

# **JOURNAL FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK**

herausgegeben vom Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik  
an den österreichischen Universitäten

vol. XX, No. 2-2004

## **GENDER & PEACEBUILDING Frauen und Geschlechterverhältnisse in Post-Conflict Situationen**

Schwerpunktredaktion: Petra Purkarthofer

**Mandelbaum** Edition Südwind

**Journal für Entwicklungspolitik (JEP)**  
**Austrian Journal of Development Studies**

Herausgeber:

Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik an den Österreichischen  
Universitäten  
Projekt Internationale Entwicklung / Zentrum für überfakultäre Forschung  
der Universität Wien

Redaktion:

Gerald Faschingeder, Karin Fischer (verantwortl.), Margit Franz, Ingeborg Grau,  
Irmi Maral-Hanak, Karen Imhof, Johannes Jäger, Bettina Köhler, Franz Kolland,  
René Kuppe, Bernhard Leubolt, Brita Neuhold, Andreas Novy, Herwig Palme,  
Christof Parnreiter, Petra Purkarthofer, Kunibert Raffer, Andreas Schedler,  
Anselm Skuhra, Franziska Schmidtkunz, Cornelia Staritz

Board of Editors:

Dieter Boris (Marburg), John-ren Chen (Innsbruck), Hartmut Elsenhals (Leip-  
zig), Jacques Forster (Genève), John Friedmann (St. Kilda), Peter Jankowitsch  
(Paris), Friedrich Katz (Chicago), Helmut Konrad (Graz), Ulrich Menzel  
(Braunschweig), Jean-Philippe Platteau (Namur), Dieter Rothermund (Heidel-  
berg), Heribert Steinbauer (Wien), Paul Streeten (Boston), Osvaldo Sunkel  
(Santiago de Chile)

Managing Editor: Pia Lichtblau

Umschlagbild: UN/DPI Photo

## Inhaltsübersicht

4	Editorial
	PETRA PURKARTHOFFER
6	Geschlechterverhältnisse zwischen Krieg und Frieden: Post-Conflict Settings und die Peacebuilding-Arbeit der Vereinten Nationen
	ANNETTE LYTH
32	The Impact of International Peace Building on Gender Roles in Kosovo
	ILJA LUCIAK
52	After the Peace Accords: Gender and Democracy in Guatemala
	PETRA PURKARTHOFFER
74	Parteienspektrum in Guatemala
	MARIA STÜCKLER
80	Spekulation als mögliche Ursache exzessiver Preisschwankungen auf Rohstoffmärkten
101	Rezensionen
103	Autoren und Autorinnen
105	Informationen für Autoren und Autorinnen

ILJA LUCIAK

**After the Peace Accords:**

Gender and Democracy in Guatemala<sup>1</sup>

The protracted military conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala have finally ended. Following the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance in 1990, the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrilla forces signed peace accords in 1992 (El Salvador) and 1996 (Guatemala) with their respective governments. In the wake of these agreements, Central America presents a new reality. The focus has shifted from war strategies to the consolidation of emerging democratic structures. The important question confronting the Central American societies is what type of democracy they seek to build. I argue that the former exclusionary regimes need to be replaced by political systems based on substantive democracy. The predominant focus on the institutionalization of liberal constitutionalism with its focus on electoral democracy<sup>2</sup> is misdirected since it is by no means a sufficient guarantee that the emerging political structures will reflect popular interests. Free, competitive elections are only one indicator that the consolidation of democracy is making progress. We need to examine closely who participates and on what terms to determine whether these electoral contests are meaningful. It is a key argument of this article that real, substantive democracy requires the full incorporation of women into the political process both at the party and societal level. I maintain that a gendered analysis of democratization is essential to obtain a meaningful picture of the social and political reality confronting societies in transition toward more democratic forms of government.

Gender can be understood as a socially produced category, defined in Carver's terms as "the ways that sex and sexuality become power relations in society" (Carver 1996: 120). Equality is used as a twofold concept that includes "formal equality, which can be achieved by means of legislation" and "substantial equality, which aspires to being able to deal with relations between individuals in different original positions" (Parvikko 1991: 48). Carver emphasizes that "gender is not a synonym for women." Gender analysis is not directed against men, but seeks to understand relations between the two sexes. In the prevailing societal relations, both women and men are negatively affected. Thus, in the final analysis only men and women together can transform the inherited power relations.

I begin this article with a brief historical background, providing the context for the 1996 peace accords. I then examine the transformation of the guerrilla movement

into a political party emphasizing a gender perspective by discussing the relative positions of power of men and women. This analysis is followed by an examination of political participation focusing on the 2003 elections. I conclude with an overview of recent efforts to strengthen the role of women in political decision-making and address the prospects for change under the new government of Oscar Berger.

### 1. Historical Background<sup>3</sup>

Guatemala's political development was disrupted when the democratically elected government of President Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown in the 1954 military coup sponsored by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (Schlesinger/Kinzer 1999). The U.S. intervention threw the country into a spiral of violence. In March 1999, U.S. President Bill Clinton acknowledged the destructive role played by the United States in the Guatemalan conflict. In an unprecedented gesture, President Clinton formally apologized to the Guatemalan people: "For the United States, it is important that I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake" (Broder 1999).

With Guatemalan army officer Castillo Armas in power, the reforms initiated by the two previous administrations were reversed and political repression became the order of the day. The corruption in the military and the government convinced a group of reformist officers to stage a coup on November 13, 1960. The coup failed but it gave birth to the first guerrilla activities in the country.

The original nucleus of what became the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*, URNG) emerged in 1960, when a group of army officers started to form a guerrilla movement. They protested and were incensed over the Guatemalan government's decision to permit the use of its territory for the training of Cuban exiles who later participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima, joined by students, workers and peasants, led the effort to establish the first guerrilla *foco* (Landau 1993: 160 f.). This foco in the mountains of Concuá, Baja Verapaz, only two hours from Guatemala City, was destroyed by the army in March 1962 and more than half of the 23 insurgents there were killed in combat (Torres-Rivas 1997: 72). By 1963, the surviving guerrillas formed a movement that became known as the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* (Revolutionary Armed Forces, FAR). FAR militants were subsequently involved in the creation of several other armed groups. The first one, the *Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres* (Guerrilla Army of the Poor, EGP) announced its existence in 1972. At the same time, another group of disgruntled FAR militants started to build the *Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas* (Revolutionary Organization of Armed Citizens, ORPA). ORPA announced its existence of-

ficially in 1978. Both the EGP and ORPA organized primarily around the indigenous community. The three groups, together with a faction of the *Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo* (Guatemalan Labour Party, PGT), which had existed since 1949, officially formed the URNG on February 7, 1982.

The conflict between a succession of military governments and the guerrilla forces raged on for thirty-six years and resulted in tremendous human suffering. According to the report by the Commission for Historical Clarification, charged with establishing the truth about Guatemala's violent past under the peace accords, more than 200,000 Guatemalans were killed or disappeared over the course of the conflict (Historical Clarification Commission 1999). In addition, hundreds of villages were destroyed and 1.5 million people were internally displaced or sought refuge in Mexico (Spence et al. 1998: 4).

The Guatemalan army launched a series of counterinsurgency offenses in the early 1980s, which led to a disarticulation of the guerrilla forces and their strategic retreat. Although the guerrilla forces continued to engage in armed attacks, they ceased to represent a serious military threat. In 1986, a democratic government was elected and with it, the hope for peace was renewed. The Guatemalan accords were the result of negotiations conducted with the help of the United Nations over seven years and that involved three successive administrations. The first accord concerned democratization and was signed in Querétaro, Mexico on July 25, 1991. Interestingly, it was the government of Jorge Serrano, a conservative, who took this first important step. Serrano instigated a failed coup in May 1993 and was subsequently forced from office. Following his ouster, the negotiation process stalled. It was resurrected in 1994 under President Ramiro de León Carpio, with the United Nations assuming the role of moderator. A group of countries - Norway, Colombia, Venezuela, Spain, Mexico, and the United States - officially organized as the "Group of Friends" of the peace process, exerted pressure on the two parties to resume talks (McCleary 1997: 137). It took two more years and a third Guatemalan administration, under President Alvaro Arzú, to finalize the accords. On December 29, 1996, the guerrilla forces integrated into the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and the Arzú government signed a comprehensive agreement that ended the military conflict.

The Guatemalan accords were considered exemplary from a gender perspective. Women's rights were specifically addressed in four of the seven substantive agreements that were reached between July 1991 and September 1996. The emphasis on gender issues in the Guatemalan peace accords indicated that the level of gender awareness in the region had changed since the 1992 Salvadoran agreement, a treaty where women's rights were conspicuously absent.

In contrast, there were a number of important passages on women's rights in the Guatemalan accords. In the agreement establishing procedures for the resettlement



of populations uprooted during the war, the parties decided, "to emphasize in particular the protection of families headed by women, as well as the widows and orphans who have been most affected" (United Nations 1994: 38). Further, the Guatemalan government "committed itself to eliminating all forms of discrimination, factual or legal, against women, and to make it easier [to have] access to land, housing, [and] credit and to participate in development projects. A gender perspective will be incorporated in the policies, programs and activities of the global development strategy" (United Nations 1994: 43). In the important agreement on the rights of Guatemala's indigenous peoples, considered one of the key achievements of the URNG leadership, indigenous women were given special protection. For example, sexual harassment of an indigenous woman was to be sanctioned particularly severely under Guatemalan law (United Nations 1995: 6). Further, as discussed below, the accords sought to strengthen women's political participation. The Guatemalan accords were very advanced in addressing the role of women in society and advocating change toward greater gender equality. At least at a formal level, women were acknowledged as key protagonists in Guatemala's future development. Yet the challenge remained to implement the provisions in the accords in a way that would transform Guatemalan society.

Several years into the peace process, the predominant sentiment within the women's movement concerning the implementation of the peace accords was profound disappointment. Most of its leaders ceased to believe in the viability of the peace process in its present form. They were especially angered by the lack of response from the political parties to their efforts to put women's rights on the agenda. Patricia Wohlers, the United Nations Peace Mission (MINUGUA) official in charge of gender issues, argued that despite efforts to incorporate a gender perspective into public policies, the peace accords had resulted in few substantive changes for women (Author's interview with Wohlers, May 5, 2001). Pablo Monsanto, the president of the URNG, maintained that only those accords had been implemented that did not affect the system (Author's interview with Monsanto, May 7, 2001).<sup>3</sup> These pessimistic appraisals lead us to raise the question of what had gone wrong.

## 2. Gender Relations within the URNG

The URNG, a key signatory to the accords, had a central role to play in their successful implementation. Alas, the guerrilla movement failed to transform itself into a strong political party and therefore lacked the leverage to pressure a reluctant government into implementing core provisions of the accords. The weakness of the URNG also had a negative impact on the party's internal development, which in turn impeded the leadership from focusing on the rights of its female membership.

In the wake of the peace accords, the URNG started the process of becoming a legal political party, seeking to provide political representation for its supporters. In October 1998, the URNG was officially registered as a new party. The process of legalization was completed six months later when the URNG held its constituent assembly. Formal recognition, however, was a necessary but by no means sufficient step in the arduous process of transforming the URNG's military, hierarchical structures into those of a democratic party of the people. URNG leaders acknowledged that they had underestimated the difficulty of this task. Rodrigo Asturias emphasized that "the process was much more complex than we had foreseen" (Author's interview, May 4, 2001). A central problem was the lack of financial resources. Whereas the guerrilla movement had been able to count on "financial support during the war and the peace negotiations, [it had] nothing" to support the tasks required for party building (Author's interview with Asturias, May 4, 2001). Further, the party continued to be directed by its leadership from the war days, a development considered a fundamental mistake in the eyes of many observers. Even within the URNG, there was a call for new leadership, not beholden to the legacy of the war.

Ricardo Ramírez, who had led the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the strongest guerrilla group during the war, was elected party president in 1997, when the URNG held its first internal election following the signing of the peace agreement. In the same meeting, Pablo Monsanto, the commander of the Armed Forces of the Revolution (FAR), was chosen as vice-president. A year later, the URNG president died from heart failure. At this point, Monsanto assumed the leadership position and Arnoldo Noriega took Ramírez's vacant seat on the party's Executive Committee. Although it appeared that the URNG was handling this transition well, the new party was soon embroiled in a power struggle.

The main battle lines were drawn between the two strongest groups forming the URNG, the EGP and the FAR. A key issue of disagreement was Monsanto's leadership style, which was deemed to be authoritarian. Yet there were many other issues the URNG leadership had to confront. An extremely divisive one concerned allegations of sexual abuse leveled against the high-ranking party official Arnoldo Noriega. The case was eerily reminiscent of the Nicaraguan controversy surrounding the accusations of Daniel Ortega's stepdaughter who charged the Sandinista leader in 1998 of having sexually abused her for years. The Guatemalan case proved to be equally divisive. The URNG's Executive Council was divided on how to handle the allegations.<sup>5</sup> While key members of the leadership were convinced that the charges were true and wanted Noriega held accountable, others viewed them as part of a political cabal (Author's interview with Monsanto, May 7, 2001). Due to the nature of the alleged crime, gender relations within the party were adversely affected.



Several disgruntled party leaders ceased to attend meetings of the Executive Committee. Without the required quorum of eight members, the party's directorate stopped to function. After several months of mutual recriminations that were frequently aired in public, Noriega was expelled from the party. At the 2001 Party Congress, the only woman on the Executive Committee, Alba Estela Maldonado, was elected president. Subsequently, Monsanto and his allies left the URNG, dealing a serious blow to the efforts of the former guerrilla movement to build a viable political party.

The turmoil engulfing the URNG had a negative impact on the internal discussion concerning women's rights. Historically, the URNG had not been known for being progressive on issues of gender equality. During the days of armed struggle, one could not find any statements on women's rights in the manifestos and programs of the URNG's four constituent groups. First in 1994 did an official URNG document incorporate a section on women's rights. When the URNG demobilized, the female militants sought to translate their contribution to the war effort into effective political participation within the emerging party.

According to United Nations data, 2,940 URNG combatants officially demobilized in 1997. Apart from the combatants concentrated in the various camps, the URNG demobilized 2,813 additional members. This latter group consisted of 493 people who had served as URNG international cadres, while the rest were URNG leaders and other personnel who had served the guerrilla army as political cadres inside the country. Thus, according to United Nations records, the total URNG membership at the time of demobilization was 5,753.<sup>6</sup>

The Guatemalan data, particularly in regard to the URNG's gender composition are not as complete as in the case of El Salvador.<sup>7</sup> This situation reflected the continued climate of fear and the extremely secretive nature of the URNG. Nevertheless, a European Union-sponsored study of the socioeconomic background of the URNG membership gives a reasonably accurate picture of the URNG's gender composition. The study is based on a survey of 2,778 URNG combatants (of the 2,940 concentrated in the camps) and 1,410 (of 2,813) political cadres. Although only half of the political cadres were surveyed, we have an almost complete picture of the URNG combatants.

Table 1: Gender Composition of URNG by Demobilization Category, 1997

Category	Women	%	Men	%	Total	%
Combatants	410	14.8	2,368	85.2	2,778	100.0
Political Cadres	356	25.2	1,054	74.8	1,410	100.0
Total	766	18.3	3,422	81.7	4,188	100.0

Source: URNG (1997: 2-4).

Thus, women represented 410 (15 percent) of the 2,778 interviewed combatants and 356 (about 25 percent) of the 1,410 political cadres. These data demonstrate that compared to El Salvador and Nicaragua, female participation in Guatemala's revolutionary struggle was rather limited.<sup>8</sup> Among combatants (where we have the most complete data), URNG women had only 50 percent of the strength of their Salvadoran counterparts. Overall female participation in the Guatemalan conflict was about half of what it had been in other Central American revolutionary movements.

Female militants did not waste time following the signing of the peace accords. In January 1997, they held their first meeting and formed the *Espacio de Mujeres* (Women's Space). This effort evolved into the *Secretaría de Asuntos Políticos de la Mujer* (Secretariat for Women's Political Matters) one of the initial structures of the party. Using the Secretariat as a base, several key female leaders argued for the need to institutionalize quotas in order to guarantee strong female representation in the new party structures. Following the example of the revolutionary Left in El Salvador and Nicaragua, the women argued in favor of a 30 percent female quota.

After considerable discussion, the URNG leadership agreed to the 30 percent target, although couching the new policy in somewhat awkward terms. The policy stated that "neither gender should have more than 70 or less than 30 percent representation in the new party structures." (Méndez n.d.: 61). This commitment "was supposed to be implemented in the election process for the leadership bodies at the municipal, departmental, and national levels" (Méndez n.d.: 61 f.). In light of the composition of the URNG's provisional executive committee - one woman and fourteen men - it was obvious that some measures of positive discrimination were indeed necessary to achieve a more equal gender composition of the party structures.

Table 2: Gender Composition of the URNG's National Structure

Year	Executive Committee				National Council			
	Women	%	Men	%	Women	%	Men	%
1997	1	6.7	14	93.3	4	9.1	40	90.9
1999	1	6.7	14	93.3	election to Council postponed			

Source: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)

Alas, the new policy was not immediately implemented. When the URNG held its first National Congress in May 1999 to elect its official leadership, the party chose to ratify the existing Executive Committee and postponed elections to the National Council. Thus, the skewed gender composition was prolonged. At the 2001 National Congress, however, the quota was adhered to. Female militants came to constitute 30 percent of the Executive Committee, albeit counting ordinary members and their substitutes. There were other signs that the URNG's thinking on gender issues was undergoing change. In a significant development, the party elected Alba Estela Maldonado as its first female president.

Maldonado inherited a party in turmoil. In October 1999, the new party had competed in its first elections. Although the right-wing *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco* (Guatemalan Republican Front, FRG) won, the former guerrilla movement made a respectable showing. The URNG competed as the key group of a three-party alliance *Alianza Nueva Nación* (New Nation Alliance, ANN) that gained 9 of the 113 seats in parliament. There were high expectations, supported by favorable opinion polls, that the revolutionary Left would be a serious competitor in the next presidential contest. Instead, the URNG self-destructed. In-fighting within the URNG led to an atomization of the Left. In November 2000, a group of URNG militants left the party and publicly criticized the URNG leadership. Having its dirty laundry exposed in the court of public opinion greatly damaged the URNG's credibility (Author's interview with Asturias, May 4, 2001).

In the opinion of Ricardo Rosales, a member of the URNG's National Directorate and an ANN congressional representative, the URNG had failed to take advantage of having representation in parliament. There was little communication between the URNG and the ANN delegation. Instead of advancing a progressive legislative agenda, energy was spent on settling ideological and personal disputes (Author's interview with Rosales, May 7, 2001). Alvaro Colom, the ANN's presidential candidate who had been supported by the URNG in 1999, chose to distance himself from his former allies after months of acrimonious debates. In the

2003 electoral contest, he ran as the candidate of the newly formed *Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza* (National Union of Hope, UNE).

With the exodus of Colom, Pablo Monsanto, the erstwhile URNG leader, became a key figure in a new party named after the ANN. In the 2003 elections, Monsanto headed the party's list in the legislative elections. The ANN did not compete in the presidential elections, since Rigoberto Quemé, the ANN's presidential candidate, renounced his candidacy in July 2003, accusing Monsanto of having taken over the party. The URNG, however, fielded Rodrigo Asturias, one of its historic commanders. The URNG ticket failed to get any significant support. In the end, the URNG had squandered a historic opportunity to mobilize and represent the Guatemalan Left. Instead, it had evolved into a "traditional" Guatemalan party, characterized by in-fighting and periodic divisions.

### 3. Political Participation Following the Peace Accords

The key problem affecting political participation of both sexes was rooted in the weakness of the political parties themselves. Edelberto Torres-Rivas (1996: 55) has argued that the weakness of Guatemala's political party system "is explained not only by its precarious temporal existence but also by its programmatic void and, even more, by its weak social implantation." Parties tend to be created for electoral purposes, winning parties tend to lack a strong mandate, and the previous governing party is often reduced to insignificance. Torres-Rivas maintains that "the experience of Guatemala is clear proof that democracy cannot function without political parties: government, a sense of order, and institutional stability will elude consolidation unless political parties rigorously shape the collective private sphere" (Torres Rivas 1996: 56). Otto Zeissig has pointed out two additional central defects of Guatemala's electoral democracy. He focuses on the continuing de facto marginalization of women and the rural poor who in turn constitute the country's indigenous majority (Zeissig 2003: 1). A brief look at Guatemala's recent elections demonstrates that these assessments are accurate.

In the 1999 legislative elections, the governing party's share of the vote declined from 54 to 30 percent. The *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco* (FRG), on the other hand, improved its share from 42 percent to 48 percent. Compared to the 1995 election results, the FRG improved dramatically, tripling its seats in parliament from the original 21. The *Partido de Avanzada Nacional* (National Advancement Party, PAN) paid the price for the public's discontent with the limited results of the peace accords, the high crime rate, the difficult economic situation and the corruption scandals engulfing PAN politicians. Of the 113 parliamentary seats contested, the FRG secured an absolute majority of 62. The PAN won only 38 seats, while the left-wing *Alianza Nueva Nación* (ANN), with the URNG as its main constituent group, had nine of its candidates elected. The PAN lost 5 of the 43



seats it held previously, while the *Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala* (New Guatemala Democratic Front, FDNG), which had represented the Left in the 1995 election before the guerrilla movement could openly participate, lost all of its six seats. Since the number of deputies was increased to 113 from the 80 deputies who comprised Congress in 1995, the change in public support in the case of the PAN was more dramatic than the number of lost seats indicated.

In the 1999 presidential elections the picture was similar, Alfonso Portillo, the candidate of the *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco*, gained almost 48 percent of the vote, just shy of the majority required to be elected in the first round. Oscar Berger, the candidate of the governing *Partido de Avanzada Nacional*, came in second with 30 percent. Alvaro Colom, who headed the ANN effort, came in a distant third with 12 percent. In the run-off elections, Portillo won easily over Berger.

The 2003 elections once again brought about a fundamental change in the political landscape. The pre-electoral period was dominated by the controversy over the candidacy of Efraín Ríos Montt, then the FRG's president of parliament. Ríos Montt had sought the nomination of his party on two previous occasions – in 1990 and 1995 – but had always been barred by the courts from becoming an official candidate. His problems dated to 1982, when he took power in a military coup. According to article 186 of the 1985 constitution, a coup leader is prohibited from running for president. Nevertheless, on July 14, 2003, Guatemala's Constitutional Court, stacked with the dictator's political allies, reversed several previous judicial findings and voted 4-3 to allow the former dictator to stand in the elections, based on the argument that the constitutional provision barring Ríos Montt could not be applied retroactively. Thus, the former dictator joined several other major candidates in the electoral contest. His main competitors were Oscar Berger who campaigned this time for the *Gran Alianza Nacional* (Grand National Alliance, GANA), Leonel López Rodas of the PAN, and former leftist candidate Alvaro Colom who headed the ticket of the *Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza* (UNE). As discussed, the URNG chose to run its own candidate, having nominated former guerrilla leader Rodrigo Asturias.

The November 2003 presidential elections proved inconclusive, with no candidate receiving the required 50 percent. Berger obtained 34 percent, Colom 26 percent, and Ríos Montt gained 19 percent. A majority of Guatemalans, together with many international observers, were relieved that Ríos Montt's controversial bid for the presidency had failed. The remaining candidates were in the single digits, with URNG candidate Asturias receiving an embarrassing 2.6 percent (69,301 votes) of support. In the December run-off, Berger defeated Colom with 54 to 46 percent of the vote. Berger's Grand National Alliance (GANA) was also the victor in the elections to the Guatemalan Congress. His party gained 47 of the 158 seats. The FRG was a close second with 43 seats, followed by Colom's National

Union of Hope with 32 and the *Partido de Avanzada Nacional* (Party for National Advancement, PAN) with 17. Three parties on the political Left, the URNG, the *Alianza Nueva Nación*, and the *Desarrollo Integral Auténtico* (Authentic Integral Development, DIA) gained two, six, and one seat, respectively (see Table 3). Thus, the infighting within the URNG had led to the revolutionary Left's marginalization.

Turnout in the second round of the presidential elections was close to 47 percent, basically unchanged from the last electoral contest. The weakness of the main political parties and the low approval that the electorate gave to politicians and the political system in general, contributed to the low turnout. High abstention rates have characterized Guatemalan elections for decades. For example, in the presidential elections of 1995, 53 percent of the voters chose to stay at home in the first round, while 63 percent did not vote in the second round. There was considerable hope that the 1996 peace accords, which made it possible for the revolutionary Left to participate in the electoral process, would strengthen the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of the electorate and lead to increased turnout. Yet turnout improved only slightly. In the 1999 and 2003 elections, 53 percent of the electorate went to the polls. In 1995, only 47 percent participated.

Guatemala was not the only post-war society in Central America with high abstention rates. El Salvador's last three elections were characterized by abstention rates as high as 60 percent. Only in the 1994 elections, the first one after the war, did more than 50 percent of the voters go the polls. This increase in turnout appeared to be temporary. In the most recent Salvadoran election of 1999, turnout reached barely 37 percent, compared to almost 53 percent in 1994. The March 2004 presidential elections, however, saw a marked improvement in turnout. A highly charged political campaign convinced 67 percent of the electorate to cast a vote. It remained an open question whether this high level of turnout would be indicative of a new trend.

#### 4. The 1999 and 2003 Elections from a Gender Perspective

Historically, Guatemalan women have been particularly disenfranchised. In the 1999 elections, only 37 percent of those who voted were women (Montenegro 2002: 3). One of the advantages that men have is that they tend to have their basic documents in order while many female voters lack the legal documents needed to vote. It is a common practice in the Guatemalan countryside not to register female children, in effect disadvantaging them already at birth (Author's interview with Carrera, March 3, 1999). The lack of birth certificates and other identification documents were major obstacles for female voters who wanted to exercise their political rights.



Female candidates did not do well in either of the two post-war elections. The election results demonstrated that Guatemala was lagging behind its neighbors in increasing women's participation in public office. In 1999, the two female presidential candidates, Ana Catalina Soberanis of the FDNG, and Flor de María Alvarado of the National Reconciliation Alliance gained 1.3 and 0.1 percent of the vote, respectively. In 2003, only Desarrollo Integral Auténtico fielded a female candidate for president. Gladys Ruíz ran as the party's vice-presidential contender.

In the 1999 legislative contest, only eight female deputies were elected. Five of them belonged to the FRG, two were PAN deputies, and one came from the ANN. This represented a decline from 1995, when eleven women representatives were part of Guatemala's Congress. The majority of the 1999 female representatives (five of the eight) were elected in the capital, the central district. The abysmal results for female contenders were no surprise if one examines the candidate lists of the various parties. The lists show ninety-one people running in the country's twenty-three districts. An additional twenty-two deputies were chosen from a national list. Among the 960 candidates nominated by the various political parties, 133 were women, representing 14 percent (Montenegro 2002: 2). With few exceptions, women were placed in noncompetitive positions on the candidate lists, making it clear from the outset that they would not be elected.

The governing party did not have a single female candidate heading either its national list or any of its twenty-three district lists. The record of the FRG was only marginally better. It had one woman, Aura Otzoy, heading the list in the department of Chimaltenango. Among the parties of the Left, the ANN had only one woman among its top candidates. Nineth Montenegro was ranked as the first candidate on the capital's list. The FDNG was the only party whose candidate lists showed a gender composition that was not as lopsided. The top two candidates on its national list and on the list of the department of Santa Rosa were female, as was the leading candidate in Chiquimula. As noted above, however, not a single FDNG candidate was elected to parliament.

The 2003 election results also proved to be disappointing from a gender perspective. Although the number of female deputies increased from eight to 14, progress was limited since the size of the Congress had been expanded from 113 to 158. Thus, while female parliamentarians represented 7 percent of the deputies in 1999, the gender composition in 2003 was only slightly better, with women holding nine percent of the seats.

Table 3: Gender Composition of the Guatemalan Legislature, 2003

Party	Women	Men	Total
Gran Alianza Nacional (GANANAL)	4	43	47
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)	6	37	43
Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE)	1	31	32
Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)	-	17	17
Partido Unionista (PU)	-	7	7
Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN)	2	4	6
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)	1	1	2
Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG)	-	1	1
Desarrollo Integral Auténtico (DIA)	-	1	1
Unión Democrática (UD)	-	2	2
Total	14	144	158

Source: Calculated based on data from the Tribunal Supremo Electoral

As a share of its congressional delegation, the right-wing FRG did best, with its female deputies representing 14 percent of the party's parliamentarians. The new governing coalition GANANAL, on the other hand, had only four women (nine percent) among its members of parliament. Of the three main parties, Alvaro Colom's *Unidad Nacional de Esperanza* had the worst record – only one of its 32 seats in parliament was held by a female legislator. The parties representing the former guerrillas, the ANN and the URNG, had an impressive gender composition with one-third and one-half of their delegations being female. However, the number of their elected representatives was so small, six and two respectively, that these results made little difference. Overall, less than nine percent of the newly elected Congress was female. As in 1999, the lopsided gender composition of the Guatemalan Congress following the 2003 election was not surprising, considering how badly female candidates had fared in terms of their inclusion on the election lists.

**Table 4: Gender Composition of the Candidates for the Guatemalan Legislature, 2003**

Party	Women	%	Men	%	Total
Gran Alianza Nacional PP-MR-PSN (GANA)	15	9.2	148	90.8	163
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)	32	21.2	119	78.8	151
Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE)	32	21.2	119	78.8	151
Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)	18	11.6	137	88.4	155
Partido Unionista (PU)	28	18.4	124	81.6	152
Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN)	11	17.7	51	82.3	62
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)	25	21.9	89	78.1	114
Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG)	25	19.5	103	80.5	128
Desarrollo Integral Auténtico (DIA)	23	20.0	92	80.0	115
Unión Democrática (UD)	16	24.2	50	75.8	66
Total	225	17.9	1,032	82.1	1,257

Source: Calculated based on data from the Tribunal Supremo Electoral

Out of the 1,247 candidates that were nominated<sup>9</sup> by their respective parties, 255 (18 percent) were female. If those women who were nominated had been elected, this would have been a respectable outcome. Not surprisingly, the success rate of female candidates in the 2003 elections was generally much lower than the one achieved by their male counterparts. Interestingly, in the case of GANA, female and male candidates had the same chance of being elected. Unfortunately, the *Gran Alianza Nacional*, the winner of the congressional elections, nominated very few women to start out with. Almost half of the female deputies who were elected were FRG members, contradicting the stereotype of right-wing parties being hostile to issues of gender equality. The next three parties in terms of the number of elected representatives, the *Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza*, the *Partido de Avanzada Nacional* and the *Partido Unionista* (Unionist Party, PU), nominated a considerable number of female candidates. However, they were mostly put in list positions with little to no chance of being elected. All three parties together managed to get a single women elected. Thus, they contributed greatly to the skewed gender composition of the new parliament.

In contrast to 1999, more parties chose to give female candidates the top position on their candidate lists for specific departments. Only the Partido Unionista failed to allocate a single top position to one of their female members. The FRG and the Christian Democrats (*Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca*, DCG) had four women each heading individual lists. While all four FRG candidates were elected, their counterparts in the Christian Democratic party were the victims of the poor electoral showing of their party. The CDG had only a single (male) candidate elected. With few exceptions, the female candidates that were successful had occupied the number one spot on an individual list. This reality was behind the urgency with which the women's movement and some female party militants advocated the institutionalization of electoral quotas for women.

### **5. Strengthening Women's Political Participation: Measures of Positive Discrimination**

The peace accords specifically addressed women's political rights. The accord concerning the strengthening of civil society advocated the introduction of measures of positive discrimination to increase female participation. The agreement required the signatory parties "to take the corresponding measures in order to ensure that organizations of political and social character adopt specific policies tending to encourage and favor women's participation as part of the process of strengthening civilian power" (United Nations 1996b: 22).

The Guatemalan women's movement used this provision of the accords to call for electoral quotas that would guarantee women access to positions of political power (Author's interview with Méndez, May 2, 2001). The demand for quotas was part of a broader effort to reform electoral laws. Within civil society, there was considerable support for the introduction of quotas. However, this consensus failed to impress the political parties which were reluctant to change the status quo. At a May 2001 meeting, called by a coalition of women's groups to discuss electoral reforms, about twenty women attended, most of them representing the organizers.<sup>10</sup> Political parties, whether on the left or the right of the political spectrum, failed to attend. The public position of most parties was that they strongly supported women's political participation but opposed any effort to introduce quotas.

Key officials in the FRG, then the governing party, claimed that its leadership had taken conscious steps to strengthen women's political participation. FRG legislator, Zulema Rodríguez insisted that her party "has a well-defined gender policy." In her view, quotas were not necessary since the party "already had a policy of including the participation of women at all levels" (Author's interview with Rodríguez, May 4, 2001). Interestingly, Zury Ríos, the daughter of Ríos Montt, the President of parliament, stood out as the sole FRG legislator supporting quotas. She even went so far as to make a public statement of support for quotas, signing a sta-



tement with Nineth Montenegro, a leader of the political Left.

Although the FRG did not support official quotas "the party leadership passed a directive starting with the last [1999] election campaign that all party lists had to include a man, a woman and an indigenous person, starting with the [candidate] lists for parliament to those at the municipal level" (Author's interview with Rodríguez, May 4, 2001). Rodríguez acknowledged that this directive did little to change a prevailing reality that favored male candidates, since very few women were included in the candidate lists despite the party's directive. In her party's defense, Rodríguez maintained that "women are still not completely ready, prepared or educated to participate in an electoral contest nor do they have the necessary economic resources to do so. Within our party we have to self-finance, everyone has to finance his/her own campaign. No one supports anybody financially; moreover, there are [financial] quotas. If one is nominated for a first place on the list, it is a specific amount one has to contribute to the [overall] campaign, those in second, third, even those in the last list position –where people almost never get elected – are obliged to contribute a certain amount." The amount a candidate has to contribute was kept confidential. Since women have in general much smaller economic resources than their male counterparts they are disadvantaged from the outset. Further, Guatemalan politicians have such a bad reputation that getting involved in politics is not considered desirable. "One is impacted by the low reputation that people have of politics and the political parties. Our own family members advise us not to participate and not to get involved in an environment that is seen as inhospitable and dirty from the outside" (Author's interview with Rodríguez, May 4, 2001).

The FRG was not the only party rejecting quotas. In general, Guatemala's political establishment rejected quotas while the social movement advocated their introduction. The disagreement over electoral quotas reflected a general lack of trust and understanding between the political establishment and the social movement. In the eyes of several high-ranking officials, the problem was endemic. In their view, the Arzú administration (1995-1999), did not understand how to reach out to the women's movement and build the necessary alliances (Author's interview with Zelaya, May 2, 2001). Little changed when the Portillo government assumed power. In the eyes of opposition legislator Olga Camey de Noack, the problems continued following the 1999 election of Alfonso Portillo to the presidency: "At the current time [May 2001] the subject of women's [rights] is a subject that has received no attention from the current government ... The agenda of this government has in no instant prioritized, much less sought to vindicate, the subject of women's [rights]" (Author's interview with Camey, May 7, 2001). Not surprisingly, members of the Portillo government held opposite views. They faulted the wo-

men's movement for not supporting the government in its efforts to strengthen women's rights.

Political infighting weakened women's efforts to advance gender equality. Ideological differences impeded networking between women across party lines. For example, the female FRG legislators headed by Zury Ríos, organized a women's event on occasion of the March 2001 Women's Day. "Upon initiative of Zury Ríos we organized a very good event – sponsored by MINUGUA - on Women and Power, with invitation to Latin American parliamentarians where all female legislators and women from the public sector were invited. Unfortunately, none of the female deputies from the other parties assisted" (Author's interview with Rodríguez, May 4, 2001). In general, ideological differences prevailed over the search for a common strategy across party lines to advance gender equality.

## 6. Conclusion

The Portillo administration (1999-2003) paid scant attention to the recommendations issued by a series of United Nations reports that evaluated the peace accords and the UN mission in Guatemala was unable to create measures ensuring the completion of the agreements. Thus, in the eyes of key Guatemalan officials, the accords had failed to bring about substantive change. Gustavo Porras, who played a key role in the negotiation and implementation of the accords, argued that the peace process "led to political peace but worsened the peace of the citizen" (Author's interview with Porras, May 3, 2001). Former President Ramiro de Leon Carpio concurred when he maintained that "very little of the accords has been implemented" (Author's interview with de Leon Carpio, May 7, 2001).

The challenge of transforming Guatemalan society is enormous. This is particularly the case considering the conditions prevailing in Guatemala's rural sector where one finds extreme inequality in land tenure and extensive insecurity over property rights. This has made the reintegrating of the URNG ex-combatants into civilian life so challenging. The majority of the URNG's personnel came from Guatemala's twenty-one indigenous peoples and belonged to the most marginalized sectors of society. The living conditions of Guatemala's indigenous communities are appalling. The people have little access to the most basic human needs, including health care, housing and education. World Bank data reveal that in the countryside, where the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population is located, 90 percent live in conditions of abject poverty. Not surprisingly, the situation is particularly precarious for Guatemala's female population. Six out of every ten Guatemalan women live in rural areas, and as elsewhere in the developing world, it is primarily the women who have to find ways to cope with the absence of public services. The situation has further deteriorated as a result of neo-liberal



policies that have led to drastic cuts in the already low level of government spending on basic services.

The 2003 election of Oscar Berger, however, gave rise to renewed hope that the peace accords would be fully implemented. The new president demonstrated a good faith effort by appointing several renowned advocates of the accords to positions in his government. Most importantly, Nobel peace prize laureate Rigoberta Menchú, was appointed goodwill ambassador for the peace accords. Further, Vice-president Ricardo Stein strongly endorsed the efforts of important social sectors that coalesced around a mobilizing effort called the "Renewed Strategy of the Peace Accords" (*Estrategia Renovada de los Acuerdos de Paz*). This strategy had at its core the effort to broaden the social base of support for the accords (Rodríguez 2004: 1). Without strong public support for the implementation of the accords, key provisions of the agreements would not be executed, since they faced opposition from the powerful economic interests that benefited from the status quo.

Guatemala's predicament was not different from the reality facing its Salvadoran neighbors. In January 2004, on occasion of the 12<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Salvadoran peace accords, Schafik Handal, a signatory of the accords on behalf of the Salvadoran guerrillas and the FMLN's candidate in the latest presidential elections, recognized "that some important agreements were never carried out or were fulfilled halfway. It was a hard blow for the stability of the country and the well-being of the majority that the government of the neo-liberal right and certain groups of great economic power did not fulfill the accord concerning the Economic and Social Forum and other important socio-economic agreements. On the contrary, what the people received was a painful succession of massive dismissals, privatizations, cuts in social spending, destruction of labor unions, [and] reduction in real salaries" (Handal 2004: 70). Thus, even in El Salvador where the former guerrillas constituted the strongest party in parliament, the accords were not fully implemented in those strategic areas that threatened the dominant economic interests. This reality bodes ill for the future of the Guatemalan accords. The URNG has failed to create a strong political force that could advocate in favor of the peace agreement. Thus, the country's economic elite has a relatively easy time successfully opposing the implementation of those accords it considers threatening. Only the mobilization of broad social forces can change this situation.

- 1 Zum besseren Verständnis findet sich im Anhang des Artikels eine Beschreibung des guatemalteckischen Parteienspektrums.
- 2 For a discussion of electoral versus "real" democracy, see Vanden and Prevost (1993: 129-151); Vilas (1995: 171-189); Luciak (1995: 13-46).
- 3 Several passages in this article are taken from Luciak, *After the Revolution: Gender and Democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala*.

- 4 See Luciak (2004).
- 5 Noriega was accused by his wife, also a respected URNG militant, of having sexually abused his stepdaughter.
- 6 Data are based on information provided by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Tanco, the United Nations military official overseeing the demobilization process.
- 7 United Nations and URNG officials were generally reluctant to discuss membership statistics. Contrary to El Salvador there are also no official data indicating the gender composition of the three groups making up the URNG combatants.
- 8 In light of the fact that many URNG combatants were brought back from refugee camps in Mexico, it is reasonable to assume that some of the women that were demobilized were not actual combatants. This is probably also the case for a number of the male URNG members.
- 9 The parties failed to nominate candidates for all positions. In the case of GANA, in some departments the individual parties of the coalition presented their own candidate lists. This is the reason why GANA has more candidates than the total 158 seats.
- 10 The author observed this meeting.

## References

### *Personal Interviews:*

- Asturias, Rodrigo. Commander-in chief of the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) and member of the URNG National Directorate. Guatemala City, May 4, 2001.
- Carrera, Amanda. URNG official in charge of the gender group of the Fundación Guillermo Toriello. Guatemala City, March 3, 1999.
- Camey, Olga de Noack. Member of Parliament for the Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN). Guatemala City, May 7, 2001.
- Carpio, Ramiro de Leon. Former President of Guatemala. Guatemala City, May 7, 2001.
- Maldonado, Alba Estela. («Comandante Lola»). Member of the URNG's Executive Council and head of the Women's Secretariat. Guatemala City, November 20, 1997, March 2, 1999, and May 4, 2001.
- Méndez, Luz. Member of the URNG's Political Council and Executive Director of the National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG). Guatemala City, March 3, 1999 and May 2, 2001.
- Monsanto, Pablo. President of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). Guatemala City, May 7, 2001.
- Montenegro, Nineth. Member of Parliament. Guatemala City, May 7, 2001.
- Porras, Gustavo. President Arzú's private secretary and key figure in the implementation of the accords. Guatemala City, May 3, 2001.
- Rodríguez, Zulema de Paz. President of the Women's Commission of the Guatemalan parliament and member of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), Guatemala City, May 4, 2001.

- Rosales, Ricardo. Head of the Guatemalan Workers' Party (PGT) and member of the URNG National Directorate. Guatemala City, May 7, 2001.
- Wohlers, Patricia. MINUGUA official in charge of gender issues. Guatemala City, May 5, 2001.
- Zelaya, Racquel. Government official under the Arzú administration in charge of implementing the peace accords, Guatemala City, May 2, 2001.

*Published and Unpublished Sources:*

- Broder, Henrik (1999): "Clinton Apologizes for U.S. Support of Guatemalan Rightists," New York Times, March 10.
- Carver, Terrell (1996) *Gender is not a Synonym for Women*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Gobierno de Guatemala (2001): *Política nacional de promoción y desarrollo de las mujeres guatemaltecas y plan de equidad de oportunidades 2001-2006*. Guatemala City: Government of Guatemala.
- Gramajo Morales, Hector Alejandro (1996): *Political Transition in Guatemala, 1980-1990*. In: Domínguez, Jorge I./Lindenberg, Marc (eds.): *Democratic Transitions in Central America*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Handal, Schafik (2004): "A doce años de la firma de paz la hora del cambio para El Salvador se acerca." *Incidencia democrática-reporte diario*. 422, 6-8.
- Historical Clarification Commission (1999): *Guatemala: Memory of Silence*. Guatemala City: Historical Clarification Commission.
- Holiday, David (2000): "Guatemala's Precarious Peace." *Current History* 99 (634), 78-84.
- Jaramillo, Velia (2003) : "Los "ex-comandantes" se dividen en la política." In : *Proceso*. November 4. , Nov.4, 2003.
- Landau, Saul (1993): *The Guerrilla Wars of Central America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Luciak, Ilja A (2004): *Gender Equality and the Guatemalan Peace Accords: Critical Reflections*. In: Mazurana, Dyan/Raven-Roberts, Angela/Parpart, Jane (eds.): *Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping: National and International Perspectives*. Lanham: Roman & Littlefield.
- (2001): *After the Revolution: Gender and Democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- (1995): *The Sandinista Legacy: Lessons from a Political Economy in Transition*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- McCleary, Rachel (1997): "Guatemala's Postwar Prospects." *Journal of Democracy* 8 (2), 129-143.
- Méndez, Luz. (No year). "El papel de las mujeres en la URNG." *África América Latina* 31, 60-62.
- Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala (MINUGUA, 2001) : *Los desafíos para la participación de las mujeres guatemaltecas*. Guatemala City: MINUGUA.
- Negro, Nineth (2002): "The Challenge of Women's Political Participation in Guatemala." In: *Women in Parliament*, Ed. International IDEA, Stockholm.

- Parvikko, Tuija (1991): Conceptions of Gender Equality: Similarity and Difference. In: Meehan, Elizabeth/Sevenhuijsen, Selma (eds.): *Equality Politics and Gender*. London: Sage, 36-51.
- Rodríguez, Dania M. (2004): "Acuerdos de Paz para el futuro." *Incidencia democrática-reporte diario* 422, 1-2.
- Schlesinger, Stephen/Kinzer, Stephen (1999): *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Harvard University-David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies.
- Spence, Jack, David R. Dye, Paula Worby, Carmen Rosa de Leo-Escribano, George Vickers, and Mike Lanchin (1998): *Promise and Reality: Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords*. Cambridge: Hemisphere Initiatives.
- Torres Rivas, Edelberto (ed., 1997): *Guatemala, izquierdas en transición*. Guatemala City: FLACSO.
- (1996): *Guatemala: Democratic Governability*. In: Domínguez, Jorge/Lownthal, Abraham F. (eds.): *Constructing Democratic Governance: Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean in the 1990s*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (1998): "Cumplimiento de los acuerdos de paz: Período mayo-agosto." Guatemala City: URNG.
- (1997): *Personal Incorporado: Diagnóstico Socio-Económico*. Guatemala City: URNG..
- United Nations (1996a): *Acuerdo sobre el definitivo cese al fuego*. Guatemala City: MINUGUA.
- (1996b): *Acuerdo sobre fortalecimiento del poder civil y función del ejército en una sociedad democrática*. Guatemala City: MINUGUA.
- (1995): *Acuerdo sobre identidad y derechos de los pueblos indígenas*. Guatemala City: MINUGUA.
- (1994): *Acuerdo para el reasentamiento de las poblaciones desarraigadas por el enfrentamiento armado*. Guatemala City: MINUGUA.
- Vanden, Harry E./Prevost, Gary (1993): *Democracy and Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Vilas, Carlos (1995): *Between Earthquakes and Volcanoes: Market, State, and Revolutions in Central America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Zeissig, Otto (2003): "Responder a los desafíos que se presentan en el proceso electoral." *Incidencia democrática-reporte diario* 3 27, 1-2.

## Abstracts

This article examines the state of post-war Guatemala focusing on gender and democracy. I argue that real, substantive democracy requires the full incorporation of women into the political process both at the party and societal level. I maintain that a gendered analysis of democratization is essential to obtain a meaningful picture of the social and political reality confronting societies in transition toward more democratic forms of government. I focus on the transformation of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement into a political party and discuss political participation in the wake of the accords. The analysis shows that the Guatemalan accords, exemplary from a gender perspective, have yet to be fully implemented. This situation requires a renewed societal mobilization in favor of structural change.

Dieser Artikel untersucht Gender und Demokratie in Nachkriegs-Guatemala. Ich argumentiere, dass wirkliche, substanzielle Demokratie die vollständige Integration der Frauen in den politischen Prozess erfordert, sowohl auf der Parteien- als auch der gesellschaftlichen Ebene. Demokratisierung aus der Genderperspektive zu untersuchen ist wesentlich, um ein umfassendes Bild von der sozialen und politischen Realität zu erhalten, denen sich Transitionsgesellschaften am Weg zu demokratischeren Formen des Regierens gegenübersehen. Ich konzentriere mich auf den Transformationsprozess der guatemalteckischen Guerilla in eine politische Partei und diskutiere politische Partizipation unmittelbar nach Abschluss der Friedensverträge. Eine Analyse aus der Genderperspektive zeigt, dass die guatemalteckischen Friedensverträge noch nicht vollständig umgesetzt wurden. Die Situation erfordert eine neue gesellschaftliche Mobilisierung für strukturellen Wandel.

Ilja Luciak

Professor and Chair

Department of Political Science

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Blacksburg, Virginia 24061, USA

E-Mail: [iluciak@vt.edu](mailto:iluciak@vt.edu)