SOUTHERN AFRICA
20 Years Post-Apartheid

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1994 marks one of the most important years in the history of South Africa and, more generally, the African continent. The first general elections of South Africa did not only end apartheid as a political system and state doctrine, which lasted for almost half a century, but also a history of racial exclusion extending over three centuries. Structures of inequality, ideologies and mentalities, which had been formed by many decades of institutionalised racism have, however, not disappeared with a stroke of a pen. In addition, the end of the apartheid rule in South Africa did not only have a significant impact on South Africa alone, but also on the entire African continent, especially the southern African subcontinent. Considering both the long history and the regional dispersion of racial segregation in the southern African subcontinent, this JEP issue extends the existing analyses on the inheritance of apartheid and discusses the relevance of apartheid today for the southern African region, 20 years after its end as a political system in South Africa. Although this issue offers only limited space to discuss such a broad topic, the reader will undoubtedly find food for thought.


What was apartheid? At first sight this appears to be an easy question to anybody with knowledge of South Africa’s recent history. The answer is, however, not quite as straightforward as one would expect. The term ‘apartheid’ is generally used to describe South Africa’s political system from 1948 to 1994. The apartheid era starts with the election of the Nasionale Party (NP), covers more than four decades of NP-rule, and ends in 1994 with the
first general democratic elections. As a consequence, apartheid can also be defined as the philosophy of the ruling NP government (Arnold 2006: 331). As discussed by Leibbrandt et al. (2001a: 3), Seekings/Nattrass (2006) and Feinstein (2005), apartheid policies were racist and secured racial domination. In addition they resulted in systemic inequality between whites and non-whites.

Racial segregation was, however, not new to South Africans. Since the discovery of minerals (especially gold and diamonds), “the economic history of South Africa becomes, in essence, a story of how this unique combination of the indigenous population, European settlers, and mineral resources was brought together in a process of conquest, dispossession, discrimination, and development to promote rapid economic progress” (Feinstein 2005: 3). In 1910, when the Union of South Africa was founded, a colour bar was part of the constitution (Arnold 2006: 330). The apartheid period is, however, characterised by an orchestrated government approach to create racial segregation at different levels. On a macro level attempts were undertaken to create (dependent) black nation-states (Leibbrandt et al. 2001a: 3). The creation of bantustans, i.e. homelands, was the first step in this direction. This policy also implied that blacks were to lose their South African citizenship. On a meso level restrictions on the free movement of people were implemented. By means of influx control, urban settlement patterns, separate schools, etc. possible interactions between racial groups were minimised. In addition the criminalisation of interracial marriages and sexual relations as well as the creation of separate amenities guaranteed at a micro level that individuals of different race groups were segregated (Leibbrandt et al. 2001a: 3). For all South Africans apartheid was a political system which defined their political, economic and social rights and which had a significant impact on their daily lives.

It should come as no surprise that apartheid was also subject to change. Over the four decades, on both the domestic and the international level, events occurred which caused shifts in policies. Different periodisations have been proposed. Seekings/Nattrass (2006) as well as Leibbrandt et al. (2001a) distinguish between the apartheid period before the 1970s and the subsequent late-apartheid period until 1994. These two sub-periods can be distinguished in terms of the composition of the power bloc. From 1948 to the 1970s, the NP regime rested on an alliance between an emerging Afri-
kaner bourgeoisie whose interests were actively promoted by the apartheid state, the white petty bourgeoisie and white workers. Big mining capital saw its interests well promoted by the guaranteed supply of cheap black labour while manufacturing industries produced for the white high income market. In the 1970s, the underlying economic model entered into crisis and, within the ruling bloc, the power shifted increasingly to the big capital groups (O’Meara 1983). The apartheid regime was not only supported by local business, but also by foreign companies. As Arnold (2006: 337-343) shows, South Africa provided profitable investment opportunities to trans-national capital.

Arnold (2006: 332-333) depicts three periods, which he defines primarily according to political criteria. The first period (1948–1961) he calls grand or classical apartheid. During this period every sphere of life became subject to apartheid. At the same time, however, conflicts and problems were exacerbated. This became clear with the Sharpeville massacre (1960), in which 69 Africans were killed and another 128 were wounded, because they demonstrated against the introduction of a new pass system (Arnold 2006: 50). During this period South Africa’s international reputation worsened and as a result it left the Commonwealth in 1961. In the second period (1961–1976) South Africa became more isolated on a global level, which was also due to the decolonisation of the African continent and the diplomatic efforts of the South African liberation organisations. At the same time, apartheid became increasingly more brutal. Repression and violence were more often used as policy instruments. On 16 June 1976 some 15,000 school children protested in Soweto against the introduction of Afrikaans as compulsory language of education. Once again the police reacted with brute force and opened fire (Arnold 2006: 593-596). This event is a hallmark and a turning point in South Africa’s history. In the third period apartheid governments were holding on to their power while facing a steady erosion of their political power. In a way, Arnold’s periodisation is closely linked to different phases of resistance. The African National Congress (ANC), the oldest liberation movement, was founded as early as 1912, mainly by black intellectuals. It was revitalised in the late 1940s by the leaders of its youth league. The 1950s witnessed strong mass resistance campaigns by the Congress movement, centered around the ANC. With the banning of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the early 1960s, the libera-
tion movements were forced underground and started to develop first guer-
illa activities. However, they suffered very severely from repression in the
1960s. It was in the 1970s that resistance forces re-emerged in renewed force
(cf. Lodge 1983; Meli 1989).

Most scholars familiar with South Africa are aware of the fact that
apartheid geopolitics stretched far beyond the South African territorial
borders. On the international stage South Africa profiled itself not only as
an important minerals supplier but also as an anti-communist stronghold
on the African continent (Arnold 2006: 336). Notwithstanding the fact that
some neighbouring countries gained independence during the 1960s, the
Southern African region formed an effective buffer against independent
Africa well into the 1970s. The small independent states of Botswana (1966),
Lesotho (1966) and Swaziland (1968) did not pose a threat to South Africa.
This situation changed dramatically in 1975 with the independence of
Angola and Mozambique, two former Portuguese colonies and in 1980 with
the independence of Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia). In the wake
of these decolonisation and independence struggles the apartheid regime
actively intervened in the domestic politics of neighbouring countries. This
resulted not only in weak political systems within these countries, but also
caused violent conflicts and wars.

2. From crisis of apartheid to negotiated transition

In the 1970s, apartheid South Africa entered a deep economic, social
and political crisis, in the words of Saul and Gelb (1981) an “organic crisis”.
“Racial fordism” (Gelb 1991: 2), which had been based on mineral exports
and import substitution industrialisation geared towards the white high
income domestic market, reached its limits. The racially segregated labour
market stunted productivity growth and domestic demand. Export earnings
did not keep pace with soaring imports. Thus, the accumulation model
encountered both domestic and external constraints. The regime reacted
to these constraints by even further accentuating the role of the mining
industry, facilitating financialisation and relaxing the labour market
constraints for an upper stratum of the black population (Gelb 1991: 25ff). Within the dominant bloc and the ruling NP, the balance of forces shifted
in favour of Afrikaner business, which forged a closer alliance with other capital factions, while the white petty bourgeoisie and workers were increasingly sidelined (O’Meara 1983: 253ff).

Resistance to apartheid re-emerged with renewed force in the 1970s. The 1973/74 strike wave marked the beginning of the re-emergence of a militant trade union movement that culminated in the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985 as a large non-racial trade union federation with close links to other anti-apartheid forces. Many students who had been involved in the Soweto uprising in 1976 had often initially been inspired by ideas of Black Consciousness, later joined the ANC or organisations politically close to the Congress movement. The ANC proved to be able to integrate a new generation of activists into its organisation and to strengthen its underground structures in South Africa. Its military activities remained primarily confined to ‘armed propaganda’. Intensifying material hardships led to the setting up of a myriad of township organisations. In August 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed as an umbrella body of anti-apartheid forces. Politically, its national leadership was dominated by veteran ANC activists. In terms of social class, the national and regional UDF leadership was mainly drawn from “radical, middle class intellectuals and professionals” (Marais 1998: 52). The UDF resembled the idea of a broad popular front bringing together a broad range of anti-apartheid forces which had already been formulated by the ANC in the late 1970s. Mass mobilisation by a myriad of (often local) organisations proved to be essential to weakening the apartheid regime. Locally, resistance activities could at times assume an insurrectionary character. Township administrations were partially paralysed. In addition to these internal activities of the resistance movements, the ANC orchestrated an international boycott campaign against South Africa which scored some important successes.

The regime responded to strengthening resistance by enhanced and more systematic repression on one hand and by attempts to co-opt parts of the black middle strata on the other. It created a National Security Management System as a parallel state structure. This highly militarised arm of the state aimed both at stifling resistance by harsh repression and by defusing socio-economic hotspots. In spite of the increasing level of repression, these counterinsurgency policies proved to be unsuccessful. The attempts
to co-opt sections of the black middle class were severely constrained by the regime’s unwillingness to contemplate full voting rights for the black majority.

South African resistance was encouraged by developments in the neighbouring countries. Mozambican independence and the victory of the Mozambican liberation movement Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) was greeted by ‘Viva Frelimo’ rallies in South Africa’s townships. The way to Mozambican and Angolan independence had been paved by the revolution on April 25th, 1974 in Portugal. Putting an end to the Portuguese colonial wars was one of the main motives that made left-wing officers move against the Caetano regime. In both Angola and Mozambique, the governments proclaimed that they intended to move in the direction of socialism. In both countries, key industries were nationalised – often in response to the hasty retreat of the Portuguese settlers. The Mozambican government launched a programme to found aldeias comunais (communal villages) that were to transform the countryside and which challenged existing rural power relations. While this radical transformation was relatively successful in some parts of the country (e.g. in the South), the challenge to the so-called traditional authorities was more badly received in other regions (Sumich 2008: 330). These conflicts in parts of the countryside opened a space for military destabilisation by military forces that were nurtured by colonial Rhodesia and later by South Africa. In Angola the government neglected the rural areas almost completely. In both countries, attempts to restructure economic relations and structures encountered many obstacles and had only a limited early success, while vigorous initiatives in education and health brought enormous improvements. Both governments rendered substantial support to liberation movements in the region (cf. Becker 1988, 2009). Mozambican support permitted ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) to significantly step up its rural guerrilla campaign in Rhodesia. Strong military resistance and severe economic crisis made the Rhodesian settler regime finally agree to a negotiated settlement. In 1980, Zimbabwe became independent. Its socio-economic transformation policies and support for the South African liberation movements was more cautious than in Angola and Mozambique.

After Zimbabwean independence, the independent states of the region formed the South African Development Co-ordination Confer-
ence (SADCC) as a regional institution which helps to reduce the inherited economic dependence on South Africa (Schwank 2006). SADCC was consciously conceived not as a liberal trade integration group, but as an organisation that should facilitate sectoral cooperation. “Production is the first goal. And reliable transport links precede lower tariffs”, Seretse Khama (1981: VII), the then president of Botswana, pointed out. Indeed, establishing respective rehabilitating regional infrastructure that would bypass South Africa was the key component of SADCC. However, efforts to increase independence from South Africa depended heavily on external funding (Mkandawire 1985).

The apartheid regime responded to the changing regional balance of power by devising systematic destabilisation policies against its neighbours (cf. Davies/O’Meara 1985; Hanlon 1986; Johnson/Martin 1986; Becker 1988; Minter 1994). Destabilisation was particularly directed against the governments of Mozambique and Angola which were perceived by the securocrats in Pretoria as the most serious regional challenge. The destabilisation policies encompassed both military destabilisation – ranging from direct military intervention (primarily in Angola) to the support of armed groups (mainly Unita which had pretended to be an anti-colonial movement, but had covertly cooperated with the Portuguese colonial power in Angola (Sotto-Maior 1985) and Renamo in Mozambique which had been originally created by the Rhodesian secret service for destabilising Mozambique) – and applying economic pressure. West European countries, particularly the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, complemented these South African policies through their own set of destabilisation policies, which were particularly directed against Angola and Mozambique (cf. Becker 1988: 45ff; Minter 1994: 142ff).

These destabilisation policies resulted in massive destruction, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. The governments of these two countries abandoned their attempts at socialist transformation in the mid-1980s. The external pressures were an essential cause for bringing about this change of socio-economic direction. However, they were not the only factor at play. Within the governing parties Frelimo and MPLA, particularly in Angola, there existed currents that favoured rather an emphasis on building a domestic bourgeoisie and which increasingly prevailed (cf. Hanlon 1984: 195ff, 263ff; Abrahamsson/Nilsson 1995: 191; Pestana 2005).
Under the extreme South African pressure, the Frelimo government consented in the 1984 Nkomati agreement to severely curtail the support for the ANC. The MPLA government in Angola, which could rely on high revenue from oil exports and enjoyed military support from Cuba since the South African military intervention in 1975, preserved a more substantial room for manoeuvre in its external policies. Its support for the ANC and the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO (South West African People’s Organisation) remained quite substantial. In 1988, South African troops suffered a decisive defeat against joint Angolan/Cuban troops in Southern Angola. This defeat opened the way for a negotiated settlement for Namibia, which had been under South African rule since World War I. Namibia’s negotiated transition to independence in 1990 was in a way a trial run for South Africa itself.

3. Negotiated transition – triple transition

The South African regime finally acknowledged in the late 1980s that a political stalemate had been reached. For the major South African capital groups, the main aim was to preserve capitalism, not its racist features. With the weakening of the Soviet Union and the implosion of state socialism, they rated their chances much higher than before to keep the transition to democracy within the confines of a capitalist socio-economic order. And the hand of big business had been strengthened in NP. The ANC and the mass democratic movement had to realise that they lacked the force to take power outright. It was in this context that the way towards a negotiated settlement was eventually paved (cf. Marais 1998: 67ff). Its first essential step was the unbanning of the ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) as well as the release of prominent political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, in 1990. Negotiations took place in an international constellation that was unfavourable to the ANC, given the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the weakening of the non-aligned countries. And these negotiations were far from smooth. The regime continued to fan violence in order to weaken its adversaries. It was with good reason that Jo-Anne Collinge (1992: 1) stated that the negotiations for a new South Africa were “launched on a bloody tide”. Arnold

According to Von Holdt/Webster (2005: 4) the end of apartheid can be regarded as a triple transition. First, there is the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This did not only include the political empowerment of all citizens but also guaranteed democratic and social rights to trade unions and workers. The NP, however, achieved succeeding in ensuring, during the negotiations, that a Government of National Unity representing all forces which won more than five per cent of the votes would be installed until 1999. Thus, the transitional phase and the formalised influence of the NP on government policies were prolonged for another five years (cf. Marais 1998: 90ff). State structures in the rural areas were one of the most contested issues of state reform and democratisation. Particularly during the final phase of apartheid, the position of so-called traditional leaders, who often collaborated with the apartheid regime, had been challenged by the militant youth. Conflicts were particularly fierce in KwaZulu. At the beginning of transition, the ANC tended to favour full democratic governance at the local level, including rural areas where the apartheid regime had bestowed considerable powers on so-called traditional authorities. However, the ANC afterwards increasingly tried to co-opt traditional leaders and by increasing their powers. As early as the late 1990s, “the government was backtracking on its previous commitments to democratic local government in favour of what it described as ‘cooperative governance’” (Southall 2013: 200). The latter ceded substantial local powers to traditional authorities, which meant marginalising women. One of the most controversial issues has been the issue of allocating land rights. This increasing role of traditional authorities did not go uncontested. Mainly gender and land activists protested strongly. In the field of industrial relations, cooperative governance had different implications. The newly elected ANC-led government acted cautiously in order to build a non-adversarial industrial relations climate. As a result, labour policy became based on the principles of consensus and cooperative governance (e.g. Bhorat et al. 2002). Secondly, the economic transition aimed at reorientation. As shown in previous sections, the apartheid growth model was inward oriented and in a state of crisis. At the same time, the new government faced some direct macroeconomic challenges. As discussed by Gelb
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(2005) it saw itself confronted with an immense budget deficit. Thirdly, social transition occurred, i.e. social inclusion and exclusion became deracialised and instead organised according to democratic principles. The contribution of Peberdy in this issue shows how inclusion and exclusion has changed with respect to (im)migration. It should, however, be noted that the general political constellation was rather unfavourable to the more radical forces of the liberation movement. This had an obvious impact on the result of the negotiation process and the eventual policy option open for post-apartheid South Africa.

Although the ANC was able to achieve a non-racial democracy, economic issues were left largely outside the political settlement, whose main elements were negotiated over three years up to the end of 1993. During this prolonged transitional phase, both international financial organisations and domestic capital strived to entrench basic features of neo-liberal policies (cf. Marais 1998: 146ff; Bond 2000: 171ff). The more progressive visions for economic policies, such as those of the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG 1993), which advocated democratisation of economic policies, redistribution, and selective industrial policies, came to be increasingly sidelined within the ANC. This shift became obvious when in 1996 the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy replaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Whereas both programmes were based on a mainstream economic policy, the RDP also envisioned an important redistributive and welfare role for the government. The political adversaries of even a mild version of Keynesianism invoked the relatively high level of inherited public debt as an impediment to the RDP and won the day. As a result the GEAR strategy focused more on macroeconomic stability, i.e. debt reduction, liberalisation and low inflation, and reduced the government’s redistributive capacities (Seekings/Nattrass 2006: 347-349).

This confinement of the official negotiations to political and juridical-institutional issues implied that the basic traits of inherited economic and social structures have remained in place. The economic model has remained highly reliant on mineral exports and finance. It has proved to be highly vulnerable to the present global crisis (Ashman et al. 2010). Socio-economic continuities are well described with respect to inequality by Leibbrandt et al. (2001b, 2012) as well as by Seekings/Nattrass (2006: 340-341). Whereas
during the post-apartheid period inequality between different racial groups was reduced (but remained amongst the highest in the world), inequality within these groups increased. The same authors stress the importance of employment, i.e. wage income, to overcome poverty and reduce inequality. At the same time, notwithstanding a complex restructuring process of work and workplaces since 1994, Von Holdt and Webster (2005) show that elements of inherited apartheid structures continue to exist (informally) in workplaces and that great numbers of households are excluded from labour market participation. They even go so far as to describe this situation as “generating a crisis of social reproduction” (Von Holdt/Webster 2005: 32) as it became increasingly more difficult for many households to make a living. Seekings/Nattrass (2006: 346-356) argue that structural inequality, created and inherited from the 1970s onward, cannot be tackled by the government’s current economic policy. This policy of deracialisation only benefited a relatively small share of South Africans. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) promoted a black economic elite and middle class. Changes in labour market legislation, public education and the social welfare system (e.g. a very strong increase of transfer payments; cf. Leubolt 2013: 377 ff) have not fundamentally modified the social structures responsible for inequality, though they have brought partial improvements. In a similar vein Delgado/Lühl (in this issue) discuss the persistence of structural inequality with respect to housing in Namibia. Though persistent high inequality and external economic vulnerability have given rise to pressures to adopt a more developmentalist strategy giving more emphasis to industrial development and redistribution, and while social protests have been strong, the ANC government has not substantially modified its development strategy (Marais 2011: 346ff, 394ff, 434ff).

4. Transition in Southern Africa

In Namibia, the potential space for progressive socio-economic changes was much more limited than in South Africa. The mineral sector, which is controlled by foreign capital, is even more economically dominant than in South Africa. Commercial agriculture faces adverse agro-ecological conditions. The arid climate that prevails in the areas of (mainly white) commer-
cial agriculture poses an extra challenge to any land reform initiative. Although the extremely unequal colonial distribution of land had been one of the main socio-economic grievances during the anti-colonial struggle, land reform has been quite limited (Kaapama 2007). Outside the TNC-controlled mineral sector, the white settler bourgeoisie is still economically predominant. The emerging black (petty) bourgeoisie is still limited in scope and highly dependent on the Swapo-led state (Melber 2007). Apart from democratisation, the expansion of social services has been the major achievement of the post-independence period. The economic structure has hardly been changed. It is an indication of the limitations of the economic model that a lot of money has been channelled to real estate. This has resulted in hefty price increases for real estate and a deepening of the housing crisis, as Guillermo Delgado and Phillip Lühl point out in their article on financialisation in Namibia.

In the early 1990s, Zimbabwe’s policies of ‘reconciliation’ and limited reform were often presented as a possible model for South Africa and Namibia. While redressing the extremely skewed colonial distribution of land had been a central issue of ‘chimurenga’, the rural-based liberation war, the ZANU-PF government proceeded very cautiously on the issue. Although there was some redistribution of land due to strong popular pressures in the early 1980s, the government tried to accommodate white settler agriculture in the new order and to deflect these pressures (cf. Moyo 1986). Changes in the urban areas were more limited. While workers’ rights were extended, ZANU-PF, which had lacked any serious links to trade unions before 1980, tried to control the trade union movement (cf. Sachikonye 1986). Black businessmen who usually were linked to the governing party gradually built up their economic base. The economy continued to rest on raw material exports and a rather diversified inward-looking industrial sector. The balance of payments continued to be a constraint on development. During the 1980s, the government dealt with recurrent external debt problems with creatively designed heterodox policies (Becker 1988: 279ff). However, regulatory controls which had been central to the 1980s economic policies were slowly eroded. The 1991 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) dismantled key controls and liberalised foreign trade and foreign exchange dealings. Aggravated by drought, ESAP decisively destabilised the economic model and the manufacturing sector began to
shrink. At the same time, ESAP led to severe cuts in social spending and an accelerated switch to neo-liberal concepts in social policy, which induced higher levels of poverty (Bond/Manyanya 2003: 35; Bond 2007: 216f; Hendricks 2007: 132ff). During the 1990s trade unions became increasingly autonomous again and started to spearhead a more broadly based urban protest movement (Bond/Manyanya 2003: 74ff). And the ruling ZANU/PF faced a serious political challenge from the war veterans who took up the land issue again (Sandomba 2011: chap. 5). The two protest movements, with their very distinct social and historical roots, did not find the road to co-operation. On the contrary, they even turned (or were turned) into adversaries. Being faced with the rapid erosion of its urban base, ZANU-PF tried to shore up at least its rural base and took up the issue of land reform. As part of its strategy to retain its rural stronghold, the ZANU-PF government consciously co-opted chiefs, whereas it had promoted elected local structures in the 1980s (cf. Southall 2013: 196f). In addition, it stepped up its rhetoric of the indigenisation of business (Andreasson 2010: 135). Instead of forging an alliance with the war veterans, the trade unionists joined hands with some manufacturing interests and white farmers in forming the very heterogeneous Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Bond/Manyanya 2003: 91ff). Similar to ZAPU – ZANU-PF’s rival and temporary ally during the independence struggle in the 1980s – MDC faced massive repression from the ZANU-PF government.

Extremely rapid land redistribution and heightened social conflict produced massive economic dislocation and hyperinflation. Mass emigration to South Africa (see Peberdy in this issue) ensued. Because of the breaches of property rights and the moves against white farmers and the urban opposition, Western governments imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe. While COSATU took sides with its repressed Zimbabwean colleagues, the South African government tried to broker a deal between the contending political forces. In 2008, a tense coalition government was formed between ZANU-PF and MDC. Harassment of MDC activists and sympathizers has, however, continued.

The coalition government was finally able to end hyperinflation – by abolishing the Zimbabwe dollar. A certain economic recovery has begun. The manufacturing sector has suffered severely from the policies and turmoil of the last two decades. Field research shows, however, that despite
the adverse economic circumstances and quite limited infrastructural support, a very significant share of beneficiaries of the land reform has been able to expand their production and make some investments (e.g. Scoones et al. 2010; Matondi 2012; Hanlon et al. 2013). In the biggest African land reform, 6,000 white farms have been replaced by 245,000 black farmers (Hanlon et al. 2013: 209). “So there has been a huge increase in the number of people working on the land, but two issues remain outstanding: tens of thousands of people have lost jobs, and the working conditions and wages of farmworkers appear to have deteriorated”, conclude Hanlon et al. (2013: 194). From the redistribution of land, women have profited much less than men, partly due to the hasty implementation of the land reform and partly due to subtle forms of bureaucratic discrimination (Matondi 2012: 186ff). Matondi (2012) underlines that the “control of land by men has not been widened just by access, but also through the importation of customary systems.”

Mozambique and Angola had initiated the most radical transformative attempts in the 1970s and had suffered most from military destabilisation by apartheid South Africa. The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo), which had been founded as an armed group by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation and later adopted by the South African regime, had to agree to disarmament and integration into the Mozambican political order as a political party during the transition phase in South Africa. In 1992, multiparty democracy was introduced in Mozambique. Frelimo was transformed from a mass-based state party into an increasingly electorally oriented formation which has won all subsequent elections. For Renamo, which originated as an armed group initiated by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation, the transformation into a political party proved to be cumbersome (Hanlon/Smart 2008: chap. 9). It has continued to threaten with the resort to violence. Beyond that, it attracted mainly rural voters by propagating regional and ethnic peculiarities and by propagating the restoration of so-called ‘traditional’, i.e. patriarchal practices (Saul 2005: 77f; Buur/Kyed 2005; Florêncio 2008: 381ff). Whereas women’s representation at the national level has continued to be considerable, rural developments have been rather politically detrimental. Saul (2005: 104) argues that Frelimo is less responsive to the demands of peasants and workers than was the case in the phase of socialist orienta-
tion. Granjo (2010: 182) quotes a widely shared perception of democracy among the Mozambican urban poor: “In democracy, you say what you think, but nobody pays attention to what you are saying.” The widening social gulf, precarious living conditions and the lack of attention for the poor produced large-scale rioting in Maputo in 2008 and 2010. However, Frelimo proved to be responsive to inputs by peasant organisations to a country-wide consultation on the new land law, which was passed in 1997 (Palmer 2003: 10ff).

In Angola, the war proved to last longer. Though multiparty elections were held as part of the Bicesse accord in 1992 in Angola, Unita resorted to renewed violence after its electoral defeat and only conceded military defeat after its leader, Jonas Savimbi, had been killed during a military operation in 2002. Because Unita had persisted so long in continuing the war, its image has been permanently tarnished. The party has shown weak results in subsequent multiparty elections. Like Frelimo, the governing MPLA has increasingly transformed into an electoral formation. Power inside the MPLA has, since the late 1970s, been increasingly centralised in the hands of the party and state president, José Eduardo dos Santos, who has been in office since 1979. The marginalisation of the party left went hand in hand with this process (Hodges 2001: 47ff). MPLA was much more heavy-handed in dealing with internal conflicts than Frelimo, even during the liberation war. A repressive tendency in dealing with political and social conflicts has persisted until today. The MPLA has historically been weaker in the countryside than Frelimo. Its historical stronghold has been the capital, Luanda. Due to an increasing social polarisation, its support base in the shanty towns of Luanda has been eroded (Conchiglia 2012: 44). Large urban development projects have produced conflicts over urban land. Ahead of the 2012 elections, left wing intellectuals, urban middle strata and popular musicians expressed a strong social critique of the MPLA’s policies (cf. Vicky 2012: 13).

In both Angola and Mozambique, transition towards “wild capitalism” (Mosca 2005: 465) commenced due to massive external pressures and to internal changing balances of forces in the 1980s. The IMF has heavily conditioned Mozambique’s way back into peripheral capitalism (cf. Hanlon 1996). Due to high oil revenues, the MPLA government enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy than Frelimo in Mozambique. Nevertheless, the results
of transformation have not been too dissimilar. In both cases, privatisation became a key element of economic policies. In Mozambique, the largest and most promising firms went mainly to external capital. The emerging local bourgeoisie, which had strong links to Frelimo, had to content itself usually with small and medium-scale enterprises (Hanlon/Smart 2008: 106ff). Under conditions of war, a very opaque process of privatisation and utilisation of oil revenue took place (Hodges 2001: chap. 5, 6). In both countries, an “alliance of foreign capital with (re-)emerging entrepreneurial classes” as Mosca (2005: 465) characterises it for Mozambique, emerged. However, this alliance has not been without conflicts. The core of the emerging domestic bourgeoisie is intimately linked to the ruling party and the state, as Pestana (2005: 201) points out. In Mozambique, the emerging local bourgeoisie was partly rentier in character, while the other part tried to build up productive capacities. Both fractions were represented in Frelimo and respectively coalesced into partisans of a ‘predatory state’ and a ‘developmental state’. In the early 2000s, power shifted somewhat away from the ‘predatory’ fraction (Hanlon/Smart 2008: 106ff).

The Angolan economy is highly dependent on the oil sector. Oil revenue has permitted a flourishing real estate business (particularly in Luanda) and a reconstruction of the infrastructure that was devastated during the war in Angola. High foreign exchange revenue likewise permitted the emergence of flourishing import business, while recovery of productive sectors remains slow. Nevertheless, the government belatedly took some measures to protect local industries (Salomão 2008: 44ff). In Mozambique, the government has promoted some large-scale projects. The focus on big projects has some parallels with some elements of the socialist construction efforts of the late 1970s, though the socio-political context has changed. In a way, central features of the colonial economic structure – raw material exports and servicing the South African economy – have not been really overcome during the brief socialist phase and have indeed re-emerged with renewed force over the last two decades in Mozambique (cf. Mosca 2005: 451ff). However, the Mozambican government has tried to protect at least some inward-looking industries. Social inequality is high in both societies, particularly in oil-rich Angola (cf. Pestana 2005: 201; Hanlon/Smart 2008: chap. 7).

Since the early 1990s, building a local black bourgeoisie has increasingly become a priority of former liberation movements in power, particu-
larly so in the two former settler economies of Zimbabwe and South Africa. In South Africa, this has been accompanied by strong initiatives in the field of social policies. The ANC government has made substantial strides in service provision (though often with a neo-liberal policy design) and has very significantly expanded transfer payments to the poor. In Zimbabwe, expansion of social services was limited to the first decade after independence. A massive decline in living standards and the emergence of strong social movements as well as a serious political opposition party made the ZANU/PF governments undertake a very radical land reform in order to shore up its rural support base. Generally, a retreat of the governing liberation movements from transformative approaches can be observed. This trend can be attributed both to the unfavourable international balance of forces as well as to tendencies of embourgeoisement within the liberation movements in power.

5. Asymmetrical regional relations

The ANC has pursued a rather outward looking economic strategy based on the liberalisation of trade and capital movements. Driven by the agro-export interests, South Africa initially joined the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the run-up to the Cancun Conference in 2003, South Africa joined a newly emerging group in the WTO, which counted Brazil, China and India among its members. Contrary to the Cairns Group, with its focus on trade liberalisation and the phasing out of subsidies, the new G20 argued in favour of a differential treatment of so-called developing countries (Wellmer 2007: 229f). Thus, the change of grouping in the WTO signalled a change in the international negotiation strategy. With the more assertive stance of the new emerging powers and peripheral states in the WTO, WTO negotiations have reached a standstill since 2008. Beyond the WTO, South Africa formed a South-South trade coalition with Brazil and India (IBSA) from which bilateral trade agreements have emerged (cf. Dupas 2006: 356ff). In 2011, South Africa joined the BRICS group. During its 5th summit in Durban in Spring 2013, the BRICS countries had the creation of a joint development bank on the agenda. Thus, the forms of
South-South co-operation among these emerging powers have evolved in spite of the socio-economic and socio-political differentiations in the group (Abdelkrim-Delanne 2013: 68). The ANC government is actively reacting to the power shift from core capitalist countries to emerging semi-peripheral powers, a shift which has accelerated with the present crisis.

More generally, a certain change of emphasis can be observed in the realm of bilateral trade negotiations, where relations with core economies had a high priority in the 1990s, whereas South-South relations have received increased attention in recent years. In the 1990s, it was a top priority of the ANC to negotiate a trade agreement with the EU, which accounted for 31.8% of South Africa’s exports from 1998 to 2003 (Wellmer 2007: 211). Initially, the South African government tried to join the ACP group and join the Lomé agreement. However, the European Commission blocked this attempt in 1995. Subsequently, the EU and South Africa negotiated a reciprocal trade agreement, which was signed in 1999. This agreement posed some limited constraints on South Africa’s policy space, had direct negative implications for South Africa’s partners in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and had at least indirect negative consequences for SADC (cf. Wellmer 2007: 211ff; Nölke/Claar 2012: 86f).

In its attempts to orient Southern African countries as exclusively as possible to the EU and confine them to a role of commodity exporters, the EU has taken a particularly obstructive course towards Southern African regional integration (Lee 2009; Qobo 2012). In particular, the EU did not want that the SADC, as the most political regional grouping, lead the negotiation process (Lee 2009: 94). The EU carved out its own concept of regional negotiation patterns for the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements, a concept that does not fit with the existing regional structures. While the EPAs, with their extremely far-reaching liberalisation agenda, have been met with strong reservations by the ACP countries, the EU has tried to at least coerce the most vulnerable negotiation partners into interim agreements. In Southern Africa, some countries bowed to EU pressures while others remain steadfast (Qobo 2012: 258). Thus, the EU has deepened already existing tensions within the SADC.
6. Limits to liberation

In his recent comparative study on South African, Namibian and Zimbabwean liberation movements in power, Roger Southall (2013: 331) concludes: “Notwithstanding the liberation movements’ capture of state power and their commitment to transformation, the transitional arrangements with the global shift to neo-liberalism to induce them to implement economic strategies which, whilst facilitative of economic growth, placed severe limitations upon the ability of governments to overcome the structural inequalities of the past and planted the seeds of subsequent social and political crisis.” In South Africa, the mineral-energy complex and the finance sector have continued to be lead sectors of the economic model. Within the confines of the growth model, with its strong continuities with the past, labour rights have been strengthened and social policies, particularly transfer payments, have been expanded. Black Economic Empowerment, rather than transforming the economic and class structures, has become the priority of the successive ANC governments. The basic traits of Swapo’s policies in Namibia, where the policy options have been even more structurally circumscribed, have been similar. The main achievements of the ANC and Swapo can be found in political democratisation and in establishing liberal democratic constitutions. The continuing extreme inequalities have created enormous social tensions in South Africa and Zimbabwe, less visible ones in Namibia. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF government suffered from a severe loss of legitimacy in the 1990 due to structural adjustment policies and the ensuing economic and social crisis. A strong, but socially very heterogeneous, oppositional movement emerged, particularly in the urban centres. ZANU-PF responded by fierce repression on the one hand, and by implementing a radical land reform in order to shore up its rural base on the other hand.

Destabilisation policies of the South African apartheid regime caused havoc in the region, particularly in Mozambique and Angola. In both countries, South African policies in the late 1970s and 1980s aimed at destroying alternative socio-economic models. Destabilisation policies, combined with the pressures of Western governments and international financial organisations, achieved this aim. However, the abandoning of socialist orientation cannot be attributed to external pressures alone. These pressures inter-
acted with currents in the liberation movements which wanted to create a
domestic bourgeoisie rather than advancing socialist transformation.

A highly asymmetrical relationship between South Africa and the
other states of the region has been one of the difficult inheritances of the
colonial and apartheid past. It has proved to be a key challenge to post-
apartheid regional integration and cooperation initiatives.

7. The structure of the issue

The issue explores how the legacy of apartheid has affected the wider
Southern African region, and particularly the relationship between South
Africa and its neighbours. Chris Saunders and Dawn Nagar explore this
relationship between South Africa and SADC countries in their article in
this issue. They highlight the colonially inherited asymmetries in the rela-
tions between South Africa and the other SADC countries. They analyse
the different actors that shape South Africa’s regional integration policies
and highlight the prominent role of the South African private sector, partic-
ularly multinational corporations, in defining South Africa’s ‘new region-
alism’. They argue that South Africa is likely to derive disproportionate
benefits from the formation of a Free Trade Area, which was initiated in
1996, but took 12 years to materialise. Thus, the more liberal approach to
regional integration which has guided policies for the last two decades
rather accentuates the already existing regionally uneven patterns of devel-
opment. This has obviously had a negative impact on the cohesion of the
regional grouping.

Guillermo Delgado and Phillip Lühl highlight key features of the
Namibian growth model. They focus on a key element of the Namibian
growth model which has so far been neglected in most analyses of the
Namibian economy: financialisation. They analyse how financialisation
has contributed to weakening the rather modest productive base and to
reproduce and cement patterns of inequalities in housing. They do not
confine themselves to a critique of neo-liberal housing policies, but provide
some indications as to what might be possible alternatives.

Whereas Delgado and Lühl deal with micro-spatial inequalities, Sally
Peberdy’s analysis of the continuities and discontinuities of South Africa’s
migration policies has macro-regional unequal development as its background. She puts migration patterns and South African migration policies into the context of the changing political economy of Southern Africa and relates them to the constellation of political forces. Immigration into South Africa has turned into a highly contested issue in post-apartheid South Africa and xenophobia has taken a very violent turn. She explores the puzzling question as to why bouts of xenophobic attacks have shaken post-apartheid South Africa. The three studies shed light on the difficulties of transforming inherited structures which bear the imprint of enormous inequalities and of many decades of institutionalised racism and violence.

References


The end of the apartheid regime has had highly significant implications not only for South Africa, but for the wider Southern African region. As part of this colonial heritage, the neighbouring states are closely and asymmetrically linked to the South African economy. The apartheid regime had pursued aggressive policies of destabilisation against its neighbours, particularly against Mozambique and Angola, in order to cut the South African and Namibian liberation movements off from external support and in order to destroy alternative development models, particularly left-wing ones. The difficult heritage of the apartheid era, of asymmetrical regional
relations and past destabilisation policies on the one hand, and the end of state socialism and the global shift toward neo-liberalism on the other, have been conditioning factors for post-apartheid transformations. This introductory article gives an overview on political, economic and social transformations, their structural constraints and main political and social actors.


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