisaged peace situation. Without a clear and transparent definition of and vision for the peace one wants to build, it is very difficult to do a serious analysis of the peacebuilding deficiencies and thus define strategies and activities for interventions. In most cases, both intervening actors as well as local actors in the conflict countries assume that everybody knows what peace is all about and therefore the definition of and the vision for peace are often left implicit (Boulding 2001; Fast/Neufeld 2005). For development sector analysis we can first identify the deficiencies in the peacebuilding process (e.g. what is needed to achieve peace in Sri Lanka in general and what are the specific peacebuilding needs in the districts where the SME programme wants to operate) and then identify the peacebuilding needs in the respective sectors (e.g. what is needed to achieve peace and conflict sensitive SME development in the districts with also a peace added value). Practically, the latter is being done by identifying the needs in the SME sector in general (the necessary information is usually provided by a sector needs analysis) and checking these needs for their conflict/peace validity along the findings of the general analysis of the peacebuilding deficiencies (the information is provided by the conflict and peace analysis).

Step 4: Identifying and Specifying the Peacebuilding Needs

After the peacebuilding deficiencies have been analysed, we can now specify the short, medium and long-term needs for peacebuilding. Several needs may be targeted at the same time. However, depending on leverage, experience, organisational expertise and country specificities, it is necessary to set clear priorities for responding to particular needs. In our example in Sri Lanka, the integration of the SME and the conflict and peace analysis led to the result that the inclusion of the different ethnic, language and religious groups (both refugees and local communities) into all activities of SME development was found as the main peacebuilding need in the SME sector in combination with promoting a business culture of working together.
Part 2: Assessing the Peacebuilding Relevance

The aim is to assess whether the overall direction of a planned or ongoing intervention (policy or programme) corresponds to the country’s peacebuilding needs as mapped in the peacebuilding deficiency and needs analysis. The peacebuilding relevance assessment ensures the link between the analysis and the implementation of the intervention. It defines or assesses the viability of the interventions’ goals, e.g. whether or not the intervention is moving in the right direction. During the stakeholder workshop for the Sri Lanka SME programme, the stakeholders jointly defined sub-goals for the programme to incorporate the peacebuilding needs and thus significantly enhanced the peacebuilding relevance of the entire programme. For example specific guidelines for the selection of partners and beneficiaries were added to the implementation plan.

Part 3: Assessing the Conflict Risks

The objective is to identify the existing problems and risks that (the) intervention(s) in zones of armed conflict face, e.g. assessing or anticipating the effects the conflict has on the intervention. For planning new interventions, the conflict risk assessment anticipates potential conflict related risks for the intervention. To assess the conflict risks, one can make use of a variety of checklists (see examples on the KOFF website: www.swisspeace.org). All checklists focus on questions relating to the security situation, the political and administrative climate, the relationship to partners and stakeholders, and the relationship to the parties in conflict and other intervening actors. In our example from Sri Lanka, we analysed a series of potential risks separately for every district based on the conflict/tension analysis undertaken in each district in question and checked it against one of the above mentioned checklists.

Part 4: Assessing the Effects on Peace and Conflict

The aim is to assess the effects (outcomes and impact) of the planned or ongoing intervention(s) on the conflict and peace situation. In other words, we want to know what kind of effects can be expected, what kind of effects are taking place, and/or what kind of effects have taken place, as a consequence of the intervention(s) on the immediate and wider conflict and peace situation. For a proper assessment of peace and conflict effects a pea-
Peacebuilding baseline study must have been conducted prior to the intervention, which allows a before/after comparison as part of the assessment. For aid interventions, the peacebuilding baseline study can be integrated into the normal development feasibility study or into the needs assessment. Moreover, results chains and indicators must be agreed upon by the stakeholders during the planning phase that can be assessed for monitoring and during evaluation. Result chains and indicators facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of the effects of the intervention (Kusek/Rist 2004). Peace research is just at the beginning in providing a set of general indicators (Smith 2003; Fast/Neufeld 2005).

For planning new interventions we recommend developing hypotheses with the help of result chains that create causal links between the activities of the intervention(s) and the conflict and peace variables. This can be done with the help of a) participatory planning methods like Action Evaluation (Rothman 2003), b) check lists and c) the use of the findings of peace research. Getting back to the example of the SME programme in Sri Lanka, we came up with a list of possible negative and positive effects the programme could have on the conflict and peace situation. Instead of giving recommendations, the stakeholders of the intervention jointly developed an action plan for the incorporation of the peace and conflict lens into the programme implementation plan during a facilitated workshop. The stakeholders checked all planned programme implementation activities for their peace and conflict sensitivity and defined additional activities accordingly. Part of this plan was for example the development of guidelines for partner selection or training and capacity building for partner organizations in peace and conflict sensitivity. Moreover, a local support structure to assist the ongoing implementation process was discussed in order to strengthen local capacities and limit the support from international experts.

7. Conclusions and Future Challenges

This article has given an overview of the nexus between peacebuilding and development. We have seen that peacebuilding was not a new issue as it has been known since ancient history. However, the incorporation of a peace/conflict lens into development cooperation started only after the tra-
genic events of Rwanda in 1994. Today the peace and conflict topic is one of the most successful new themes on the development agenda and development actors also fund and implement a variety of peacebuilding programmes and projects.

After Rwanda the topic was discussed as a very political issue and has then shifted into a tool-based discussion. Over recent years a variety of different tool-based approaches have been developed. However, only a few approaches are comprehensive and also useful for a variety of different actors on all levels of interventions. Important requirements for good approaches are a) the systematic link between the analysis of the conflict and peacebuilding environment with the implementation of interventions in conflict zones in a systematic step by step process, b) the merger between a theory of social change and conflict transformation with operational requirements for policy and programme planning and implementation.

Nevertheless, a critical look into the Post-Tsunami aid in Sri Lanka in terms of overall distribution and delivery mode shows how far away the field is currently from an automatic, systematic peace and conflict sensitive aid implementation. In reality, the peace and conflict topic is just beginning to get practical momentum on the ground – besides a few good pilot examples and a lot of rhetoric and good institutional efforts at headquarters. I therefore see the following challenges ahead:

**Protecting the Values of Peacebuilding**

It is important that the essential values and concepts of peacebuilding – the transformation of armed conflicts into peaceful means and finally the contribution to social change – remain at the heart of peace work.

**Re-politization of the Debate**

In order to cope with the challenges of working in conflict zones, there is a need to re-politicize the debate around peace/conflict sensitivity (Bush 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). Often the available policy concepts are not sufficiently applied as donors find it hard to reach for coherent policies in fragile, conflict affected countries. However, peace and conflict are political issues: partner governments turn into conflict parties and the need to talk to ‘non-state armed actors’ prevails as they often control major parts of the country where access is needed to support the affected population. This fosters the
need for better cooperation between diplomatic and development actors. Moreover, the entire debate around peace and conflict sensitivity needs to be better linked to the international debate among donors within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the ‘Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on so called ‘fragile countries’ as most of these fragile states are also countries affected by armed conflict (OECD 2002; World Bank 2002; Debiel et al. 2005).

From a Tool-Based to a Holistic Peace/Conflict Approach

As with many themes on the agenda of development agencies, the peace/conflict topic was introduced by many agencies with a tool-based strategy. It is now time to engage in a more holistic implementation approach that involves all dimensions and aims at a systematic ‘peace and conflict sensitive programme management’.

Assessing the Impact on the Overall Peace Process

It is difficult to assess the impact of a single intervention on the macro peace process, because it is difficult to isolate the exact contribution an intervention has made from other contributions if something changes in the peace process. In evaluation research this is called the attribution gap. However, this is not a problem specific to peacebuilding alone since the same attribution problems occur in development cooperation or policy evaluation. Therefore I am opting for both – more modesty in the debate on assessing impact of peacebuilding interventions on the macro peacebuilding process, e.g. not setting always too ambitious goals, and at the same time more investment into serious social science research on assessing impacts. In the future, there will be a growing need for evaluation oriented peace research such as developing standard result chains for certain recurring peacebuilding interventions or accompanying impact assessment studies covering an entire country’s programme.

Investment into the Planning of Interventions in Conflict Areas

One of the main challenges when evaluating peacebuilding interventions as well as development programmes in conflict affected areas is investment in a good planning process. This concerns donors and implementing agencies alike. Donors should therefore not only emphasise evaluations of
peace programmes or commission separate peace and conflict assessments (PCA) of development and other programmes, but also would be well advised to include funds for training courses in participatory planning for their peace partner organisations and provide their development partners with integrated peace and conflict planning procedures. This concerns the policy interventions alike.

**Strengthening Training and Capacity Building in the South**

Though there has been a lot of training mainly around the ‘Do No Harm’ approach, much more training and most of all capacity building is needed especially in the South. There is a need to establish training partnerships with institutions in the South in order to create ownership for and make more use of local knowledge for peace/conflict sensitivity in international cooperation. We need to avoid an only Northern agency and consultant driven approach to conflict and peacebuilding.

**Standardization of Planning and Evaluation Guidelines**

A further challenge is to achieve a certain degree of standardisation for planning and evaluating peacebuilding interventions as well as aid interventions in conflict zones on similar lines to the OECD criteria for the evaluation of development programmes. It is not meaningful if each donor and organisation now starts developing their own guidelines. It would be far more beneficial if this process were carried out with researchers, governmental and non-governmental actors from the North and South in the context of an international network. Such a network, that can also provide knowledge sharing and joint learning, needs to be located at an independent institution that is not a donor or a donor dependent international NGO. A first start could be the establishment of a web-based joint learning platform to share information and experiences of the practice of both, linking conflict, peace-building and international cooperation.
References


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**Abstracts**


The objective of this article is to give an overview of the contribution development actors can give in support of peacebuilding. The involvement of the development community into the peacebuilding discourse started mainly in the aftermath of the Rwandan crisis of 1994. The article looks at the different contributions of development to peacebuilding on the macro political and development sector level as well as on the operational level where traditional development programmes and projects can contribute to peace through the way they are working and through the support for new types of programmes and projects that are directly related to the objective ‘peacebuilding’.

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