SOUTHERN AFRICA
20 Years Post-Apartheid

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As of 2014 it will be 20 years since South Africa became a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is appropriate, then, to reflect on the nature of the relationship between the country that dominates SADC and the regional organisation: what explains the nature of that relationship and how has it evolved over time? What role has SADC played in South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994, and how has South Africa’s membership shaped the regional organisation? In attempting to answer such questions, this article will first consider political aspects, then economic ones. It begins with some history, for it is only possible to understand the relationship between South Africa and SADC post-1994 by relating it to aspects of earlier history.

When the Union of South Africa was founded in 1910, bringing together four British colonies, its rulers, men of European descent, envisaged that in time neighbouring countries would be incorporated into a much larger, white-ruled South Africa. In the same year as the Union came into being, a Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was created that included, besides South Africa, which has always dominated SACU, three African territories then ruled by Britain, these being today Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Because of South Africa’s racial policies, these territories were never incorporated into South Africa. Neither was neighbouring Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), because the white settlers there did not want to become part of a South Africa dominated by Afrikaner nationalists. And although the former German territory of South West Africa (now Namibia) was ruled by South Africa for 75 years, it never became part of South Africa. When it was eventually freed from South African rule in 1990 it joined
SACU, which was by then the oldest customs union in the world. Instead of white South Africa incorporating other territories in the region, it was a South Africa that had just moved from apartheid to majority rule that, in 1994, joined an already existing regional institution, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1994 (Schoeman 2001; Oosthuizen 2006).

SADC was only two years old when South Africa joined it, having come into existence in August 1992 at a conference held in Windhoek, Namibia, of what until then was known as the Southern African Development Co-Coordinating Conference (SADCC). SADCC had been born in April 1980 as the successor to the Front-Line States (FLS), an informal organisation of the leaders of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, countries that worked together from the mid 1970s to decrease their economic and other dependence on white, minority-ruled South Africa (Khadiagala 1994). South Africa was the only country in the region with an industrial economy, but its race-based policy of apartheid was anathema to the leaders of the newly independent neighbouring countries. When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, it joined the FLS, and the grouping was formalised as SADCC. By then apartheid South Africa had embarked on a policy of destabilising its neighbours, to prevent them organising against it, and, in particular, to try to ensure that they did not allow guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC), which was engaged in an armed struggle against the apartheid regime, to move into South Africa. In the 1980s South Africa’s war against its neighbours intensified, and involved major raids by the South African Defence Force into southern Angola. With the winding down of the Cold War in the late 1980s, however, an agreement was reached to end the devastating conflict in southern Angola, and in 1990 President R.W. de Klerk of South Africa conceded to the pressures mounting on his country and announced the abandonment of apartheid and his willingness to negotiate with the ANC and others. A negotiated settlement was reached in November 1993, enabling the first democratic election to take place in South Africa in April 1994. That in turn made it possible for South Africa to become a member of SADC in August of that year at the annual meeting of heads of state held in Gaborone, Botswana.
1. SADC and South Africa: the early years

South Africa joined an organisation of governments of territories of vastly different geographies and economies, ranging from the large territory of Namibia, with a small population, owing to the fact that much of it is semi-desert, to tiny Lesotho, entirely surrounded by South Africa. SADC included countries that were not near neighbours of South Africa, such as Tanzania and Malawi, and in 1997 was enlarged further when the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became a member. Although most of those who lived in the SADC countries spoke one or other Bantu languages, their very different colonial experiences had left their governments operating in different European languages, as two had Portuguese as their official language, while the DRC had French. While movement of people across the region had a long history, and the diamond and later gold mines in South Africa had attracted labour from as far north as what is now Malawi, as well as from Mozambique and from the three British colonies adjacent to South Africa which were led to independence in the 1960s, no common set of values bound the very diverse region together.

South Africa had by far the largest minority populations, which had been attracted there by relatively favourable climatic conditions and then, from the late nineteenth century, by the discovery of vast mineral riches. With its relatively large and diverse economy, and a significant manufacturing sector that had developed on the back of mineral exploitation, South Africa immediately became SADC’s most important member. South Africa’s iconic transition to democracy, moreover, gave it a role on the world stage out of proportion to its size and economic strength.

Concern at South Africa’s economic dominance, along with suspicions of its intentions, limited the role the country might otherwise have played in the region after 1994. The headquarters of the SADC remained in Gaborone, Botswana, and the prior history of South Africa’s aggression in the region could not simply be swept under the carpet. The new South African government from 1994 was sensitive to the need not to appear as the regional hegemon, or to play a ‘big brother’ role in SADC, asserting its influence in the region. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who had been active in SADCC/SADC since 1980 and was the leading figure in the organisation at the time South Africa joined it, was not happy to see Presi-
dent Nelson Mandela of South Africa usurping his role. There were then, from the beginning, tensions within SADC between South Africa and the other members, while relations between South Africa and its fellow SADC members differed from country to country (Nathan 2012: passim).

On coming to power in 1994, the new government in South Africa had enormous problems to deal with, including threats from right-wing elements unhappy with the country’s abandonment of apartheid, as well as significant socio-economic issues arising from the poverty of much of the population. The new government soon stated that the Southern African region was the most important priority in its foreign policy (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004), but there were those in government who thought that the priorities of the country should lie at home, or that its foreign relations should focus on the country’s immediate neighbours, rather than the much larger SADC. On the other hand, the ANC had close ties with most other countries in SADC, many of which had hosted it in exile or supported its struggle in other ways, and those ties encouraged the idea that South Africa should engage with the broad southern African region. South Africa therefore assumed its responsibilities in SADC, hosting a summit meeting for the first time as chair of the regional organisation in 1996 and signing most of the many SADC protocols.

2. Mbeki and SADC

Thabo Mbeki, who was an active Deputy President of South Africa from 1994 and then took over from Mandela as President of the country in 1999, believed that South Africa should be actively involved in the continent as a whole, to promote peace and development and to give content to what he called the African Renaissance. Although this sometimes worked against a focus on South Africa’s relations with the southern African region, Mbeki played a major role in working for the inclusion of the DRC, a very large country far from South Africa that would long remain embroiled in conflict, into the SADC in 1997. The following year South African forces, along with some from Botswana, moved into Lesotho to restore stability there, and this intervention was post-facto declared to be on behalf of SADC. When Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent their armies into the
DRC in 1998, this was again said to be a SADC operation, but South Africa would not join them (Nathan 2012: 85-91). At this time there was, within SADC itself, a major struggle over the status of its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, which Mugabe, who did not like the idea that he would play second fiddle to Mandela within SADC, tried to make independent within the organisation under his leadership. It was not until the Windhoek summit of SADC heads of state in 2001 that this issue was resolved, when the Organ was brought under the control of SADC itself (Nathan 2012: chapter 5). From then on, relations between South Africa and the other members of SADC were less conflictual.

In the early years of the new century, South Africa, under Mbeki’s leadership, played a vital role in bringing peace to the DRC. Since then South Africa has continued to play an important role as mediator for SADC. South Africa was the main facilitator in the internal conflicts in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Mbeki helped bring about the Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change factions in 2008, and after President Jacob Zuma took over as chief ‘facilitator’, he sought to get the parties to agree to a new constitution as a prelude to the holding of a free and fair and credible election (Matlosa 2012; Zondi/Bhengu 2011). In the case of Madagascar, after the coup that took place there in 2009, South Africa was only one of a number of SADC countries involved in mediation, but it played a major role in persuading both of the leading figures involved to agree that neither would contest the first post-coup election, originally scheduled to take place in mid-2013. Having experienced its own negotiated settlement, South Africa saw itself as well-placed to work to bring together the parties in conflicts elsewhere, but, in the case of Zimbabwe was unable to get the GPA to work effectively; the election there, when it was held in July 2013, was widely believed to have been rigged to ensure a ZANU-PF victory.

3. SADC in South Africa’s foreign policy

South Africa has often put its national interests before those of the region. Its policies towards SADC have often been incoherent, in part
because different parts of its bureaucracy – the Presidency, the Department of Foreign Affairs (the name of which was changed to Department of International Relations and Co-operation – DIRCO – in May 2009), the Treasury and others – interact separately with the regional body. South Africa signed a separate trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union (EU) in 1998, with scant regard for either SADC or SACU. In the more recent negotiations on economic partnership agreements with the EU, South Africa has not always taken SADC interests into account. Since 2008 South Africa has taken the lead in pushing for SADC to join with the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in a tripartite agreement (on which see further below). Although the South Africa head of state meets with the other SADC heads of state at summits, now held at least twice a year, bilateral relations often appear to trump those with the region as a whole. South Africa’s relations are closest with those governments formed from parties which fought liberation struggles; besides the ANC, these are the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, and ZANU-PF (Southall 2013). Although the head of state of Botswana, Seretse Ian Khama, voiced opposition to the SADC position on Zimbabwe in 2008 and again in 2013, South Africa took the lead in bringing him into line. The view that SADC is little more than a club to protect the interests of those in power in the countries of the region appeared to be validated when the SADC heads of state agreed in 2010 to disband the tribunal it had set up to adjudicate on disputes in the region, after that tribunal had ruled against the Zimbabwe government. The chief judge of the tribunal was then very critical of South Africa for not using “its power as the SADC’s largest state and its ‘moral authority’ to prevent the tribunal being emasculated” (SAFPI 2013b).

Along with other states in SADC, South Africa has remained opposed to the transfer of national sovereignty to the regional body, presumably from a lack of confidence in the latter and a wish to ensure that national interests remain paramount at all times. Laurie Nathan has argued that South Africa and other countries in SADC have been reluctant to transfer any sovereignty to the regional body in part because their sovereignty, acquired relatively recently, remains so fragile (Nathan 2012: passim).
many respects, South Africa’s involvement in SADC continues to appear half-hearted. It has, for example, done very little to ensure that ordinary citizens play a role in SADC, which in turn makes little attempt to inform the wider public of its activities; its website remains poor and its newsletter has a very limited circulation. However, on the other hand, SADC brings South Africa clear benefits. It was only because Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma was put forward as the SADC candidate, and received the support of all the members of SADC, that South Africa was successful in 2012 in getting her elected chair of the African Union (AU) Commission.

Since 1994 South Africa has sought to play a role on the global stage, and SADC has not been one of its main priorities. SADC remains a weak institution, being heavily dependent on donor funding, much of which comes from the European Union (EU). While the EU, which sees itself as a successful example of regional integration, wishes Southern Africa to embrace a similar model, its history and economic position is very different. In Europe regional integration was undertaken largely to avoid any recurrence of a devastating war, which had ended in the defeat of the country which then became the region’s economic powerhouse. In Southern Africa there had been war between South Africa, the economic powerhouse, and other states, but with the collapse of apartheid there was no sense that any recurrence of such conflict was likely, and the memory of the apartheid-era wars was divisive and did not promote regional integration. While the benefits of regionalism were evident in tackling such issues as the promotion of economic growth and development, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and dealing with illegal immigration and refugees, as well as narcotics and arms smuggling, South Africa did not wish to subordinate its global ambitions, as a country with close ties to other countries and regions, to the regional project. Given those ties, and its global ambitions, the likelihood is that South Africa’s relations with SADC will remain half-hearted and ambiguous. But the economic aspects of the relationship are as important as the political ones, and it is to those that we now turn.
4. Economic aspects of the relationship between South Africa and SADC

Before it joined SADC, South Africa was already the economic giant in Southern Africa, a region rich in mineral resources: South Africa had gold, platinum and other metals; Botswana diamonds; Zambia copper; the DRC diamonds, and Angola oil. Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) have long been a driving force behind South Africa’s regional economic policies, including Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers (diamond marketing), and Minorco. A range of other MNCs, such as MTN, Vodacom, and Shoprite/Checkers, mainly South African-based, have been able to develop new markets in other countries in the region (Nagar 2012a).

South Africa has long been seen as of vital geostrategic interest for the United States (US) and Europe. In 1998, the US sought to devise a regional trade policy for sub-Saharan Africa and approved the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Ngwenya 2012) which South Africa became a signatory to in 2000. The EU signed a separate agreement with South Africa, the 1999 EU-South Africa Trade Development Corporation Agreement (TDCA) (Lee 2003). South Africa was widely seen as the ideal entry point into Southern Africa and Africa at large (Nagar 2013). Both the US and Europe pushed for market liberalisation for Southern Africa; the EU sought to enlarge its agricultural market but its Common Agricultural Policy had a very negative effect on Southern Africa (Nagar 2013).

Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994, the post-apartheid government has employed a number of economic policy instruments to deliver on the promise of social development. In 1996 the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy replaced the Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, created to address persistent poverty. When GEAR failed to improve South Africa’s weak post-apartheid political economy, the country began to look towards the region to help fast-track its development (Landsberg/Wyk 2012). The New Growth Path (NGP) of 2010 and the National Development Plan (NDP) of 2011 set out an economic growth policy plan that included infrastructure projects across Africa. A National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) seeks to promote trade that is value-added and industrial production that
builds employment and further promotes job creation, while the Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (TPSF) is an industrial policy instrument to support trade in favour of local manufacturing as well as to diversify the economy so that is not so heavily dependent on commodities and non-tradable services (Vickers 2012).

SADC’s key regional economic instrument and blueprint, which spearheads its trade agenda, is its 15-year Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of 2003. This set out ambitious goals: to establish a free trade area (to which South Africa belongs) by 2008, a customs union by 2010, a common market in 2015, a monetary union in 2016 and a common currency in 2018 (SADC 2012). The mid-term review of the SADC RISDP is an opportunity to develop an integration agenda for Southern Africa that balances and enhances trade in both goods and services, that generates capital and labour, and that takes into account migration policies allowing for the free movement of people.

South Africa cannot be expected to be consistent in its efforts in region-building, given its severe socio-economic problems. It is inevitable that its economic foreign policy will straddle regional and domestic needs, and at times the pendulum will swing in favour of the latter. As a semi-developing state, South Africa’s national interest of building its own economy and addressing the socio-economic inequalities inherited from the apartheid regime remain of paramount importance (Nagar 2013; see also SAIIA 2013). South Africa’s contradictory behaviour is explained in part by the fact that it has to balance its relationship with SADC with the smaller regional organisation, the five-nation economic bloc SACU, as well as its own socio-economic inequalities back home.

5. SACU, South Africa and regional integration

There are huge economic disparities between SACU’s member states – Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia – and the region’s hegemon, South Africa. All five states belong to SADC. Within the confines of a regional institution like SACU, the impact that a semi-developing state like South Africa has on small economies, like Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, and the difficulties of this strained relationship, has been
huge. These difficulties are also linked to the common monetary area (CMA) agreement signed by Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland, which Namibia joined after it became independent in 1990. Huge economic disparities remain between South Africa and both its SACU partners and the other members of SADC (McCarthy 2013; see also Flanagan 2013).

How states deal with the issue of sovereignty is an indication of whether there is genuine political will towards regional integration and a genuine interest to support and boost weaker economies. Unlike South Africa, which benefited from the EU-SA TDCA, Namibia refused to sign trade deals with Europe and only provisionally initialled an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) with Brussels (SAFPI 2012). SACU has become a stumbling block to Southern Africa and Africa’s overall regional integration agenda and in particular the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite agreement of 2008. It may be sensible to incorporate these member states into the agenda of SADC or to create a larger merger of all three schemes. However, this is not straightforward and could hamper any efforts at building a viable COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area, given multilateral agreements, such as AGOA and the EU-SA TDCA, and their impacts on economic integration. Swaziland is a member of both COMESA and SADC.

SACU’s present revenue-sharing formula provides that South Africa currently contributes 98 percent to the revenue pool, which is shared according to intra-SACU trade or imports. But intra-SACU trade, especially imports, is dominated by South Africa. South Africa’s dominant role over the import markets of BLNS states is just over 75 per cent of trade of the market of each state and over 90 per cent of trade in the cases of Swaziland and Lesotho. South Africa’s trade with the other SACU states pales in comparison with that of other markets, given South Africa’s diversification of exports to, and imports from, global markets. In 2011, Swaziland’s disbursements from SACU were reduced by 62 per cent, which brought that country’s already ailing economy to its knees. Other important developments, such as AGOA, are positive for SACU, and AGOA will be highly significant for smaller SACU economies such as Swaziland, which depends heavily on the continuation of AGOA beyond its 2015 agreement. It now appears that the Obama administration supports the renewal of AGOA in 2015, when the current agreement is meant to end for the 40 sub-Saharan African countries that receive tariff-free access to US markets (SAIIA 2013).
SACU’s present revenue-sharing formula presents a challenge to the admission of new members. Issues centring on allowing South Africa to reintroduce tariffs on certain sensitive SACU products, and debates that centre on the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, have further complicated regional integration and almost resulted in the disintegration of SACU (Nagar 2012a: 140). SACU may have become a stumbling block to Southern Africa’s overall regional integration agenda, and in particular to the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite agreement of 2008, which provides for a much larger free trade area (AfDB 2013).

Greater trade and enlarging markets will increase the SACU revenue pool and strengthen the SACU region; for example, South Africa’s merger with the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) grouping of the world’s fastest-growing economies is potentially positive for Southern Africa as a whole.

However, South Africa joining the SADC 2008 Free Trade Agreement and other accords with COMESA and the EAC, 2008 tripartite agreement, has placed a damper on regional trade for smaller economies, since these accords call for removing all tariff and non-tariff barriers among SADC member states. While South Africa has been reaping the benefits from the 1910 SACU trade agreement (revised in 1969 and again in 2002), in 2012 South Africa’s exports made up 80 percent of intra-SACU trade. The tables have now turned, as BLNS countries are now reaping the benefits due to trade generated by South Africa’s enlarged market with China, the United States and with the European Union. According to a 2013 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on SACU-generated revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are accruing enormous income from the customs union and do not see the benefit of joining another free trade area such as the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite arrangement. Current account receipts constitute only 28 percent of GDP in South Africa, compared with over 37 percent in Botswana, more than 55 percent in Namibia, and 102 percent in Lesotho (IMF 2013). South Africa has the lowest figure and is nevertheless the main contributor, making up 80 percent of intra-SACU trade (Canales-Kriljenko et al. 2013). With the economic position of the BLNS states increasing, they may be put in a stronger position to decide whether they want to join the COMESA-EAC-SADC grouping, initiated by the Tripartite Agreement of
2008. This initiative aims for a free trade area and a customs union in 2015 that may impact negatively on the BLNS states, which may subsequently lose out on tariff revenues on some sensitive products (such as textiles and sugar) (SAFPI 2013a). Other issues at play for SACU members include agreements that South Africa is exploring to further trade with its IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) partners towards a SACU-Mercosur-India Trilateral Trade Arrangement (TTA) for trade convergence between the parties with a market of 1.2 billion people, GDP of US$1.2 trillion, and foreign potential for trade of US$300 billion. As the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite, with a population of 530 million people and GDP of US$630 billion (averaging only US$1,180 per capita), pales in comparison, BLNS states are reluctant to join the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite (Nagar 2013).

To date, Southern Africa’s market integration efforts have been relatively unsuccessful. Though attempts have been made to expand the region’s ‘periphery’ by strengthening weaker economies through robust trade and market integration efforts, about 90 per cent of South Africa’s trade is still conducted outside the region (Canales-Kriljenko et al. 2013). As Andre Gunder Frank suggests, the core can be a major obstacle to regional integration when it begins feeding off the periphery in its imbalance of trade (cf. Saunders et al. 2012: 2).

While it was announced by South Africa’s Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, in early 2013 that R827 billion was to be spent on domestic infrastructure development, R6.2 billion of this was to be invested by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in projects largely in other SADC member states, in mining, industrial infrastructure, agro-processing and tourism (Gordhan 2013: 15). Efficient, reliable and workable infrastructure is important for trade and to benefit agriculture and industrialisation projects. Of SADC’s 15 member states, six are landlocked; six have populations below 10 million, while 10 have economies smaller than $10 billion dollars per annum. Linking emerging economies like those of Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to markets in South Africa would create a larger market. The proposed north-south trade corridor (roads, sea, and rail) will link South Africa with Botswana, the DRC and Malawi. Although Southern Africa’s rail transport is well established, more needs to be done. In March 2012, South Africa opened the Ngqura Port in Nelson Mandela Bay in the Eastern Cape to serve as
a major trade conduit in enhancing south-south imports and exports. In the medium term the port will form part of an emerging shipping route between China and Brazil, while in the longer term, it is envisaged that South Africa and the region will establish trade corridors with south-east Asia and South America (Nagar 2012b).

6. Conclusion

Regional integration in Southern Africa remains very much a work in progress. South Africa’s relations with the main regional body, SADC, are complex and shift over time, and are now part of broader interactions with other regional organisations, such as SACU, COMESA and the EAC, as well as with the AU. While statements from South Africa’s DIRCO suggest that the Southern African region is the country’s main priority in foreign policy, in reality SADC has often not been accorded prime attention by South Africa’s policy-makers. DIRCO has also often said that it sees South Africa as the gateway into the rest of the continent, but other countries, such as Nigeria in West Africa and Kenya in East Africa, are now increasingly seen as gateways into the continent. While it remains unclear how far regionalism in Southern Africa will be taken, given the unwillingness of countries to surrender their sovereignty, the regional organisation is an important bridge between the national and the continental, for SADC remains a building block in continental integration. It can confidently be predicted that South Africa will continue to be the main driver behind the ongoing Southern African region-building project.

References


Abstracts

South Africa became a member of the leading regional organisation, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with the ending of apartheid in 1994. What relationship has evolved between South Africa and SADC in the 20 years since then? This article argues that the relationship can only be understood against the background of some pre-1994 history. The precursors to SADC, which was founded in 1992, had been antagonistic to apartheid South Africa, which in the 1980s had carried
out a policy of destabilising other countries in the region. South Africa’s relationship with SADC has also been shaped, from 1994, by its relative economic strength, as well as by the nature of the new multipolar global economy, which emerged in the 1990s. This article firstly discusses political, then economic, aspects of the evolving relationship from 1994. Among the topics examined that help explain the relationship are the hegemonic role of South Africa in the southern Africa region; its foreign policy and economic regional integration strategy; the influence of external actors, such as the European Union (EU); the existence of the Southern African Customs Union; and the role that regional infrastructure projects play in the regional integration process.


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