its colonial history, both marketing boards and Caisses, the cocoa and coffee Caisses being by far the most important bodies. The various organizations were replaced by a single Office Nationale de Commercialisation des produits de Base (ONCPB - National Produce Marketing Board) in 1976. The ONCPB disposes of an export monopoly for the crops and handles. The size of its budget, one fourth to one half of the government budget in the late 1970s (Bilan 1980, I; Assoumou 1977, 252), is an indication of the importance of the ONCPB for the Cameroun economy.

In fixing producer prices for the export crops cocoa, coffee (these two together account for more than 50 % of total export earnings - DeLancey 1981, 6), cotton, palm kernels and ground nuts, the ONCPB takes into account previous producer price levels, world market prices, the reserves it needs (during the 1970s the rapidly rising costs of marketing caused by rising oil prices must have been an important item) and the trend in official minimum wage levels (Marchés Tropicaus 1980, 2767). Given the absence of detailed data on rural incomes, and its politico-psychological value in a country where the great majority of the population earns much less, the latter criterion presumably serves as an indicator of a desirable general income level (Bilan 1980, 141).

Table 1: Guaranteed producer prices per kilogram, 1960 - 1980 (FCFA)

	Cocoa*)			Coffee		Cotton	Ground-nuts	Palm-kernels
	Grade I	Grade II	Hors Stand.	Robusta	Arabica			
1960	80	-	-	100	180	27	-	-
1961	75	-	-	95.7	175.3	28	27	-
1962	70	-	-	90.3	174.8	28	28	-
1963	75	-	-	102	192.1	28	27	-
1964	85	-	-	127	195.4	28	27	-
1965	55	-	-	100	185.3	28	26	-
1966	65	55	25	115	157.3	28	25	25
1967	65	55	25	115	155.7	28	24	25
1968	70	70	65	115	157.8	28	23	25
1969	85	85	70	117	201	30	23	25
1970	85	85	70	125	174	30	23	25
1971	90	75	65	125	165	31	23	-
1972	90	75	65	125	175	31	23	-
1973	100	80	65	130	200	38	28	-
1974	120	100	75	135	190	43	30	-
1975	130	120	90	145	235	43	30	-
1976	150	150	90	195	275	55	45	-
1977	220	220	90	250	325	65	55	-
1978	260	260	90	280	360	65	55	-
1979	290	290	100	310	390	75	55	-
1980	300	-	-	320	-	-	-	-

Sources: L'agriculture africaine 1970, vol. 1; Bilan 1980, 145; Marchés Tropicaux 1980, 2780; Seventeenth Annual Report of the West Cameroun Marketing Board, 5).

*) Grade I: Over 80 % of production since 1970. Hors Standard is not exported, but processed in Cameroun.

There has been a conspicuous increase in prices since the mid 1970s. As the following graphs show, stabilization has succeeded in the sense that, if one looks at the whole period, producer prices have fluctuated less than export prices; the producer's share in the FOB-price has dropped, however. Cotton is an exception, but the producer's share in the FOB-price was very small to begin with. (The curves in graph 4 represent regression lines based on the individual scores for each crop.)

Graph 1: FOB and producer prices for cocoa, 1960 - 1979



Graph 2: FOB and producer prices for robusta coffee, 1960 - 1979

FCFA/kg



Graph 3: FOB and producer prices for arabica coffee, 1960 - 1979

FCFA/kg



Graph 4: Producer price as percent of FOB-price



Real value of producer prices

What of the real value of producer prices? Apart from a number of isolated remarks on this subject scattered in the literature on Cameroun, only one attempt seems to have been made to treat it systematically at the time of writing of this essay. The "Bilan diagnostic du secteur agricole du 1960 à 1980", an internal document of the Ministry of Agriculture, devotes a special section to nominal producer prices for cocoa, coffee and cotton, and their real value. To arrive at these real values, the price index for middle class consumers (1959 = 100) in the capital of Yaounde has been used. It goes without saying that applying this index to rural incomes is a hazardous procedure, yet, it seems worthwhile to reproduce the table from the "Bilan".

Table 2: Producer prices, main export crops, nominal and real values, 1960 - 1979

	Price index, consumer goods (1959 = 100)	Coffee				Cocoa		Cotton	
		Robusta		Arabica		Grade I			
		FCFA/ kg	real value	FCFA/ kg	real value	FCFA/ kg	real value	FCFA/ kg	real value
1960	103	100	97.1	180	175	80	78	27	26.2
1961	106	95.7	90.3	175.3	165.4	75	79.8	28	26.4
1962	117.6	90.3	76.8	174.8	148.6	70	59.5	28	23.8
1963	124.2	102	82.1	192.1	154.7	75	60.4	28	22.6
1964	126.8	127	100.2	195.4	154.1	85	67.0	28	22.1
1965	129.9	100	77	185.3	142.6	55	42.3	28	21.6
1966	134.2	115	85.7	157.3	117.2	65	48.4	28	20.9
1967	137.1	115	83.4	155.7	113.5	65	47.4	28	20.4
1968	138.9	115	82.8	157.8	113.6	70	50.4	28	20.2
1969	142.9	117	81.9	201	140.7	85	59.5	30	21
1970	148.3	125	84.2	174	117.3	85	57.3	30	20.2
1971	157.3	125	79.5	165	104.9	90	57.2	31	19.7
1972	167.8	125	74.5	175	104.3	90	53.6	31	18.5
1973	177.8	130	73.1	200	112.5	100	56.2	38	21.4
1974	205	135	65.9	190	92.7	120	58.5	43	21
1975	229	145	63.3	235	102.6	130	56.8	43	18.8
1976	255	195	76.5	275	107.8	150	58.8	55	21.6
1977	293	250	85.3	325	110.9	220	75.1	65	22.2
1978	320	280	87.5	360	112.5	260	81.3	65	20.3
1979	352	310	88.1	390	110.9	290	82.4	70	19.9

Source: Bilan 1980, 146.

The Bilan also compares the increased prices of capital goods and various inputs with the increase in producer prices:

Table 3: Price index, capital goods, building materials, agricultural inputs, producer prices, in selected years (1970 = 100)

	1960	1965	1966	1970	1974	1975	1976	1977	1979
Capital goods			63	100	156				266
Cement	90	91	94	100	174	155	471		
Petrol			88	100	147	158	162	170	
Fertilizer				100	295	598	456	450	
Pesticides				100	223	325			
Kerosene			83	100	118	120	121		
Guaranteed producer price									
Cocoa grade I	94	94	76	100	141	153	176	259	341
Robusta coffee	77	102	92	100	108	116	156	200	248
Arabica coffee	138	138	114	100	109	135	156	187	284
Cotton	90	93	93	100	143	143	167	217	250

Source: Bilan 1980, 151.

Once again, the application of these price indices raises a number of problems. Petrol, fertilizer, pesticides and fungicides are not used widely by farmers yet: fertilizer was used on less than 40 % of the cash crop area in 1972/73, and in the same year less than 30 % of these crops was treated against pests and diseases. The use of fertilizer and fungicides has grown in later years, expecially in cocoa-growing areas, but a large part of the costs are borne by parastatal development corporations, not by individual farmers (Bilan 1980, 78, 84; Statistiques agricoles 1980/81, 44 - 45). Simple tools, such as hoes and shovels may be more important cost items for the farmer. According to the 1981 "Note annuelle de statistique" (table 4.15), the price of these implements has on the whole risen considerably during the 1970s.

Although the data are incomplete and do not fully fit the purpose, it is hard not to conclude that farm earnings per kilogramm of export crop were higher in 1960 than at the end of the 1970s (cf. also Illy 1976, 300 - 301; Bilan 1980, 143 f.). Cocoa is an exception, but it should be noted that the rise in real cocoa prices occurred only after a long period during which producers received no more than 70 - 80 % of the 1960 price, in real terms. Not amazingly, many authors have noted a decreasing farmers' interest for export crops. Disease and a rapid aging of many tree crop plantations, both leading to a decreasing production per hectare, are major problems.

Table 4: Production per ha, major export crops

Crop	Tons/ha	
	1972/73	1979/80
Cocoa	0.33	0.3
Robusta Coffee	0.5	0.33
Arabica Coffee	0.2	0.2
Cotton	0.5	1.3

Source: Annuaire de statistiques agricoles 1977/78, 112; Annuaire 1980/81, 16.

Cotton is an obvious exception. It is largely grown under close supervision of the parastatal 'Société de Développement du Coton' (Sodecoton). Parastatals are also active in coffee and cocoa production, but all in all only some 100.000 rural families (10 % of the farmers) are involved in projects supervised by these organizations. In Cameroun, large supervised private production units hardly exist for the major crops either. Most of the cocoa and coffee harvest has to come from small farmers and these cannot cope with the technical and economic problems.

Food crop prices and government intervention

As their earnings from export crops are low, many farmers devote most of their (family's) energy to the production of food crops for the rapidly expanding urban market. Food crop production is much more readily adaptable to rising market prices than cocoa and coffee production - trees take years to mature. Cocoa and coffee trees are, however, retained to supplement cash income.

Over one third of the population lived in towns by 1980 - a doubling of the urban population took place within a decade (Marchés Tropicaux 1980, 2741). Food production has expanded just enough to cope with population growth. The only main food import items are cereals and cereal products, and these imports amounted to less than 10 % of national cereal production in the late 1970s (cf. Statistiques agricoles 1980/81, 24, 51). The most pressing problem in food production (which, intercropping with tree crops being the normal state of affairs, benefits from government assistance to coffee and cocoa production in certain areas) is the lack of good roads and marketing infrastructure. These infrastructural barriers sometimes raise the price of a foodcrop in the urban market to ten times its production value, although most food only travels a few dozen kilometers to the consumer. Although these high profit margins largely accrue to middlemen (and -women), various staples have become highly profitable for farmers in urbanized regions (N'Sangou 1973; 1977b; Dongmo 1976; Bilan 1980, 37).

Government action in the field of food production has so far mainly resulted in attempts to bring some planning to the horticultural zones around the major towns and in expanding plantation production - some 450 ha having

been planted by the parastatal 'Mission de développement des cultures maraîchères et fruitières' (Mideviv) by late 1976. Mideviv's activities now also include seedling distribution and limited food marketing at reasonable prices (some 1000 - 2000 tons yearly, in the late 1970s) (DeLancey 1981, 12; Marchés Tropicaux 1980, 2797).

Government intervenes in cereal marketing in the Province du Nord through the 'Office Céréalier' (O.C.) since 1975. The scope of its activity is limited: the official purpose is to prevent extreme price fluctuations only, by buying and selling part of the crop at supply and demand peaks. Even that modest goal has not been attained during the 1970 s - less than 1 % of annual cereal production was bought and stored by the O.C.

Yet, plans exist to extend this type of indirect food price control and buffer stock formation to all provinces. The Fifth Five Year Plan (1981 - 1986) (p. 59) also mentions a producer price policy for food crops, but nothing is said about its implementation. So, "the market for food crops appears to remain largely lassez-faire" (DeLancey 1981, 12).

ONCPB and Caisse reserves - their utilization

The Caisses on the ONCPB have been very reluctant to publish information on their financial situation. As far as the Caisses are concerned, systematic information is available on the 'Caisse de Cacao' only. Fortunately, this was by far the most important Caisse intervening in the export crop trade. The figures quoted below will give an indication of these organizations' receipts.

Table 5: Caisse and ONCPB receipts (millions FCFA)

Caisse de Cacao *)	1959/60	465.5
	1972/73	2,961.7
	1973/74	10,320.6
	1974/75	13,964.9
ONCPB**)	1978/79	53,859.5
	1979/80	42,177.0
	1980/81	36,994.6

Sources: Nzekio 1978, 203; Assoumou 1977, 286; DeLancey 1981, 114.

*) Earnings from export crops only
**) Earnings from export crops, interest, participations, etc.

Officially, at least 50 % of the net earnings from exports have to be reserved for stabilization purposes (Marchés Tropicaux 1980, 1763; Kouotou 1979). As price stabilization was necessary in only a few years (see below), the Caisse de Cacao's reserves constituted "... une masse de manœuvre mobilisée en permanence au service de l'économie générale et de l'état", as Assoumou (1977, 287) writes; up to the beginning of the 1980s, when export earnings dropped sharply, the same could be said of ONCPB reserves.

Apart from the 50 % share for stabilization purposes, no fixed formula seems to exist for the disposition of ONCPB income. Decisions are apparently made year by year at the cabinet level. For 1978/79, the following figures were available:

Table 6: ONCPB receipts and expenditures, 1978/79 (millions FCFA)

Gross receipts	54,900	Operating costs	3,300
		Commercialization costs	23,900
		Price stabilization reserves	13,900
		Subsidies & investments	13,900
		Other investments	5,500
	54,900		57,700*)

*) The deficit was covered by reserve funds.

Source: Bilan 1980, 58, 60 - for somewhat different distribution of expenditures see DeLancey 1981 (statistical appendix).

As net export earnings seem to have amounted to approximately 31,000 million FCFA (depending on the method of calculation - cf. Bilan 1980, 60, 61), it is clear that less than 50 % was reserved for stabilization purposes in the 1978/79 year.

With only occasional expenditures for price support, total reserves of the marketing organizations grew from 4,033.3 million FCFA in 1960, to 11,000 million FCFA in 1970 and 45,000 million FCFA in 1978 (Nzekio 1978, 199; Gracia 1973, 141; Bilan 1980, I). Although no recent figures were available at the time of writing, these reserves appear to have dwindled in the early 1980s as a consequence of falling export prices.

Price support

Expenditures for cocoa price support were made in three years: 1964/65 (148.7 million FCFA), 1966/67 (163.9 million FCFA) and 1980/81 (2,000 million FCFA). The only other figure available is the sum expended for coffee price support in 1980/81: 900 million FCFA (Nzekio 1978, 205; DeLancey 1981).

Support to the economy in general

General support to the Cameroun economy comes in several categories. ONCPB and Caisse-reserves have on occasion been used for national debt servicing, to cover the debts of the national water and electricity boards, to build stadiums for the African Games. During the 1980/81 financial year, the ONCPB held shares in airlines, hotel chains, etc. at values in the 100 to 1000 million FCFA range (Assoumou 1977, 285 - 287; Troisième Congrès 1973, 36; Bilan Consolidé 1980, 91).

Caisse and ONCPB funds have also been used to finance part of Cameroun's Five Year Plans. The Plans constitute a frame of reference for development in general, and serve as a guideline for the coordination of economic, infrastructural and social activities by government organizations and parastatals. They do not constitute a comprehensive investment program: many investments and expenditures for development are made independently from the Plans (cf. Marchés Tropicaux 1980, 2763, and the chapter of Five Year Plans in L'économie camérounaise 1977). Of the Second Five Year Plan (1966 - 1971) investments, 5.6 % was borne by the 'Chaisse de Cacao'. The Caisses provided 4.8 % of the funds needed for the Third Five Year Plan (1971 - 1979). In both cases, there was a clear emphasis on agricultural investments. The ONCPB'S share in funding the Fourth Plan (1975 - 1979) was very modest, initially (2 % of agricultural investments). But eventually, its share may have been somewhere around 6 % (Gracia 1973, 143; Bilan 1980, 12; Marchés Tropicaux 1980, 2759; Troisième Plan 1973, XI, 161).

Although many of the expenditures for general development do not contribute to the development of the agricultural sector, there are some, like those for road construction, that do. Moreover, the marketing organizations have invested much in industries which are closely related to agriculture, such as Socame (fertilizer), STPC (leather goods), Hevecam (rubber) and Socapalm (palmoil). The latter two enterprises are also directly involved in (plantation) agriculture (see table 10).

Support to agriculture

The greater part of Caisse/ONCPB funds has been allocated to the agricultural sector, and most of the expenditures for agriculture concern cocoa and coffee production, though it was not possible to establish exactly how much money has gone to these major export crops. In the early 1970s, 50 - 70 % of 'Caisse de Cacao' subsidies etc. seems to have gone to cocoa production (Assoumou 1977, 286; Nzekio 1978, 209). Exact data are not always available, partly as a consequence of "fréquentes confusions" and "autorisations de dépense hors budget" (Assoumou 1977, 285, on the 'Caisse de Cacao'). Below, an attempts has been made to classify such figures as were available on subsidies and investments. The magnitude of ONCPB's financial operations may be underlined by pointing out that direct government expenditure for agriculture amounted to 10,000 million FCFA in 1978/79 (Bilan 1980, 62).

Table 7: Subsidies, 'Caisse de Cacao' (millions FCFA)

Type of expenditure	Period	Amount
Pesticides/fungicides	60/61 - 74/75	4,528.9
Extension services, seedlings, fertilizer etc.	62/63 - 74/75	1,647.6
Infrastructure, cocoa regions	69/70 - 74/75	1,276.4
Cooperatives	59/60 - 74/75	808.9

Source: Assoumou 1977, 201; cf. Nzekio 1978 and Gracia 1973 for details in individual years.

Table 8: Subsidies, 'Caisse de Café' (millions FCFA)

Type of expenditure	67/68	68/69	69/70	70/71
Pesticides, fertilizer, etc.	314.4	455.6	439.8	439.8
Cooperatives and other rural organizations	-	20.0	20.0	20.0

Source: Gracia 1973, 145.

Table 9: ONCPB Subsidies, 1978/79 - 1980/81 (millions FCFA)

	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81
Price support	-	-	2,900
Fonader	7,435	8,005	9,310
Development crops; other subsidies to agriculture	3,720	2,870	4,461
Rural infrastructure*)	6,537	7,100	3,900
Other subsidies (non-rural)	4,227	1,191	765
State budget	4,000	5,000	6,350
Total	25,919	24,166	27,686

*) Mainly roads in cocoa producing areas

Source: DeLancey 1981, statistical appendix.

Table 10: ONCPB shares in major parastatal agricultural development corporations, 1979

	field of activities	millions FCFA	% of total shares
Socopalm	oilpalm plant.; palmoil production	2,858	47.16
Semry	rice production	2,160	46.70
Hevecam	rubber plant. prod.	2,030	54.80
CDC	oilpalm, rubber, banana plant	1,019	22.03
Sodeble	wheat prod., flour milling	900	45.00
ZAPI-Est	cocoa, coffee prod.*)	410	68.33
Sodecao	cocoa prod.*)	285	67.05
Soderim	rice production	200	18.18
Sodecoton	cotton prod.*)	200	11.14

*) Also involved in food production on a limited scale.

Source: Bilan 1980, 91.

Fonader

Since 1973, the actual allocation of ONCPB funds to a large extent takes place through Fonader (Fonds national pour le développement rural). The ONCPB budget (table 9) shows Fonader to be the main recipient of subsidies. Fonader coordinates, supervises and stimulates rural development (both crop production and cattle raising) - it does not just finance operations, as the ONCPB does. Its budget grew rapidly, from 2,600 million FCFA in 1973/74 to 14,470 million FCFA in 1979/80. The greater part of this budget has always been furnished by the marketing organizations, the remainder being supplied by the state and international donors. Restricted commercial activities finance a small part of the budget.

Fonader's activities covered various fields in the 1970's:

- It coordinated and subsidized the majority of fungicide operations in the cocoa and coffee regions. This was Fonader's most extensive task; 30 % of the 11 billion FCFA 1978/79 budget went to spraying operations, partly carried out by the parastatal development corporations.
- It organized and subsidized cocoa and coffee regeneration projects. Again, these projects were partly carried out by other parastatals. As the minimum "plantation" size for these operations has been fixed at 1 ha, many small farmers do not benefit from them.
- It supplied subsidized fertilizer in the cocoa and coffee regions, mainly through the intermediary of the development corporations and cooperatives. Farmer demand far exceeded supply: in 1978/79 only 50 % of demand could be met. Some 23,000 tons were supplied at a price of 25,000 FCFA per ton, the market price being 45,000 FCFA.
- It subsidized Mideviv food projects.
- It supplied credit to individual farmers, cooperatives and rural development organizations, mainly to promote the production of cocoa and coffee. A small amount was used for rural infrastructure at the village level. Young farmers could get interest-free loans to start new farms (there was also a limited subvention program for young farmers). Interest levels are low (4.75 % annually for a 9-year loan). Stagnating farm incomes, however, have made repayment of these short-term (1 - 10 year) credits a great problem for individual farmers. Total arrears amounted to some 900 million FCFA by the end of the 1970s. Fonader therefore prefers to supply credit to cooperatives and development organziations (DeLancey 1981, 26 - 36; Marchés Tropicaux 1980, 2771; Mboudou 1982, 166 - 170; Obam Mbom 1981, 390 - 405; Fonader- Rapport d'Activités; Cinquième Plan, 86 - 87).

Fonader's range of activities is quite impressive. However, only a small minority of Cameroun's farmers has so far benefited from them, and these tend to be the "better placed" ones - socially or geographically. Although several billions worth of credit was granted yearly in the late 1970s, farmer demand for Fonader credit could not be met by far. In the 1980s,

Fonader may expand to become a major supplier of cheap rural credit: plans exist to convert it into an agricultural development bank working mainly through the development corporations (Troisième Congrès, 37; Cinquième Plan, 86).

Conclusions

This essay set out to answer four questions related to agricultural pricing policies in Cameroun:

a) have these policies helped to stabilize farmer incomes?
b) have these policies made the production of export crops more attractive than the production of food crops?
c) concerning the marketing organziations' reserves, what is the relationship between price stabilization funds and funds for economic development?
d) to which sectors of the economy do these latter funds flow?

a)
Guaranteed prices for export crops have fluctuated less than export prices, but this has not done much to stabilize farmer incomes. On the whole, there has been a slow decline in real incomes from export crops. Increases in producer prices have lagged behind increases in price levels of inputs and consumer goods.

b)
Far from discouraging food production, the insufficient increase in guaranteed prices for export crops has caused a partial switch to food crops in urbanizing regions. Generally speaking, food crops are not subject to a pricing policy, which is this case means that maximum prices can be very high in areas of great demand. Although traders take the larger part of the profits made on food crops in the urban markets, many farmers find it profitable to devote most of their energy to these crops.

c)
Price support as a consequence of low export prices was necessary in only a few years prior to 1980. The reserve funds which kept accumulating have

largely been used for other purposes. These expenditures have not always contributed to economic development, but the great mass of funds appears to have been used in a productive way through the years.

d)

Most of the funds made available for economic development through the marketing organizations have been used to stimulate agricultural production. Part of the remaining funds has been used to finance industries closely related to agriculture. Where money has been made available to agriculture, the larger part of it appears to have flowed back to the production of cocoa and coffee, crops which generated the greatest part of the reserves. There is something of a vicious circle here: to accumulate funds, the Caisses and the ONCPB have kept producer prices relatively low, which has led to a neglect of cocoa and coffee trees. which again forced the marketing organizations to subsidize parastatals stimulating the production of these crops.

The growing activities of parastatals in Cameroun agriculture fits well in an overall pattern of growing government involvement in rural areas, a trend not peculiar to Cameroun. Tchala-Abima (1982) has devoted his thesis to the growing influence of the state on rural development in Cameroun through parastatals. Set up in most cases to stimulate the production of an export crop, their influence initially was quite limited. But their activities are expanding and their resources are now also used to promote food production and to improve rural infrastructure. In the long run, as more funds and trained manpower become available, they may well become provincial or regional development bodies - Sodacao for the Province du Sud, ZAPI-Est for the Province de l'Est, etc. Integrated rural development, however, is impossible without intervening in the management of individual farms; becoming involved in a more general process of development necessarily entails a (partial) loss of independence. Whether, for the rural population, this is a positive or a harmful development depends on the way the benefits of development are distributed, and on the opportunities for the rural population to participate actively in the development process. As far as benefits are concerned: farm incomes tend to be distinctly higher in those areas where development corporations are active (see Bilan 1980, 153, 155). Will there be a general increase in rural incomes if these activities become more generalized?

Grass roots participation in rural development so far seems extremely limited. Cooperatives, the most common type of farmers' organization, only involve male heads of households, and tend to be run by the local elite (see e.g. Tchouamo 190, ch. 4; World Bank 1978, 8), just as the above mentioned bodies are run by, and provide economic and political power for, certain groups of the national elite. Where these cooperatives take part in rural development projects, their influence seems rather marginal (Thala-Abima 1982, ch. 8; Cordeiro/Dikoumé 1979; World Bank 1978, ch. 4 and 7). Shall we witness, as Tchala-Abima (1982, 300) believes, a transformation of the independent family farmers into agricultural labourers, working in "factories in the field", where control has passed on to representatives of the state and the farmer has as little say in the production process as those who work in privately owned industries?

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Journal für Entwicklungspolitik 3, 1985, S. 131 - 134

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ENTWICKLUNGSHILFE IST EINE MORALISCHE VERPFLICHTUNG

Lord Bauer hat vielen das langersehnte Stichwort gegeben: Entwicklungshilfe zahlt sich nicht aus. Selbstverständlich hat Lord Bauer dies so plump nicht formuliert, dennoch haben seine massiven kritischen Betrachtungen nicht nur den immer notwendigen Beitrag einer kritischen Analyse bedeutet. Für viele wurde er zur Ausrede und Vorwand, sich endlich gegen Entwicklungshilfe aussprechen zu können. Hier gilt es durch Fakten und durch Bewußtseinsbildung gegenzusteuern.

Zunächst die Fakten. Selbstverständlich ist die globale Aufgabenstellung der Hilfe an die Dritte Welt nicht ohne Rückschläge und Fehler abgelaufen, und es ist klar, daß auch nach Dekaden bewußt betriebener Entwicklungspolitik der Abstand zwischen arm und reich kaum verändert wurde. Ebenso klar sind die Fakten der Erfolge. Durch internationale Anstrengungen gelang es in vielen Ländern, die Kindersterblichkeit drastisch zu senken und die durchschnittliche Lebenserwartung ebenso deutlich zu heben. Krankheiten, die das Schicksal vieler Menschen in vielen Ländern bestimmten, sind drastisch reduziert und in manchen Zonen zum Verschwinden gebracht worden. Sogar im Zusammenhang mit der Hungerkatastrophe in Afrika - bei Gott ein Ansatz dafür, skeptisch zu sein - muß man festhalten, daß die verspätet eingesetzte Hilfe letztlich doch Wirkungen gezeigt hat.

Man darf Entwicklungshilfe und Entwicklungspolitik nicht mit euphorischem Optimismus angehen. Die Probleme sind ganz einfach zu groß, um nur mit Optimismus behandelt zu werden. Aber, Entwicklungspolitik ist keine Frage des Optimismus oder des Pessimismus. Es ist die moralische Verpflichtung der Reichen für die Armen. Es ist die Solidarität des Teilens, um die es hier geht. Wer etwas von Politik versteht, weiß, daß dieser Anspruch so einfach nicht zu verwirklichen ist. Die wenigsten wollen etwas hergeben oder gar brüderlich teilen. Schon der Abbau von Privilegien, von Vorteilen der Reichen, von überhöhten Handelsspannen, ist ohne enorme politische Anstrengungen nicht möglich.

Mit anderen Worten, Entwicklungspolitik muß die Probleme realistisch angehen. Sie darf aber die Zielsetzung nach mehr Chancen für die Armen und nach einer verbesserten Welt nicht aufgeben.

Wer mit Realismus diesen Anforderungen die Leistungen Österreichs gegenüberstellt, wird mit Bitterkeit bemerken müssen, daß diese ungenügend sind. Das betrifft nicht die Bürger dieses Landes, deren Aufkommen an Spenden jährlich größer ist als die bilateralen Leistungen des Staates. 1984 ergaben die Sammlungen der Kirchen 459 Millionen Schilling für die Dritte Welt, an Staatsmitteln wurden nur 204 Millionen Schilling für bilaterale Zuschüsse, also für Entwicklungshilfe im strikten Sinn, ausgegeben.

Die Leistungen sind ungenügend, weil es uns seit Jahren nicht gelingt, den Einsatz der Mittel wirklich zu steigern. Überdies sind wir auch nach den Qualitätskriterien, die international zur Beurteilung der Entwicklungshilfe herangezogen werden, in den untersten Rängen. Die 70er Jahre wurden 1979 mit einem besorgniserregenden Tiefstand von nur 0,19 % Anteil am Bruttoinlandsprodukt abgeschlossen. Danach kam ein vielbejubelter Anstieg dieses Anteils, der sich inzwischen als Scheinblüte herausstellte. Rückwirkend mußten die Ziffern korrigiert werden. Man hatte schlicht zuviel Leistungen auf anderen Gebieten mit dem Titel Entwicklungshilfe versehen. 1984 stehen wir nun bei einem Anteil von 0,28 % vom BIP, was uns zum Schlußlicht in Europa macht.

Leider steht dieser Entwicklung eine stolze Tradition verbaler Ankündigungen gegenüber. Ginge es nach dem, was Österreich auf vielen internationalen Konferenzen angekündigt hat, so müßten wir weit an der Spitze liegen und nicht wie die Realität ausweist, am Schluß in der Liste der Industrieländer. Das gilt auch für die Qualität unserer Entwicklungshilfe. In den entscheidenden Bereichen stellt Österreich bei seinen Krediten die härtesten Anforderungen. Bei den gebundenen Krediten mit einem Zuschußelement von unter 50 % liegt Österreich weit über allen OECD-Ländern, macht also das schlechteste Angebot. Auch mit der Bindung der Herkunft von Waren und Dienstleistungen an das Geberland hat Österreich mit 77 % im Jahre 1983 den höchsten Wert und damit die geringste Qualität erreicht. Bei allem Verständnis für die Schwierigkeiten, die ein

kleines Land hat, den internationalen Qualitätserfordernissen von Entwicklungshilfe nachzukommen, muß Österreich hier umdenken und einen drastischen Kurswechsel zustande bringen.

Auch unter einem anderen Qualitätsgesichtspunkt muß man die österreichischen Projekte kritisch untersuchen, nämlich, inwieweit wird Entwicklungshilfe für die ärmsten Länder, für die Least Developed Countries, aufgebraucht. Auch da schneidet Österreich im Gegensatz zu den öffentlichen Ankündigungen extrem schlecht ab. Nämlich gerade dort, wo der Kontrast von arm und reich auch die kleinste Hilfe besonders wirksam macht, zeigt sich Österreich gegenüber einem internationalen Maßstab von 0,15 % vom BIP mit seinen 0,04 % in den Jahren 1981 und 1982 weit abgeschlagen. 1983 sank dieser Anteil weiter und liegt nun bei 0,03 % des BIP. Österreich ist damit Schlußlicht der Industrieländer.

Mit anderen Worten, die ziffernmäßige und qualitative Basis der österreichischen Entwicklungshilfe bedarf einer grundlegenden Änderung. Dies ist nicht in Jahresfrist zu schaffen. Dies ist nur über ein mehrjähriges Arbeitsprogramm mit realistischen Detailansätzen einigermaßen ins Lot zu bringen. Dazu muß eine Überprüfung der regionalen Schwerpunkte treten. Allzu leicht hat man in vergangenen Jahren bei Staatsbesuchen Projekte und Projektchen hinterlassen. Ebenso leicht hat man da und dort Maßnahmen der Exportförderung zu einem Entwicklungshilfeprojekt umfunktioniert. Die Folge ist eine Vielzahl von Ländern, in denen verstreut österreichische Entwicklungshilfe läuft. Von einer Schwerpunktbildung, wie sie dringend notwendig wäre, kann nicht die Rede sein. Den Sinn einer solchen Schwerpunktbildung zeigt die Arbeit der katholischen Kirche, bei der ein hoher Anteil der Mittel seit Jahren in drei Ländern eingesetzt ist. Das hat nach einigen Jahren die Folge, daß man wechselseitig zwischen den Ländern und Österreich ein Beziehungsgeflecht und einen Stock an Know how aufbauen kann, was letztlich der Qualität der Hilfe zugute kommt. Finnland und die Niederlande operieren mit großem Erfolg mit einem ähnlichen Ansatz.

Auch die Qualität einzelner Projekte muß mit mehr Anstrengung auf den Punkt der tatsächlichen Bedürfnisse gebracht werden. Es geht nicht darum, unter dem Titel Entwicklungshilfe österreichische Waren zu plazieren. Dafür haben wir das großartige System unseres Exportes. Es geht vielmehr