Welfare Regimes in the Global South

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Foreword

The question of the role and notion of a welfare state is a pressing one in times of crisis. As is currently seen in Europe, a common answer to a financial and economic crisis is austerity, entailing a reduction of public expenses and a cutback of social services. Social policies – under this conventional paradigm – have to follow economic and fiscal priorities.

There is much at stake. The development of the various European social welfare models is by no means a one-way street. What can be observed is a constant shift of the perception and conception of welfare or social policies throughout the twentieth century. For some decades a shift towards a profound neoliberal ideologisation seems to have become predominant; an ideologisation which was even partly successful within progressive political movements in Europe.

This shift – implying an interpretation of social policies as a distortion of effective (market driven) allocations by the use adverse incentives – is possibly accelerated by the current crisis, a crisis which started off as a financial one and seems to have ended up as a sovereign debt, political, economic as well as environmental crisis. Nevertheless, instead of rethinking the current economic models, the unbearable imbalances within the European Union and the fundamental causes of the crisis, we see an 'adaptation and modernization' of the social systems. These adaptations result in new (or old) forms of recommodification, privatisation and scaling back of the level of social security – not only in 'Old Europe', but especially also in the countries of the east and southeast of the European Union.

However, it is not only useful but indispensable to leave the predominant Eurocentric viewpoint and to change the perspective. On the one hand many countries of the Global South had already developed welfare systems early in the twentieth century, a fact which is often neglected when discussing processes of state formation in the southern hemisphere. On the

other hand, as several contributions in this special issue show, many parts of the Global South – sometimes federal states within certain countries like Brazil, sometimes even on a regional or transnational scale – recently seem to have developed models of welfare provision beyond existing economic and political hegemonies. These recent developments of welfare states sometimes clearly turn away from previous and current neoliberal transformation processes; however, until now they seem to have been widely ignored in the political sphere of the Global North. It has still to be examined whether certain social improvements were a result or rather a precondition of economic growth and development in the South. These new approaches towards socially and ecologically more balanced and sustainable growth models definitely deserve attention, as they create opportunities for many and not prosperity for a few.

We are very thankful for the productive and fruitful cooperation with the Mattersburger Kreis in the framework of this publication. The Karl-Renner-Institute will intensify its work on these subjects, focussing not only on the economic developments of the BRICS-states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the 'shooting stars' of the global economy, but also dealing with questions of social and ecological transformation processes in the respective countries and regions. For us as a political academy, it is of the utmost importance to discuss certain dimensions of globalisation not only within scientific circles, but also with a broader public audience. Looking outside often sharpens the perception of internal developments. In Europe – and probably especially in countries like Austria – certain social and political positions and achievements are taken for granted, even if in reality they are subject to constant struggles and very much depend on political power relations of different forces and groups in the society. Social systems and democracy are interdependent and influence each other. This is not only true for countries of the Global South, but also for Europe – and it makes it even more important to shed light on this topic and to discuss the fundamental principles of the welfare state and social systems on a global scale.

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Welfare Regimes in the Global South: A Short Introduction

Welfare states are usually celebrated as *the* crucial achievement of supposedly 'Western' modernity. However, a look at processes of state and nation-building in other regions of the world seriously challenges this Euro-centric vision of exclusivity (see for example Leibfried/Mau 2008: xxviii). Quite a considerable number of states in the global South, especially in parts of Asia and Latin America, developed *modern* welfare state policies and structures at the same time or even earlier than most of the European countries. In Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay initiated their first public welfare programmes in the early decades of the 20th century (Mesa-Lago 1978). In the context of the strategy of state-induced import substitution policies in the first half of the 20th century, welfare state policies were used to alleviate the tensions brought about by (dependent) capitalist development and the growing demands of democratic inclusion and participation. These countries, however, although heavily influenced by asymmetric relations with their European colonisers, did not copy European models or follow European trajectories. Nevertheless, the positive reference to the European Welfare states as representing a crucial political and social achievement has played a role in the political discourse of countries in the South, even at times when the neoliberal dismantling of the European welfare states was already under way. Thus, despite the neoliberal assault on social expenditures and the structure of welfare provisions (Deacon 2007) both in the Global North and South, the idea of using the state's regulatory capacity for welfare provision remains a powerful and mobilising demand which has been advocated by different progressive social movements all over the world. Although in the context of the so-called Washington consensus, neoliberal structural reforms have been pushed by governments from the Global North and international institu-

tions, these pressures did not uniformly result in a dismantling of existing social policy programmes. As was the case with similar processes in Western Europe, attempts to reduce social expenditure or privatise existing public programmes met with the staunch resistance of civil society groups. Additionally, the globally popular conditional cash transfer programmes, originally meant as a kind of shock-absorber in the context of drastic reforms, effectively became incipient social security programmes based on means-tested or social rights approaches. Whether the post-Washington consensus will lead to a post-neoliberal era is still a very contested issue in scholarly debate. What has become clear within the context of the post-Millennium Development Goal debate, however, is the fact that social policies, welfare regime reforms and their impact on multiple, intersectional social inequalities will remain on the (global) political agenda for quite some time.

Due to the one-sided focus, until recently, on a handful of case studies within the global North (mainly Western European countries and a couple of former white settler colonies (the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia), developments in countries and regions of the global South were largely ignored by comparative welfare state research (see Wehr 2010: 88-89). Only in the last 10 years did 'peripheral' welfare states in Asia and Latin America and South Africa enter into the focus of the international research agenda (Gough/Wood 2004; Franzoni 2008; Haggard/Kaufmann 2008; Mesa-Lago 2008; Rudra 2008; Seekings 2008). Most of the efforts focused on 'pressing' welfare state and regime development within the global South into the categories and typologies of Esping Anderson, i.e. categories and typologies derived from a specific historical context quite different from that containing the challenges faced by most postcolonial states (for a criticism of those typologies see Wehr 2009, 2010).

Gradually, however, in an attempt to broaden the research agenda on welfare regime trajectories, contributions about and from the global South have been challenging the binary assumption of 'modern' Western welfare states residing in the Global North and 'traditional' welfare regimes in other parts of the world. Partially advanced by the findings of feminist research (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1996) which showed that even in supposedly 'advanced' welfare systems, benefits were not expanded simultaneously to all groups in the population but showed strong asymmetries according to gender/sex, race, ethnicity, or place of birth, recent research has made an

effort to take seriously historical trajectories of welfare regime development outside the traditional OECD world. 'Peripheral' welfare regimes are no longer classified as deficient, premodern varieties of the European norm, but rather as distinct *modern* models, whose origins and characteristics must be explained and criticised in terms of the respective historical and regional context and the specific challenges of (dependent) capitalist and democratic development.

Despite their differences, all articles in this volume share a perspective on welfare regimes which challenges underlying Eurocentric assumptions and shows a keen interest in deconstructing actors, power constellations and ideas which shape welfare trajectories in (post-)colonial settings. Seen from this approach, modern (peripheral) welfare states are not viewed as benevolent guarantors of certain social standards or as simple safeguards against the vicissitudes of life (unemployment, old age, accidents, disabilities, illnesses or parenthood), created to level income or other social inequalities. On the contrary, states use certain types of social policies in order to actively influence the social order and to reproduce or transform class and other social relations (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23). From this perspective, welfare states are powerful stratification and (re)distribution machines, exerting considerable influence on the social inequalities and commonly accepted rules of social justice. Social conflicts about the concrete limits and scope of social policies and interventions, thus, are not only related to questions of income and social security. What is at stake, then, is the definition of crucial inclusion and exclusion mechanisms (Kronauer 2002) and the participation opportunities and rights of individuals and particular social groups (rural workers or workers within the informal economy, women and ethnic groups), i.e. the right to participate in certain public goods like health and education). Access to social services and participation rights and opportunities always reflect existing political power constellations and asymmetries and cannot be isolated from the social struggles and social coalitions which brought them about. This can be clearly seen in the fact that social benefits were first of all extended to those social groups which were in a position to stabilise or destabilise existing production patterns or political authority structures, either due to their degree of organisation, their capacity to stir social unrest (for the term '*Konfliktfähigkeit*' see Schubert/Tetzlaff 1998: 28-29) or their strategic position within

the production process (on the authoritarian origins of welfare regimes see Mares/Carnes 2009: 96-101). Whether this originally very narrow circle of stakeholders could later be expanded, depended very much on the correlation of forces within society and the existing possibilities of coalition building (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Korpi/Palme 1998).

A look at the origins of the European varieties of welfare state regimes also shows that early institutional arrangements have long-term influences on the further development of welfare regimes, a fact which considerably impedes radical transformations. This surprising continuity of welfare state institutions may be partially explained by the social and political power of distributional coalitions with a keen interest in perpetuating the existing status quo (Pierson 2003; Haggard/Kaufmann 2008). Additionally, socialisation mechanisms contribute to the tenacity of welfare institutions, once these have been established. Recent results of comparative inequality and welfare regime research indicate that prevailing visions of welfare state orders and authority structures are not only transmitted and consolidated by direct interventions via social policies or the provision and distribution of private as well as public goods, but also by specific visions of social justice. According to these recent analyses, levels of income and perceptions of upward mobility (Benabou/Ok 2001) play only a secondary role. Path dependencies, though partially explaining the fact that welfare policies are 'slow-moving processes' (Pierson 2003), do not necessarily lead to frozen structures. The confluence of national and inter- or transnational factors might lead to punctuated equilibria or new critical junctures, challenging existing welfare regimes and policies.

In a nutshell, these brief considerations point to the fact that the concrete design of welfare state policies and structures always reflects political and social power relations and that these relations are embedded in formal as well as informal political institutions and state structures. In line with the power-centred approach advanced by Esping-Andersen (1990: 16-18) and in an explicit attempt to overcome the Eurocentrism of most welfare regime research, this special issue of the Austrian Journal of Development Studies concentrates on welfare regime trajectories in (post-)colonial societies. Special emphasis is given to the emerging 'semi-peripheries' (Worth/Moore 2009) in the 'Global South', whose rise is often connected to a possible rise of 'post-neoliberal' political alternatives.

Jeremy Seekings' article *Pathways to Redistribution: The Emerging Politics of Social Assistance across the Global 'South'* further elaborates on the discussion of political influences and their institutional legacy as regards welfare regimes in the 'Global South'. Seekings analyses the unprecedented rise of 'redistributive' welfare regimes in the global 'South', which are replacing previous models. This is in contrast to developments up to the end of the twentieth century, when the predominant welfare models were either 'workerist', based on social or private insurance linked to formal employment, or 'agrarian', with a 'safety-net' based in subsistence agriculture and the responsibilities of kin. According to Seekings, the development of 'peripheral' welfare regimes today is less class-driven, i.e. it is focused on citizens, rather than on workers or peasants. Seekings identifies processes of democratisation, especially increased political competition for votes of poor citizens, as crucial factors in the diverse pathways towards redistributive, pro-poor welfare regimes. He illustrates his arguments with three case studies (Brazil, Korea and India) of countries that have recently undergone considerable transformations and suggests that future research should concentrate less on the amount of aggregate social spending than on the question of on which social groups social assistance and social security funds are spent and on the political factors enabling welfare regime change.

Luciano Andrenacci's *From Developmentalism to Inclusionism: On the Transformation of Latin American Welfare Regimes in the early 21st Century* examines welfare regime trajectories and changes in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century. Similar to Ehmke and Seekings, Andrenacci raises the question as to whether recent changes in welfare regime development can be interpreted as critical junctures, transforming existing patterns of inequality and poverty. After reviewing the classical literature on comparative welfare regime research and the possibility of transferring key concepts and assumptions to Latin American cases, Andrenacci identifies key elements of Latin American welfare regimes, regimes which are characterised by a problematic form of inclusion which finds its expression in a highly unequal access to central goods and services and thus a very asymmetrical distribution of citizenship and social rights in the region. Whether recent positive trends might actually lead to a transformation of Latin America's highly segmented and asymmetric welfare regimes is still an issue of debate, although the article ends on a slightly optimistic note.

The article *Farewell to diversity? New zones of health care service in China's Far West* by Sascha Klotzbücher, Peter Lässig, Qin Jiangmei, Rui Dongsheng and Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik analyses Chinese health care policies and service provision to Kazak herders in Yinyuan County. Drawing on James Scott's concept of 'state enclosure' and a solid empirical basis of interviews conducted between 2005 and 2009 with herders, patients, and representatives of the health care system, the authors come to the conclusion that the Chinese health care system can be interpreted as a modern form of enclosure which enables the state to expand to remote areas. In an attempt to govern via health care policies, the welfare regimes become a 'distance-demolishing technology' which binds previously independent local groups to the state. The resulting governance structures in the health sector are not only more costly than local initiatives but also have harmful effects on these social groups as they are in opposition to the nomadic life-style of the Kazak herders. Additionally, due to its reliance on Han Chinese dominated concepts, the current health care system marginalises both local medical approaches and the Kazak employees.

Ellen Ehmke's contribution to this special edition focuses on *Ideas and Culture in the Indian Welfare Trajectory*. In contrast to the mainstream of comparative welfare regime research, which concentrates on regime types and institutional factors, Ehmke emphasizes the role of competing ideas in order to examine different welfare regime trajectories in the Global South. The author shows how, in the case of India, ideas of social transformation, strongly advocated by the independence movement, were gradually displaced by ideas of national unity. Within the larger political context of decolonisation and democratisation, preference was given to the stability of rule and national unity to the detriment of radical social transformation. Although neoliberal, growth-oriented development ideas have recently been replaced by ideas of 'inclusive growth', it is an open question whether the latest ideational shift constitutes a critical juncture which might actually bring about social reforms altering local power structures and the asymmetries characterising the Indian welfare system.

Even though the contributions build upon different theoretical backgrounds, they share the 'power-political approach', which views "institutions first and foremost as the political legacies of concrete historical struggles [...] [and] embrace a power-political view of institutions that emphasizes

their distributional effects" (Mahoney/Thelen 2010: 7). Empirically, they highlight a considerable expansion of redistributive policies in the emerging 'semi-peripheries' (Worth/Moore 2009) of the 'Global South', an expansion which seems to be both patronising (as especially shown by Klotzbücher et al.) and empowering hitherto excluded groups (especially shown by Seekings). How far these recent developments will contribute to the rise of new socio-economic paradigms (such as 'post-neoliberalism'; cf. Brand/Sekler 2009) remains to be seen. However, these developments will continue to be shaped by the specific correlations of forces on politics.

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Jeremy Seekings
Pathways to Redistribution: The Emerging Politics of Social Assistance Across the Global 'South'

1. Introduction

Fifteen years ago it appeared that the dominant trend in welfare reform in the 'developing' countries of the 'global South' was the 'neo-liberal' shift associated with the Chilean model (see Borzutsky 2002) and the World Bank's 1994 policy document, *Averting the Old-Age Crisis* (World Bank 1994). In a wide range of countries in Latin America and post-Communist Eastern Europe and Central Asia, risk-pooling and state-subsidised social insurance schemes were replaced, in full or in part, by individual savings accounts managed by private sector pension funds (Madrid 2003; Brooks 2007; Weyland 2007). Since then, however, it has become clear that another, quite different reform process has been underway in a diverse and growing set of countries across the South. Various governments have been experimenting with what Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme (2010) call 'just giving money to the poor'. Cash transfer programmes such as the *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil entail a form of social assistance to the poor that contrasts with both the neo-liberal paradigm of marketisation and state shrinkage and the pre-existing 'northern' paradigm of social insurance. It also contrasts with the prevailing model of 'development', which has emphasised doing things for the poor. The World Bank itself has become an enthusiastic advocate of social assistance, including both the non-contributory, poverty-oriented 'pillar' in old-age pension systems (World Bank 2005) and the 'conditional' cash transfers pioneered in Brazil and Mexico[1]. The Bank warns that "without appropriate social protection mechanisms the MDG targets for 2015 will not be achieved" (World Bank 2003: 3).

By about 2008, at least 45 Southern countries were paying cash transfers to more than 110 million families (Hanlon et al. 2010: 47). Armando Barrientos et al.'s (2010) *Social Assistance in Developing Countries* database documents programmes in more than 50 countries, including 21 in Africa. Given the expanding coverage of these programmes, it is likely that at least one-tenth of the world's population in 2010 lived in households where someone received a cash transfer.

The new programmes give money to the poor in three ways. The first option is to pay wages, for work on public works programmes, to able-bodied adults of working age. This strategy makes most sense if poverty is due to unemployment that is transitory, either because of a sudden economic crisis that is expected to be short-lived (for example, in South Korea in 1997–1998), or because of seasonal variations in employment opportunities (for example, in rural India). The second option is to provide pensions or grants to categories of the poor deemed to be deserving. This strategy makes most sense when the poverty is concentrated among people who are unable to work on grounds of age or disability, and who are not looked after by those who can and do work. This strategy has been especially important in some former British colonies and dominions, including in South Africa. The third option is to provide grants to poor families with children, so as to improve the prospects of those children taking advantage of educational and economic opportunities. This approach has been especially prevalent in Latin America, through conditional cash transfers. A fourth option – giving money to all citizens – is rarely popular, because neither elites nor ordinary people believe that *all* people are deserving.

Unsurprisingly, the politics of reform varies between countries (and even within essentially federal countries such as Brazil or India). The context for reform is invariably when prior policies fail in some sense: when economic policies fail to prevent sharp recessions, development policies fail to reach the landless poor, social insurance programmes fail to reach households in which no one is in formal employment, poor families are unable or unwilling to support elderly or other hitherto dependent kin, or when children are not attending schools or clinics. The immediate impetus most often arises from the political power of the poor: not so much through the threat of direct action (in part because new welfare programmes typically take too long to introduce to avert direct action) but rather through political competition

for the votes of the poor. Whilst neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition, such competition is a crucially important factor in the otherwise varied pathways towards redistributive, pro-poor welfare regimes across the South.

2. Typologies of welfare provision

These new policies are not easily accommodated within most existing typologies of welfare provision in the South. Southern typologies typically take Esping-Andersen's work on the welfare regimes of the North as their starting-point, but then seek to reconfigure his approach so as to take into account the rather different conditions that exist across most of the South.

Esping-Andersen's (1990) basic insight was that the differences between welfare states in the North were not simply ones of scale (some spending more than others), but reflected different designs. 'Who got what?' (and 'when?') depended not only on the *volume* of public expenditure but also on the details of *how* protection against poverty-related risks was divided between states, markets and kin (or community). Welfare regimes differed in terms of Polanyian 'decommodification' – i.e. "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation" (ibid.: 37) – as well as 'stratification' and 'universalism'. Decommodification on its own was not a sufficient measure, because individuals could be decommodified unequally, or some people might be excluded altogether. Esping-Andersen (1999) later incorporated a more gendered dimension into his analysis, emphasizing also 'defamilialisation', i.e. the extent to which the state assumed responsibilities otherwise borne by the family (for example, care for children or the elderly).

In the first major analysis of the South, Gough et al. (Gough et al. 2004; Wood/Gough 2006) pointed out that Esping-Andersen's analysis assumed the existence of developed markets and legitimate, largely autonomous, 'modern' states. Much of the South lacks such markets and states. Commodification is incomplete insofar as subsistence agriculture persists and people do not rely on the sale of their labour or produce. The poor development of financial markets also means that access to insurance and savings is often mediated through local patrons. More importantly, for Gough et al., few states are sufficiently developed for the welfare regime to

be seen as an 'actual or potential welfare *state* regime'. In many cases, the state does nothing for popular welfare, and in some cases predatory elites running the 'state' actually undermine popular welfare (including through violent conflict). Gough et al. label these 'informal security' and 'insecurity' regimes respectively. They recognise that states exist in the 'informal security regimes', but argue that states are primarily vehicles for patron-client relationships and the reproduction of political and economic inequalities. The consequence of this is that the construction of a more modern state ('declientelisation') is more important than, or at least a prerequisite for, decommodification (and, presumably, defamilialisation also).[2] Gough et al. (2004) and Wood/Gough (2006) also suggest that the concept of welfare regimes in the South needs to take into account other mechanisms or players that do not exist in the North, including the local 'community', foreign aid donors and remittances sent by international migrants.

Whereas Gough and Wood focus primarily on the character of the state and the importance of declientelisation, Rudra (2007, 2008) focuses more on markets, or more precisely on what the state does to promote commodification. Rudra distinguishes between 'productive' and 'protective' welfare states: 'protective' welfare states (such as India) focussed on the decommodification of formal sector workers (typically behind tariff barriers or subsidies), whilst 'productive' welfare states (such as Korea) prioritised commodification, especially through mass education, which pulled people into wage labour in export-oriented production. Some, 'dual' welfare states (such as Brazil) combined both emphases. This distinction accords with the distinction made by Gough, Wood et al. between different kinds of 'actual or potential welfare state regimes', but Rudra extends this to cover countries across the global South, regardless of the form or capacity of the state. Haggard and Kaufman (2008) make a somewhat similar distinction in their analysis of the differences between Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia. Under Communist rule, Eastern European countries provided comprehensive and near-universal protections and services. The East Asian countries offered minimal social insurance whilst investing in education. In Latin America, public protection privileged the urban middle class and some blue-collar workers whilst excluding peasants and informal-sector workers. Martinez Franzoni (2008) extends this to consider also the gendered dimension of defamilialisation.

These typologies are faithful to Esping-Andersen's basic approach in that they focus, in different ways, on how states interact with markets and families, but they are less faithful in terms of their relative inattention to the *distributional* questions that underlay Esping-Andersen's concerns. They are more concerned with 'what' states do, and 'how', than with 'who' benefits. This is partly due to their use of data on public expenditure, despite Esping-Andersen's insistence that aggregate public expenditure data does not reveal 'who gets what'. A different approach focusses on who benefits. Elsewhere I distinguished between welfare regimes focused on peasants, workers and the poor respectively (Seekings 2008). *Agrarian* regimes bolstered peasant agriculture through shaping access to land, access to product markets (especially through parastatal marketing) and production systems (through agricultural extension and regulation). While ostensibly pro-poor, the primary beneficiaries were usually better-off or 'middle' peasants, and the objective was as much 'developmental' as directly poverty-reducing. *Workerist* regimes promoted income security through state-sanctioned, corporatist risk-pooling among workers in formal employment, primarily through labour regulation and social insurance programmes that entailed either indirect consumer subsidies (via high prices and tariffs on imports) or direct subsidies from taxation. *Pauperist* regimes targeted 'deserving' categories of very poor people through highly targeted non-contributory social assistance.

Social assistance programmes were introduced in a number of places in the early and mid-twentieth century (most notably in South Africa (Seekings 2005, 2007a), parts of the Caribbean (Seekings 2007b), and in Mauritius (Willmore 2006; Seekings 2011)), but these cases were rarely emulated between the 1950s and 1980s. British-style social assistance was introduced in settings where colonial officials assessed that neither the agrarian nor the workerist models were feasible (the former due to a shortage of land for peasant agriculture, the latter because of the implications for production costs in export sectors). In the 1940s, however, the British Colonial Office formulated a new doctrine of development which emphasised the agrarian model, wherever possible, limiting 'welfare' to community-oriented social work and the possibility of workerist measures for formal sector workers (Seekings 2010; Cooper 1996; Lewis 2000). The British repudiation of social assistance outside of Britain itself was replicated by the post-war interna-

tional agencies, with the consequence that social assistance rarely figured on the policy menu in the second half of the twentieth century. When interest re-emerged in the 1990s, the historical antecedents were generally long forgotten.

By the 1990s, the social, economic and political context across much of the South was no longer propitious for either the agrarian or workerist models. On the one hand, agrarian society exhibited a declining capacity to accommodate the poor. Across much of Africa, population growth has resulted in substantial deagrarianisation. In India, for the first time, per capita agricultural production fell, especially of pulses, and falling water tables and dried-up reservoirs devastated many rural villages. At the same time, populations of elderly dependents were growing. In some countries, especially in Southern and East Africa, higher rates of morbidity and mortality among working-age adults compounded dependency ratios. In many countries, fewer and fewer people were able and willing to support their kin.

On the other hand, trade liberalisation posed profound difficulties for contributory systems of social insurance. The costs of contributory schemes could no longer be passed onto consumers through tariff barriers and high domestic prices, and governments were reluctant to continue to subsidise them heavily from tax revenues. Globalisation also exposed developing countries to increased hazards of economic crisis and abrupt recession, as in East and South-east Asia in 1997/1998.

These social and economic changes contributed to, and combined with, the political transformation of democratisation. As the 'third wave' of democratisation swept across the South, people pressed for rights, not as peasants or as workers but as citizens. In this context, the 'pauperist' model was revived, not as a residual model with roots in colonial poor laws, but as a universal model of citizens' rights. As in Britain (and other parts of North-west Europe) in the early twentieth century, benefits which stigmatised were transformed into 'social citizenship'.

These new welfare regimes might therefore be considered as 'redistributive' in that they redistribute, generally from rich taxpayers (and sometimes from external donors) to poor citizens, on the basis of their rights. Their origins may lie in 'pauperist' programmes, but they have transcended these. They are clearly distinct from workerist programmes, which failed

to deliver on the promise of universalism, instead limiting benefits to the non-poor.

Data collated by Weigand and Grosh (2008) indicates the scale of expenditure on social assistance relative to social insurance. Incomplete data on a total of 87 'developing' and 'transition' countries (including much of Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Central Asia) between 1996 and 2006 show mean total expenditure on social assistance of 1.9% of GDP, and median total expenditure of 1.4%. Across the South as a whole, average social insurance expenditure is slightly more than double average social assistance expenditure, but there are major regional variations. Africa – which is generally overlooked in typologies of welfare regimes – accounted for most of the countries spending the highest proportions of GDP on social assistance, with Mauritius, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Algeria, South Africa and Malawi accounting for six of the top 10 positions. Indeed, among the 14 African countries for which they have data, average social assistance expenditure exceeds average social insurance expenditure. In India, also, social assistance expenditure exceeds social insurance expenditure.

3. The politics of reform in Brazil

Brazil's famous *Bolsa Escola* programme originated in experiments in the mid-1990s in two municipalities: Brasilia, controlled by the Worker's Party (PT, in Portuguese), and Campinas, by the Social Democrats (PSDB). These experiments were emulated by some other municipal administrations, gathering attention and support. Just prior to the 1998 presidential elections, the federal government (headed by President Cardoso of the PSDB) committed federal funding for half of the cost of the programme in poorer municipalities. In 2001, in the run-up to the next presidential election, federal funding was expanded further. In 2003, newly-elected President Lula (of the PT) launched the *Bolsa Familia* programme, to integrate several hitherto fragmented social assistance programmes, including *Bolsa Escola*. By 2006 payments of up to US$40 per month were being paid to 11 million poor families, comprising 55 million poor people, at a total cost of about 0.3% of GDP. Partisan competition was crucial to the expansion of expenditure. At the federal level, competition between

Cardoso's centrist PSDB and Lula's PT drove increased expenditures and hence adoption of the scheme in many parts of the country which would not have done so without external funding (Melo 2008). As importantly, diffusion between municipalities in the late 1990s was driven by electoral competition. Although Sugiyama (2008a, 2008b) found that the diffusion of municipal experiments in pro-poor social assistance and health care was *not* affected by the overall intensity of electoral competition, Coêlho (2009) showed that electoral competition on the political left, between the PT and PSDB, was crucial.

Democratisation affected other aspects of the Brazilian welfare state also. In Brazil, as in South Africa, a rudimentary non-contributory old-age pension in rural areas preceded democratisation but programmes were broadened and expenditures increased after the transition. In 1991, Brazil introduced a new non-contributory rural pension (the *Previdencia Rural*), and subsequent reforms reduced the qualification age, increased benefits, and did away with restrictions. In urban areas, a new *Beneficio de Prestacao Continuada* (BPC) was introduced in 1993 to supplement the existing semi-contributory *Renda Mensual Vitalicia* (RMV); qualification for these urban schemes was more restricted than in rural areas, with strict means-tests and older qualification ages, whilst eligibility for the RMV required at least 12 months of contributions to social insurance. By the end of 2000, there were 4.6 million pensioners on the *Previdencia Rural* scheme and 0.7 million on the BPC and RMV; together, the three schemes therefore reached over 5 million pensioners, at a cost of about 1 percent of GDP – which was substantially more than was spent on the *Bolsa Familia*.

In other respects, democratic institutions impeded reform in Brazil. The federal government's ability to expand funding for social assistance has been constrained by its onerous commitments in subsidising social insurance. Dating back to the 1920s, Brazil's social insurance programmes are a prime example of corporatist welfare provision for politically powerful but non-poor groups. Following trade liberalisation, the federal government had to subsidise the social insurance system from tax revenues to the tune of about 5 percent of GDP. The Cardoso and Lula governments both tried to whittle away some of the privileges enjoyed by public and private sector workers, with only limited success (Brooks 2007; Hunter/ Sugiyama 2009). Whilst Cardoso and Lula were able to circumvent gover-

nors and other state-level political intermediaries in developing *Bolsa Escola* and *Bolsa Familia* as programmes rather than vehicles for patronage (Melo 2008; Fenwick 2009), Cardoso was unable and Lula minimally able to erode the vested interests of state-level patrons in Congress with respect to social insurance.

4. The politics of reform in Korea

The East (and South-east) Asian region is widely regarded as a laggard in terms of welfare state building. Rather than building a 'protective' welfare state, East Asian countries invested in 'productive' activities – including primary education – whilst repressing rather than buying off the urban working-class (Holliday 2000; Haggard/Kaufman 2008; Rudra 2008). In (South) Korea, to take the best-documented case, the state only introduced welfare reforms to co-opt the armed forces and selected public employees. Very belatedly, minimal reforms, primarily around health insurance, were introduced for a wider range of private sector employees, in order to bolster state legitimacy (Kwon 1999). The Korean state was a developmental state, with an ideology of anti-communism and economic nationalism. It was quite explicitly not a welfare state. Poverty was addressed through equitable growth, and welfare was left to families and companies, in a modest version of the Japanese welfare state (White/Goodman 1998).

The first impetus to change for the Korean state arose from the slow process of democratisation. Pro-democracy demonstrations in the late 1980s prompted some constitutional reforms and modest changes to welfare policies. Both the incumbent and opposition parties promised the extension of social insurance in the 1987 elections. Since then, "welfare policy has been a major policy agenda in every presidential and congressional election" (Kim 2006: 76; see also Wong 2004). In 1989, the ruling party's candidate narrowly won the presidential election against a divided opposition. In 1995, the social insurance system was modestly reformed. An opposition candidate, the former dissident Kim Dae-jung, finally won a presidential election in December 1997 and assumed office in 1998 amidst financial crisis. In this initial decade of democratisation, both health insurance and old-age pensions were extended, although with limited risk-pooling

or redistribution (Wong 2004), but unemployment insurance and social assistance lagged behind.

Further impetus came from the 1997/1998 financial crisis, which drove the Korean economy sharply into deep recession. Two major *chaebols* (i.e. massive corporate conglomerates) went into receivership, there was massive capital flight, and unemployment rose from 2 percent in 1996 to a peak of 8.6 percent in February 1999. Unemployment was very high among college graduates, who were deemed to pose a threat to social and political stability. The existing welfare system provided inadequate protection: only one-third of waged or salaried workers were covered by unemployment insurance (under the 1995 programme), and only 3 percent of the population received social assistance under the Public Assistance Programme. As a democratically elected president, and with his political background, Kim Dae-jung had more political space to manoeuvre than his predecessor, and succeeded in pushing a social accord through tripartite negotiations with business and labour. The government was also looking forward. As a government with a minority in the legislature and elections due in April 2000, it could not afford to neglect poor and unemployed voters.

The result was what Kim (2004: 153) calls "a major shift to a universal social security system". The crisis transformed popular perceptions of the appropriate role of the state. In response, Kim Dae-jung promised a "comprehensive social welfare system" (quoted in Kim, 2006: 81): "Now, all citizens, including those getting by with less than the minimum level of income, will be provided with institutional guarantees of education, medical care and other basic requirements of decent living. […] The medical insurance, unemployment insurance, national pension and industrial accident insurance systems will be beefed up so as to build a comprehensive system of social security under which all citizens can enjoy stable, secure lives" (quoted in Yang 2000: 248). He reformed unemployment insurance to expand access to benefits, launched a massive emergency public works programme (which employed, at its peak, 450,000 workers) and revised social assistance (tripling the number of beneficiaries of public assistance to 1.5 million, and raising benefits). In 2000/2001, as the crisis receded, the public works programme and existing social assistance programme were replaced by a new programme of social assistance, the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee. This new programme raised benefits and means-test

thresholds and, for the first time, covered working-age adults as well as the young and elderly. The Kim Dae-jung government also reformed pensions. It rejected the proposal of its predecessor to privatise pensions (as in Chile), instead consolidating a single-pillar pension system and extending its coverage. The government also reformed health insurance. As Kwon (2005: 4) writes, the new programmes "recognised entitlement to benefits as a social right and raised the level of benefits according to the relative concept of poverty".

Democratisation lies at the heart of Korean welfare-state-building. As Wong (2004: 14) writes, "democratisation affects what policy ideas are debated, how social problems are defined, and how decisions are ultimately made". His conclusion applied more generally: "Among late democratizers, the institutionalization of political competition, and thus conditions of political uncertainty, compel newly democratic regimes to initiate some social policy reform, no matter how secure (or insecure) the regime may be at the time" (ibid.: 159). The process may, paradoxically, be strengthened by the weakness of left-wing political parties. Cross-class coalition-building is necessary, Wong argues, pointing to the fact that Korea's reforms accelerated when the trade union movement shifted from sectional demands to a commitment to a more class-blind notion of social citizenship (ibid.: 146-149).

5. The politics of reform in India

India provides perhaps the least likely context for welfare reforms. It is by far the poorest of the case-studies considered in this paper, with GDP per capita (taking purchasing power into account) in 2009 less than one-third of Brazil's and barely one-tenth of Korea's. India is home to approximately one quarter of the world's poor. The state has limited fiscal and administrative capacity, and the dominant parties are minimally programmatic. Moreover, since the 1980s successive national governments have deregulated the economy in (successful) pursuit of economic growth. Unsurprisingly, "rights to social security have often been concluded to be a luxury India cannot afford to generalise" (Harriss-White 2004b: 429). The 1999–2000 OASIS (Old Age Social and Income Security) inquiry noted that the

joint family system was less and less able to cope with the growing number of elderly people, such that India was "inexorably moving towards […] a gigantic number of destitute elderly", but concluded that the financial challenge was far beyond the state's capacity. "Faced with such large numbers, it is apparent that the problem will have to be addressed through thrift and self-help" (OASIS 2003: 22).

As in Brazil, sub-national governments in India have considerable power and autonomy, and some of the regional governments introduced important reforms. Uttar Pradesh introduced non-contributory old-age pensions for the destitute elderly as early as 1957. Some other states much later introduced more ambitious schemes. Tamil Nadu introduced a package of social assistance measures in 1989, including pensions for old-age, widows and deserted wives, and the disabled, as well as survivor benefits and other grants. The state finance minister boldly described this as "a comprehensive safety net which will ensure that no person in Tamil Nadu suffers from want and deprivation" (Harriss-White 2004b: 436). The number of pensioners in Tamil Nadu rose from just under 400,000 in the first year of the scheme (1989) to over 600,000 in 1995 (ibid.). Tamil Nadu also pioneered a midday meal scheme for children, while Maharashtra introduced employment guarantee schemes that provided a minimum cash income to poor rural households during the agricultural off-season.

At the national level, the state provided considerable benefits to public employees, and social insurance also covered much of the small number of workers employed formally by private firms (Rudra 2008). It also subsidised food through the public distribution system or PDS, although the benefits typically accrued to farmers more than to poor consumers. Further reforms have been placed on the agenda. A Working Group on Social Security (part of a broader Economic Reforms Commission) proposed in 1984 a package of old-age pensions and survivor benefits (for the dependents of a deceased household head) that would cost 1% of GDP and less than 4% of central and state governments' combined revenues.

Only recently, however, has the national government embarked on dramatic reforms, as in Brazil replicating reforms that had been pioneered by sub-national governments. In 1995, it adopted a National Social Assistance Scheme, including old-age pensions, family benefits and maternity benefits. The number of pensioners rose from 3 million in 1995/1996 to over

6 million in 1999/2000. Central government funding is limited, although the states can and do top up central funding with their own revenues. A midday meal scheme (the nutritious meal scheme or NMS) was based on the Tamil Nadu model. In 2005, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was passed. This was the boldest pro-poor initiative ever adopted in India, with a prospective price tag of 1 percent of GDP. Introducing the Bill, Congress Party leader Sonia Gandhi insisted that "an economy growing at 7 percent per year, can and must find the resources […] to improve the lives of its millions of poor" (Chopra 2005). The scheme, named after Mahatma Gandhi, drew heavily on the Maharashtra precedent. It was introduced in selected trial districts in 2006, and nationally in 2008 (Drèze 2010). By 2007/2008, more than 30 million poor rural households – or one quarter of the poor rural population – was paid for an average of 43 days per year (almost all over the mean season from April to June).

In the early 1990s, Guhan (1994: 50f) estimated that total Indian expenditures on all social assistance schemes amounted to 1.5% of GDP, and suggested that "a target of 3 percent of GDP for such basic minimum social assistance appears to be reasonable and affordable". Jean Drèze, one of the architects of the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, argued that spending 1% of GDP was hardly "an exorbitant price to pay to protect the bulk of the rural population from hunger, insecurity and unemployment" (Dhavse 2004).

The expansion of public commitments in India was driven in large part by the country's long-standing democratic institutions becoming much more competitive. Mobilisation by both lower-class and caste voters, mostly through regional parties, and by higher-caste Hindu nationalists through the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), sharpened partisan competition, pushing the long-dominant Congress Party to more programmatic, pro-poor interventions. The Congress Party committed itself to a national rural employment guarantee whilst in opposition in 2002, and the commitment was part of the 2004 National Common Minimum Programme of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) that was formed around the Congress Party for the 2004 *Lok Sabha* (parliamentary) elections. The UPA's electoral successes in 2004 and again in 2009 were based on strong support among lower or poorer castes and communities, and among voters who were sceptical that recent economic reforms had brought them benefits. As Suri (2004: 5405)

notes, "parties which made liberal promises to take up welfare schemes for the poor, farmers, and marginalised groups to offset the reform hardships" tended to perform well in the election (see also Yadav 2004; Swamy 2010).

Electoral competition provided a major impetus to the rural employment guarantee, but civil society activism was also important. At each stage of the policy-making process, conservative groups sought to water down the proposals. Only sustained pressure from civil society, and support from Congress Party leader Sonia Gandhi, sustained the momentum of reform (Drèze 2010; Chopra 2011).

The introduction of national programmes is less transformative than it might seem. Of the Indian states, only Kerala and Gujarat provide pensions to non-destitute elderly. Nationally, the coverage of old-age pensions remains minimal, and local politicians and officials exercise considerable discretionary power allowing them to use welfare programmes to consolidate their patronage networks. The midday meal scheme in Tamil Nadu provided a midday meal for children – and also employed 100,000 people as cooks and helpers, with salaries absorbing the lion's share of the costs of the programme. As Harriss-White (2004a: 376) notes, the programme "has built a decentralized and entrenched set of 'bureaucratic' interests in its perpetuation". Farmers as well as the grain distributors working for the national public distribution system constitute powerful vested interests, rendering the system "politically rock-solid" (ibid.), whilst politicians clearly like schemes that create opportunities for massive patronage. At the local level, partisan politics in India tends to be dominated by local elites. The poor exercise much less power through electoral or other channels than their counterparts in Brazil and Korea (although this has begun to change with the establishment of elected village councils, or *panchayats*). Even the NREGA fuels local patronage politics. If more than a quarter of the funds invested in a government programme actually reaches the poor, then the programme is regarded as a great success.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to dismiss India's welfare reforms as insignificant. As in Korea and Brazil, they reflect a slowly changing relationship between poor citizens and the state, with the state expected to deliver more benefits to the poor, who increasingly claim these benefits as citizens, not as clients. As a result, a range of political parties are campaigning on more programmatic grounds, and less on the basis of patronage (Price 2011).

6. Conclusion

The Brazilian and Indian cases show how sub-national reforms can serve as experiments. When they prove popular and effective, reforms may be replicated by other sub-national governments, or by the national government. Similarly, reforms that become established in a regional giant often diffuse later across national boundaries. Conditional cash transfers not only extended from Brasilia and Campinas to the whole of Brazil, but were also introduced across almost all of Latin America. In Southern Africa, also, some of South Africa's social assistance programmes have been replicated by its neighbours. South Africa's welfare state predates by 70 years the transition to democracy. Democratisation encouraged increased expenditures and wider coverage. In post-apartheid South Africa, non-contributory pensions for the elderly, together with grants for poor mothers and the disabled, mitigate poverty considerably. The South African case serves as a powerful image across the region, notwithstanding the ambivalence of political elites. Across much of Africa, political elites "exhibit a striking bias in favor of the economically active poor, who are considered 'deserving', and a fear, despite evidence to the contrary, that 'handouts' create 'dependency'" (Devereux/White 2010: 63). It would be expected that poverty-reducing cash transfers would primarily take the form of public works programmes, employing working adults, along the lines of India's NREGA. Yet, between 1996 and 2005, South African-style old-age pensions were introduced in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.[3]

These Southern African cases also point to the importance of electoral competition. The prospect of sharpened electoral challenges pushed incumbent governments towards reform in both Botswana and Lesotho, whilst the Swazi reforms seem to have been in part a response to agitation from civil society (ibid.; Pelham 2007). But competitive elections are not always an incentive to programmatic reform, as the Zimbabwean case illustrates. Even when other countries in the region introduced old-age pensions, and did so in the face of strong electoral competition within Zimbabwe, the government did not introduce programmatic welfare reforms for the general population. Instead, it provided corporatist benefits to the powerful War Veterans' Association (Krieger 2005).

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There are diverse pathways towards redistributive, pro-poor welfare reforms, in countries with GDP per capita as high as South Korea and as low as India. These case studies also reveal some common elements. In a more democratic setting, intensified competition for the votes of poor citizens provides strong incentives for political leaders to implement reforms, especially when there is a strong demand for programmatic reforms rather than more extensive patronage. Korea's President Kim, Brazil's President Cardoso and his challenger (and successor) Lula, and India's Congress Party all sought to use welfare reforms for electoral purposes. Democratisation alone is rarely sufficient, however. In all of these cases, electoral competition combined with non-particularistic militancy on the part of civil society. Even when political elites are ambivalent or even conservative, as in most of Africa, they might initiate reforms for political gain.

These case studies all entail pre-eminent cases of reform, however; there are many other cases where reforms have been limited or non-existent. The precise relationship between political change and social assistance requires further research. Existing studies – such as by Haggard and Kaufman (2008) – examine aggregate data on 'social security spending', without distinguishing between social insurance and social assistance. Unsurprisingly, given the pressures to reduce public subsidies to non-poor beneficiaries of social insurance, Haggard and Kaufman find an uneven relationship between democratisation and expenditure, with the former leading to permanent increases in the latter in some regions (Eastern Europe and East Asia) but not in Latin America. Careful measurement of social assistance spending specifically, and of the political, social and economic conditions that are likely to explain variation, will allow more precise specification of the relationships between these.

1   See, for example, the Third International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfers, Istanbul, 26-30.6.2006. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/SPLP/0,,contentMDK:20892674~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSitePK:461654,00.html, 29.1.2012.
2   Their emphasis on declientelisation "is derived from our central premise that formally guaranteed rights to welfare and employment security, embodied in legitimated states and regulated labour markets, will always be superior to a clientelist, or even reciprocal, system of informal rights which deliver dependent rather than autonomous security" (Wood and Gough, 2006: 1698).

3 They were introduced in Namibia (then South-West Africa) under South African administration, prior to independence.

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Abstracts

The end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries have seen an unprecedented growth in social assistance in countries as diverse as Brazil and Mexico, Namibia and Botswana, South Korea, India and Nepal. The extension of cash transfers to the poor through non-contributory schemes represents a fundamental transformation in the role of the state relative to markets and communities (or kin). Until the end of the twentieth century, the predominant welfare regimes in the South were either 'workerist', based on social or private insurance linked to formal employment, or 'agrarian', with a 'safety-net' based in subsistence agriculture and the responsibilities of kin. The rise of 'redistributive' welfare regimes focussed on citizens, rather than on workers or peasants, results from a combination of social and economic changes, new ideas and ideologies, and the political changes associated especially with democratisation. Whilst neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition,

increased political competition for the votes of poor citizens is an especially important factor in the diverse pathways towards redistributive, pro-poor welfare regimes.

Am Ende des 20. und zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhundert nimmt die Bedeutung von Sozialhilfe in so unterschiedlichen Ländern wie Brasilien, Mexiko, Namibia, Botswana, Südkorea, Indien und Nepal zu. Die Zunahme von Geldzuwendungen für die Armen über nicht beitragsfinanzierte Modelle bedeutet eine fundamentale Veränderung der Rolle des Staates im Vergleich zu Märkten und Gemeinschaften (bzw. Familien). Bis zum Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts waren die vorherrschenden Wohlfahrtsregime im Süden entweder „lohnarbeitsbasiert", begründet auf einer Sozial- oder Privatversicherung für formell Beschäftigte, oder „agrarisch", mit einem „Sicherheitsnetz", das auf Subsistenzlandwirtschaft und den Verantwortlichkeiten innerhalb der Familie aufbaute. Das Aufkommen von „umverteilenden" Wohlfahrtsregimes, die auf StaatsbürgerInnen statt auf ArbeiterInnen oder BäuerInnen ausgerichtet sind, ist auf eine Kombination aus sozialem und ökonomischem Wandel, neuen Ideen und Ideologien sowie auf vor allem mit Demokratisierung verbundene politische Veränderungen zurückzuführen. Obwohl weder notwendige noch hinreichende Bedingung, ist der politische Wettbewerb um die Wählerstimmen armer BürgerInnen ein besonders wichtiger Faktor auf den verschiedenen Entwicklungspfaden hin zu umverteilenden *pro-poor*"-Wohlfahrtsregimen.

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From Developmentalism to Inclusionism: On the Transformation of Latin American Welfare Regimes in the Early 21st Century[1]

In comparison to classical trends, contemporary Latin America has, through the first years of the 21st century, undergone significant changes. In the last decades of the 20th century, politically unstable and economically unsound democracies barely survived the social consequences of their inability to cope with the lingering crises of 'development-oriented' strategies. In contrast, at the beginning of the 21st century, strengthened democracies, with relatively solid fiscal situations and growing social budgets, are making serious attempts to remedy the core structures of 'social exclusion' that have characterised the region historically.

Experts widely agree that, on a regional scale, Latin American economic development had its most dynamic moments during the globally-oriented period of the 19th century's last decades up to the First World War, and during the 'inward'-oriented period after the Second World War until the 1970s (Pinto 2008). Although both periods were marked by rapid economic growth and a relative amelioration of social conditions, the second one represented a more decisive efforts by states to become effectively 'national', by reaching most social classes and materially integrating most of the countries' territories. The set of economic and social policies linked to this period is usually known as *desarrollismo*, loosely translatable as 'developmentalism' (Draibe/Riesco 2007).

Except for isolated national cases, 'developmentalism', even if it was the region's best try at reducing poverty and inequality, never actually succeeded in overcoming the structural inequalities typical of all Latin American societies and states. Surprisingly resilient patterns of inequality, cemented in deeply embedded social and cultural cleavages around class, territory, ethnicity and gender remained in force from colonial to (post) colonial times, only superficially affected by Republican forms.

The persistence of inequality and poverty became more and more unacceptable as the region, after the Cold War, was able to move towards the consolidation of democratic institutions and practices. After the authoritarian backlash of the 1960s and 1970s, against many odds, Latin American democracies were able to consolidate, even as the economic crises of 'developmentalism' in the 1980s and the brutal market-oriented reforms of the 1990s produced widespread social conflicts.

Nevertheless, since the first years of the 21st century, the widespread consolidation of representative democracies, effective political autonomy and the progressively more favorable global economy has allowed a combination of rapid economic growth, sounder fiscal foundations and expanding social investment. In a clearly noticeable trend, income poverty decreased significantly and income inequalities started to fall, albeit timidly, while indicators of material conditions revealed improvements for most citizens (ECLAC 2009, 2010, 2011a; UNDP 2009).

Are these changes to be interpreted as the positive consequences of a global economic situation that has been temporarily beneficial to the region? Or are they to be taken rather as signs of structural transformations affecting longstanding equilibria between politics, economics and the social fabric in Latin America? In this paper I argue for the second proposition, suggesting that welfare regime perspectives can offer valuable insights and elements on these matters.

In the first section I present a brief account of welfare change and social amelioration in present Latin America, a trend I suggest calling 'inclusionism'. In the next section, I turn to the evolution of welfare regime categories, outside the 'developed world' in general, and in Latin America in particular. I then propose deriving from this debate the common regional trait of 'problematic inclusion'. Finally, I will propose a few hypotheses on how 'inclusionism' is actually doing against 'problematic inclusion'.

1. Change and *Zeitgeist*

From the first years of the 21st century, Latin American economies seem to have been generating more employment, both in the formal and informal economy. Arguably, this has come along with a gradual improvement of

employment quality, in terms of stability and income. As a consequence of these changes in the labour markets, poverty has declined both in absolute and relative terms (ECLAC 2011a). Although some scholars point to demographic trends as key causes (Ros 2009), most academics attribute an important part of these positive effects to growth (Cecchini/Uthoff 2008) and the distributive impacts of social spending, especially through a noticeable move toward massive and more universalistic social policies (Cecchini/Martínez 2011). In this area of public policy, a substantial loss of credibility of 'neoliberal' approaches which were dominant during the 1990s and the easing of fiscal constraints paved the way for a new generation of efforts on poverty and inequality.

Surprisingly, these new approaches were adopted by governments of varying political constituencies and diverse ideological orientations, although with a left-leaning predominance (Lustig 2009). Socialist, social-democratic, nationalist and populist narratives combined, even in conservative and liberal governing coalitions, as a sort of *Zeitgeist* (a 'spirit of the time') based on vague and nonetheless effective claims on the importance of 'combating exclusion'. The minimal common denominator was a convergence in pragmatic social policies oriented to a new and remarkable expansion of social assistance, the upscaling of public services, and even some degree of universalization of social security.

I suggest calling these common perspectives and practices '*inclusionism*'. Like 'developmentalism' and even 'neoliberalism', 'inclusionism' is best understood as a spirit of the time, a perspective diffused among different social constituencies, parties, government officials and technical advisors, generally tending to produce comparable, albeit not similar, strategies of intervention in economic and social policies.

Regional comparative statistics annually presented by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2009, 2010, 2011a) show a drop in total income poverty from 44% of the population in 1999 to 31% in 2010, while extreme income poverty fell from 32% to 13%. Total multidimensional poverty (an indicator including housing conditions and access to key social services) also presents positive progress, with all Latin American countries removing significant housing and service deficits for more than 50% of their population by 2009 (ECLAC 2010). Latin America also shows amelioration from 2002–2003 to the present in income

inequality. Both the region's Gini coefficients (an index of income concentration) and the region's income gaps (a measure of the distance between the top and bottom tiers of income) show moderately positive evolutions, against a background of negative change in the 1990s. The region's average Gini coefficient slightly fell for the first time since the measure has been taken, from a historical top of 0.55 (1989–1991) to 0.54 (2009–2010), while the region's average household income gap, measured between the first and last quintiles dropped from 20.28 (1989–1990) to 17.99 (2009–2010).

According to ECLAC, these positive effects are to be attributed to the combination of economic growth (producing more and better paid jobs); a labour market gradually reducing qualification gaps; and a substantial growth in social public spending, including monetary transfers and subsidised services for the poorest households. These factors were helped by the continuing drop in fertility rates, allowing for smaller households and more opportunities for women, although still showing substantial inequality among different income tiers.

At the same time, public spending has tended to rise in the past two decades, and social spending has grown in both relative and absolute terms, accounting for an ever higher proportion of public spending. According to ECLAC, the average regional public expenditure increased to almost 29% of GDP in 2008–2009, while social spending rose from 44.9% in 1990 to 62.2% in 2008–2009. This effort represented an expansion of per capita social investment from 459 constant US $ in 1990–1991 to US $ 981 in 2008–2009. Even if social security (the least progressive type of social spending) took up a good part of this rise, passing from 4.4% to 7.9% of the region's GDP (1990–2009), public health care rose from 2.7% to 3.7% of GDP and education from 3.1% to 4.9% in the same period.

Yet, the region's labour market is always, as ECLAC puts it, a "factory of inequality". When divided into three segments of productivity, the highest stratum, encompassing only 20% of the workforce, generates 67% of the region's GDP, while the lowest, comprising about 50% of the working population, accounts for an output of barely 11% of Latin America's GDP. This asymmetry translates into important disparities in the capacity to appropriate productivity gains, hence income and better life conditions. It is worsened by the fact that higher productivity is usually associated with formal jobs, while low productivity coincides with infor-

mality. However, trends are not homogeneous. While they show a gradual reduction in the proportion of urban low-productivity labour, from about 48% in 1990 to around 43% in 2009, there is an increasing gap between formal and informal workers in terms of real wages; a lingering concentration of employed women (around 90%) in low-productivity jobs; a growing unemployment rate for women and the young (18–21 years old); and a low pace of workers' entry – even those employed in the formal economy – into social security schemes.

As a consequence, the access to subsidised health expenses and old-age benefits, the two most important features of any social protection system (and the two most expensive parts of any social security regime) are very highly stratified according to income, gender, age or place of residence. In 2009, while around 60% of the highest income quintile workers were covered by social security, less than 20% of the lowest quintile of the workforce was (10% in the case of women). Furthermore, in 2009, around 36% of all Latin American households had no social protection of any kind. The trend, nevertheless, is positive. According to ECLAC's comparative analysis, in 2009 about 53% of Latin Americans were covered by social security schemes, rising from 49% in 2002. Massive social assistance and non-contributory social security, on the other hand, helped to gradually cover new segments and grant access to public services and new sources of income.

Is this evidence, besides being a source of moderate optimism in itself, strong enough to support the argument in favour of identifying a positive trend in Latin America's social structure? Is 'inclusionism' the adequate vessel of a more inclusive and less unequal set of life conditions for Latin American citizens, as 'developmentalism' once (at least partially) was? I argue that, behind positive though inconclusive empirical evidence, a look at the comparative analysis of welfare regimes in the region might shed some light on the depth and characteristics of institutional changes underway.

2. On welfare regimes

According to Esping Andersen (1990), the category of welfare regime invites us to interpret the 'well-being' in capitalist societies as the product of interlaced processes in three spheres of social practices: markets, states

and families. These spheres interweave in varying types of 'arrangements', according to which the market is partially displaced by the state and other social arrangements (unions), or complemented by families' and local communities' reciprocity in the generation of welfare. Welfare is therefore said to be 'decommodified' by such arrangements, since well-being (partially) loses the character of a monetised commodity. Social stratification reflects the varying types of decommodification specific to each regime. The original typology proposed by Esping-Andersen identifies a 'liberal' welfare regime, where the market reigns almost unchallenged as provider of welfare, whereas states and families are relatively weak alternatives, and social stratification results in extreme inequalities. In 'corporatist' or 'conservative' welfare regimes unions and other corporate organizations are the main welfare providers, achieving important levels of decommodification, even though substantial inequalities remain due to persisting social cleavages. Clearly, Esping-Andersen's preferences lie with 'social-democrat' regimes, where the state is the main actor of welfare and decommodification processes follow a 'universalistic' or citizenship-oriented logic, leading to less stratified social structures.

Esping-Andersen's (1996, 1999) typology quickly became a widely accepted reference for comparative welfare studies, although deficits and blind spots were intensely debated (Arts/Gelissen 2002). The three spheres were clearly too biased toward northern and western European historical trajectories, and therefore had to be refined to grasp southern European 'familialistic' regimes (Ferrera 1996; Moreno 2000) where families and communities are as important as unions in the provision of welfare not based on citizenship rights. The model also showed serious shortcomings when it came to explaining East Asian welfare 'mixes' of liberal and conservative features (Goodman et al. 1998; Aspalter 2006). Also gender asymmetries veiled by the apparent 'universalism' had to be put under critique (Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1999; Daly/Rake 2003), as much as the uncomfortable relationship of 'universal' welfare states with ethnic cleavages (Sainsbury 2006; Castles/Miller 2009).

Drawing on Esping-Andersen, but in an explicit attempt to overcome the above-mentioned limits, a team of scholars led by Ian Gough and Geoff Wood (2004) helped to understand welfare trajectories outside North America and Western Europe by paying attention to the singulari-

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ties of subsistence economies, enclave or predatory varieties of capitalism; labour relations based on systematic human exploitation and lack of social protection; and ineffective, fragmentary states, as well as those built on violence and oppression. This opened fruitful paths, leading to the identification of new categories, such as 'productivist' (Gough 2004), 'informal security' (Wood 2004) and 'insecurity' regimes (Bevan 2004), incorporating the general idea that regimes may not be homogenous but show 'dual' arrangements in multi-tiered societies. In 'productivist regimes', based on stylised East Asian cases, a strong state enforces rapid economic growth in alliance with private enterprise and familialistic social arrangements, limiting the political and institutional scope of unions and developing a subordinate and peripheral (yet important) social policy complex. Welfare results in a singular 'mix' of commodification and decommodification, dependent on social position and areas of business and labour. In 'informal security' regimes, subsistence economies, as well as limited and precarious employment and self-employment, generate forms of 'adverse incorporation' into the economic sphere. In the context of relatively weak states, the perversity of paralegal, patrimonial and clientelistic political arrangements makes welfare 'negatively permeable' to particularistic interests. These economic and political shortcomings overcharge families and communities as providers of welfare creating a singular sort of social dependency. Finally, among 'insecurity regimes', found in the polar situation of very restricted or contingent welfare arrangements, tenuous and unstable economies combine with the almost inexistence of the state or its subordination to small groups of exclusive, particularistic and patrimonial elites. In these regimes, welfare is left almost exclusively to family, kin or community relations.

'Productivism' and 'duality' were repeatedly found to be defining features of developing countries' welfare regimes. Rudra (2007), using empirical evidence to compare developing countries' welfare institutions, finds regimes turn to either 'jumping ahead', promoting market development and citizens' market dependence (productive welfare states); or to cautiously shield people from the market, creating market substitutes for welfare and/or reducing the pace of commodification (protective welfare states), hence partially diverging from 'embedded liberalism' models; as well as artfully combining both strategies.

3. Welfare regimes in Latin America and 'problematic inclusion'

Latin American scholars have dealt with the question of the region's social welfare in their own ways, turning only recently toward welfare regimes categories. I would like to briefly review a handful of analyses I consider essential. The fertility of these analyses lies not essentially in the typologies they produced, but in their contribution to the understanding of the complex historical processes underlying welfare regime trajectories. I will, therefore, explicitly exclude taxonomic references to the intricacies of typologies and concentrate on the reasoning of the authors. From this perspective, three sets of studies pioneered in providing the basic assumptions and ideas under which the issue of welfare regimes could be later tackled: Carmelo Mesa-Lago's, Víctor Tokman's and Sonia Fleury's.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago was arguably the first scholar to call attention to the relationship between Latin American modes of development and the impact of the institutional design of social protection on social inequality. Introducing the Latin American cases to comparative international welfare regime research, Mesa-Lago compared the composition, evolution and outcomes of Latin American welfare regimes from their early beginnings until the neoliberal reforms (Mesa-Lago 1978, 1989, 2008). According to Mesa-Lago, despite their obvious differences, welfare regimes in the region shared a number of characteristics: extreme stratification, financial inefficiency and inequality. Triggered by asymmetric pressure from key social and political groups in the piecemeal 'inception' of each country's system, welfare regimes are shaped by a complex architecture of juxtaposed inequitable schemes. Although inequality thus became a common trait of all Latin American welfare regimes, there are crucial structural differences, depending on the length of welfare policy trajectories and different styles of development. Whereas latecomers and less developed countries are characterised by major differences in protection between the elite of insiders and the majority of the population which are outsiders to the schemes, in the second group of countries, which started their welfare development later in the 20th century, access to social security schemes is relatively widespread, although important differences arise from relative positions in the labour market. Even in the pioneer countries with long welfare regime trajectories and high rates of coverage, there exist vast differences concerning stratified

access to and the quality of services. As a consequence, the social security of 'developmentalism' had no progressive social impact or a very limited one, mostly reproducing social inequalities as they were, or even aggravating them.

Víctor Tokman's long research on the issue of informality should also be credited as a key contribution to the understanding of the underlying duality of Latin American welfare regimes. Tokman drew on the region's literature on 'dual social structures' (Nun 2001) and 'structural heterogeneity' (Pinto 2008) to explain the nature, causes and consequences of informality, thus shedding light on the dynamics of economic and social inequality (Tokman 1990). He did so in an attempt to grasp the insufficiencies of what has here been called 'developmentalism', once its 1980s crises were over and the structural problems of inequality in Latin American employment were once more apparent (Tokman 2004). Tokman's studies contributed to the understanding of informal employment as a structural part of the region's economic failures and successes. He also showed how informality influenced the adjustability of employment in a context of permanent instability, indirectly functioning as a sort of unemployment absorber in times of crisis. Informal employment had consequently to be reinterpreted as a key source of (precarious) income for large sectors of the region's urban population and as a potential avenue of 'alternative inclusion'.

Sonia Fleury (1994) related welfare regimes to types of 'citizenship', underlining the varying nature of inequalities in different welfare regimes. She proposed to understand modern social protection schemes as institutional arrangements that regulate types and dynamics of state responses to social rights. In 'universalistic' citizenship models, where social security arrangements predominate, protection is generally provided by the state, using public resources to create a 'floor' of services universally available through social rights. In models where social insurances are dominant, protection is provided on criteria of group solidarity, only for the insiders, generating fragmented schemes and corporative differentiation. She calls these 'regulated' types of citizenship, as social rights depend on the kind of insertion citizens enjoy in the productive structure. Finally, in countries where social protection is marginal, i.e. delivered only in the form of social assistance to necessity- or means-tested recipients, citizenship is 'inverted',

because individuals have to prove their need in order to exercise their citizenship rights. From the 1980s and 1990s onwards, Fleury argues, regulated models of citizenship, combined with scantily universalistic ones which predominated so far, have started a transition towards inverted modalities of citizenship.

These works served to prepare the terrain for comparative welfare regime research in Latin America taking regional historical trajectories seriously. They helped to highlight the very different economic dynamics, policy schemes and social structures arising from the region's singular relationship between the capitalist market, state and social inequality. I only wish to comment here on a few contributions that greatly helped to fashion the region's welfare regimes discussion.

Although not directly using 'welfare regime' as a conceptual tool, Fernando Filgueira (1998) was probably the first to analyse how Latin American 'social states' reflected and co-produced inequality. He found three overall groups of welfare systems developing from the 1930s through the mid 20th century, explicitly relating them to modes of development and political arenas (Huber 2002). A 'stratified universalism', built by competing élites seeking popular support, was the closest the region could get to social-democratic outfits. Relatively extended formal employment and social protection coverage were accompanied by important inequalities among the protected. Less performing, in terms of social protection, were 'dual' social states. Developed by élites' statecraft through selective cooptation and repression of popular sectors, dual welfare states contributed to crystallize 'two worlds' of social incorporation divided on class and territorial cleavages. Finally, in 'exclusive' welfare regimes, built by 'predatory élites', 'insiders' (clients of these élites) formed a small minority among a majority of citizens enjoying only 'residual' social protection. Later on, Filgueira (2005) traced the evolution of democratic politics, social expenditure and social security changes suffered by Latin American social states during their critical phase of the late 1970s to the first years of the 21st century, particularly in the context of their more or less profound neoliberal reform stages. He found Latin American welfare states to be gradually adopting one of two new general forms: an 'exclusionary' social state, more or less egalitarian, according to the quality and degree of its attempts to build effective basic protection; and an embryonic 'social democratic' state,

where there is an effective try on more 'inclusionary' and less unequal social policies, at least according to Latin American historical standards (Filgueira 2005).

Despite their differences concerning the relative role of states, markets and households in the provision of welfare, Armando Barrientos (2004) considers Latin American welfare regimes as sharing sufficient commonalities to be understood as variations of a single welfare regime, in the Esping-Andersen sense. Historically, the main feature of this regime was the central importance of formal employees' social insurance, against a background of limited access of the population to formal employment, and the existence of very fragmented networks of social assistance. As work contracts in the formal sector serve as "gate-keepers" to public social (security) provision, leaving most of the population working in the informal economy outside public protection schemes, such a mix has created welfare regimes characterised by an overall segmented and/or weak social protection, and overly dependent on household arrangements. Although in Latin America spheres of welfare intertwine in a way that complicates the application of Esping-Andersen's categories, Barrientos considers the region's regimes to be predominantly closer to the 'familialistic' variety of European 'corporatist' welfare types. Yet, as the protected group of formal workers is a relative minority and informal employment dominant, he proposes labelling the regimes as 'informal-conservative' or 'conservative-informal', according to each element's relative importance. In the 1990s, as a consequence of neoliberal reforms scaling down employment protection and public services, Latin American regimes embarked on a transition which leaned progressively toward their residual liberal aspects. The changes produced substantial losses of protection, and were not met by an appropriate market replacement of state schemes, which was in turn aggravated by demographic transitions and economic changes that reduced the capacity of Latin America's households to provide welfare.

Barba Solano (2004) criticises the widespread oversimplification of subsuming Latin American welfare regimes within Esping-Andersen's corporatist type – supposedly undergoing a transition to a (neo)liberal type. He emphasises the need to pay more attention to the region's singular histories of segmented markets and heterogeneous political regimes, as well as the relatively low level of material welfare provided by local arrangements.

According to Solano, such generalizations brush over the notorious diversity among the region's countries in all aspects of welfare, as well as the different criteria and outcomes of neoliberal reforms, in spite of (only apparently) similar agendas. However, he agrees with the usefulness of identifying welfare regimes, suggesting a typology similar to Filgueira's where, during most of the 20th century, forms of outcome inequality and system fragmentation, against a background of varying ethno-cultural diversity, combined in three clusters of universalistic, dual and exclusionary welfare regimes. These three types of regimes showed different results under the 1990s reforms, because fiscal adjustment and market-oriented reforms varied very much in timing, speed, intensity and relative success, particularly concerning 'social reforms'. Additionally, Latin American countries varied in development strategies and employment patterns, although in most cases 'labour exclusion' remained dominant. By the end of the 1990s, reforms had failed to provide better welfare alternatives than classic arrangements, and the relationship between development and 'inclusion' remained the key issue for the region's social agenda.

Juliana Martínez Franzoni (2005) centered her studies on Central America, but her work is a source of valid hypotheses for the entire region. Departing from a standard discussion on welfare regimes, she turned to the more empirical problem of welfare as "what people actually do to survive", particularly in economic realms that are not entirely commodified and in residual public welfare schemes, where social protection is heavily dependent on family structures (ibid.: 2008). Tracing the ways welfare regimes allocate resources, she finds women under growing pressure stemming from low quality employment, non-remunerated household tasks, and increasing responsibility in receiving and administering resources coming from public assistance. These processes, also described by Maxine Molyneux (2007), aggravate already existing cultural patterns of primary family and kin relationships which are then crystallised in a burdensome sexual division of labour. In this sense, Martínez Franzoni also stresses the importance of putting the 'decommodification' effect under a new light. In welfare regimes such as most of the Central American ones, 'decommodification' is attained through non-state schemes such as community or international cooperation. In these regimes 'commodification' (providing a remunerated employment alternative to self-consumption) is of key importance to

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welfare, and 'defamilialisation' (providing effective alternatives to family dependence) becomes a fundamental welfare objective. Martinez-Franzoni's typology of Latin American welfare regimes is therefore organised according to degrees of 'commodification', 'decommodification', 'familialisation' and 'performance'. These categories helped to isolate two subtypes of state-dependent welfare regimes, according to their degree of reliance on 'commodification' or 'decommodification' as a means of welfare provision; and a type of family or primary relations-dependent 'informal' welfare regime, where commodification is fragmentary and state protection of low quality and coverage.

Based on both insights from regional academics and comparative welfare regime research outside Latin America, these four studies share a heuristic interest in linking the ongoing debate on welfare regimes with the explicit or implicit recovery of classical regional debates on the relationship between development and inequality. As such, they propose new and interesting ways of understanding Latin American social protection. Next, rather than debating specific labels and typologies, I would like to draw on the effort to identify common traits within the region's welfare mixes, hence the main axes on which to inquire whether in recent years social and economic policies have actually shifted or not to what I suggested calling 'inclusionism'.

4. 'Inclusionism' vs. 'problematic inclusion'

In a nutshell, the aforementioned studies pointed to the fact, that, considering the general features of Latin American welfare regimes, *inclusion is problematic in itself*. For two or three decades, probably as a result of the obvious contradiction between democratic consolidation and resilient social inequalities, 'exclusion' was used both as a category and a political banner to describe the main problems of Latin America's social structure and its most important political and economic challenges (Wood 2005). Yet, the mechanisms of inclusion themselves are means of voluntary or involuntary reproduction of inequalities. It is the specific type of interaction between market and state which produces inequality, and not (only) the absence of state capacity, although this can be arguably so in cases of very low state capacity or in regions too tenuously integrated to capitalist markets.

This 'problematic inclusion' is thus defined by the intersection of the two prominent features linking Latin American markets and politics, namely high 'structural heterogeneity' (Pinto 2008) and low 'state capacity' (UNDP 2008). It therefore represents the root of the region's resilient and highly unequal citizenship status. For 'inclusionism' to actually represent a historical shift in terms of welfare regime arrangements, qualitatively superior to the irregular and partial successes of neoliberal reforms, it should succeed against problematic inclusion. And, according to what has been stressed here, making inclusion less problematic would entail obtaining effective outcomes in relevant aspects of both labour market quality and fragmentation, as well as in social protection coverage and segmentation, thus helping reduce overdependence on family-kin relationships as instruments of welfare.

As far as labour market fragmentation (Alter Chen 2007), especially Latin American-style 'dualism' is concerned (Gasparini/Tornaroli 2007), the key seems to lie in the economy's capacity to provide more stable and higher income-generating activities (Ocampo 2000) and in the state's ability to adequately regulate them (Weller 2001, 2009). Regional governments are currently under pressure to deal with the historical burden of its modes of development, as noted above by most welfare regime students. Numerous social groups have restricted access to quality employment and stable economic activities in both urban and rural areas whereas large parts of the population suffer from informal and unstable low-paid jobs, precarious self-employment, or are part of small subsistence economies. This usually means that large majorities face persistent obstacles in their attempt to obtain stable access to income and therefore acquire, through the market, minimum material life standards, let alone to save and/or accumulate. Moreover, 'majorities' are not homogeneous, as tougher obstacles make access to salaried income even more difficult for women, ethnic minorities and the young.

In relatively better performing welfare regimes, these obstacles are softened by social policies that (partly) decommodify the access to income, goods and/or services through citizenship entitlements. In order to become genuinely 'inclusive' Latin American social protection should be focused on developing state capacity to democratically determine citizens' rights to certain basic 'floors' of material life conditions, and enforce their avail-

ability through universalistic social policies (Mkandawire 2004, 2005; Andrenacci/Repetto 2006). But the burden of 'neoliberalism' on top of 'developmentalism' has led to welfare regimes characterised by a number of problematic features: the segmented and elitist nature of social insurance schemes and/or the very partial coverage of social security systems; the relatively low quality and incomplete territorial coverage of basic public services and infrastructure; and the residual, selective and erratic nature of social assistance. Last but not least, the recurrent obstacles to the access of stable income radically intensified many citizens' quest for social protection, which helped to turn these schemes, as precarious as they might be, into objects of high politicisation.

'Inclusionism' was the outcome of Latin America's 21st century weariness toward the inability of neoliberal reform to effectively provide better economic opportunities and social protection. As such, I would like to stress, it is not only a leftist agenda but a common focus on 'social inclusion' that can be traced in most of the regions' governments, whether left, center or right, even if ideological mixes, institutional practices and governance styles make relevant differences (Lustig 2009). Even so, has 'inclusionism' really been able to dent problematic inclusion in its strongholds, i.e. the economic and social policy realms?

Since employment fragmentation is the result of deep cleavages, profound and prolonged transformations will be needed to guarantee structural reforms. There are, however, some positive tendencies indicating in such a direction. An attentive observer (Cornia 2010) argues that positive changes in inequality are to be attributed to the coincidence of a generally favourable global environment for Latin American economies, which has allowed almost unprecedentedly high and stable growth, together with two important political economy changes. Firstly, a more effective preoccupation with employment patterns has led to a new 'fine tuning' of state regulation through mechanisms of formalisation, employability policies and intervention on key consumer prices to hold down the cost of living. Together with macroeconomic stability and access to credit, these factors could have an impact on the quality and quantity of employment produced by economic growth, as well as on real incomes. Secondly, it is possible to discover 'prudent public redistribution' in the regulation of macroeconomic cycles, with more financial and

exchange rate mechanisms, founded on sounder fiscal policies, that have allowed the expansion of social expenditure, the promotion of strategic economic sectors and a more efficient steering of national integration to global circuits.

Moreover, this relatively positive decade-long pattern, partially offset by the temporary crisis in 2009, is likely to continue. In its annual preliminary overview of the region's economy, ECLAC (2011b) calls attention to the gradual slowdown of most of the region's economies, but highlights the continuity of positive external conditions, the rise in international monetary reserves and the steady expansion of domestic demand. Although 'channels of transmission' of the global crisis are likely to impact the region (through falling foreign commerce and remittances, as well as lower commodity prices), the majority of countries are less vulnerable to external shocks. Fiscal situations have improved in most countries, allowing for continued public expenditure expansion. Employment has continued to expand, accompanied by formalisation and higher wages. Only rising inflation remains a risk to be taken seriously.

As far as social policies are concerned, the higher availability of resources has allowed significant rises in social expenditure and a relatively massive public service expansion, notably in non-contributory social security, education and social assistance. Although this is good news in itself, and it does help to reduce historical insufficiencies, 'problematic inclusion' is also about the nature of social services delivery. And yet, positive processes can be found in most areas, including the three key areas of Latin American social policy (Andrenacci/Repetto 2006): social security and labour market regulations, public provision of social services and infrastructure, and social assistance.

In the area of labour market regulations, as we have seen above, while most (though not all) rigid 'developmentalist' regulations were done away with by neoliberal reform, a new 'fine tuning' in employment expansion and quality development is slowly coming into force. The search for adequate legal regulations and protections, guaranteeing both relative flexibility and security, is unfinished but underway nonetheless (Weller 2009). Additionally, a historically segmented, élite-biased and state subsidised social security system has gradually turned toward (relatively) sounder fiscal bases, flatter conditions and benefits – hence reducing segmentation – and wider

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non-contributory coverage as well as elitism (Cecchini/Martínez 2011). Of course employment growth and formalisation rates need to intensify, and social security needs to be more overtly non-contributory, for 'non-problematic inclusion' to fully emerge.

Public provision of social services is also undergoing positive change. New public intervention schemes, mostly through 'delegation' and 'regulation' styles (Jordanà/Levi-Faur 2004) are producing important expansion and coverage effects in water supply, sanitation, energy and communications. The new priority given to education in public expenditure is a powerful pro-equality instrument, although it has yet to prove its capacity to tackle quality issues and expand coverage toward middle instruction and all-day attendance, as well as new inequalities stemming from decentralisation and private sector expansion (Cornia 2010). Health, finally, is probably the most salient pending challenge. There has been, undoubtedly, an effort to widen coverage and ameliorate public provision, but protection is too dependent on public-private provision mixes, making health expenditure extremely unequal and insufficient for important sectors of the citizenry (Sojo 2006).

In the area of social assistance, the massification of previously targeted poverty programmes has been the dominant trait. This has allowed for very significant rises in the coverage of poor households and individuals, and therefore better fulfillment of basic needs, as well as wider access to basic services. The gradual replacement of a patchwork of international-cooperation-sponsored need-targeted and means-tested projects by more decisive state-funded and rights-based public intervention and social assistance (Sojo 2007), particularly through conditional cash transfers (Cecchini/Madariaga 2011), has contributed to vulnerability control and poverty reduction. Still, two processes are yet to be neutralized for 'universalistic' social assistance to become dominant. Firstly, further institutionalisation is required for politicisation to be softened and citizenship rights to gain sounder terrain. Secondly, a renewed 'familialist' and community-oriented conservative discourse, based in the uncritical strengthening of 'family' and 'community' as key social institutions, and mixed with neoliberal fantasies on civil society solidarities, has to be adequately redirected so as to not reinforce neo-moralisms that can dangerously damage advances in individual freedom, sex and gender equality.

5. Some concluding remarks

At the beginning of the 21st century, 'inclusionism' is increasingly orienting employment and social policy towards citizenship- and rights-based approaches, even if there is mixed evidence, and still a long way to go for social risks to be dealt with in genuinely universalistic fashions.

Although a longer historical perspective is needed to normatively judge 'inclusionism', there is evidence indicating major transformations of historical bulwarks of 'problematic inclusion'. Even if ongoing changes admit different interpretations, I have tried to show that 'inclusionism' is a sort of underlying unitary (if heterogeneous) consensus on the need to interrogate and neutralize historically strong inequalities and provide for less inequitable forms of social integration. In the context of a combination of endogenous political processes and lucky external circumstances, Latin America is presently going through a transition rich in possibilities to break with its problematic past. 'Inclusionism' is, under this light, a necessary development for the region's welfare regimes, even if it becomes an end in itself, in spite of the author of this lines' preference for more decidedly universalistic and equality-oriented welfare arrangements.

Translation: Kyle Younker, Ingrid Wehr, Steve Lepper

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Abstracts

The paper analyzes the change in Latin American welfare regimes during the first decade of the 21st century. It reviews literature on the development and adaptation of classical welfare regime categories to other regions of the world, and revises selected Latin American scholarly production on welfare regimes. It suggests that, behind typologies and normative assessments there are underlying common features in the region's historical welfare regimes that can be well understood as forms of 'problematic inclusion'. It concludes by stressing the existence of sufficient elements to affirm there is a contemporary 'inclusionist' trend, cutting across ideological and political lines, that is making important contributions in the reduction of 'problematic inclusion'.

Der Artikel analysiert Transformationen lateinamerikanischer Wohlfahrtsregime in der ersten Hälfte des 21. Jahrhunderts. Nach einem kurzen Überblick über den Stand der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsregimeforschung,

die Lateinamerika erst relativ spät als Untersuchungsgegenstand entdeckt hat, setzt sich der Autor mit der Frage auseinander, inwiefern sich zentrale Konzepte und Modelle auf Lateinamerika übertragen lassen. Ausgehend von einer Analyse der vorhandenen Typologisierungsversuche und der zugrunde liegenden normativen Prämissen kommt Andrenacci zu dem Schluss, dass lateinamerikanische Wohlfahrtsregime in erster Linie durch eine problematische Form der Inklusion gekennzeichnet sind. Jüngste Trends deuten allerdings auf positive Entwicklungstendenzen hin, die mit diesem historischen Erbe brechen könnten.

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**Farewell to Diversity? New State Zones of Health Care
Service in China's Far West**

1. Research question and data

James Scott has argued in his recent book *The art of not being governed,* how specific production and settlement patterns enable or hinder the state in its endeavour to extend its administration to the state boundaries (Scott 2009: 35). Focussing on the geographical terrain of Zomia, he explains how the minorities living in the mountainous region of the Southeast Asian Massif utilise a repertoire of subsistence strategies, which enable them to resist state control. While the state is located in the valleys, the minorities evade the state by fleeing into the mountains, a region of relative statelessness, in order to avoid taxation and recruitment for the army. Since the 19th century, however, the nation state has aimed at making its sovereignty reach its physical borders and has therefore aimed at making the mobile peoples at its peripheries settle down and become incorporated into the state (Scott 2009).

In this paper, we will use James Scott's (2009) theoretical framework to explore the situation of Kazak herders living as nomadic pastoralists in the far West of the People's Republic of China. We will analyse the way in which the Han Chinese state seeks to incorporate them into insurance schemes and patterns of curative care in order to expand its reach to the very periphery of the country. While acknowledging that health care service is of major importance for the lives of people, we focus on welfare as instrumental in spreading the idea of the modern nation state into areas where people hide away from state dominance by moving back and forth between different states, and between the state dominated valleys and the

mountainous areas, to which the state has only limited or no access. Thus, we regard welfare in terms of its capability to provide security to people as a modern form of "enclosure" (ibid.: 11), for which policies are designed by the central government and implemented according to a national plan, in order to overcome the distance between state and peripheral society.

The situation in the People's Republic of China is well suited as a case study, one built on the theories developed by James Scott in his latest book. The rise of the Communist movement as a precondition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) takeover in 1949 is to a large extent the consequence of the Guomindang state's inability to expand the reach of the state to the rural areas. Mao Zedong developed his revolutionary strategy by exploiting the relative statelessness of the so-called border regions in provinces far away from any urban area whatsoever. Since 1949, the CCP has tried time and again to reach out to the rural areas. However, peasants used to living in local autonomy distant from state domination have been able to limit the reach of the state (Shue 1988; Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2008; Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2011). Since 1978, the Chinese state has even gone so far as to retreat from the rural areas by permitting the re-introduction of a family based agriculture and by substituting the market for the state as the organiser of supply and demand. At the same time, rudimentary forms of welfare, which had been developed in Maoist China, vanished and made health care the most important driver of poverty in the countryside (Liu Yuanli et al. 2002: 18; Klotzbücher 2006: 169-185). Looked at from the perspective of health care, the Chinese countryside between 1978 and 2002 can be considered as a "nonstate space" (Scott 2009: 13): Although aware of the health care problems in the countryside, the Central Government in Beijing refused to fund any insurance schemes. It refrained from investing in training and in equipping grassroots service institutions for primary health care. Instead, it demanded that local governments find solutions for the deficient health care situation. Minimal guidelines, non-binding decisions, conflicts between ministries at the central level and lack of subsidies from the central coffer resulted in low levels of motivation, inadequate funding and a lack of responsiveness by local governments, both to the needs of the local population and to the demands of the central government. As a consequence, a highly marketised health service structure developed, with private doctors or institutions earning high profits. With the

breakdown of the previously introduced schemes of risk protection in the early 1980s and unsustainable experiments in poor regions in the 1990s, individuals and families had to shoulder the financial risks of illnesses and costs for health care services.

However, beginning in 2002, the Chinese Government began to implement new welfare policies for the countryside: rural health care for the poor, even in the remotest areas, has been transformed from a task assigned to the local governments into an issue at the top of the priority list of the Central Government in Beijing. With local uprisings occurring in China's villages on a daily basis, the distance between the state and rural society is now regarded as disadvantageous and detrimental to the stability of CCP rule in China. After years of disengagement, the policies to provide better and affordable health care service to the rural areas have been recognised as instrumental in overcoming this distance (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2008).

The previously neglected and de-facto private practitioners in the villages were replaced by state-financed village clinics managed by township hospitals. Most of these health care service providers have been integrated as assigned health care units into the county-based rural insurance scheme called "New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS)" (Klotzbücher/Lässig 2009; Klotzbücher et al. 2010a). This system is co-financed by the Central, Provincial and County governments as well as by the peasant families. For the first time since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Central Government is paying for every member of NRCMS in every village of China, with the result that the villages, as former non-state spaces (Scott 2009), were integrated into the state and people began to consider themselves as consumers of state provision.

However, with China being a multi-ethnic state, the Beijing government not only has to deal with its distance to the Han dominated rural areas; it also has to find solutions to the task of incorporating minorities of different ethnic backgrounds into the state. This is especially true for minorities living in border areas and in transnational settings, such as the Kazaks living in the Yili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region near the border of Kazakhstan. Between 2005 and 2009 we were able to observe the implementation process of the above mentioned welfare policies in Xinyuan County, with its unique geographical settings and challenges defined by the special needs of a population

of Kazak semi-nomadic herders. The findings are based on a quantitative household survey of 457 households with 2286 family members and 25 in-depth interviews with herders and administrators at different levels of government. The survey, as well as the interviews, were conducted by researchers from the Department of East Asian Studies of the University of Vienna and from the Department of Public Health of Shihezi University (see design and discussion of the health related results of the project in Klotzbücher et al. 2010b).

Xinyuan (in Kazak language Künes) County is peripheral in several respects. It is part of the Yili (Ili) Kazak Autonomous Prefecture on the Chinese border with Kazakhstan, and has the highest percentage of Kazak population in any Chinese county. The county has a total population of 303,300, of whom 133,900 are ethnic Kazaks (44.1 percent), 118,000 Han (39.2 percent), 28,300 Uyghurs (9.3 percent), 18,900 Hui (6.2 percent) and others (1.2 percent) (Yili hasake zizhizhou tongjiju 2006: 63). The majority of the Xinyuan Kazaks live as semi-nomadic pastoralists in the mountains during the period of the summer pasture. Parts of the family and their cattle migrate to high plains (about 2000m altitude) in May. They live there in yurts and return to their winter housings at a lower altitude or in the valley of the Yili River in September.

The situation of the Kazaks in Xinyuan County is typical of the state having difficulties in bringing, by means of production and taxation (Scott 2009: 35), the target population of nomadic herders from the shadow zones of the mountains into assigned agricultural settlements under state administration (see discussions on settlement in Cui 2002, 2005; Mejias 2009). In the past, the state has attempted to implement a coercive form of sedentarisation policy to reach its aims. However, these measures have repeatedly shown themselves to be ineffective. Trying to settle the herders on a permanent basis in the valleys while leaving the mountains ungoverned has not been a convincing strategy. However, establishing schools and health posts with state subsidised services as a form of "expansionary state" (Scott 2009: 3) might convince the herders to change their lifestyle and assist the state in its attempt to fully incorporate "peripheral peoples" (ibid.: 4), even those from a "geographically difficult terrain" (ibid.: 6). By introducing the idea of welfare as a modern equivalent of the "distance-demolishing technology" (ibid.: 11) of state-making, we would like to add a new aspect to the

traditionally Marxist focus of James Scott (2009: 11), who limits his explorations of the interaction between state and nonstate groups to the defined interface of production and taxation, as well as the instrument of coercion as the means "to project […] its power to the very edge of its territory". Our paper applies Scott's theoretical concepts, originally used for analysing the Southeast Asian past of Zomia, to China's current health governance and its spread to the Far West of the PRC. While Scott is mostly interested in investigating mobility as a form of avoiding state appropriation, we analyse the state's response to a nomadic lifestyle and look at welfare as an important policy arena of post-modern Chinese state-making. Health care policies are of growing relevance as a non-coercive form of state-making. Thus, we will identify governance in a centre-periphery constellation, which is state driven and to some degree advantageous to the local population, although detrimental to preserving cultural diversity.

2. The state health care providers: Inadequacies and distance from the needs of the users

There is a pressing need for outpatient treatment and illness prevention, particularly for chronic diseases in Xinyuan County and especially for the herders, who, as we argue in accordance with our Chinese research partners elsewhere (Huang et al. 2010; Rui et al. 2011; Klotzbücher et al 2010b), are not adequately taken care of by the present health care service providers. The three tiers of rural health care service organised by state agencies (county [xian], township [zhen] and village [cun]) follow a stationary pattern: one clinic/hospital for every settlement (township or village) in the valley far from where the herders spend the summer months. Following central guidelines, the insurance schemes of NRCMS focus on in-patient treatment (Klotzbücher et al. 2010a).

In addition to the People's Hospital, the TCM (Traditional Chinese Medicine) Hospital and three hospitals at the county level, there are small out-patient facilities – one each in the 12 townships, and 29 clinics at the village (cun) level, employing 556 medical personnel, seven technical staff and 116 non-medical personnel (2005 figures). In addition, there are 29 free practitioners (Shihezi University and University of Vienna 2007: 77), and

an undefined number of illegal doctors, drug sellers and traditional healers, whose services are not covered by the newly introduced health insurance scheme, NRCMS.

The brain drain of the most capable doctors to the medical and administrative institutions at the county level or to health care facilities in the cities make any effort to improve the quality of health care in these grassroots institutions very difficult. Work in the pasture area is neither lucrative nor seen as an important step on the career ladder. Shabby premises, old and inadequate equipment, narrow specialization of doctors, lack of general practitioners, and the low pay of the health professionals in the countryside make the situation for local patients and doctors even worse. Besides the problems in human resources, the investment in health care at the village level is generally insufficient.

3. New 'distance-demolishing' measures of the Central State after 2002

3.1 Enhanced role of the County Health Bureau

Before 2002, the role of the County Health Bureau in providing 'technical guidance supervision' (yewu zhidao) as the extended arm of the Ministry of Health (MoH) under the 'dual leadership' (shuangchong lingdao) concept with the lower governments was marginal. In general, local governments were hesitant to subsidise health institutions directly.

Only substantial and growing subsidies of the central state have enhanced the position of the County Health Bureau as the local agent for health care. We discussed the logic of demand-driven subsidies elsewhere (Klotzbücher/Lässig 2009; Klotzbücher et al. 2010a) and focus here only on the impact of provider-oriented subsidies.

Vertical provider-oriented subsidies are now developing into a tool to extend the reach of the state administration. It is important to understand that health care facilities in townships and villages are nowadays run by the state but are at the same time profit-oriented units, which make the patients pay for the services in order to cover the running costs of the facilities, while the state provides for the salaries of doctors and nurses. Doctors and nurses at village clinics and township hospitals who had previously provided serv-

ices on a private basis, have since 2007 been integrated into NRCMS and receive a monthly subsidy of 80 ¥ RMB (100 ¥ [Yuan] RMB [Renminbi] was equivalent to 11 € in September 2011) from the county in recognition of the administrative workload generated by the new system. Since 2009, the provincial authorities have demanded an amelioration of the payment for doctors and nurses. Since then, the county has paid an additional monthly subsidy to village doctors of 200 or 500 ¥ RMB, depending on qualification. However, 125 of the total of 130 village doctors do not have the certificate which qualifies them as village doctors and only receive the minimum of 200 ¥ RMB. In addition, bonuses are given to the doctors at the end of the year. The total average monthly income of a village doctor in 2009 was 700-800 ¥ RMB, including the mentioned subsidies, but some of the most qualified village doctors could generate an income of up to 3,000 ¥ RMB per month. In 2007, 18 doctors on the state payroll in township hospitals were reported to earn 1,000 to 1,200 ¥ RMB per month. The payment of a nurse of 1,345 ¥ RMB per month is slightly higher, because nurses are not eligible to bonus payments.

3.2 Inclusion and exclusion of local providers

The subsidies from county and higher level government bodies benefit only those health care providers participating in the NRCMS, which is defined as a new county-run insurance system introduced in 2006 (Klotz-bücher et al. 2010a). The County Health Bureau places village doctors on its payroll and expects compliance with its orders. Thus, the County Health Bureau is able to improve the operation and control of the insurance system and to improve health care services, which is of major importance in order to give peasants confidence in the system. However, by integrating the medical personnel into NRCMS, they lose their autonomy and have to learn to comply with state rules and procedures. They are compelled to embark on a process of reorienting themselves from their individual profit-seeking attitude to being 'representatives' of the new insurance schemes designed by the state. That this new position is not always a comfortable one is shown by the fact that doctors sometimes have an unpleasant buffer function between the insurance administrators and patients in cases of dissatisfaction with the medical scheme (limited reimbursement, lengthy administrative processes, etc). This is especially true in the mountainous

areas where doctors are the only available contact point for the patients. The new medical standards, paperwork for NRCMS, deduction of fees, and obtaining refunds from NRCMS, combined with the decrease in income resulting from standardised fee structures, have given rise to considerable frustration on the part of the doctors (Interview I-06/06). Instead of working at their own risk as in the 1990s, they must transfer all fees received from their patients to NRCMS on a monthly basis and are then reimbursed in accordance with established tables (Interview I-02/09). All this implies that doctors have to follow standardised practice, comply with rules and make their income transparent to the state. They are part and parcel of a nationwide system and have to give up their autonomy for the sole advantage of being a state employee.

The right of staff allocation is taken over by the County Health Bureau, which thus exerts control over local medical agents. Medical qualification and performance standards are established as the main criteria for recruitment of medical personnel and provide legitimation for intervention at the grass roots level. This is clearly shown by data collected at the township level: in 2006, 30 positions were advertised for medical-technical assistants, nurses, medical assistants and doctors. A competitive examination procedure was designed for the whole district. The procedure, which also included an oral examination, was supervised by the Bureau of Personnel at the prefecture level. All participants had at least one year of professional experience after graduation from a medical high school, which provided basic medical training at the secondary level. No nationality quota was applied (Interview I-04/07). However, the testing was exclusively focused on knowledge of Western Medicine. The questions for the written examination were provided by the provincial government. Of 216 applicants from Xinyuan, 90 were retained for final consideration and 30 were finally selected for appointment.

Similar recruitment standards are formulated for employment in villages: here a period of at least three years of practice is expected before appointment after a semi-open selection process under the guidance of the Villagers' Health Committee (Interview I-02/09).

The implementation of NRCMS and the inclusion of village doctors into this system are used to strengthen quality control: doctors practising in villages and in pastoral areas will have their services recognized by NRCMS only if they meet the required qualification standards. The

economic survival of doctors who are unwilling or unable to adjust to the new requirements is threatened. Doctors not meeting the basic formal qualification requirements have the possibility of being converted to officially recognized village doctors upon passing a provincial examination.

The effect of these measures, as seen in Xinyuan and other counties of the Kazak Yili Autonomous Prefecture, is that traditional healers or doctors of Traditional Kazak Medicine (TKM) do not meet these standards and have difficulties in coping with the institutionalisation of their profession. As their knowledge is not part of what is required to pass the exams and as they are unable to perform in terms of Western Medicine, they are excluded from the system (Main 2011). Medical treatment at the Department for Traditional Kazak Medicine at the Xinyuan County hospital is included in NRCMS and thus reimbursable, but according to NRCMS rules patients have to pay out-of-pocket for the treatment of traditional healers by non-state health providers below this level.

In addition, the inclusion into NRCMS does not privilege the village doctor as the exclusive agent for his/her village, but in fact reduces the power of the village doctors: the scheme allows participants to choose freely between doctors within the county with more or less the same price standards for outpatient treatment at the respective administrative levels.

3.3 Geographic inclusion of the valleys and exclusion of the summer pasture in the mountains

The payment of subsidies does not only have an impact on inclusion or exclusion of providers, but also on that of geographical areas. Deciding on where and how many medical staff are available in the villages implies the possibility of prioritisation. In the case of Xinyuan County, the decision was taken to provide services in the valleys and *leave the mountains unserved*. The decision to disconnect the mountainous pasture lands from easily accessible service and to concentrate on developing the accessibility to state provision in the valley is a decision taken in order to influence where and how people settle down. It is a decision taken within the framework of post-modern state governance aimed at using non-coercive methods to reach the policy aim of sedentarisation. In contrast to the sedentarisation policy implemented by state coercion in the past, subsidised state health care can be used as a *non-coercive pull-factor* attracting nomadic or semi-

nomadic people to the new settlements designed and assigned by local governments. In addition to providing subsidies for housing and schooling facilities, including school housing and teaching staff, state-subsidised health care makes life in these areas so much easier that more and more people will – so the government logic goes – give up their nomadic lifestyle.

The non-availability of state provision of health care service in pastoral areas is a well-designed measure. There are no laws at the central government or party level for health care services in pasture areas, except for a circular with non-binding recommendations jointly issued by the Ministries of Health (MoH) and Finance in 2008, which reads as follows:

"Fourth, in old revolutionary regions, regions with national minorities, near the frontier or in poor regions, pilots of mobile health service and telemedicine should be conducted for improving health service quality and medical standards" (Weinong weifa 2008-17).

However, the Central Government did not provide additional subsidies. The Central Government called for pilots providing mobile services for nomads, but the local government in Xinyuan decided not to respond to this call, although the Vienna and Shihezi teams were sent to Xinyuan to explore the possibility of mobile hospitals for Kazak herders. It clearly discerned the *optional* character of these calls for pilots. Consequently, no pilots for herders' clinics or telemedical facilities to obtain instant diagnostic feedback and results from laboratory tests were financed by the county health administration between 2005 and 2009.

This move is quite astonishing given the fact that our survey clearly shows a need for better service in the pastoral areas. While the local government showed a high degree of responsiveness to the needs of the population in the process of implementing NRCMS in the region (Klotzbücher et al. 2010a), the county government refrained from responding to the needs of a large semi-nomadic population. Mobile clinics, where they exist, are the result of initiatives of township hospitals and/or of village heads and were created without government interference. One village head 'persuaded' the village doctors to accompany the herders' families into the mountains (Interview I-10/07). Whenever we found doctors – most of them of Kazak background – providing services in yurts near the herders, they explained to us that they had economic or personal reasons to spend their summer in the mountains. These ad hoc solutions at the township level are operational

solutions which do not follow the state logic and are consequently regarded as irrelevant when it comes to the County Health Bureau formulating its policy on how to tackle the challenge of medical services for herders in pastoral areas. The state governance logic consists in disregarding the health needs of the herders and opting for solutions which have the potential for discouraging their nomadic lifestyle.

In contrast to the state's non-action as regards nomadic and semi-nomadic herders in the mountains, the "expansionary" state increases the accessibility to medical service in the valleys: according to recent plans designed at the central and provincial levels and implemented by the County Health Bureau, each village health station should be equipped with at least one doctor and one nurse. As part of this programme, Xinyuan County established seven "pastoral hospitals (muye yiyuan)" in 1995, some of which are under township and some under village administration. None of these pastoral hospitals are mobile. The Chinese technical term is in fact misleading, because all these facilities are stationary and located close to winter settlements (in most cases in villages of Kazak pastoralists). During the summer, the doctors can only treat herders after many hours on horse or motorcycle after being contacted by phone. No subsidised doctors were allocated to mobile communities or villages with a high percentage of pastoralists. Instead, pastoral hospitals which had existed since the 1990s (according to plans earmarking medical personnel and services for the seven summer pastures in the highlands of Xinyuan County) were turned into village health posts (cun weisheng shi) under the administration of a township hospital. As the clinics were to be staffed by only one doctor and one nurse, each surplus doctor or nurse was either transferred to other health institutions, or had their contracts terminated. At present, six of these health posts are staffed by 12 medical personnel (three licensed doctors, six village doctors and three nurses) in Xinyuan County. One pastoral hospital (Shaha Pastoral Village) was closed because an earthquake had destroyed the school building. The village health post building was therefore turned into a school, and the retired doctor had to use his own house as village health post. No replacement for his position had been allocated at the time of our survey. (Interview I-11/07). However, due to the absence of some 80% of the herding population during the summer months, the pastoral hospitals in the valley are overstaffed for almost half of the year.

4. Local implementation options for pastoral health care

Besides these national trends, central agencies, local administrations and scientists have formulated different strategies for improving health care for pastoralists in Xinjiang. This chapter discusses policy options and policy-making during in the period from 2005 to 2009. We argue that bottom-up solutions like mobile health stations are 'breakthroughs' which reflect and build upon the strengths of the local diversity in the area. They should be regarded as belonging to the portfolio of subsistence strategies (as described by James Scott) people have developed in the area. As such, they are not compatible with options of the central state aiming at the extension of existing administrative patterns or procedures to peripheral areas. Compliance with a top-down implementation is not compatible with bottom-up breakthroughs.

4.1 Mobile clinics vs. a national unified service organisation

The idea of mobile clinics has its own tragedy. Mobile clinics are needed for better health care and prevention, but they contradict the idea behind the ongoing restructuring of the rural health care system. They cater to the needs of the Kazak people and their culture of mobility (Cui 2002, 2005; Mejias 2009), but they do not comply with state scenarios for the future of nomads in China.

In the summer of 2005, the project team of Chinese and Austrian researchers started conducting interviews with administrators from the provincial and county levels about health care provisions for the summer pastures in Xinjiang. The situation of health care for pastoralists was considered unsatisfactory; consequently, since 2005, the Provincial Health Bureau has been considering ways of improvement and prepared in 2005 an internal document for circulation at the central level, wherein the lack of service is addressed and the advantages of the pastoral clinics discussed. The document opted for more financial and human resources as a basis for a better service in the pasture areas (Xinjiang Weishengting 2005).

On this basis, the team developed a plan for mobile health clinics. The model was based on results of the above mentioned field study and designed after extensive talks with stakeholders. It ties in with experiences gained at an already operating pastoral health station at Biesituobie Town-

ship in Xinyuan County. However, instead of demanding more personnel and buildings for the pasture area, the researchers opted for mobile health units under the leadership of the township hospital. They were to be staffed by experienced surplus doctors and nurses from the township hospitals, and not by the generally less qualified health workers from the village health stations. This advice was given as we could show that herders would only make use of the mobile clinic if they had confidence in the quality of its services. Also, we could show that doctors would only be willing to go to the pasture areas if they stayed on the state payroll.

Solutions do not need to be costly. The running costs for this model were estimated by us at less than € 7,000 p.a., including write-offs for 'hardware'. The estimated cost of the initial investment in hardware for one pilot station was calculated at approx. € 6,500.

However, while this policy advice catered to the need of the herders and cost considerations were favourable to the local government, it did not comply with the overall health policy of the central government, as described above. The priority for the Central Government in Beijing lies with general problems applying to all of China. It intends to build up a three-tiered rural health care system with a stationary concept of primary health care. Health posts are to be established in villages and no further funding or subsidies for mobile clinics from central level are envisaged. The homogenised local health care administration and service institutions lack the flexibility required by the mobile community of herders and their families. They do not provide for special solutions or additional subsidies regarding health care for semi-nomadic herders. As the special life style and health requirements of nomads are generally not considered, it is difficult to attract additional funding for adequately qualified doctors in the pastoral areas. (Interview I-14/07). Claims for more funds are also difficult to sustain in the light of studies which show that the average ratio of medical personnel/population is already higher than in other areas of Xinjiang (Huang et al. 2010).

The proposed mobile health clinics were supposed to be an administrative part of the township hospitals and would have fitted quite well into the three tier health system. However, the Director of the Finance Section in the Provincial Health Department cautioned that the administrative upgrading of village health stations and pastoral clinics to the level of town-

ship hospitals, an upgrading which, according to his logic, would have been necessary to establish mobile health clinics, would be too costly and that there was no budget available at the provincial level. To apply for central funds would be difficult as there was no provision made by the central legislation for special health care in pastoral areas. Without this provision, the Section for Financial Planning of the Xinjiang Health Department can neither pay for special health care for the pastoral areas from its own funds nor apply for additional funding at the central level. Due to the absence of special budgets from the provincial and central governments, additional funding provided at the local level or by international donors would be a prerequisite for the success of the model (Interview I-14/07).

The Provincial Department of Rural Health Care had argued for more and better equipped mobile doctors in the pastoral areas and urged for more consideration of local diversity by the central state authorities in 2005. However, the Central Government regarded the regional and cultural factors of health care as obstacles to establishing a unified primary health care service structure. Confronted with the problems of government control of rural areas, the Central Government's policies were focussed on overcoming the distance between the state and rural society. Central policies were aimed at extending state structures and services to settled agricultural communities. Mobile health care stations run counter to this logic. In this context, to implement the idea of mobile health care would have been politically risky. Of course, the local agents at the county level are more interested in projects without political risk. In addition, compliance with state policies pays; breakthroughs at the local level have to be paid. Therefore, the proposals of the project team, although well received in principle, did not meet with sufficient support from either the local or the provincial leaderships.

4.2 Charity funds from Hong Kong for mobile health care

Another option was discussed intensively within the provincial administration in 2007. A rich patron from Hong Kong had pledged funds for pastoral health care to the MoH. The International Office (*guoji hezuochu*) of the Center for Communicable Diseases in the MoH suggested Xinjiang as a possible location and pastoral hospitals as a possible project (Interview I-02/07, I-15/07). The donor would provide funds and let the provin-

cial health administration decide on the implementation. The donor had indicated that funds should be used for new buildings and equipment of pastoral hospitals, particularly in southern Xinjiang and in the Altai region, where the donor's 'Hong Kong group' already co-operates with village health posts, attracting the interest of the public with the distribution of gifts. In official language, the outcome of this initiative is 'unclear' (Interview I-02/09).

This model thus does not contribute to the implementation of the national inclusion strategies. It does not open up new models for funding on a broad provincial or even national level and does not solve the problem of human resources, which had turned out to be a major obstacle in running mobile clinics, according to our research.

4.3 Renovation of existing (stationary) 'pastoral hospitals'

In the autumn of 2006 at the same time as the discussion on the mobile clinic was taking place, the Xinyuan County Health Bureau applied for Central Government funding to upgrade seven existing stationary pastoral clinics to become independent from the township hospitals, obtain the same status and be equipped like hospitals at the township level. As part of their plan, doctors would receive 100% of their pay from the State. This would generate additional costs, to be provided by the Province (Interview I-04/07). The County proposal also included the construction of six new village clinics of 300 m² each (Interview I-02/07). The Xinyuan County application was successful: the necessary funds were transferred through the Province to the County Finance Office for disbursement in 2009.

Similar to 1994, the County applied successfully for subsidies for the renovation of pastoral hospitals. 300,000 Y RMB (€ 36, 300) for six clinics of 300 m² each was received in January 2009 from the state budget. The six new pastoral clinics were constructed at settlements with a relatively high density of herders. They are administratively supervised by the County Health Bureau. The township hospitals concerned are responsible for technical management and control and also provide equipment and staff.

This decision is not uncontroversial: the Director of the Center of Disease Control (CDC) at county level heard of this County initiative and felt that this would only be a second best alternative to mobile health stations (Interview I-08/07, I-04/09). Other agencies, e.g. the director of the

local NRCMS bureau, said that mobile health stations would have been a much more effective measure to improve accessibility to the health service (Interview I-02/09).

However, low cost and bottom-up solutions were disregarded when external funding became available and higher compliance with central governmental policy became possible. The project team made clear in its proposal that no additional posts, but rather flexibility and mobility of health personnel would be required for staffing the mobile health stations during the summer months. However, as early as 2007, county and province health administrators had pointed to the incompatibility of mobile pastoral stations with the government logic.

Another factor was gaining importance during the talks of 2007 and especially in 2009. The sedentarisation of herdsmen with their families in the valleys is one of the untouchable key policies in Xinjiang and marked as an important factor of policy-making. Government and Party at the provincial and county level regard semi-nomadic pastoralism as economically inefficient and ecologically problematic. Nevertheless, provincial health administrators made it clear that the high political ambitions of building new settlements for the herders had turned out to be impracticable since 2005 (Interview I-15/07). Semi-nomadism as a production pattern is not disappearing, and herders stated that the number or people and animals on the summer pasture is increasing. These trends should nourish arguments in favour of strengthening the health service in pastoral areas. However, national policies do not allow for this kind of responsiveness. It is a political dogma that sedentarisation will, in the long run, solve all problems of semi-nomadic economy and lifestyle (including health care service), as these are the results of an anachronistic and non-ecological form of pastoral economy.

This all-in-one-solution is highly ideological and lacking any supporting evidence. No efforts are being made to quantify, in a long term study, the effects of sedentarisation in terms of income growth or the better health status of new settlers in comparison to pastoralists. Instead, state administrators continue to draw the herdsmen away from the humid meadows in the high plains to the new settlements in the dry valleys. They intend to discourage nomadism in summer pastures and try to transform herdsmen into farmers (Interview I-15/07). Excluding the summer pastures as spaces of nomad mobility from state-funded health care service and extending

administration and service in the valleys, is looked at as a feasible and non-risky way to achieve this aim. Simultaneously, health administrators secure their positions by showing how health care policies can be the *pull-factors* for encouraging the herders to settle in newly built valley villages. Last but not least, to integrate the sedentarisation policies with the homogenisation of health care structures can demonstrate compliance with upper levels.

According to James Scott, the policy of the central and provincial governments in the PRC conforms with the aim of projecting state power into the most peripheral areas of the country and to the most marginalised people who so far have survived, despite state negligence. Although the sedentarisation of the Kazak herders might not have a positive economic effect on the development of Xinjiang, it surely is designed to have a positive effect on the stability of an otherwise highly contested border region. The moving of the Kazak herders between China and Kazakhstan does not comply with the idea of the nation state. The fact that they prefer life in the mountains despite hardship induced by cold weather, lack of sanitary equipment and dietary deficiencies is regarded by the Han dominated state as a form of self-barbarisation, which cannot be allowed to continue.

5. Conclusion

The different approaches to pastoral health care in Xinjiang since 2006 provide insights into the decision-making process and the implementation of policies in the field of health care in regions of ethnic and cultural diversity. The County and Provincial Health Department have realised the need for action in pastoral health care. The existing pastoral hospitals do not satisfy the health needs of herders. Health service in the hills or on high plains is inadequate or absent. However, the county did not opt for a low-cost solution to establish mobile clinics in the mountains, but relied on funds for the renovation or upgrading of facilities in the valleys. This focus on the winter settlement areas ignores the needs of the semi-nomadic population during the summer pasture. The prioritisation of health care in the valleys complies with central state policies of unification and homogenisation, but also serves the aim of inducing the Kazak herders to give up their semi-nomadic lifestyle.

In our analysis, we argued that welfare or health care policies should be seen as a strategic tool of post-modern governance in China. The modern state, analysed here with James Scott's theoretical approach, tries to project its administrative capacity to the very last edge of its territory. As Scott put it, a characteristic of the classic states of Southeast Asia was to colonise the hills and relocate the so-called barbarians in order to exploit production in the valleys, even with coercive means like slavery etc. The 'modern barbarians' – like the Kazak nomads – are characterised as sticking to economically backward or ecologically unsustainable production and migration patterns. Through its logic of modernisation, the state claims to know that the lifestyle of these peoples is inadequate, both for themselves and for the requirements of state modernisation, and therefore feels legitimised to force them into compliance with central policies.

Regarding the post-modern state, we argue that it has the capacity to integrate the peripheral peoples into a state-paid system of welfare or medical service. They have to settle in the valleys, become members of NRCMS and give up nomadism. Only once settled in the valleys and as members of NRCMS, they are able to profit from state-subsidised medical care. The state builds up a service system of health care that disconnects 'escape medicine' (a term inspired from Scott's [2009: 23] notion of "escape production") and their representatives, such as traditional practitioners of TKM, from the system. Financial support from the central level, the integration of the rural areas into NRCMS and the township hospital system have facilitated the management of the local health care system by the County's health administration.

Bottom-up initiatives such as the introduction of mobile pastoral clinics do not comply with the aim of homogenising the rural health care system because they tend to preserve the mobility of the Kazak herders and their culture. They are therefore politically risky for local governments, particularly if they are supported by foreign donors and researchers. The idea of a people-based, culturally sensitive approach legitimising diversity is not compatible with the modernisation effort of the Chinese state, which draws its strongest arguments from the deteriorating ecological situation on the grasslands caused by over-grazing.

So far, the sedentarisation policy has had only very limited effects. The future will show whether inflow of central money and the re-orienta-

tion of the rural health care system to upper levels of decision-making and unquestioned compliance with central party policies will not only ensure cost-control and financial sustainability, but also preserve local diversity.

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Abstracts

Using James Scott's (2009) theoretical framework of the interaction between the state and peripheral people, we argue that the welfare state should be regarded as a *pull-factor* in the context of the state's endeavours to project its power to distant peoples in assigned state zones. Our discussion is based on interviews in Xinyuan County in the Western part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China. Presenting current policies and alternative policy options discussed at the local level for providing primary health care in rural China, we argue that decisions made in the implementation process did not respond to the special health needs of mobile pastoralists in the high plains, but were part of the central state logic of homogenising settlement efforts and health care.

Der theoretische Ansatz von James Scott zur Expansion von staatlicher Ordnung auf periphere Gebiete wird auf den Aufbau von Wohlfahrts- und Gesundheitspolitik des modernen Staates angewendet und weiterent-

wickelt. Anhand mehrjähriger Feldstudien zwischen 2005 und 2009 zur Gesundheitsversorgungsstruktur im Kreis Xinyuan der Autonomen Uighurischen Region Xinjiang in der Volksrepublik China werden zuerst die nationalen Restrukturierungsmaßnahmen vorgestellt und Lösungen für eine bessere Versorgung der halbnomadisierenden kasachischen Hirtenfamilien diskutiert. Lokal entwickelte und an die nomadischen Lebensformen angepasste mobile Lösungen zur Gesundheitsfürsorge konnten nicht implementiert werden. Die Anstrengungen der staatlichen Akteure sind als Versuch zu sehen, bisher marginalisierte Gruppen aus den peripheren Gebirgsregionen über die Integration in eine staatliche Gesundheitsversorgung in den Tälern anzusiedeln.

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ELLEN EHMKE
Ideas in the Indian Welfare Trajectory[1]

This article studies the ideas which shaped the development of welfare institutions in India. The analysis is situated in the broader context of the ongoing discussion on welfare regimes outside the OECD. The article suggests we depart from the identification of regime types and ideal type formulation. Instead, it focusses on the role of competing ideas and their institutional anchorage to explain why a specific welfare route was taken. The thesis advanced is that socio-political ideas shape the institutional arrangements of welfare regimes. Agency, context and coherence of ideas matter for their success, but they are also mediated through cultural parameters and pre-existing institutional environments. In the case of India, ideas of social transformation played a strong role in the independence movement, but in the overall policy environment around the foundation of the republic, national unity was favoured over the potential turmoil created by social reforms. The early politics of accommodation have had a lasting impact to this day, despite two later ideational shifts.

1. Welfare regimes in the Global South – an emerging field of study

The welfare regime approach originated in the OECD, for which it was most prominently formulated by Esping-Andersen (1990). Over the past decade, it has been adapted and applied to the study of welfare regimes outside the OECD world (Gough et al. 2004; Rudra 2007; Haggard/Kaufman 2008; Seekings 2008; Gough/Abu Sharkh 2010). In their pioneering work, Gough et al. (2004) have innovatively included new

institutions in their framework and mapped the components of welfare regimes in the South, but they have been less clear on how and why particular regimes evolve. As in Esping-Andersen's work, they assume a complex interdependence between stratification and mobilisation, with institutional conditions, welfare outcomes and an extended welfare mix, which create welfare regime types that become stable over time and, hence, path-dependent (Gough/Abu Sharkh 2010).

The notion of path-dependency is shared by other recent treatises on welfare development in developing contexts, such as that of Rudra (2007). She explains variances between different types of Southern welfare regimes through the influence of policy makers, who have reacted differently to internal as well as external pressures, and thereby shaped path-dependent distribution regimes in the long run. Haggard and Kaufman (2008) analyse strategic alignments and critical junctures in coalitions pressing for redistribution, and the impact of economic performance, as well as that of democratic institutions. They contend that "the effects of institutions are conditional on the distribution of underlying preferences over the policy in question and the strength of the contending social groups in the political process" (Haggard/Kaufman 2008: 15f). Additionally, Seekings (2008) points to the importance of an immigrant working class, the degree of agrarian crisis, the openness of the economy, prevailing norms of welfare provision and electoral competition for the votes of the poor for the development of distinct welfare regimes.

These approaches share the recognition of international influences on national welfare regimes, which have most clearly been formulated by Deacon (2007: 9f). Also, all approaches mention the long-term structuring effects of welfare institutions and agree that actors, at least during critical junctures, can shape institutional development. Yet, they disagree on the key determinants of the welfare regimes in the South. Consequently, they each develop different regime types. This has been viewed as an over-emphasis on ideal-type construction by Wehr and Priwitzer (2011). Other issues have received comparatively less attention (Wehr/Priwitzer 2011: 144f): the (semi-) peripheral welfare state has largely remained a black box, the impact of colonial legacies, power constellations and governing functions of social policies have been neglected, and the more diverse actor constellations should be given more attention.

The last point is crucial to the argument developed here: much of the OECD welfare research emphasises either electoral competition between ideologically distinct parties or class coalitions for the discrete shapes which welfare regimes take. However, for the non-OECD we have to consider other models than class based identity formation and coalition building; indeed, we do not necessarily find similar party structures. Instead, identities might centre around clan, kinship or caste, and coalition building needs to take account of this heterogeneity. If we cannot treat the interests of stakeholders in the welfare regime as a given, a point to which I will return later, what then shapes regimes and its institutions? This article proposes to take up this question through a closer look at the ways in which 'ideas' shape welfare regimes. Ideational influences on welfare politics are recognised in the OECD debate as a focal point for, for instance, social-democratic, liberal and conservative (Esping-Andersen 1990) coalition building, despite a lack of a clear notion of 'ideas'. In debates on welfare in the South, the importance of ideational factors has so far been largely absent, the notable exceptions being Rieger and Leibfried (1999) for East Asia and Barrientos (2004) for Latin America.

2. An ideational perspective on welfare regimes

An ideational analysis can draw on previous works from various strands of institutionalism. Firstly, in historical institutionalism we find Thelen's (1999: 397) argument that institutions "rest on a set of ideational and material foundations that, if shaken, open possibilities for change". That ideas are foundations of institutions is a central argument; however, the notion of 'ideas' remains somewhat underspecified. Secondly, ideas are recognised as an important part of culture in a more sociological strand of institutionalism (Rieger/Leibfried 1999; Kaufmann 2003). Kaufmann (2003: 32ff) emphasises that societal processes and phenomena, be they rural-urban migration or income poverty, have to be articulated as social problems, identified as fields for political action and to find resonance among policy makers and their constituencies before they are included in welfare policies by the state. Additionally, culture acts as a filter for ideas on problem definitions and influence which policy solutions are favoured over others

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(Kaufmann 2003: 32); they frame the boundaries within which specific social policy development routes are either opened up or closed (Rieger/ Leibfried 1999: 455) according to a 'logic of appropriateness' (Schmidt 2011). 'Culture' in this context can be understood as "(historically specific) habits of thought and behaviour of a particular group of people" (Harriss 2006: 18). Cultures are not static but fluid, and undergo developments and changes. They have to be upheld through practice, and can be internally and externally contested (ibid.: 7).

Lately, ideas have come to the forefront of analysis in 'constructivist' (Hay 2011) and 'discursive' institutional perspectives (Schmidt 2011). These stress that the focus on ideas allows us to shift the emphasis to "an adequate account of postformative institutional change" (Hay 2011: 66) and identify 'path-shaping' logics and dynamics. Institutions, understood as "humanly devised rules that affect behaviour, constraining certain actions, providing incentives for others, and thereby making social life more or less predictable" (Harriss 2006: 14) are "subject and focus of political struggle" (Hay 2011: 68). The nature of these struggles is contingent and "outcomes can in no sense be derived from an extant institutional context itself" (ibid.: 68). Institutions do not necessarily arise because are they are the most effective; their "functionality or dysfunctionality is an open – empirical and historical – question" (ibid.: 68). The focus on ideas in institutional formation and change, hence, breaks with functionalist explanatory models, because it allows us to emphasise different and competing ideas and to study the settings in which one prevails over another.

Ideas do matter in the political processes of institutional formation and change because they inform agents' perceptions of the issue at hand and the choices available to them to react to it; they provide "guides for action" (Béland/Cox 2011: 4). However, agents' knowledge of the institutional context in which they are situated is "at best, incomplete and […] might often prove to have been inaccurate after the event" (Hay 2011: 67). Therefore, agents neither act rationally (because they do not have complete information), nor are their interests a mere reflection of material or social circumstances. Instead, interests, desires, and motivations "are irredeemably ideational" (ibid.: 67), are always historical, social, and political constructions that reflect an agent's perception of his or her situation and aspirations in a context about which he or she cannot establish certainty.

Generally, ideas can be seen to operate at different levels. In the context of this article, ideas will be understood as 'problem definitions', which are concerned with the broader sense in which problems to be solved by certain policies emerge, how they are linked to the objectives to be achieved and the instruments to be applied; as such, "problem definition is a contested process among players with varying levels of power and persuasiveness" (Mehta 2011: 34ff). The study of the influence of ideas also needs to pose the question why some ideas gain more importance than others. Mehta (2011: 35ff) points our attention firstly to agency, that is to individuals and groups that advocate a certain idea, the backing that these enjoy, and the ownership of the idea in the long term. He secondly refers to consistency and context. This concerns the frame provided for an idea, the context in which it is promoted, whether an idea of a social problem also offers a corresponding policy solution, and how it fits into the larger ideational and institutional environment.

These considerations guide the following analysis of ideas in the development of the Indian welfare regime. Herein, the focus is on ideas within policy-making circles, rather than on their communication to a larger public. This is based on Schmidt's (2011: 59) argument that, in 'compound polities' with multiple authorities and federal structures, as we find in India, this level of discussion is crucial for legitimating ideas among policy makers' constituencies as well. Three phases in which ideational shifts occurred are examined in greater detail: independence, economic liberalisation in the 1990s, and the shift to an 'inclusive growth' agenda under the current government. A shift signals that existing ideas are losing relevance and legitimacy and new ideas are coming to take their place (Berman 2011).

3. Ideas in the trajectory of Indian welfare

India constitutes an interesting case for the study of ideas in welfare development because of the strong role that debates on welfare have played from the early independence movement onwards. The delivery of welfare has been of key importance for the perception of the legitimacy of government (Arora 2004: 330). In turn, "the collapse of the welfare functions of

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the state [could] become the cause of national unrest" (Kumar 2005: 343). And yet, India's development path has been characterised by persistently high poverty levels and relatively low achievements in literacy and health indicators (Drèze/Sen 2011), which suggests that these high aspirations have not been realised. The Indian case, hence, also points to the question of how particular ideas of welfare find an anchor in existing or emerging institutional settings, and how ideas succeed or fail in altering such settings in the long run.

In this process, it is not only the national level, on which this article focuses, which is of importance. The international environment, state and local settings play a role as spatial scales in which "social strategies and struggles for control and empowerment" (Swyngedouw 1997: 141) take place, and which are themselves subject to shifts and reconfiguration in socio-spatial power relations. Nevertheless, any paper which concentrates on developments in India as a whole does injustice, to a certain degree, to developments at state and local level. Huge regional variations in historical, political and economic developments have existed and persist between and within India's states and cannot be discussed here in greater detail (see Harriss 2006).

3.1 Welfare institutions before independence

Before turning to the reconfigurations in welfare around the time of independence, this section provides information about welfare arrangements in pre-colonial and colonial India, hence the setting from which the larger debates on welfare emerged. The pre-colonial order in the field of welfare had rested on three pillars of solidarity: extended families, villages and religious or caste communities (Muzumdar 1964: 5). Within the village, especially in Northern India, different groups were linked to each other in reciprocal, yet hierarchical, duty relationships of the jajmani system (Guha 2007: 202). Social relationships were governed by customary, non-contractual rights based on the principles of status and fairness (Platteau 1991: 119f). These rights partially excluded those not living within the village, such as mobile craftsmen, landless labourers, the outcast(e)s and the indigenous tribal population (Jürgenmeyer/Rösel 2009: 207).

Castes,[2] as endogamous groups, had an all-pervasive influence on the social, economic and ritual life of the individual, as caste determined

rights and duties within and between groups, marriages, the professions, and access to education (Jürgenmeyer/Rösel 2009: 208). Castes are a source of strong internal solidarity and trust (Muzumdar 1964: 5f; Harriss 2006: 21ff), but the relation between castes involves extreme forms of economic and social exclusion. Next to ritual authority exercised by high castes, the control over agricultural land was an important source of power at the local level. In the South, where a small group of Brahmins held control over substantial portions of arable land, "caste, wealth and power tended to converge" (Frankel 2005: 6). In many parts of Northern India lower ranking peasant castes were strong in number and landholding and could exercise power as dominant land-owning castes, or 'landed communities.' Those who owned large shares of land among these communities held authority – equal to those of high-ranking castes – over the poor peasantry for whom they acted as patrons providing "minimal economic security in return for personal deference and loyalty" (ibid.).

The arrival of colonialism, on the one hand, opened up the rigid determination of occupations by caste when the colonial industries and the military offered jobs and upward social mobility to some of the most oppressed groups (Frankel 2005: 6). On the other hand, the arrival of industrially manufactured goods displaced, for instance, craftsmen, who became subject to a new mode of economic exploitation, as part of the incipient working class. For many, the disruptions in the economic order led to loss of economic self-sufficiency, which Kaufmann (2003: 45) sees as the origins of state action in the field of welfare. Yet, this did not provoke a reaction from the colonial administration; the English, who had been among the first nations to install a system of poor relief at home, perceived the problem of the rural poor as a result of their backwardness, untouchability and of 'Indianness' itself (Corbridge et al. 2005: 52f). The administration's efforts to establish social security hardly went beyond the "small segment of the population whose contentment was particularly important for the colonial powers to stabilise their rule" (Loewe 2009) – in particular the administrative service and selected groups of manufacturing workers.

3.2 The social question emerges: India's independence (movement)

The long-standing belief that the welfare arrangements should be left to the different (religious) communities was finally challenged by the Indian

independence movement's key organisation, the Indian National Congress, in 1917 (Muzumdar 1964: 50, 56). Under the leadership of (Mahatma) Mohandas Gandhi, Congress developed into a mass organisation, started to overcome its earlier urban bias, and embraced a social reform agenda in which the question of self-government was tied to the demand for more just government for India's people (Kumar 2005: 338). Congress, hence, identified foreign rule as a cause of poverty and starvation, and the primary solution to this problem was seen in self-governance.

Despite this shared analysis, different ideas were advocated by important intellectual leaders of the independence movement within Congress, such as Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and outside by Bhimrao Ambedkar, leader of the 'untouchables' or Dalits. The question of which ideas prevailed over others was partially decided in the formulation of the 'best of all constitutions' (Kaviraj 1997: 22) of the Republic of India. It can be seen as the culmination of the institutionalisation of new ideas, in a long process during which colonial rule and the corresponding ideas had gradually lost legitimacy and were followed by those promoted by the independence movement. The Indian Constitution was discussed for nearly three years by more than 300 members of the Constituents Assembly (CA) before it was passed in November 1949.

Gandhi, besides foreign rule, blamed poverty on a decline in morals and lack of education. India was to be rebuilt through its villages, which needed to be cleared from the defects of untouchability, the oppression of women, illiteracy, drug abuse, and diseases, through local reform and individual change triggered by education (Muzumdar 1964: 25). In a "glorification of village life" (Frankel 2005: 10), he evoked a picture of the moral superiority of village knowledge over modern materialism. Part and parcel of his ideas was the rejection of industrialisation and the call for self-rule, *swaraj*. This included economic self-reliance, *swadeshi*, of the Indian village, as well as of the country as a whole, based on village cooperative economies. Another key component of his strategy was the refusal to attack the existing class structure in the cause of national independence and unity (ibid.: 33ff). Gandhians argued that, if the reconstruction through villages and education came into full play, the economic and social inequalities would largely disappear peacefully through a "strategy of gradualism" (ibid.: 11, 44).

Gandhi was in a very prominent position; nationally and internationally he attracted a large fellowship. However, Gandhi was neither himself a member of the CA, nor was the group that advocated Gandhian structural and economic reforms strongly represented. Gandhi's ideas called for a path to democracy without reference to modern British, Continental or American traditions, but to ancient India. That the latter should guide a modern nation did not fit with the aspirations of the many urban and Western educated members of the Assembly. The Gandhian idea of decentralised village councils was rejected in favour of a federal structure with a strong centre. This was partly a legacy of the late colonial Government of India Act of 1935, and a concession to pressure groups that had formed around commonly spoken languages. The politics of accommodation and class conciliation fell back on Ganhdi also when the federal states, not the central parliament and government in Delhi, assumed the rights to rule on education, local government, land reform and land revenue assessment, to name just the most important fields. Nehru, who was to become India's first Prime Minister, was a close friend and follower of Gandhi. Yet, his reform agenda was quite different: Nehru advocated what he called a "third way which takes the best from all existing systems – the Russian, the American and others – and seeks to create something suited to one's own history and philosophy" (cited in Frankel 2005: 3). Nehru aimed for a socialist society through the development of modern industries in state led economic reform (Kohli 2010: 502f). With regards to the agrarian sector he advocated the development of cooperative organisation too, but neither collectivisation nor Gandhi's idealised village economies. Nehru's, and his fractions', handwriting could clearly be seen in the Constitution of the Republic of India, which was to be "sovereign, socialist, secular, [and] democratic" . They succeeded also in officially abolishing the *zamindari* – revenue collectors who had gained full rights to land under British rule. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the list of Fundamental Rights entailed the right to property within 'reasonable restrictions.' In the central question as to what extent property should be protected. conservatives in the CA prevailed (Kaviraj 1997: 4; Frankel 2005: 79f). This deal had been struck by Sardar Patel, another key Congressman, and conservative opponent to Nehru (Guha 2007: 105). While the idea to reverse some of the most grave injustices introduced under colonial rule found a majority in the CA, Nehru and his fraction had too little clout

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to overturn older inequalities in landholding. The right to property had serious implications for future social and economic reforms, which had to be carried out in compliance with the Fundamental Rights.

Ambedkar, who was the President of the Drafting Committee of India's Constitution, and its Minister of Law, opposed the views of both Gandhi and Nehru on the causes of exploitation and poverty. For him, they lay in the domestic caste system; colonial rule had eased rather than worsened the situation. He called for the abolition of untouchability and condemned the caste system as such. He succeeded in the first, as the constitution officially abolished untouchability, but not in the latter. To achieve the objective of equality for those who had been historically excluded from economic and social domains, and who continued to face discrimination, he suggested a clear set of policy instruments: ensure formal equality, laws that penalise discriminatory actions, and adequate representation in legislatures, education institutions and public services (Ambedkar 2008). These were all legislated, including welfare measures for those former untouchable castes and indigenous tribes, which were listed in a schedule of the constitution (and are hence called Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST)).

Ambedkar also called for far reaching economic reforms and a strong state that could intervene to ensure the economic independence and welfare of marginalised groups (Ambedkar 2008). However, social objectives such as a commitment to "promote the welfare of the people, […] the right to an adequate means of livelihood", and the aim to minimise inequalities between individuals and groups in income, status, between castes and regions – became part of the 'Directive Principles of State Policy'. These are – unlike the Fundamental Rights – not directly legally binding. Ambedkar could not meet his ambitions, as he laconically said himself, because he "was not the only member of Drafting Committee" (cited in Drèze 2010: 510). Hence, only the questions of 'untouchability' and 'indigenousness' had gained momentum among the politicians at the time and moved to centre stage of the social question. Their earlier exclusion and continuing discrimination was successfully framed as an injustice that demanded a remedy through state action. No special provisions were made at the time for other reasons of marginality, such as gender, religious minority groups or regional origin – even after lengthy debates and despite the awareness of them (Guha 2007: 111f).

3.3 Competing ideals and limiting structures:
Welfare in early independent India

Many decisions that shaped the post-independence order were not determined through the constitution. They were made during the first years after independence with Nehru as Prime Minister – a period of "politics in pursuit of ideals" (Kohli 2010: 502) under a "Gandhian-socialist collaboration" (Frankel 2005: 15ff): Despite all differences, both factions within Congress agreed that economic policy should lead to the progressive removal of inequalities and create a new set of cooperative motives for economic activity. Both Gandhians and socialists held prominent positions in the leadership of Congress, and Congress had won the first national elections with an absolute majority. The theoretical discussion above suggested that agency is central for ideas to gain influence. With a view to post-independence India one could hence expect that there were good chances for the reformers to pursue an agenda of social change. In the following, several reasons why these were not realised are discussed.

Firstly, the composition of Congress changed; with the arrival of universal suffrage, Congress needed to strengthen its support base in the rural areas. It chose the easiest way: the inclusion of the landed communities who could organise large personal followings or 'vote-banks' (Frankel 2005: 21ff, 30f). This setting harboured two problems: a) the local loyalties and kinship ties were stronger than the affiliation with the party – in consequence the parties were rather more dependent on their rural middlemen, than these on the parties. And, b) the organisation along caste and kinship ties had a tendency to hamper the political power of the marginalised, who did not organise around a potentially shared experience of exploitation.[3] In these circumstances, "universal suffrage and an open electoral process 'by themselves' could not create conditions of popular pressure from below to accomplish peaceful implementation of social reforms" (Frankel 2005: 23, emphasis original). The momentum of agency was lost and the accommodative party structure subsequently inhibited the possibilities for democratic pressure for social reform.

Secondly, Nehru and other reformers reluctantly gave in to the Gandhian principle of class conciliation: it was the dread of caste and class-based social unrest as well as religious and linguistic communal violence which loomed large at independence, as well as the experience of Partition

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that convinced "even committed socialists" (Frankel 2005: 22). The political struggle after independence, hence, sought to accommodate "linguistic, religious, and caste sentiments and structures as the only way to accelerate national integration, enhance legitimacy of the political system, and maximise the possibilities for peaceful adjustments of social conflicts that arise during the development process" (ibid.: 20). In other words, radical social reforms were sacrificed for the sake of the nation's (and Congress') unity in the overall policy environment in the early years after independence. But, as outlined above, the chances to take up a more radical reform agenda had significantly deteriorated.

Thirdly, the urban industrial and rural reforms failed to reach large sections of the workforce: neither did the predominantly publicly run industries ever grow enough to absorb the large labour surplus (Kohli 2010: 502), nor did the agrarian reforms sponsored by the central government in the 1950s and 60s change the basic economic and social structures; rather, they "perpetuated and aggravated income disparities in rural areas" (Frankel 2005: 584). Yet, the central government could do little to change the continuity in land holding, as the power to legislate further reaching land reforms had been entrusted to the states. Consequently, a domestic consumer market did not develop, which impeded further growth of industries (Gosh 2004).

Fourthly, the administration was to bear a large colonial legacy: Patel ensured continuities in personnel and structure from the British colonial Indian Civil Service (ICS) to the post-independence IAS (Frankel 2005: 80f). The ICS maintained law and order in the British ruled territories of India and served as its 'steel frame' (Brass 1994). Its successor, IAS, was not readily equipped and devoted to the tasks of socio-economic planning and development required by the new government. This meant that a key institution for the implementation of any change perpetuated ideas of the old regime.

Fifthly, the state's early welfare activities were limited. They mainly catered for the small industrial working force, the civil service and SC/ST for whom special provisions had been made in the constitution. Employment-based social protection was only available to those workers who were organised and who possessed a voice in the political systems. The early social programmes for rural areas were community based development

programmes, rather than individual and citizenship focused. When tax-financed welfare programmes were expanded in the 1970s, they largely remained targetted at the 'deserving poor'. This lead to multiple beneficiary groups of welfare provision, which tended to organise along target group lines. Yet, even when programmes were universal in spirit, they often profitted groups with more voice and better political ties rather than the poorest (Ehmke 2011a). Social policy was an ad hoc instrument for groups that were able to stage a political voice for their needs (Gosh 2004: 293f). Consequently, a 'plethora' of measures was introduced but lacked effective implementation (Dev et al. 2001: 14). The social programmes for the majority of the population remained residual in character (Haan/Sabharwal 2008), and "social policy which ensured the provision of basic needs to the entire population was never a priority" (Gosh 2004: 293).

This, ultimately, led to a continued reliance upon the traditional forms of social security, i.e. within families and religious communities or castes. The redistributive capacity and the horizon of solidarity of these institutions is acknowledged to be limited. The continued reliance on them points to the acceptance of inequalities, roots of which can be found in the caste system and in the strong tradition of the communal organisation of welfare in general. Several authors have claimed that India's pre- and post independence order showed a "high level of social tolerance for high and growing asset inequality, persistent poverty and low levels of human development among vast sections of the population, especially in the rural areas" (Gosh 2004: 293; also see de Haan/Sabharwal 2008: 71f). Cultural habits and those of thought and behaviour formed a pattern in which the acceptance of inequality was high. It paved the way for a welfare trajectory that did not challenge these inequalities. Culture also played a role in terms of the larger democratic culture. Kaviraj argues that the underlying societal and cultural 'grammar of politics' did not keep pace with the speed with which the modern nation-state was erected by its elites. He points out that, "even if the state could insulate itself completely from societal influences, ordinary people would respond and react to the new state according to rules of experience generated from their dealings with earlier forms of power" (Kaviraj 1997: 123). Hence, i.e. traditionally influential local strong men continued to be important in the new democratic order.

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To sum up, within the larger policy environment, preference was given to stability of rule and the unity of India to the detriment of radical social transformation. Social reforms that would have changed the basic inequalities were seen as a potential source of social unrest and were put on hold when Nehru and other socialist-minded Congressmen embraced the idea of class conciliation, which had originally been advanced by Gandhi. The stability of rule also justified the reliance on the hardly reformed IAS as a local outpost of the Delhi government in rural India. This implied that those representing the new state were those who had stood for the old state too. Local power structures were additionally preserved – rather than democratically transformed – through the reliance on local party brokers from the landed communities. The consequence was a smooth transition of pre-independence patron-client-relationships into the new order, which seriously compromised the potential for social reform through democratic processes. Pre-independence loyalties also remained powerful, because they continued to be the primary sources of welfare for the large majority of Indians in the absence of social reform. Overall, the ideas of social reforms continued to fill the five year plans of the Indian government, but they did not succeed in transforming key institutions for their delivery.

3.4 From *license raj* to liberalism

Berman (2011: 107) points out that ideologies change in a two-stage process: in the first stage the existing ideology is called into question and thereby opens up a space for its successors to fill. Once this process has started, the second stage, the development of (competing) alternative approaches, begins. The Nehruvian socio-economic order remained largely unchallenged under the rule of his daughter, Indira Gandhi. The ideas of state-led industrial development and *swadeshi*, economic self-sufficiency in the sense of import substituting policies (ISP), only came under pressure in the mid 1980s, then the first phase started. The economic regime was deemed to be exhausted by (liberal) reformers within and outside Congress. At the time, India was experiencing stagnating growth rates and had increased its foreign debt to finance its imports up to a point that was increasingly deemed unsustainable. The problem definition staged was that the public control over large shares of industries, the import substituting policies and the strict regulations on domestic private companies

and foreign capital – called *license raj* – were hindering economic progress. The domestic critics of the old regime could count on international support too; during the peak of the Washington Consensus, privatisation and liberalisation were the clear policy preference of, or condition for loans by, the international financial institutions. Alternative problem definitions, as, for example, by Frankel (2005: xi), argued that it was the failure of Congress not to have carried "out agrarian reforms and institutional changes at the core of the great Nehruvian experiment", which weighed heavily on the development path of India. It was the resulting lack of domestic demand, not the lack of openness of the economy or *license raj*, also argues Gosh, that caused the crisis. This analysis, however, neither enjoyed international backing nor was it strong in public debates at the time.

Still, the change of this fundamental policy orientation, and the embrace of liberalisation did not come to India easily. As early as 1985, the Congress Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed a liberalising path, but his 'pro-rich' policies were successfully rejected by the still numerous socialist Congressmen. In 1989 Congress lost the national elections and when it returned to power in 1991, after the assassination of R. Gandhi during the electoral campaign, it was in a minority government under the leadership of Narasimha Rao. His government, and the then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, still met opposition to the plans of liberalisation and the resort to IMF lending to solve the balance of payments crisis. Only after the collapse the Soviet Union, India's ideologically and economically important partner, was the opposition from the left temporarily silenced. The event instantly reduced the viability of a socialist development path. The IMF credit was sanctioned and followed by Asian Development Bank and World Bank lending, while the parliamentary opposition of the left and the right was too weak to produce an alternative government or policy solutions.

India, however, did not experience radical liberalisation, due to a broader public resistance form urban and rural middle classes who were the main beneficiaries of fertiliser, power and telecommunication subsidies (Frankel 2005: 591). Also, the public sector unions that feared large scale job losses and the rural administration that did not want to give up their patronage networks successfully resisted. Other groups were not equally successful in shielding the programmes from which they benefited; for instance, the spending on employment programmes was reduced (Gosh

2004). As elsewhere, liberalisation was accompanied by a shift to human development policies as well as safety nets, and away from the provision of subsidised food. There was a swing to programmes that do not necessarily focus on the traditional poor, but specifically on the losers of the liberalisation process (Dev 2007: 134). According to Gosh (2004: 290), the growth path on which India embarked after 1991 was "openly based on the demand stimulus emanating from certain sections of capital and what could be called 'labour aristocracy' comprising middle-class professionals and more skilled workers" and meant "very substantial increases in income accruing to a small minority in the population". She points out that between 1993/1994 and 1999/2000 rural employment generation remained below rural population growth, per capita food grain consumption declined and the provision of public service worsened (ibid.: 291).

The ideological shift of the 1990s marks the change from development to growth as the primary aim of economic activities, and from state-led economic planning to greater market reliance. It only became possible after the domestic opposition was de-legitimised by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The new paradigm of liberalisation could additionally count on large and financially strong international backing in the international financial institutions. An alternative analysis that stressed the lack of domestic demand and the need for further reaching agricultural reforms as a basis of economic growth, could not find a majority in a situation in which the structural settings that had prohibited such reforms under Nehru had not significantly altered.

3.5 Another juncture? Welfare under the UPA government since 2004

This prioritisation of growth has lately been called into question and might signify yet another ideological shift. In 2004 the centre-right National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, which had been in power from 1999 onwards, surprisingly lost the elections to the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a coalition of several left and regional parties and Congress. While the NDA had pointed to high growth rates and claimed that India was 'shining' under its rule, the UPA campaigned around the needs of the *aam admi*, the common man, which it promised to take up. The credo of 'inclusive growth' was aimed at the rural and urban poor. Apparently

these did not perceive of themselves as beneficiaries of the high growth rates of the preceding years; neither had growth trickled down. In 2004 they voted the NDA out of office. In 2009 the UPA was re-elected, supposedly due to one of its flagship social programmes, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), the biggest employment programme in the world, with around 55 million participating households in 2010/2011 (Ehmke 2011b). Under the UPA government, although not always on its initiative, there has indeed been a shift towards a rights-oriented and citizenship-based social policy (Dev 2007: 134). The social rights-based paradigm has been heralded as a change and as a sign that "India's underprivileged majority is not completely marginalised in this elitist political system" (Drèze 2010: 511). Yet, the real challenge is not the adoption of an act, but its implementation on the ground (Drèze 2010: 511); in this respect much remains to be done (see Khera 2011). As we have seen with earlier periods, the idea alone may not be sufficient if it meets, for instance, an environment in which other policy objectives are more important, or the domestic opposition is too strong. In some ways, the institutional constraints that the UPA government faces are much the same as earlier, but there are also differences: the international policy environment has also seen a swing to an increased attention to social policies and a loss of legitimacy for the Washington Consensus (Deacon 2007). And, during the international economic and financial crisis of 2009/2010 the domestic opposition from the corporate sector joined those hailing MGNREGA, despite this sector's earlier sharp criticism (Khera 2011). Lastly, the continued high growth rates make it less difficult for the government to finance social programmes. However, on the other hand, several observers doubt the commitment of the government to inclusive growth policies (Patnaik 2011; Chandrasekhar 2011). Not the least because Manmohan Singh, the current Prime Minister, acted earlier as Finance Minister and key organiser of liberalising policies. Additionally, the rights based policies are seen to have been enacted due to civil society pressure and the strength of left parties in the first term of UPA. These parties have not been part of the coalition since 2009. Additionally, the concept of 'inclusiveness' is seen as incoherent and lacking indicators, as opposed to that of 'growth' (Chandrasekhar 2011). Hence, it remains yet to be seen whether the ideological swing from a primarily growth oriented approach to more

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inclusive economic and social policies has enough agency and can advance a coherent problem definition to effectively alter those structures which have so far been successful in maintaining raising levels of inequality and their societal acceptance.

4. Conclusions

The article set out to study the role of competing ideas and their institutional anchorage in order to explain why a specific welfare route was taken in the case of India. It started with the premise that, in colonial India, social phenomena such as poverty were not yet perceived of as problems that required state action. It was only the independence movement that identified poverty and exploitation as social problems, with roots in both foreign rule and domestic cultural practices. Yet, different ideas about the causes and the policy solutions existed among important leaders and their followers. Ambedkar successfully portrayed untouchability (and indigenousness) as forms of social exclusion that required state-led remedies, for which he presented clearly formulated and coherent policy solutions. He thereby, and also through his prominent position in drafting the constitution, succeeded in giving weight to this core concern. The abolition of untouchability, however, could also count on broader support in India and internationally. The abolition of the caste system, on the other hand, lacked such support and it was opposed to Gandhi's idea of class conciliation, which was later also taken up by Nehru and other socialists. Yet, Nehru influenced the post-independence order through his insistence on a strong socialist oriented secular central state.

The post-independence order clearly inherited some burdens from its (pre-)colonial predecessors. But, as Hay (2011:68) suggests, the outcome of the struggle on institutions, in this case India's colonial institutions, is not predictable. For instance, the constitution removed some of the obstacles to greater equality that had been introduced under the British, the *zamindari*, while older inequalities in land-holding were not successfully challenged. The federal organisation of the country and the IAS carry colonial legacies. However, that they were preserved in the new regime was the outcome of the strength of contending groups in the CA and the shared fear of social

and political turmoil. The latter was very prominent after the experience of partition and led to a situation in which the larger ideational and institutional environment favoured stability of rule and the country's unity over far reaching social and economic reforms.

Similarly, family and communal organisation of welfare emerged as major traditions from pre-colonial times, but not as a functional legacy. They also remained powerful because employment-based social security never reached the majority of Indians. It led to the continued reliance on strong solidarity within groups, which acted as an obstacle to the formation of a common horizon of solidarity and citizenship-based social policies (see also Harriss 2006: 21ff). Strong local and kinship ties and caste loyalties remained a motif in electoral politics, and led to coalitions with complex actor constellations in which the unequal distribution remained unchallenged for a long time.

This article emphasises that the juncture around the liberalisation in 1991 does not signify an abrupt change enforced by external events, but a gradual process in which problem definitions shifted. Only after the collapse of Soviet Union could the domestic opposition be broken. The event called the viability of a socialist development path into question and delegitimised the traditional path of state-led planning. This shift also shows that domestic welfare arrangements are prone to international influences. Similarly, the recent swing to 'inclusive growth' policies can profit from the fact that the legitimacy of the Washington Consensus has been crumbling. The latest ideational change to 'inclusive growth' policies has already begun to alter the institutional landscape of welfare in India through the introduction of citizenship-based social policies legislated under the UPA government. Seekings (this issue) claims that party politics in India have become more competitive over the past years. This could signify a shift in voting patterns from traditional ties to issue politics. Whether this can be the mechanism by which an ideational change succeeds in altering the cultural acceptance of inequalities and the institutions maintaining these until now, is still an open question.

2 The term 'caste' for the structuring principle of the Hindu society has its origin in the Portuguese casta. The Hindu term is jati and stands for the group into which one is

born. Relationships between castes became rigid when they were incorporated into the hierarchically graded social order of the four varna, which henceforth established an ideology of rule of and for brahmans (Jürgenmeyer/Rösel 2009: 201f). The varna, in a descending order of purity/ impurity, are: brahmans, priests; kshatriya, warriors; vaishya, traders and farmers; shudra, craftsmen and servants. Outside the order are the casteless, the a-varna, aka the untouchables or Dalits, literally broken people. The term 'untouchable' refers to the social practice in which caste Hindus would literally not touch members of the a-varna.

3 On the other hand, Kaviraj (1997: 8ff) points out that the listing of a number of scheduled castes and tribes in the constitution also formed new grounds of solidarity and agitation for, for example, the Dalit community. Caste is not a static social structure, but it has been significantly altered during its transition to post-independence India and caste mobilisation in electoral politics (ibid.: 17).

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Abstracts

This article studies the ideas which shaped the development of welfare institutions in India. The analysis is situated in the broader context of the ongoing discussion on welfare regimes outside the OECD. It focusses on the way in which socio-political ideas shape the institutional arrangements of welfare regimes. Agency, context and coherence of ideas matter for their success, but they are also mediated through cultural parameters and pre-existing institutional environments. In the case of India, ideas of social transformation played a strong role in the independence movement, but in the overall policy environment around the foundation of the republic, national unity was favoured over the potential turmoil created by social reforms. The early politics of accommodation have had a lasting impact up to now, despite two later ideational shifts.

Thema des Artikels sind die Ideen, die zur Ausgestaltung der indischen Wohlfahrtsinstitutionen beitrugen. Die Analyse steht im Kontext der Debatte um Wohlfahrtsregimes außerhalb der OECD. Der Fokus liegt auf der Untersuchung konkurrierender sozialpolitischer Ideen und ihres Einflusses auf institutionelle Arrangements. Wirkung, Kontext und Kohärenz sind von Bedeutung für die Durchsetzungsfähigkeit von Ideen, doch diese wird auch von kulturellen Praktiken und bestehenden Institutionen beeinflusst. In Indien spielten Ideen zur sozialen Transformation eine große Rolle in der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung. Zur Zeit der Unabhängigkeit beherrschte jedoch das Ziel nationaler Einheit die politische Agenda, einschneidende soziale Reformen wurden wegen ihres Unruhepotenzials zurückgestellt. Die Folgen dieser Politik der nationalen Einheit reichen bis in die Gegenwart, trotz zweier späterer ideeller Wechsel.

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Ingrid Wehr, Hans-Jürgen Burchardt (Hg.): Soziale Ungleichheiten in Lateinamerika. Neue Perspektiven auf Wirtschaft, Politik und Umwelt. *Baden-Baden: Nomos 2011, 334 Seiten, 19,90 Euro.*

Neben dem südlichen Afrika weist Lateinamerika die höchsten Ungleichheitsraten weltweit auf. Auch die Demokratisierungsprozesse der letzten dreißig Jahre haben daran kaum etwas verändert. Diesen Umstand nehmen die HerausgeberInnen des vorliegenden Sammelbandes zum Anlass, um den Ursachen der langfristigen Ungleichheitsverhältnisse auf den Grund zu gehen und „das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen wachsender politischer Demokratisierung und der hartnäckigen Persistenz der eklatanten sozialen Disparitäten in der Region genauer zu beleuchten" (S. 5).

Diesem Anspruch gemäß vereint der Sammelband eine Reihe von Aufsätzen, die unterschiedlichen Dimensionen des Ungleichheitsphänomens in Lateinamerika nachgehen. Der Einleitungsartikel von Ingrid Wehr bietet einen informativen Überblick über zentrale Probleme der Ungleichheitsforschung im lateinamerikanischen Kontext. Die Autorin plädiert für eine Forschungsperspektive, die die Beharrungskräfte oligarchischer und (post-)kolonialer Herrschaftsstrukturen in den Blick nimmt. Dieser Perspektive lassen sich auch die beiden folgenden Beiträge von Olaf Kaltmeier zur *Hacienda* und von Tanja Ernst zur Benachteiligung indigener Bevölkerungsgruppen zuordnen. Dem Problem der Staatsfinanzierung und der in Lateinamerika chronischen Unterbesteuerung widmet sich Andreas Boeckh, während Anika Oettler auf geschlechtsspezifische Formen von Ungleichheit eingeht. Ein für die Ungleichheitsforschung durchaus neues Feld erschließt Kristina Dietz mit ihrer Analyse ungleicher Formen der Naturnutzung und -aneignung. Die drei folgenden Beiträge versuchen, die vergleichende Kapitalismusforschung für die Analyse sozialer Ungleichheit in Lateinamerika fruchtbar zu machen. Während Andreas Nölke die Widersprüche des gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftswachstums in Brasilien in den Blick nimmt, arbeiten Ben Ross Schneider, David Soskice und Sebastian Karcher eine eigene Form des Kapitalismus heraus, die sie als hierarchische Marktökonomie bezeichnen. Sebastian Karcher analysiert im Anschluss den Einfluss

der Arbeitsmärkte auf die Reproduktion sozialer Ungleichheit. Die drei darauffolgenden Beiträge widmen sich spezifischen Aspekten lateinamerikanischer Sozialpolitik. Sowohl Stefan Peters als auch Anne Tittor zeigen die ambivalente Rolle des Bildungs- bzw. Gesundheitssystems in Bezug auf den Abbau sozialer Ungleichheiten auf. Ihre Erkenntnisse werden von Ingrid Wehr in deren Beitrag über die vergleichende Wohlfahrtsregimeforschung bestätigt, in dem die Autorin die lateinamerikanischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten als mächtige Stratifizierungs- und Umverteilungsmaschinen charakterisiert. Der anschließende Beitrag von Nico Weinmann und Hans-Jürgen Burchardt wirft einen durch die staatstheoretischen Arbeiten Claus Offes angeleiteten Blick auf die Ungleichheitsforschung, während Emanuelle Barozet den Band mit einem Einblick in ein konkretes Forschungsprojekt zu sozialer Ungleichheit in Chile abrundet.

Dem Anspruch der HerausgeberInnen, einen innovativen Beitrag zur Ungleichheitsforschung im lateinamerikanischen Kontext zu leisten, werden die Beiträge durchaus gerecht. Weniger konsequent scheint hingegen die Verbindung der Themenbereiche Ungleich-

heit und Demokratie gelungen zu sein, obwohl die Notwendigkeit einer demokratietheoretischen Unterfütterung der Ungleichheitsforschung einleuchtet. Sieht man weiters von einer teils ungenügenden Berücksichtigung lateinamerikanischer Theorieproduktion ab, stellt der Sammelband einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Ungleichheitsforschung in Lateinamerika dar. Vor allem die kritische Lesart modernisierungs- und transitionstheoretischer Ansätze sowie die Berücksichtigung postkolonialer Studien bzw. historisch-institutioneller Ansätze machen das Buch zu einer lohnenden und erkenntnisreichen Lektüre.

Stefan Pimmer

Karin Fischer: Eine Klasse für sich. Besitz, Herrschaft und ungleiche Entwicklung in Chile 1830–2010. *Baden-Baden: Nomos, 208 Seiten, 39.- Euro.*

Der wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Aufstieg der herrschenden Klasse ist das Ergebnis eines erfolgreichen Kampfes um die politische Macht – diese Ausgangsthese einer historischen Klassenanalyse setzt Karin Fischer den wenigen Ansätzen entgegen, die sich mit der besitzenden Klasse in Chile beschäftigen. Dieser werde sich nämlich zumeist verkürzt als abstrakte Kategorie („Lumpenbourgeoisie" in der Dependenztheorie) oder eher als Objekt denn Subjekt eines Prozesses (Globalisierungsforschung) oder als *ex ante* festlegbare Kategorie (Elitenanalysen) genähert. Die vorliegende Monografie hingegen, erschienen in der Reihe *Studien zu Lateinamerika* der Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, liefert eine analytisch präzise Definition des Begriffs „Klassenbildung", die den Ausgangspunkt einer äußerst detaillierten Beschäftigung mit der Frage bildet, wie aus individuellen, miteinander konkurrierenden Kapitalisten eine kollektiv handelnde „Klasse für sich" wird.

Entstehungsprozess und Veränderungen von Allianzen, Identität und Handlungsfähigkeit der chilenischen Grundeigentümer, Händler, Spekulanten, Industriellen und Banker wird in der *longue durée*, von der formalen Unabhängigkeit bis in die Gegenwart des Landes, nachgezeichnet. So behandelt das erste Kapitel den langen Expansionszyklus ab der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929 und den Anfängen des Industriekapitalismus in Chile. Das darauffolgende „kurze Jahrhundert" der binnenorientierten Entwicklung wird in einem zweiten Kapitel insbesondere anhand der Wechselwirkungen ökonomischer und politischer (sowie militärischer) Macht beschrieben. Mit dem Antritt des Pinochet-Regimes beginnt das dritte Kapitel, das unter anderem die Kontinuität eines von Handels- und Finanzkapital dominierten Akkumulationsmusters erläutert. Das vierte und letzte Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit dem „demokratischen Neoliberalismus" ab 1989 bis zum Wahlsieg der rechten Parteien 2010.

Als Vorteil erweist sich die historische Analyse der chilenischen Klassenbildung, da sie den LeserInnen einen „roten Faden" bietet, entlang dessen aus den einzelnen

Kapiteln sowohl Beständigkeit als auch Spezifika der herrschenden Klasse in den jeweiligen Zeiträumen herauszulesen sind. So wird entgegen gängiger Studien nicht von einem einfachen Zusammenhang zwischen Akkumulationszyklen und der Herausbildung politischer Hegemonien ausgegangen. Vielmehr dient das Nachzeichnen der frühzeitig relativ stabilen politischen Ordnung mit einer verhältnismäßig unabhängigen chilenischen Oligarchie zunächst der Hervorhebung von Besonderheiten im Vergleich zu anderen lateinamerikanischen Gesellschaften. Eine gewisse Kontinuität wird u.a. durch die Einführung spezifischer Konzepte wie des *Legalismo* aufgezeigt, der die Fortschreibung eines strikten Glaubens an Verfassung und Gesetz bis in die Aktualität beeinflusst und gleichzeitig als Instrument der herrschenden Klasse zur Integration der Mittelklassen (Castells) interpretiert wird. Auch mit der Einführung der *poderes fácticos* als Netzwerke der rechten finanzindustriellen Machtkartelle, die sowohl die Volksfrontära unter Allende als auch nach dem Übergang zur Demokratie durch die Erschaffung „autoritärer Enklaven" überdauerten, wird die Identität einer geeinten Rechten angedeutet.

Gleichzeitig trägt *Eine Klasse für sich* der Komplexität der historischen Klassenbildung Rechnung, indem einem „Klassenstandpunkt" der miteinander verschmolzenen chilenischen Bourgeoisiekräfte und ihren einheitlichen Forderungen nach Kapitalismus und Privateigentum die Heterogenität historisch divergierender Bündnisse und Entwicklungsmodelle gegenüber gestellt wird. Unter Bezugnahme auf Immanuel Wallerstein wird so die frühe Verschmelzung der Kapitalfraktionen zwischen Händler/Financier/Unternehmer und aristokratischen Rentiers als „Bourgeoisifizierung der Aristokratie" nicht abstrakt-theoretisch, sondern basierend auf konkreten historischen Handlungszusammenhängen untersucht. Letztlich bietet Fischer mit einem Hinweis auf die Gewinnorientierung der Wirtschaftseliten, die ihre Position zugunsten ausländischer Akteure abgaben, auch eine akteursbasierte Erklärung für den chilenischen Übergang zum Industriekapitalismus an. Die dichte Verflechtung der chilenischen *grupos económicos* wird anhand von illustrativen Beispielen und Auszügen aus persönlichen Interviews mit verschiedenen Unternehmerfamilien sowie visuell in übersichtlichen Tabellen dargestellt.

Die Konfliktlinien, die in diesem Zusammenhang aufgezeigt werden, dienen gleichzeitig als Hinweis auf das Verschwimmen der Kapitalfraktionen und den ihnen idealtypisch zugeordneten Interessenlagern. Interessant sind hierbei erneut Hinweise auf komplexe Beziehungen zwischen besitzender Klasse und den sogenannten „organischen Intellektuellen" (Gramsci) aus Think-Tanks, Medien und Interessenverbänden, die eine transnationale Ebene der Wissensproduktion und ihre Auswirkungen auf Machtasymmetrien innerhalb der chilenischen Politik und Gesellschaft andeuten.

Insgesamt bietet die Monografie eine äußerst differenzierte Perspektive auf 200 Jahre Klassenbildung als umkämpfter Prozess in der Geschichte Chiles. Auf die Kontingenz dieser Entwicklung weist die Autorin selbst in einem einführenden Kapitel hin, indem sie die Bedeutung gesellschaftlicher Akteure erwähnt, die sich den durchsetzungsfähigen Gruppen entgegenstellen, um „die Macht im Staat und die Diskurshoheit" (S. 22) für sich zu beanspruchen. Dennoch lassen sowohl die Erläuterungen zur Regierung Allende als auch zum „demokratischen Neoliberalismus" der chilenischen Gegenwart eine ausbalancierte Perspektive auf machtbasierte Asymmetrien vermissen. Trotz der Analyse von Statistiken zu sozialen Ungleichheiten im Bildungs- und Gesundheitssektor werden deren strukturelle Ursachen und Folgen nicht weitergehend erläutert. Für eine ausgewogene Analyse der herrschenden Klassen wäre eine differenziertere Betrachtung ihrer Gegenspieler wünschenswert gewesen. Unhinterfragt bleibt so in gewisser Hinsicht nicht nur die Machtverteilung innerhalb der chilenischen Staatsgrenzen, sondern auch die Verortung des Landes im (historischen) Weltsystem. So ließe die koloniale Vergangenheit Chiles Rückschlüsse auf die gegenwärtige Situation marginalisierter Bevölkerungsgruppen im Land und den hiermit verbundenen Einfluss globaler Machtasymmetrien zu. Insgesamt liegt jedoch mit *Eine Klasse für sich* ein äußerst relevanter Beitrag zur politökonomischen Analyse der Klassenverhältnisse in Chile vor, dessen Übersetzung zur Einbindung einer breiteren LeserInnenschaft unbedingt empfehlenswert erscheint.

Laura Kemmer

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mandelbaum *verlag*, 2009, 300 Seiten, Euro 16.80

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