

JOURNAL FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK

herausgegeben vom Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik
an den österreichischen Universitäten

vol. XXII 1–2006

IN MEMORIAM: ANDRE GUNDER FRANK

Was bleibt von der „Entwicklung der Unterentwicklung“?

Schwerpunktredaktion: Karin Fischer und Christof Parnreiter

Mandelbaum Edition Südwind

Journal für Entwicklungspolitik (JEP)
Austrian Journal of Development Studies

Herausgeber: Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik an den Österreichischen Universitäten

Redaktion: Gerald Faschingeder, Karin Fischer (verantwortlich), Margit Franz, Inge Grau, Irmi Maral-Hanak, Franziska Herdin, Karen Imhof, Johannes Jäger, Bettina Köhler, Franz Kolland, René Kuppe, Bernhard Leubolt, Barbara Nothegger, Andreas Novy, Christof Parnreiter, Petra Purkharthofer, Kunibert Raffer, Anselm Skuhra

Board of Editors: Dieter Boris (Marburg), John-ren Chen (Innsbruck), Hartmut Elsenhals (Leipzig), Jacques Forster (Genève), John Friedmann (St. Kilda), Peter Jankowitsch (Paris), Friedrich Katz (Chicago), Helmut Konrad (Graz), Ulrich Menzel (Braunschweig), Jean-Philippe Platteau (Namur), Dieter Rothermund (Heidelberg), Heribert Steinbauer (Wien), Paul Streeten (Boston), Osvaldo Sunkel (Santiago de Chile)

Produktionsleitung: Pia Lichtblau

Umschlaggestaltung: Michael Baiculescu

Inhaltsverzeichnis

- 4 Editorial
- 8 COLIN LEYS
A Tribute to Andre Gunder Frank
- 12 ANDREA KOMLOSY
Vom europäischen Weltsystem-Modell zur globalistischen
Analyse. Entwicklungen und Diskussionsanstöße des
Andre Gunder Frank
- 37 RONEN PALAN
Andre Gunder Frank's Legacy in Contemporary International
Relations
- 55 RICARDO DUCHESNE
Globalization, the Industrialization of Puerto Rico and the
Limits of Dependency Theory
- 84 MARCOS AGUILA, JEFFREY BORTZ
Andre Gunder Frank: The Limits to the Latin American
Lumpenbourgeoisie
- 98 Ausgewählte Bibliographie von Andre Gunder Frank
- 112 Rezension
- 117 Schwerpunktredaktion, Autorinnen und Autoren
- 120 Impressum

Editorial

Das Jahr 2006 mit einem Heft zu beginnen, das den Beitrag von Andre Gunder Frank zur Entwicklungsforschung würdigt und zugleich kritisch diskutiert, war schon lange geplant. Vor 40 Jahren veröffentlichte Andre Gunder Frank seinen Aufsatz *The Development of Underdevelopment*, in dem er das damals dominierende Entwicklungsdenken auf den Kopf stellte.

An die Stelle behaupteter Geschichtslosigkeit setzte Frank eine Historisierung der Unterentwicklung. Ging die Modernisierungstheorie davon aus, dass der Wohlstand des Zentrums sich auf alle Nationen ausbreiten könnte, wenn diese bestimmte Vorgaben erfüllen würden, waren für Frank gerade die historischen und fortgesetzten Beziehungen zwischen Satelliten und Metropolen dafür verantwortlich, dass sich erstere „unterentwickelten“ und zweitere entwickelten. Unterentwicklung wurde damit zu einem historischen Prozess, der durch die Beziehungen zur Metropole entstand. Folglich konnte wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in den Satelliten am besten dann stattfinden, wenn deren Verbindungen zur Metropole möglichst schwach ausgeprägt waren. Auch die interne soziale Differenzierung sah Frank als abhängig von der Metropolenbindung, die demnach zur Herausbildung einer „Lumpenbourgeoisie“ in den Satelliten beitrug. Diese „Lumpenbourgeoisie“ profitierte einerseits von einer Integration der jeweiligen Länder in einen asymmetrisch strukturierten Weltmarkt, erwies sich aber andererseits als unfähig und unwillig, jene „historische Mission“ zu erfüllen, die der Bourgeoisie in der konventionellen marxistischen Geschichtsauffassung zugeschrieben wurde, nämlich eine radikale Transformation der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse.

Frank wurde mit diesen Thesen zu einem der wichtigsten Vertreter der Dependenztheorie in Lateinamerika und zu ihrem ersten Vermittler im englischen und deutschen Sprachraum. Die These von der „Entwicklung der Unterentwicklung“ sollte die Entwicklungs- und Kapitalismusforschung für viele Jahre beeinflussen und der gleichnamige Aufsatz hat heute noch, 40 Jahre nach seinem Erscheinen, einen Fixplatz in der Literaturliste zahlloser Seminare.

Leider erscheint diese Ausgabe des *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* nicht nur aufgrund des Jubiläums der Publikation von *The Development of Under-*

development: Andre Gunder Frank ist am 23. April 2005 verstorben. An der Idee, Aspekte seines Werkes kritisch einzuschätzen, wollten wir allerdings festhalten, alleine schon der Hunderten Studierenden wegen, die sich Jahr für Jahr im Rahmen der „Internationalen Entwicklung“ an der Universität Wien mit seinen frühen Arbeiten auseinandersetzen.

„Franks frühe Arbeiten“ – dieser Fokus ist uns in der Vorbereitung dieses Heftes nicht nur in der Reflexion unseres eigenen Umgangs mit dem alleine schon vom Umfang her beeindruckenden Schaffen Franks – Cristóbal Kay (2005: 1177) zählt über 1.000 Publikationen, die in über 30 Sprachen erschienen sind – aufgefallen. Trotz der Debatten, die Frank mit *ReOrient* (1998) ausgelöst hat, scheint die Auseinandersetzung mit seinem Frühwerk in der Entwicklungsforschung nach den 1970er Jahren deutlich an Intensität verloren zu haben. Die (zahlreichen) Absagen, die wir vor allem von jüngeren EntwicklungsforscherInnen aus Lateinamerika auf unsere Bitte um einen Beitrag erhalten haben, bestätigen die Diagnose von Colin Leys. Er schreibt in seiner Würdigung, die am Beginn dieser Ausgabe steht, dass es heute „für jeden unter sechzig“ wohl sehr schwer ist, den „Enthüllungsscharakter“ und die ungeheure Wirkung von Franks Thesen nachzuvollziehen.

Zu den Beiträgen in diesem Heft

Im Anschluss an das *Tribute* von Colin Leys beschäftigt sich Andrea Komlosy mit Franks zentraler These in seinem Spätwerk. Frank machte in seinem Buch *ReOrient* (1998) Ostasien und insbesondere China zum Zentrum eines Weltsystems mit weltumspannendem Charakter, das erst an der Wende zum 19. Jahrhundert von den seefahrenden Mächten Nordwesteuropas abgelöst wurde. Frank hat auch hier, ähnlich seiner These von der Entwicklung der Unterentwicklung, mit einer Sichtweise radikal gebrochen, in diesem Fall mit dem Eurozentrismus, der dem Weltsystemkonzept Wallersteins laut Frank anhaftet.

Daran anschließend setzt sich Ronen Palan mit Franks Konzept des kapitalistischen Weltsystems auseinander, das Frank als ein zugleich soziales und räumliches Phänomen begriff und dessen universelles Kennzeichen die (abhängigen) Beziehungen zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie sind. Palan würdigt Franks Beitrag zu einer grundlegenden Infragestellung modernisie-

rungstheoretischer Annahmen, Entwicklungsvorstellungen und auch Analyseeinheiten des Faches *International Relations*, das bis dahin unhinterfragt den Staat in den Mittelpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit gerückt hatte. Palan diskutiert allerdings auch kritisch Franks monolithischen Blick auf das Zentrum-Peripherie-Verhältnis, mit dem neuere Entwicklungen nicht (mehr) ausreichend erklärt werden können.

Ricardo Duchesne widmet sich ebenfalls diesem Aspekt, allerdings stärker auf empirischer Ebene. In seinem Fallbeispiel untersucht er Costa Ricas Rolle in der internationalen Arbeitsteilung. Er fragt, inwieweit Franks Thesen dazu beitragen können, die Entwicklung dieses Landes zu verstehen und zu erklären – und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass sie das nicht (ausreichend) tun können.

Marcos Aguila und Jeffrey Bortz richten ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf interne Faktoren in armen Ländern, genauer auf die internen Klassenstrukturen, die Unterentwicklung aufrechterhalten. Die Autoren verleihen Franks Klassenanalyse und seinem Konzept der „Lumpenbourgeoisie“ (1972) mit einem Blick auf die jüngsten politischen Entwicklungen in Lateinamerika Aktualität. Hätte Andre Gunder Frank die Wahlerfolge der politischen Linken in zahlreichen Staaten derart eingeschätzt, dass diese Regierungen in der Lage sind, eine soziale Dynamik zu entfachen, die zu einer Transformation der „Lumpenentwicklung“ führen könnte?

Das Heft bietet schließlich allen an Frank Interessierten weitere Referenzen zu seinem Schaffen. Bernhard Wernitznig, der an der Universität Wien Internationale Entwicklung studiert, hat eine Bibliographie erstellt, die Franks Bücher und Zeitschriftenaufsätze umfasst. Den Abschluss des Heftes macht Susan Zimmermann: Sie bespricht ein von Gerald Hödl posthum herausgegebenes Buch (Frank 2005), das bislang kaum bekannte Aufsätze versammelt.

KARIN FISCHER UND CHRISTOF PARNREITER

Literatur

- Frank, Andre Gunder (1966): The Development of Underdevelopment. In: Monthly Review 18 (4), 17-31.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1972): Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpenddevelopment. Dependence, Class, and Politics in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1998): ReOrient. Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (2005): Von der Neuen Welt zum Reich der Mitte. Orientierung im Weltsystem. Herausgegeben von Gerald Hödl. Wien: Promedia.
- Kay, Cristóbal (2005): Andre Gunder Frank: From the “Development of Underdevelopment” to the “World System”. In: Development and Change 36 (6), 1177–1183.

COLIN LEYS

A Tribute to Andre Gunder Frank¹

Andre Gunder Frank was one of the most influential progressive thinkers about development in the twentieth century – perhaps the most influential of all. His famous article attacking modernization theory, *Sociology of Underdevelopment and Underdevelopment of Sociology*, first appeared in 1967 in a magazine called *Catalyst*. I imagine *Catalyst* was a fairly obscure publication because the article was soon being passed around in various copied forms (this was the pre-photocopier age), like samizdat. Most of us read it, however, in 1969 when it came out in his Monthly Review book, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution*. In this book the critique of modernization was first linked to dependency theory, which he had absorbed during his time in Chile in the mid-1960s. He extensively cited and quoted the Latin American historians and social scientists who had developed the dependency perspective. He did for Latin American dependency theory what the *New Left Review* did for continental European Marxism at the same time, making it available to English language readers.

It is hard for anyone under the age of 60 to grasp the significance of this – a successful intellectual challenge to orthodox ideas before May 1968 and the anti-Vietnam War struggles in the USA had dispersed the stifling atmosphere of the Cold War and McCarthyism. Frank's book effectively broke the grip of modernization theory, and made dependency the dominant paradigm for the decade of the 1970s. For those of us working in Africa at that time, it was a confirming revelation. It made sense of what we were seeing in Africa, whereas modernization theory made no sense of it. As Engels said of how his generation of young German radicals reacted when they first read Ludwig Feuerbach's critique of idealism, *The Essence of Christianity*: 'we all at once became Feuerbachians' – now we all at once became *dependen-*

tistas. Frank was not our only source of dependency thinking. For example Walter Rodney from Guiana was teaching in Dar es Salaam and his book on *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* was a major influence there, and there were many others. But I think Frank influenced most of them too. There is another parallel with Feuerbach, whose radical politics kept him effectively exiled from Berlin, where the intellectual action was. Frank and his Chilean wife Marta Fuentes had to flee Chile in 1973 when the government led by his friend Salvador Allende was overthrown, and Allende himself murdered. Frank, who had German nationality, although he grew up in the US, had already been banned from re-entering the US as a result of his radical politics – his son Paul says his trouble began with his opposition to the Korean War. And his 1967 article devastatingly attacked the development establishment, whose modernization ideology was promoted by the most influential American journal of development at the time, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. So after Chile Frank became a nomad. He never settled down again, even when he had the chance of a permanent job, but held numerous jobs for short periods in at least half a dozen countries including Brazil, Mexico, Germany, England, the Netherlands and Canada. He always felt an exile – even when he was allowed to live in the USA again.

Exile from the mainstream can spur originality, but can also lead to extremism. Feuerbach notoriously went on to say 'man is what he eats', allowing his powerful critique of idealism to be reduced to the crudest kind of materialism. Frank committed himself to ill-judged positions too. Even his version of dependency theory had a sort of Parsonian-Marxist quality. It was framed in terms of three interrelated contradictions, the nature of which wasn't all that clear. It was curiously ahistorical, given that history was of its essence. And it made the underdevelopment of the periphery into a necessary cause of the development of the metropolises – an implausible position that he later abandoned, like many others – including dependency theory itself. Many Latin American social scientists felt uncomfortable with the way he handled the concept of dependency – including some of the Chilean Marxists in the MIR, with which Frank was aligned when he was there.

His formulations also allowed mediocre minds in the US and Britain – and I dare say others elsewhere – to make laboured criticisms that showed,

to their satisfaction, and the satisfaction of the doyens of American development studies, that Frank was wrong. For instance Frank had maintained that the underdevelopment of the colonies and ex-colonies had been a necessary cause of the industrialization of the colonial powers. So his critics huffed and puffed to show that it was historically implausible that Britain *could* not have industrialized without looting India. Frank also argued that the periphery had developed, and could develop, only when its links with the metropolises were weakened. So American academics did elaborate cross-national quantitative surveys, using “key indicators” (of sometimes absurdly dubious value) to show that the level of investment and trade between the periphery and the centre varied *positively* with the level of development at the periphery, not *negatively* as, on their reductionist reading of it, Frank’s thesis implied.

But by then Frank himself had long moved on from those formulations, and so had those most influenced by him. Yet part of his impact was due, I think, to his capacity to frame his ideas in extreme, dramatic ways that challenged existing positions very effectively, and provoked telling responses. The fact that he framed his version of dependency not in terms of dependency, but of *underdevelopment*, is a case in point. “Underdevelopment” had been introduced into the official language of the United Nations and its regional agencies as a euphemism to replace the term “undeveloped” which had itself been introduced as a euphemism for ‘backward’. Frank now took the term and gave it a new, subversive meaning. For him, underdevelopment was a *process*. In his usage, “to underdevelop” became a verb, what the metropolises had done and were still doing to the periphery. For him, to call a country underdeveloped no longer implied that it was short of capital and technology and advice from the developed countries, but that it was an ongoing victim of their rapacity. And Frank’s usage spread rapidly, throughout the third world, and among progressive students and activists everywhere.

So the orthodoxy needed a new euphemism: “underdeveloped” was dropped, and replaced by ‘less developed’, which remains with us to this day. It is one of the few cases I can think of where the ideologists of the right have been forced to surrender of a term to the ideologists of the left. That was a remarkable achievement in itself, and I think really due to the single-

handed intervention of Andre Gunder Frank. And it wasn't just a semantic victory. For the next decade the intellectual initiative passed from the American mainstream, and its institutional allies in Europe, to their opponents in the third world. Of course many others were part of this. Indian historians and social scientists had developed their own version of dependency theory long before Frank's popularisation of the Latin American version of it, and of course there were influential counterparts elsewhere, such as Franz Fanon – the English translation of *The Wretched of the Earth* appeared in 1967, simultaneously with Frank's famous first article. From the late 1960s onwards there was a convergence of thinking about development, in which Frank's way of modelling dependency was debated and challenged and refined by progressive thinkers from all over the world. But I think it is true to say that more than anyone else Frank initiated this debate, and to a remarkable extent it continued to evolve around his formulations – long after he himself had moved on from them, in fact.

From the 1980s onwards, as the Washington Consensus descended on the world like an iron blanket (replacing the Iron Curtain), Frank became more and more pessimistic about the prospects for any kind of nation-based developmentalism. He turned first to World Systems theory, and finally to a conception of development as a global process, occurring on a scale, and for reasons, more or less beyond conscious human intervention: a process based on westward moving centres of innovation, starting in China and eventually, in the twenty-first century, arriving back via Europe in China again. I don't want to dwell on this, partly because I am not familiar enough with that phase of his work, but also because I don't think it is possible to abandon the commitment to development – and because development is inescapably linked to imperialism, and imperialism is, evidently, very far from being something unconscious. No serious student of development today can do without this kind of broad historical analytic framework, and our understanding of it is due significantly to the work of Andre Gunder Frank.

¹ The tribute was presented at a memorial event in Queen Elizabeth House, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, on May 12th 2005. The written version was slightly shortened by the editors.

ANDREA KOMLOSY

**Vom europäischen Weltsystem-Modell zur globalistischen Analyse
Entwicklungen und Diskussionsanstöße des Andre Gunder Frank**

Einen Namen in der kritischen Sozialwissenschaft hat sich Andre Gunder Frank mit seinem Werk *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967) erworben. Dieses schlug in der entwicklungspolitischen Öffentlichkeit nicht zuletzt deshalb so stark ein, da es Analyse und Handlungsperspektive in einem bot. Frank führte die Probleme der lateinamerikanischen Staaten nicht auf deren Rückständigkeit, das heißt den Ausschluss von bzw. den Mangel an Entwicklung, sondern auf ihre abhängige Integration in die von Europa beherrschte Weltwirtschaft zurück. Die europäischen Mächte funktionalisierten die lateinamerikanischen Gesellschaften, wozu sie dem jeweiligen Wirtschaftszyklus nach nützlich waren: zu Silberproduzenten, Plantagenökonomien, Lieferanten von Nahrungsmitteln und Rohstoffen für Weiterverarbeitung und Konsum sowie, im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, zu Absatzmärkten und Standorten für kostengünstige industrielle Massenproduktion. In jedem Fall wurden einheimische Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft auf die Erfordernisse ausgerichtet, die dem Zentrum nützten; eigenständige Kreisläufe wurden unterbrochen und eine Peripherisierung in Gang gesetzt, die sich selbst verstärkend reproduzierte. Frank bezeichnete diese Dynamik bahnbrechend als „Entwicklung der Unterentwicklung“. Die einheimischen Machteliten wurden dabei nicht aus der Verantwortung genommen, als „Lumpenbourgeoisie“ jedoch auf die Rolle reduziert, die sie als Brückenköpfe, Vollstrecker und Nutznießer ausländischer Interessen spielten (Frank 1972).

Als entwicklungspolitische Konsequenz aus diesem *Circulus vitiosus* schlug Frank Abkoppelung vor. Ein Durchbrechen der Abhängigkeitsbande durch eine bewusste Herauslösung der Staaten der Peripherie aus den weltwirtschaftlichen Zwängen würde Perspektiven für den Aufbau eigen-

ständiger, regional angepasster Strukturen bieten. Eine solche Strategie wurde unter lateinamerikanischen Intellektuellen bereits seit den 1930er Jahren debattiert; die Atempause, die die Verstrickung der europäischen Mächte im Zweiten Weltkrieg eröffnete, hatte erste Erfolge importsostituierender Entwicklung gebracht. In der UN-Wirtschaftskommission für Lateinamerika (CEPAL) mehrten sich die Stimmen, die die Hoffnung auf nachholende Entwicklung nicht mit Integration, sondern mit Dissoziation verbanden. Frank war in diese Debatten in den 1960er Jahren durch mehrere Aufenthalte an lateinamerikanischen Universitäten involviert; er heiratete die politisch engagierte Marta Fuentes, ließ sich in ihrer Heimat Chile nieder und setzte, auch wenn er selbst eine radikalere Variante der Abkoppelung vertrat, große Hoffnungen auf den chilenischen Weg unter Salvador Allende. Franks *Abhängige Akkumulation und Unterentwicklung in Lateinamerika* (1980) kam zu einem Zeitpunkt, als die Weltöffentlichkeit das Experiment Allende verfolgte. Es vermittelte den theoretischen Hintergrund und machte die *Dependencia*-Theorie als Theorie des peripheren Kapitalismus weit über Lateinamerika hinaus bekannt.

Die Dependenztheorie kann als Vorläufer der Weltsystemanalyse gelesen werden. Sie wies klar den dualistischen Erklärungsansatz der herrschenden sowohl bürgerlichen als auch marxistischen Modernisierungstheorien zurück, die Unterentwicklung als innere Entwicklungsbarriere ansahen und erklärte die Disparität aus der Polarisierung innerhalb der durch das Kolonialsystem etablierten ungleichen internationalen Arbeitsteilung. Die Analyse nahm also ein von Europa beherrschtes Weltsystem an, die Überwindungsstrategie hingegen zielte auf die - zumindest vorübergehende - Herauslösung der peripherisierten Staaten aus diesem. Die Niederschlagung des chilenischen Sozialismus versetzte der damaligen Aufbruchstimmung einen klaren Dämpfer; sie zeigte die Grenzen, die die herrschenden Machtverhältnisse örtlichen Alternativen bescherten, bestätigte jedoch gleichzeitig die Abhängigkeitsdiagnose. Frank, der Chile mit seiner Familie 1973 verlassen musste, hat seinen Abkoppelungsoptimismus damals aufgegeben. Er widmete sich fortan der Analyse der Wirkungsweise des globalen Kapitalismus. Die Werke, die Frank in den nächsten zehn Jahren publizierte, stehen im Zeichen der Weltsystemanalyse, die eng mit dem Namen Immanuel Wallersteins und dem Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations an der Binghamton University (New York) ver-

bunden ist (Wallerstein 1998-2004; <http://fbc.binghamton.edu/>). Frank hat seine historischen Forschungen immer mit dem aktuellen Geschehen verbunden und sich kritisch zu Krise, Verschuldung, Militärintervention und Krieg zu Wort gemeldet.

Im Folgenden wird entlang der wichtigsten Frankschen Veröffentlichungen seine Entwicklung von der Erforschung des „europäischen Welt-systems“ zu einem globalistischen Erklärungsansatz aufgezeigt. Mit dem Vorwurf des Eurozentrismus an die ältere Weltsystemanalyse in der Tradition von Fernand Braudel und im Umfeld von Immanuel Wallerstein weist Frank auch bewährte Erklärungen für Ursachen und Ablauf europäischer Expansion sowie die Lokalisierung und die Abfolge von Hegemonien innerhalb der Weltwirtschaft zurück. Der Beitrag greift die Einwände auf, die das Franksche Konzept eines „Single World System“ hervorgerufen hat und diskutiert abschließend Konsequenzen seines globalistischen Anspruchs für die globalhistorische Forschung.

1. Das europäische Weltsystem

Tatsächlich muss die Entwicklung der Weltsystemanalyse als kooperatives Projekt angesehen werden, an dem ein großer Kreis von Forschenden und Institutionen teil hatte. Eine Kommunikationsdrehscheibe stellte das „Kleeblatt“ Wallerstein, Frank, Samir Amin und Giovanni Arrighi dar, die in einem engen Diskussionsprozess standen und mehrere Bände miteinander veröffentlichten (Amin et al. 1986; 1990). Die elaborierten wirtschaftshistorischen Werke, die Frank selbst über die Geschichte des kapitalistischen Weltsystems verfasst hat (Frank 1975, 1978, 1980a, 1980b, 1981a, 1981b), sind an die breite Rezeption von Wallersteins *Das moderne Weltsystem* (1998-2004) jedoch niemals herangekommen. Im Wesentlichen herrschte damals Konsens unter den KollegInnen: das kapitalistische Weltsystem habe sich seit dem 16. Jahrhundert aus der Überwindung der spätmittelalterlichen Krise heraus als ein auf Kapitalakkumulation und Expansion gerichtetes Projekt entwickelt, das durch wechselnde politische Hegemonien und langfristige Zyklen der Kapitalakkumulation sowie eine funktionale Arbeitsteilung zwischen Kernräumen und von diesen abhängigen Peripherien gekennzeichnet war. Im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert gehörten

diesem Weltsystem Nordwesteuropa als Zentrum, Süd- und Zentraleuropa als Semiperipherie sowie Nordosteuropa und die erschlossenen Regionen in den Amerikas als Peripherien an; der Rest der Welt wurde als „Außenarena“ oder „externe Zone“ wahrgenommen, die politisch zersplittert war (Afrika, Zentral- und Nordostasien, Ozeanien) oder in der sich eigene Weltsysteme etablierten (China, Japan und Korea, Indischer Ozean, Osmanisches Reich, Zaristisches Reich). Für diese interessierte man sich allerdings nur insoweit, als europäischerseits Handelsverbindungen mit oder koloniale Vorstöße in diese Weltregionen erfolgten. Ihre „Inkorporierung“ in das von Europa beherrschte Weltsystem erfolgte, von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen (Westafrikanische Sklavenstützpunkte, Goa, Ceylon) allerdings erst im Laufe der großen Expansion des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, als Indien, Zaristisches und Osmanisches Reich, Afrika und Australien-Ozeanien ihre Eigenständigkeit verloren und sich die bis dato multizentrische in eine von den nordwesteuropäischen See- und Industriemächten (seit dem 20. Jahrhundert auch von den USA) beherrschte Weltwirtschaft verwandelte. Franks Beitrag zur Erforschung dieser Weltwirtschaft konzentrierte sich auf die Verknüpfung zwischen der ökonomischen Unterentwicklung durch Kolonialismus und Imperialismus und den Beitrag, den die „permanente primäre Akkumulation“ (Frank 1979: 71) in den Peripherien, wie er den Werttransfer vom Süden in den Norden bezeichnete, für den Aufbau der Führungsrolle der Industriestaaten darstellte.

Ein zweiter großer Strang von Franks Veröffentlichungen war den langen Wellen der Entwicklung gewidmet, die er zur Grundlage seiner Theorie zur Erklärung von Krise und Krisenüberwindung im Kapitalismus machte. Frank zeichnete diese nach ihren „Erfindern“ Kondratieff, Schumpeter u.a. bezeichneten Zyklen bis in die zweite Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts nach (Frank 1978). Diese im Abstand von 40-50 Jahren beobachtbaren, wiederkehrenden Wellenbewegungen der Ökonomie waren durch eine Aufschwung- oder Expansionsphase (A) und eine Abschwung- oder Kontraktionsphase (B) charakterisiert. Die A-Phase stand jeweils im Zeichen eines bestimmten Leitsektors und bestimmter Leittechnologien sowie regionaler Zentren der Kapitalakkumulation, die die ökonomische Expansion beherrschten. Der Umschwung erklärt sich daraus, dass sich Wachstum und Verwertung durch Nachfrageschranken und verschärfte Konkurrenz unter den Anbietern abschwächten. Dies bewirkte fallende Profite, Zusammen-

bruch von Unternehmen, Kollaps der Finanzmärkte, kurzum eine Krise, welche die so genannte B-Phase einleitete. Diese war gekennzeichnet durch die Suche nach neuen Grundlagen für Wachstum, d. h. nach technischer Innovation und neuen Wachstumsbranchen zur Einleitung eines neuen Akkumulationsmodells. Bei diesen Bemühungen veränderten sich die zuvor eingespielten Muster der internationalen Arbeitsteilung: Führende Wirtschaftsräume erlebten Grenzen des Wachstums, andere stiegen auf der Basis neuer technologischer, räumlicher und sozialer Arrangements auf. Es kam also zu einem Wechsel innerhalb der führenden Industrienächte; allerdings eröffnete eine Krise im Zentrum auch den Peripherien der Weltwirtschaft neue Chancen, z. B. wenn diese als kostengünstigere Produktionsstandorte Investitionen anzogen, die bisher den Zentren vorbehalten waren. Umgekehrt bot die Integration peripherer Regionen auf neuer Grundlage dem Zentrum die Möglichkeit, Krisenlasten auf Peripherien abzuwälzen und auf diese Weise die herrschenden Kräfteverhältnisse zu stabilisieren.

Franks persönliche Krise - die Vertreibung und Flucht aus Chile - fiel zusammen mit der Weltwirtschaftskrise von 1973, die die bis heute währende, unter das Motto von Rationalisierung und Kostensenkung gestellte, neue Akkumulationsphase der Weltwirtschaft einleitete. Sie eröffnete die technologische Offensive des Computerzeitalters, leitete eine Loslösung der Finanztransaktionen von der Ebene der realen Produktion ein, die Verschuldung begünstigte und trug durch die Verlagerung der industriellen Massenproduktion in periphere Regionen der Welt zur deren nachholender Industrialisierung bei (Frank/Fuentes-Frank 1990: 49-70); dies stand allerdings nicht im Zeichen von Importsubstitution und eigenständig-endogener Entwicklung, sondern diente der Kostenoptimierung im Rahmen einer zunehmend durch Standortketten und -kombinationen geprägten arbeitsteiligen Produktion im Weltmaßstab.

2. Sozialismus als Modell nachholender Entwicklung

Fast überhaupt kein Interesse rief der wohl originellste Beitrag Franks aus dieser Zeit hervor. Es handelt sich um einen in der Zeitschrift *Review* veröffentlichten Aufsatz zur Rolle der Sowjetunion im Weltssystem (1977). Frank kam dabei zu Schlussfolgerungen, die damals niemand wahrhaben

wollte. Er konstatierte, dass die Sowjetökonomie einen integralen Bestandteil des kapitalistischen Weltsystems darstellte: Dies gehe aus ihrer außenwirtschaftlichen Verflechtung hervor, aber auch aus der Tatsache, dass Zielsetzungen und Bewertungskriterien des Sowjetsystems sich in keiner Weise von den kapitalistischen Vorgaben unterschieden. Die als „Sozialismus“ propagierte Systemalternative sei nichts anderes als eine staatlich verordnete Entwicklungsstrategie zur Förderung nachholender Entwicklung im Weltmaßstab. Während diese den sozialistischen Staaten im Fahrwasser des expansiven Wiederaufbauzyklus nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ein Aufholen erlaubte, zwingt die Weltwirtschaftskrise von 1973 die Wirtschaftsblöcke zu einer verstärkten Integration. Frank prognostizierte also - auf Grundlage seiner aus der zyklischen Bewegung der Kapitalakkumulation abgeleiteten Krisentheorie - bereits 1977 die „Rückkehr“ der sozialistischen Länder in die Weltwirtschaft - als Peripherien, versteht sich, und als Regionen, mit deren Hilfe ein neuer Akkumulationszyklus eingeleitet werden könne. Trotz dieser ernüchternden Erkenntnis plädierte Frank in seinem Buch *The European Challenge* (1983) dafür, dass sich die Europäische Union dem sozialistischen Block öffnen möge. Aus einer solchen Erweiterung erwartete er sich eine Stärkung Europas im Konkurrenzkampf mit den USA, den er als unausweichliche Folge der verschärften globalen Auseinandersetzungen im Gefolge der Weltwirtschaftskrise ansah.

Frank verstand sich seit seiner Politisierung in der Studentenzeit als linker Intellektueller und radikalisierte sich in Lateinamerika zusehends. Das sowjetische Modell, mit dem er sich bereits in seiner Dissertation auseinandergesetzt hatte (1958), hielt er allerdings niemals für attraktiv: Die dependenztheoretische Debatte, auch wenn viele ihrer ProtagonistInnen auf eine wie immer geartete Revolution setzten, orientierte sich nicht an der Sowjetunion; es wurde daher auch verabsäumt, die Erfahrungen der Sowjetunion mit Abkoppelung im Zusammenhang mit den eigenen entwicklungspolitischen Strategien zu reflektieren. Frank arbeitete dieses Defizit nun im Lichte der lateinamerikanischen Erfahrungen auf: Abkoppelung war auch unter sowjetischen Vorzeichen zum Scheitern verurteilt, daher - seine defensive Schlussfolgerung - könnten die gesellschaftspolitischen Errungenschaften des Sozialismus nur gerettet werden, wenn sie sich mit dem europäischen Wohlfahrtsmodell gegen den Kapitalismus US-amerikanischer Prägung verbündeten. Der politische Frank konnte es offenbar nicht lassen, wie-

der Hoffnung auf ein seiner Meinung nach praktikables Modell zu setzen, wenn es nur dazu beitrug, die US-Hegemonie in der Welt zu schwächen. Die Europäische Union ließ die Gelegenheit indes ungenutzt verstreichen. Die Franksche Prognose hingegen erwies sich angesichts des Zusammenbruchs des realen Sozialismus als treffsicher; sie gehört in der Zwischenzeit zum festen Bestandteil einer welt-systemischen Analyse (vgl. Hofbauer/Komlosy 2000).

3. Die Zentralität Zentralasiens

Ähnlich wie der Sturz Allendes und die Weltwirtschaftskrise Frank von Lateinamerika in das Weltsystem als Bezugsrahmen für seine Analyse katalysiert hatten, löste eine von der UNESCO organisierte Studienreise entlang der Seidenstraße einen Positionswechsel aus. Erstens lernte Frank dabei alte Hochkulturen kennen, die sich seit 5000 Jahren vom Mittelmeer bis zum Chinesischen Meer entlang der Seidenstraße entfaltet hatten und die im europäischen Geschichtskanon keine Erwähnung finden. Zweitens bemerkte er, dass diese in ein hoch entwickeltes Netz von Kontakten und Interaktionen eingebettet waren, das nicht erst im Weltreich der Mongolen im 13. Jahrhundert zum Ausdruck kam. Frank wurde sich des Eurozentrismus gewahr, den er und die Weltsystemtheoretiker bislang vertreten hatten. Er war bereit zu lernen: *ex oriente lux*. Ein Schnellkurs in Archäologie und Altertumskunde ließ Frank zur Erkenntnis gelangen: Weltgeschichte ließ sich nicht erst seit der europäischen Expansion als Abfolge und Auseinandersetzung von Kulturen betrachten, die miteinander in Austausch standen, mit wechselnden Kernen und Randzonen, deren Positionen von ihrer jeweiligen Position im Rahmen der sich entfaltenden überregionalen Beziehungen abhing. Die Analogie war so bestechend, dass Frank flugs die bisher vertretenen 500 Jahre durch 5000 Jahre als jenen Zeitraum ersetzte, in dem ein Weltsystem existiert habe (Frank 1992; Frank/Gills 1993). Den Beginn markiere der Übergang ins Neolithikum, mit einer agrikulturnen Wirtschaftsweise, die auf regelmäßigen und systematischen Austausch mit anderen Kulturen angewiesen gewesen sei und sich ausgehend von ihren Ursprüngen in wenigen klimatisch begünstigten Zonen durch Kulturkontakte auf dem Globus verbreitet habe.

Dieses Weltsystem wird anders als das bisher angenommene europäische, das anfänglich mit anderen regionalen Weltsystemen koexistierte und diese erst im Laufe des 18. Jahrhunderts seinem Einfluss unterwarf, als ein einziges weltumspannendes System gesehen. Zwecks Periodisierung und Untergliederung wurde das Modell der langen Wellen in die Frühgeschichte der Menschheit ausgedehnt. Das Attribut „kapitalistisch“, mit dem das europa-zentrierte Weltsystem verbunden war, ließ Frank im Laufe der Periodisierungsdebatte fallen; anstelle von Kapitalismus erklärte er „Kapitalakkumulation“ und „Standortkonkurrenz“ zu den Bewegungsgesetzen des 5000jährigen Weltsystems.

Wie Franks Positionswechsel in Archäologenkreisen aufgenommen wurde, entzieht sich meiner Kenntnis. In den historischen Sozialwissenschaften rief sein Revirement größtes Unverständnis hervor; es wurde - ich schließe mich selbst ein - weitgehend ignoriert. Dass Frank den Fund eines vor 5000 Jahren verstorbenen Hirten, des so genannten „Ötzi“, in den Tiroler Alpen im Jahr 1991 begeistert als Indiz für frühe Transhumanz begrüßte, hielt ich für mehr als überzogen. Niemand leugnete die alten Hochkulturen und auch nicht den Austausch, auf dem diese beruhten. Aber man konnte doch nicht die sporadischen Kontakte, die zwischen diesen bestanden, mit der systematischen Eingliederung immer größerer Teile der Welt in eine von Europa ausgehende globale Arbeitsteilung vergleichen, die bisher als Charakteristikum eines „Weltsystems“ gegolten hatte. Kaum jemand wollte sich auf diesen Vergleich einlassen.

In der Zwischenzeit hat meine eigene Beschäftigung mit Globalgeschichte größeres Verständnis für Franks Verunsicherung hervorgerufen. Die Jungsteinzeit liegt zwar nach wie vor außerhalb meines Betrachtungshorizonts, die atlantische Expansion des 16. Jahrhunderts hat indessen ihre große Bedeutung als Epochenschwelle eingebüßt. Dazu beigetragen haben nicht zuletzt die Forschungen über die Interaktionen zwischen den eurasischen Großregionen, die zum Beispiel Janet Abu-Lughod für das 11. bis 13. Jahrhundert von einem eurasischen Weltsystem sprechen lässt (1989). Dieses sei zwar multizentrisch verfasst gewesen, die Dynamik lag jedoch klar in Asien. Europa profitierte über die Kontakte, die es über den Mittelmeerraum empfing. Auch die Erforschung der atlantischen Expansion brachte zutage, dass diese viel weniger ein Bruch mit dem Vorangegangenen, sondern vielmehr eine Kontinuitätslinie mit älteren Expansionen

der italienischen Republiken im Mittel- und Schwarzmeerraum, bei den Kreuzzügen sowie bei der spanischen Reconquista darstellten (Feldbauer/Liedl/Morrissey 2001, 2005). Wenn das Jahr 1492 also nicht mehr sakrosankt ist, warum sollte globalgeschichtliches Erkenntnisinteresse nicht bis zu jenen Zeiten ausholen, als erste Interaktionen und Akkulturationen stattfanden (Komlosy 2005). Eine solche zeitliche Erstreckung des Gegenstandes müsste selbstverständlich bemüht sein, den Charakter, Wandel und das wechselnde regionale Geflecht der Interaktion in den einzelnen Phasen herauszuarbeiten; genau dies wollte Frank mit seiner Initiative bewirken. Eine Erweiterung des globalgeschichtlichen Betrachtungshorizonts heißt indes noch lange nicht, die Welt seit dem Auftauchen erster überregionaler Kontakte als ein System anzunehmen.

Mit der zeitlichen Schranke geriet für Frank auch Europa als der Ort, von dem aus die Entwicklung des Weltsystems voranschritt und von dem aus sie analysiert wurde, ins Wanken. Warum sollte dieser Standort besser geeignet sein als irgendein anderer, um weltsystemische Zusammenhänge ins Auge zu fassen. Nach Jahren der (west-)europäischen Verortung beschloss Frank, die Perspektive nach Asien zu verlagern. Er ließ sich auf ein neues großes Forschungsvorhaben ein. Dieses zielte einerseits darauf ab, den Eurozentrismus der vorherrschenden Geschichts- und Entwicklungstheorien zu hinterfragen und gleichzeitig ein Gegenmodell zu entwickeln, das frei von diesem eurozentristischen Ballast war. 1998 legte er mit *ReOrient. Global Economy in the Asian Age* das Ergebnis seiner Bemühungen vor (Frank 1998; vgl. auch kurz gefasst in deutscher Sprache 2005: 17-70). Nach Jahren der relativen Unbeachtetheit schlug dieses Buch in die Debatten der historischen Sozialwissenschaften wie eine Bombe ein.

4. *ReOrient*

ReOrient klammert die Debatte über den Zeitpunkt, ab dem von einem global wirksamen Weltsystem gesprochen werden kann, aus. Es behandelt den Zeitraum 1400 bis 1820 und nimmt für diesen aufgrund der vielfältigen Verflechtungen der Handels-, Verkehrs-, Kapital- und Migrationsströme die Existenz eines weltumspannenden Weltsystems an. Als eine zentrale Klammer und Mittlerin des Austauschs in dieser Weltwirtschaft wird Sil-

ber angesehen. Die Silbertransfers weisen gleichzeitig auf das Zentrum hin, das laut Frank in Asien, insbesondere im chinesischen, im indischen und im südostasiatischen Raum zu verorten ist. Franks Aufmerksamkeit ist dabei in erster Linie auf China gerichtet; das Osmanische Reich, Persien und Russland werden nur am Rande behandelt, lassen sich sinngemäß jedoch in abgewandelter Weise in die Argumentation der asiatischen Zentralität einfügen. Das Material, das Frank vorlegt, führt den bis ins 19. Jahrhundert hohen Entwicklungsstand der chinesischen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft eindrucksvoll vor Augen und zeigt auf, welche Impulse von dieser auf andere Weltregionen ausgegangen sind. Der Rest der Welt wird aus dieser Perspektive zu einer Peripherie des - in sich multizentrisch und in Bezug auf Zentralität abgestuft gefassten - asiatischen Zentrums. Ungewöhnlich ist dabei die Kategorisierung Europas als periphere oder marginale Zone der Weltwirtschaft. Gemeint sind damit sowohl das europäische Zentrum, das in der älteren Weltsystemtheorie das Zentrum des kapitalistischen Weltsystems ausmachte, als auch die Peripherien im europäischen Norden, Osten und Südosten, ebenso wie die von Europa kontrollierten amerikanischen Kolonien. Das europäische Weltsystem mit seiner inneren Zentrum-Peripherie-Struktur fügt sich somit wie eine Zwiebel als Subsystem in das asiatisch zentrierte Franksche Weltsystem ein. Eine geniale gedankliche Konstruktion, muss man zunächst trotz aller möglichen Einwände anerkennen, die den Machtverhältnissen in der atlantischen Welt Respekt zollt, die dortige Führungsrolle des europäischen Nordwestens jedoch nicht als teleologisch angelegte Entwicklung auf die ganze Welt überträgt. Stattdessen wird der vielfältigen Überlegenheit der asiatischen Kulturen Rechnung getragen, indem (Ost- und Süd-)Asien zum globalen Zentrum erklärt werden, dem der von Nordwesteuropa beherrschte atlantische Raum deutlich nachgeordnet ist.

Frank entwickelt die Beziehungen zwischen den einzelnen Weltregionen auf der Ebene von Schätzungen hoch aggregierter wirtschaftsstatischer Daten. Wie die Interaktions- und Dominanzbeziehungen auf der Ebene der praktischen wirtschaftlichen Kontakte, der politischen und kulturellen Beziehungen, der Selbstwahrnehmung und der gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung ausgesehen haben, bleibt offen. Man darf davon ausgehen, dass das Weltsystem, das in asiatischen Reichen zentriert war, nicht als einfaches Gegenstück zum europa-zentrierten Weltsystem aufgefasst werden darf, wie es für die euroatlantische Welt für die frühe Neuzeit bzw. nach der

Inkorporierung sämtlicher Weltregionen für das 19. und 20. Jahrhundert entwickelt worden ist. Zwischen den einzelnen Reichstraditionen bestanden große Unterschiede. Es gibt einige Hinweise darauf, dass Hegemonie im asiatischen Weltsystem offenbar viel weniger missionarisch angelegt war als die europäische Expansion und die abhängigen Gebiete keiner vergleichbaren Unterwerfung, Knechtung, Vernichtung, Anpassung und Verächtlichmachung aussetzte, wie wir es aus der europäischen Kolonialherrschaft und Missionsgeschichte kennen (für Russland und islamische Reiche vgl. Nolte 1969, 1997; für China und Ostasien vgl. Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2004: 81f., 2005). An die Stelle der Abqualifizierung als Wilde, Barbaren und deshalb entweder Auszurottende oder zu Bekehrende trat in den asiatischen Reichen vielmehr die Vorstellung, ihr Reichsgebiet sei mit dem Kosmos ident. Peripherien waren weniger durch Abhängigkeit vom Zentrum als eine mit der Distanz zunehmende Autonomie gekennzeichnet; in Krisensituationen konnten sie die Rolle des Zentrums übernehmen; für dem Reich nicht Zugehörige wurden keine gesonderten Kategorien entwickelt und es gab keine Integrationsstrategien. Eine Abweichung von dieser ausschließlich an Tributleistungen interessierten Haltung gegenüber der Außenwelt stellt freilich die Ausbreitung des Islam dar, was vielleicht erklärt, warum Frank sich mit dem Osmanischen Raum schwer tat; man darf allerdings nicht übersehen, dass die Machtübernahme islamischer Herrscher die Existenz anderer Religionen niemals in Frage stellte. Dies schließt freilich nicht aus, dass asiatische Imperien ihre territoriale Herrschaft ausweiteten, im Fall des Osmanischen Reiches auch nach Europa.

Über solche Fragen von imperialem Selbstverständnis, der Einordnung von Eroberten, Vasallen oder anderen Reichen sowie von Kulturkontakt und Akkulturation, die einem den Charakter der asiatischen Zentralität etwas anschaulicher vor Augen führen würden, erfährt man bei Frank leider wenig. Einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Veranschaulichung hierzu leistet die Weltgeschichte 15.-19. Jahrhundert von Hans-Heinrich Nolte (Nolte 2005). Da Nolte ebenfalls, wenn auch mit anderen Parametern, im welt-systemischen Rahmen argumentiert, stellt sein Buch eine ideale Ergänzung und Konkretisierung von Franks *ReOrient* dar. Nolte folgt Frank im Bemühen, die eurozentristische Simplifizierung abzulegen, er ergänzt das trockene, wirtschaftsstatistische Gerüst Franks durch anschauliche Beispiele, wie die Reiche und Kulturen einander begegneten und wie sie die anderen in

ihr Weltbild einordneten. Frank kann sein weltumspannendes Weltsystem-Modell durch vielfältige wirtschaftliche Verflechtungen erhärten. Was dem Weltsystem in seinem „asiatischen Zeitalter“ aber auf jeden Fall fehlt, ist die universalistische Zielsetzung, die das römische Christentum und später die Aufklärung der süd- und westeuropäischen Expansion einschrieben.

Die chinesische Zentralität beruht nach Frank auf dem hohen inneren Entwicklungsniveau der chinesischen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, dem hohen Stand von Gewerkekunst und Innovation, von Kommunikation und Marktverflechtung, von wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Dynamik, die aufgrund der Einbettung in traditionelle Sozialsysteme und starke Regulierung durch Bürokratie und Hof über lange Zeiträume hinweg gesellschaftliche Stabilität erlaubte. Frank bringt der chinesischen Gesellschaft - und in weniger expliziter Form auch den anderen asiatischen Gesellschaften - durch seine Darstellung klare Ehrerbietung entgegen. Für ihn zählt jedoch nicht so sehr die innere Entwicklung, sondern die Dynamik, die von den einzelnen Gesellschaften auf die Weltwirtschaft ausging. Franks historisches Erkenntnisinteresse hat dabei einen offen erklärten aktuellen Bezugspunkt: den heutigen Aufstieg Chinas zur führenden wirtschaftlichen Großmacht, der vor dem Hintergrund der historischen Zentralität nicht mehr verwundern kann. Nachdem Europa seine Hoffnungen, den US-Imperialismus in seine Schranken zu verweisen, enttäuscht hat, setzt Frank - so eine mögliche Interpretation für seine Sympathie für die neue ostasiatische Entwicklungsdynamik - auf China. Zunächst muss er jedoch klären, wie es im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert zum Positionswechsel zwischen Asien und Europa, zwischen China und Großbritannien gekommen ist.

Frank unternimmt es, den Aufstieg Großbritanniens zur hegemonialen Kraft des 19. Jahrhunderts aus chinesisch-asiatischer Perspektive zu erklären. Die Ergebnisse können hier nur knapp zusammengefasst werden: Das Wachstum der chinesischen Wirtschaft, die ein noch stärkeres Wachstum der Bevölkerung in Gang gesetzt hatte, rief erhebliche soziale und regionale Verteilungskonflikte hervor; die Folge waren Krisen, Hungersnöte, Aufstände, die die innere Stabilität gefährdeten. Frank greift zur Charakterisierung dieser wachstumsbedingten Entwicklungsbarrieren, die um 1760 zum Zeitpunkt des Zusammentreffens eines säkularen Trends (chinesischer Hegemonie) mit einem zyklischen Umbruch einsetzten, auf das Modell des *high level equilibrium trap* von Mark Elvin zurück (Elvin 1973). Es ist ihm

wichtig, dass die chinesische Entwicklungsstörung dem Aufstieg des Westens voranging. Er interpretiert diese Entwicklungsblockade als Gelegenheit für den Westen, allen voran Großbritannien, das Zurückbleiben hinter dem asiatischen Entwicklungsstand zu überwinden. Mit welchen Maßnahmen dies bewerkstelligt wurde, wird nur sehr kursorisch zusammengefasst. In den Mittelpunkt der Bemühungen um nachholende Entwicklung und die Substitution der aus Asien stammenden Importe und Reexporte stellt Frank die Industrielle Revolution, also die Mechanisierung und Zentralisierung der gewerblichen Produktion in Fabriken. Dies ergab sich in Großbritannien aus der Notwendigkeit, die im Vergleich zu den asiatischen Gewerberegionen weit geringere Zahl von Arbeitskräften zu kompensieren. Diese Umstellung hatte viele Implikationen: technische und organisatorische Veränderungen, neue Formen der Arbeit, der Technik, der Energiebasis, der Antriebskraft, des Transportsystems, der Kapitalaufbringung, der Unternehmerpersönlichkeit, der Anforderungen an die Arbeitskräfte, der Ausbildung u.v.a.m. Frank negiert dies nicht. Seiner Meinung nach kam all dies in Gang, weil die veränderte Position der asiatischen Reiche in der Weltwirtschaft die asiatische Zentralität und damit das globale Kräfteverhältnis aufbrach. Für Großbritannien - und in Konkurrenz mit diesem auch für andere europäische Staaten - ergab sich damit die Möglichkeit, die gewerbliche Produktion nun auch in jenen Sektoren auszuweiten, die bisher durch Importe aus Asien bedient wurden. Mit der industriellen Produktion verschoben sich auch die Dynamik, die Finanzzentren und die Kommando- und Logistikzentren von Asien nach Großbritannien. Im Gegensatz zur vorherrschenden wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Auffassung gelang Großbritannien dies jedoch nicht aus eigener Kraft, sondern war Folge einer globalen Entwicklung. Wer anderes behauptet, wird von Frank als „Eurozentrist“ kritisiert, und dieser Vorwurf trifft nicht nur europazentrierte Wirtschaftsgeschichte, sondern ebenso jene VertreterInnen des Weltsystemansatzes, die den Aufstieg Europas zur globalen Hegemonie aus einer europäischen Perspektive erzählen.

5. China: Himmel ohne Erde?

Frank verbirgt seine Bewunderung für die chinesische Stärke nicht. Er läuft damit Gefahr, mit dem Pendel in die andere Richtung auszuschlagen und den Eurozentrismus durch Sinozentrismus zu ersetzen. Sinozentrismus ist einer der Standardvorwürfe, die seinem Buch entgegen gehalten werden und viele Textstellen bestätigen genau diesen Eindruck. Bei genauem Hinsehen zeigt sich jedoch, dass Frank sich für China genau genommen nur wenig interessiert. Die Frage, wie China selbst seinen Platz in der Welt definierte, wird nirgends angeschnitten, obwohl es dazu eine umfangreiche Literatur gibt (vgl. Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2004, 2005). Grob zusammengefasst, begriff sich das chinesische Kaisertum als „Himmel“ der Welt. Alle nicht im unmittelbaren Herrschaftsbereich liegenden konnten diesem Himmel als Vasallen angehören - sofern diese dem Kaiser Tribut und (im Kotau) Ehrerbietung entgegenbrachten. Alle anderen standen außerhalb der Welt. Diese Auffassung, die erst ins Wanken kam, als China im 19. Jahrhundert fremde Herrschaft im eigenen Land zur Kenntnis nehmen musste, ist mit dem Frankschen Weltsystem mit chinesischem Zentrum (bis 1800/1850) durchaus kompatibel. Die chinesische Hofhistoriographie begründete diesen Umstand freilich nicht mit der Rolle Chinas in der Weltwirtschaft, wie Frank dies tut, sondern postulierte sie im unhinterfragten sinozentrischen Selbstverständnis. Auch das Zyklenmodell Franks hat eine chinesische Entsprechung: den Aufstieg und Abstieg der Dynastien. Im Aufstieg einer Dynastie, in der die Zentralgewalt ihre Interessen gegenüber regionalen Interessen durchzusetzen in der Lage ist, findet eine Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Verhältnisse statt. Mit dem Auftreten von Konflikten verweigern regionale Kräfte Steuern und Gehorsam; es folgen Krise und, getragen von den rebellierenden Kräften an der Peripherie, ein Dynastiewechsel mit einer neuerlichen Festigung der Zentralmacht (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2004: 92f.). Der dynastische Wechsel, der mit dem Kräftespiel zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie einhergeht, wird im chinesischen Geschichtsbild allerdings rein aus innerchinesischen Faktoren heraus erklärt, während Frank die chinesische Zentralität als Folge globaler Kräfteverhältnisse ansieht. Frank postuliert, dass China von 1400 bis 1800/1850 das Zentrum der Weltwirtschaft darstellte. Als eigentliche Triebkraft der weltwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung ortet er jedoch nicht das Zentrum, son-

dern den globalen Wirkungszusammenhang selbst. Diese Botschaft gerät bei der vergleichenden Gegenüberstellung von Ostasien und Nordwesteuropa leicht aus dem Blick. Sie bildet gleichwohl die Essenz der Frankschen Weltsystemanalyse. Auf- und Abstieg, Hegemonie, Konkurrenz und Abhängigkeit einzelner Teilräume lassen sich nach Frank nur begreifen, wenn man das Weltsystem als eigenständige Handlungsebene wahrnimmt. Widersprüche und Veränderungen, die auf der globalen Ebene stattfinden, beeinflussen die Position dieser Teilräume und damit die Entwicklungsbedingungen vor Ort. Zwar ist Frank bereit zuzugestehen, dass die örtlichen Bedingungen ihrerseits auf die Verfasstheit des Weltsystems einwirken. Allerdings interpretiert er die Totalität nicht als bloße Summe ihrer Teile. Er ortet in der globalen Ebene eine Eigendynamik, die sich nicht aus dem Zusammenwirken der Teilräume, sondern aus Entwicklungsgesetzen der Globalgeschichte erklärt, die jenseits der Regionalgeschichte wirksam sind. Frank ist wegen dieser Überzeugung oft des ökonomischen Determinismus bezichtigt worden; genau genommen liegt sein Determinismus allerdings nicht im Ökonomismus, auch wenn dieser seinen wirtschaftshistorischen Analysen durchaus eigen ist, sondern im Globalismus, der für ihn den Schlüssel für die Erkenntnis jeder regionalen Entwicklung und ihrer Transformation darstellt.

6. Herausforderungen für Globalgeschichte

Frank präsentiert seine Ergebnisse, unter Berufung auf Leopold von Ranke, als Beschreibung der Welt „wie sie wirklich gewesen ist“. Dieser historische Anspruch auf absolute Wahrheit der eigenen Geschichtsinterpretation erleichtert es zusammen mit der saloppen Art, GegnerInnen und bisherige Weggefährten ins eurozentristische Eck zu stellen, die heftigen Angriffe auf den Universalismus der westlichen Geschichts- und Sozialwissenschaften als überzogen abzutun. Tatsächlich liegt Franks Stärke nicht in der exakten Beweisführung, auf die er in seinem Alterswerk überhaupt keinen Wert mehr legt, sondern in der innovativen Infragestellung und gleichzeitigen Weiterentwicklung des Weltsystemmodells. Mit „Geschichte, wie sie wirklich gewesen ist“, hat eine solche Herangehensweise nichts zu tun. Frank will vielmehr einen theoretischen Rahmen für eine alternative Interpretation der Weltgeschichte liefern, die die zum Dogma erstarrten Triade

Zivilisation = (Nordwest-)Europa = Entwicklung aufbricht. Dafür ist Frank uneingeschränkt zu danken. Gleichzeitig sind weder sein Modell noch seine empirischen Ausführungen sakrosankt. Im Gegenteil, erst durch die Debatte seiner Hypothesen, seiner Argumentation und seiner Belege kann das eingefahrene Denken über Fortschritt und Entwicklung überhaupt in Bewegung geraten. Diesen Zweck hat *ReOrient* erfüllt. Frank hat für das Buch mehrere Preise erhalten und es ist in unzähligen Rezensionen zusammengefasst, bejubelt, kritisiert oder verdammt worden (vgl. u.a. die Kritiken von Vries 1998; Arrighi 1999; Wallerstein 1999; Duchesne 2001/2). Bei der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Werk sind eine Reihe von Annahmen erheblich in Zweifel gezogen worden, sowohl auf der konzeptionellen Ebene als auch in der empirischen Untermauerung. Hier seien einige davon kurz angeführt.

Gegen die Existenz eines weltumspannenden Systemzusammenhangs wurde eingewandt, die Interaktionen zwischen den Weltregionen sei im behandelten Zeitraum viel zu schwach und sporadisch, um von einem System zu sprechen; vielmehr zerfalle die Welt in zahlreiche größere und kleinere Subsysteme ohne gemeinsamen Bezugsrahmen. Ein weltumfassendes System sei erst entstanden, als die - was die asiatischen Reiche anlangt - multipolare Interaktion im 18. bzw. 19. Jahrhundert durch britische Hegemonie ersetzt wurde (Arrighi 1999; Wallerstein 1999; Duchesne 2001/02). Peer Vries hat seine Kritik an den Silbertransfers aufgehängt, die Frank - in Anlehnung an andere AutorInnen - für China viel zu hoch ansetze und zudem in ihrer Bedeutung überschätze (Vries 2006). In seinem Bemühen, die Rolle Europas als zentraler Akteur der Weltgeschichte zu relativieren, habe Frank innere Entwicklungen, aber auch die europäische Expansion nach Übersee heruntergespielt und in ihrer Wirkung unterschätzt. Zudem reiche die rein wirtschaftliche Gegenüberstellung der Konkurrenten im Weltsystem nicht aus: Auch das politische System, die staatliche Politik und die militärische Kraft stellten entscheidende Faktoren zur Erklärung von Positionswechseln dar (Arrighi 1999: 348f; Vries 2003). Schließlich, so führte Arrighi ins Treffen, sei die Ablöse der (ost-)asiatischen durch die nordwesteuropäisch-britische Hegemonie nicht als konsekutive Abfolge zu fassen, sondern zeichnete sich durch gleichzeitig stattfindende und aufeinander bezogene Prozesse aus, die nicht durch einen krisenhaften Umschwung allein zu erklären seien. Frank müsste sich eigentlich freuen, dass seine Provokationen so viele

Forschungen in Gang gesetzt haben, die die These von der asiatischen Hegemonie kritisch überprüfen.

Abschließend sollen einige Herausforderungen der Frankschen Hypothesen für die globalgeschichtliche Forschung genannt werden. Sie lassen sich auch als Agenda für eine globalgeschichtliche Überprüfung eurozentrischer Weltgeschichte lesen.

6.1 Asiatische Modernisierungsunfähigkeit?

Franks *ReOrient* stellt im Einklang mit der nach ihren Forschungsstätten so genannten California School der Globalgeschichte (Wong 1997; Pomeranz 2000; American Historical Association 2002; vgl. auch Pilz 2004) das in den historischen Sozialwissenschaften dominierende Bild von der Unfähigkeit der asiatischen Reiche zur eigenständigen Modernisierung, das in der These von der „orientalischen Despotie“ und der „asiatischen Produktionsweise“ kulminiert, massiv in Frage. Er betont die führende Rolle, die arabische, jüdische, persische und indische Händler und Transporteure bereits vor 1400 in der Integration der Weltwirtschaft spielten. Für die Überlegenheit der asiatischen Gewerbekunst führt er vor allem die Warenstruktur des Fernhandels ins Treffen, in der hochwertige asiatische Gewerbeprodukte von den europäischen Händlern in erster Linie durch ungemünztes Edelmetall aufgewogen wurden. Dies mag ein Beweis für den geringeren Entwicklungsstand der gewerblichen Verarbeitung in Europa sein; es muss freilich bezweifelt werden, ob der Tausch der Edelmetalle, die den europäischen Händlern aus der kolonialen Durchdringung Amerikas erwachsen, gegen asiatische Gewerbeprodukte und Spezereien für die europäische Seite tatsächlich von Nachteil war. Ein weiteres Argument resultiert aus dem Vergleich des Lebensstandards und der Kommerzialisierung im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen den wirtschaftlichen Zentralräumen Chinas und Westeuropas, bei dem sich Frank vor allem auf Kenneth Pomeranz bezieht. Dass China hier mit Großbritannien gleichauf wenn nicht gar darüber liegt, gilt als Beweis für die Leistungsfähigkeit und die Wachstumskraft der chinesischen Marktwirtschaft, was europäischen ZeitgenossInnen durchaus bewusst war. Das verächtliche Asienbild ist schließlich ein Produkt des späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhunderts, als die britische Krone im Interesse ihres Industriekapitals darauf setzte, die Eigenständigkeit der chinesischen Wirtschaft aufzubrechen. Die Leistungssteigerung der chinesischen Industrie im 18. Jahrhun-

dert kam - von wenigen Fertigungsschritten abgesehen - ohne Mechanisierung und Zentralisierung der Produktion aus; eine solche war angesichts der Verfügbarkeit von Arbeitskräften nicht notwendig. Deshalb besteht auch kein Grund, die Absenz einer Industriellen Revolution, wie sie die britische Leistungssteigerung erforderte, als Manko anzusehen; auch der Begriff der Protoindustrialisierung für die Bezeichnung des chinesischen Verlagssystems ist irreführend. Einen möglichen Ausweg zur Charakterisierung der chinesischen Reformen als andere, aber durchaus ebenbürtige Formen der industriellen Leistungssteigerung, scheint die Bezeichnung der „industriösen Revolution“ darzustellen. Im Gegensatz zur „industriellen“ Revolution, die Wachstum und Produktivitätssteigerung durch den Einsatz von mechanisch angetriebenen, arbeitssparenden Werkzeugmaschinen in Fabriken erzielt, beruhen die Erfolge der „industriösen“ Revolution auf Verbesserungen der Arbeitsorganisation im Rahmen von Heimarbeits-, Manufaktur-, Verlagssystemen (De Vries 1994).

Argumentationskette und Beweisführung im einzelnen müssen an anderer Stelle überprüft werden. Hier geht es vielmehr um die Konsequenzen für die Frage der

Periodisierung von Globalgeschichte sowie die Definition von Kapitalismus und Industrialismus - und zwar auch dann, wenn jemand das Frankische Single World System nicht als Bezugsrahmen anerkennt. In dem Moment, in dem Asien als globales Zentrum oder eigenmächtiger Akteur in einem multizentrischen Modell wahrgenommen wird, geraten selbstverständlich gewordene Wahrheiten über historische Abläufe, Periodisierungen, Rangordnungen und Bewertungen unterschiedlicher Entwicklungsverläufe ins Wanken. Akzeptiert man die führende Rolle der asiatischen Märkte in der Vernetzung der Weltwirtschaft, lässt sich Welt- und Globalgeschichte nicht aus einer rein europäischen Perspektive erzählen. Die atlantische Expansion bleibt ein entscheidender Moment der euroatlantischen Geschichte, leitet aber keineswegs eine Epochenschwelle zur Neuzeit ein. Die Erzählstränge müssten aus der Perspektive der verschiedenen Weltregionen und Weltkulturen heraus konzipiert und in Hinblick auf die Interaktion und das dieser jeweils zugrunde liegende Kräfteverhältnis aufeinander bezogen werden. Dabei wird auch die Charakterisierung und der Beginn eines wie immer gearteten Kapitalismus als Wesensmerkmal der Moderne einer neuen Bewertung unterzogen werden müssen. Muss der Begriff als eurozent-

ristisch-universalisierend ad acta gelegt werden, wie Frank dies in seinem Spätwerk tut? Kann er auf seine regionale Bedeutung in der europäischen Wirtschaftsentwicklung zurückgestutzt werden, die im Zuge einer späteren Europäisierung der Welt auch auf andere Weltkulturen ausstrahlte? Oder lässt er sich von seinen europäischen Spezifika befreien und als ein Instrument zur Beschreibung wirtschaftlicher Transformationsprozesse in unterschiedlichen Weltregionen benützen? Die gleiche Frage stellt sich für die Industrielle Revolution als entscheidende Voraussetzung erfolgreicher (kapitalistischer) Modernisierung. Muss diese Schwelle nach nordwesteuropäischem Vorbild überschritten werden, damit eine Region - auch in der Beurteilung ihrer historischen Entwicklung - in der Weltwirtschaft mithalten kann, oder lässt sich der Begriff auf Nordwesteuropa zurückfahren? Kann es neben der Leistungssteigerung nordwesteuropäischer Prägung, die als Messlatte und Leitstern in die Beurteilung jeglichen industriellen Fortschritts in die entwicklungstheoretische Debatte eingegangen ist, auch andere Ausprägungen industriell-gewerblicher Modernisierung geben - etwa die industriösen Revolutionen in den asiatischen Gewerberegionen des 18. Jahrhunderts, deren Traditionen sich auch im heutigen Kompetenzvorsprung asiatischer Industrieproduktion widerspiegeln (Sugihara 2005)?

6.2 Europäischer Sonderweg?

Die Debatte um den „europäischen Sonderweg“ fußt auf der Überzeugung, der Aufstieg der (nordwest-)europäischen Staaten beruhe auf einer spezifischen, aus dem Zerfall der Antike, der feudalen Zersplitterung und der befruchtenden Konkurrenz rivalisierender Machttäger resultierenden historischen Konstellation, die die Trennung zwischen Staat und Kirche, von Politik, Recht und Wirtschaft als Grundlage der parlamentarischen Demokratie ermöglichte, wie sie sich in den westeuropäischen Gesellschaften seit dem Zeitalter der Aufklärung herausbildete. Auch wenn dieses Modell in Hinblick auf gesellschaftliche Polarisierung und Partizipation und die ungleiche Realisierung in unterschiedlichen Weltregionen kritisch hinterfragt und von manchen eine Korrektur, von anderen eine Überwindung durch eine soziale Demokratie angestrebt wird, der Konsens über die Voraussetzungen und die Stadien der Entwicklung verbindet die unterschiedlichen weltanschaulichen Lager. Und diese Voraussetzungen sind untrennbar mit der (nordwest-)europäischen Geschichte verknüpft. Die Sonderwegsdebatte

te findet unter vielerlei theoretischen Prämissen statt; auch die zeitlichen Schwerpunktsetzungen, zu denen die Weichenstellung erfolgte, variieren je nach Autor und Disziplin (Jones 1987; Landes 1998; Mitterauer 2003). In der Regel sind jedoch auch die in jüngeren Zeiten angesetzten Studien von der Überzeugung geprägt, der „Sonderweg“ lasse sich bis in die Antike zurückverfolgen, die - wenn auch vielfach gebrochen - als Fundament der europäischen Moderne gilt.

Meines Erachtens stellt die Konzentration auf die Wurzeln und Grundlagen europäischer Geschichte nicht das eigentliche Problem dar. Problematisch sind vielmehr deren Verallgemeinerungen. Diese erfolgen einerseits, wenn regionale Entwicklungen in Europa, noch dazu in eklektischer Mischung - denn wen interessieren die britischen Inseln zur Zeit der Antike, und wen interessiert Griechenland zum Zeitpunkt der Industriellen Revolution? -, eine gesamteuropäische Verallgemeinerung erfahren, von der die nicht diesem Bild entsprechenden Regionen abgespalten werden müssen. Und sie erfolgen andererseits, wenn solcherart vereinheitlichte Europabilder zum universellen Entwicklungsmuster hochstilisiert werden. Diese erheben Europa zum Vorbild, an dem andere Kulturen gemessen werden können, und sie leiten daraus entwicklungspolitische Strategien ab, deren Erfolg auf dem Nachvollzug des europäischen Vorbilds beruht.

Frank widmet der Infragestellung der eurozentrischen Grundlagen der Geschichts- und Sozialwissenschaften in seinem Buch *ReOrient* breiten Raum. Der „europäische Sonderweg“ wird dabei in all seinen Facetten massiv in Frage gestellt. Frank gibt sich dabei kämpferisch und regt zum Nachdenken an. Er selbst gibt sich über jeden Eurozentrismus erhaben.

6.3 Globale Konkurrenz als Triebkraft des Weltsystems?

Frank bietet damit einen Erklärungsrahmen an, der zunächst sehr abstrakt wirkt. Zur Illustration zieht Frank ein bekanntes Marx'sches Bild heran: „Die Menschen machen ihre Geschichte, aber sie machen sie nicht aus freien Stücken, nicht unter selbst gewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar vorgefundenen, gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen.“ (Karl Marx: Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Napoleon (1852), zitiert in Frank/Fuentes-Frank 1990: 14). Umgelegt auf den Beitrag einzelner Weltregionen und Weltkulturen zum globalen Geschehen hieße dies: Die Menschen agieren zwar vor Ort, aber was sie dort tun (können), hängt nicht (oder nur zu einem gerin-

gen Teil) von diesen örtlichen Bedingungen ab. Die Weichen für den Erfolg oder Misserfolg ihres Handelns hängen von den Möglichkeiten ab, die sich aus der Stellung ihrer Region in der globalen Konkurrenz ergeben. Diese wirkt als Rahmen setzende Instanz unmittelbar auf das regionale Geschehen ein. Dennoch ergibt sich aus der globalen Determiniertheit kein geschichtsphilosophischer Determinismus. Denn beim Abschneiden einer Region in der überregionalen Konkurrenz kommt es immer auch auf den örtlichen Umgang mit den vorgegebenen globalen Konstellationen an. So gesehen sind weder das Globale, das Regionale noch die konkrete Verbindung, die sich zwischen diesen herausbildet, abstrakt. Diese zu erforschen, betrachtet Frank als die eigentliche Aufgabe von Globalgeschichte.

Was Frank so sperrig macht, ist schlussendlich nicht sein - wenn auch sehr apodiktisch vorgetragenes - Angebot für einen globalen Analyse Rahmen. Beunruhigend wirkt vielmehr die fehlende Veränderungsperspektive: das bis in neolithische Zeiten zurück projizierte Auf und Ab der Akkumulationszyklen mit ihren wechselnden Hegemonien und Triebkräften erscheint ewig vorgegeben; Frank spekuliert nicht, ob theoretisch ein Ende möglich ist, wie Wallerstein dies mit der Kategorie des „historischen Kapitalismus“ nahe legt (Wallerstein 2002). Manche deuten dies als Zustimmung zum System. So stimmt dies zwar nicht, allerdings ist er der Meinung, dass Veränderung immer nur Aussicht auf Realisierung hat, wenn sie Weichenstellungen und Widersprüche aufgreift, die das System selbst hervorbringt. Gleichzeitig übt Frank ohne Rücksicht auf Verluste Fundamentalkritik, er überlässt es der Leserin und dem Leser, daraus die wissenschaftlichen und politischen Konsequenzen zu ziehen.

Literatur

- Abu-Lughod, Janet (1989): Before European Hegemony. The World System A. D. 1250-1350. New York: Oxford University Press.
- American Historical Association (2002): AHA Forum: Asia and Europe in the World Economy mit Beiträgen von Patrick Manning, Kenneth Pomeranz, R. Bin Wong und David Lutton. In: American Historical Review 107 (2), 419-481.
- Amin, Samir/Arrighi, Giovanni/Frank, Andre Gunder/Wallerstein, Immanuel (1986): Dynamik der globalen Krise. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag (engl. 1982).

- Amin, Samir/Arrighi, Giovanni/Frank, Andre Gunder/Wallerstein, Immanuel (1990): Transforming the Revolution. Social Movements and the World System. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Arrighi, Giovanni (1999): The World According to Andre Gunder Frank. In: Review 22 (3), 327-354.
- De Vries, Jan (1994): The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution. In: Journal of Economic History 54, 249-270.
- Duchesne, Ricardo (2001/02): Between Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism: Debating Andre Gunder Frank's Re-Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. In: Science & Society 65 (4), 428-463.
- Elvin, Mark (1973): The Pattern of the Chinese Past. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Feldbauer, Peter/Liedl, Gottfried/Morrissey, John (Hg.) (2001): Vom Mittelmeer zum Atlantik. Wien-München: Oldenbourg.
- Feldbauer, Peter/Liedl, Gottfried/Morrissey, John (Hg., 2005): Mediterraner Kolonialismus. Expansion und Kulturaustausch im Mittelalter. Magnus: Essen.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1967): Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press. Auf Deutsch: Frank, Andre Gunder (1969): Kapitalismus und Unterentwicklung in Lateinamerika. Frankfurt: EVA.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1972): Lumpenbourgeoisie Lumpendevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1975): On Capitalist Underdevelopment. Bombay: Oxford University Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1977): Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor. In: Review 1 (1), 91-140.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1978): World Accumulation 1492-1789. New York: Monthly Review Press - London: Macmillan Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1979): Über die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation. In: Senghaas Dieter (Hg.): Kapitalistische Weltökonomie. Kontroversen über ihren Ursprung und ihre Entwicklungsdynamik. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 68-102.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1980a): Abhängige Akkumulation und Unterentwicklung. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp (engl.1978).
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1980b): Crisis: In the World Economy. New York: Holmes & Meier - London: Heinemann.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1981a): Crisis: In the Third World. New York: Monthly Review Press - London: Heinemann.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1981b): Reflections on the Economic Crisis. New York: Monthly Review Press - London: Hutchinson.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1983): The European Challenge. Nottingham: Spokesman Press - Westbury, Conn.: Lawrence Hill Publishers.

- Frank, Andre Gunder (1992): *The Centrality of Central Asia*. Amsterdam: Comparative Asian Studies.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1998): *ReORIENT. Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (2005): *Orientierung im Weltsystem. Von der Neuen Welt zum Reich der Mitte*. Wien: Promedia.
- Frank, Andre Gunder/Fuentes-Frank Marta (1990): *Widerstand im Weltsystem. Kapitalistische Akkumulation - Staatliche Politik - Soziale Bewegung*. Wien: Promedia.
- Frank, Andre Gunder/Gills, Barry (ed., 1993). *The World Systems: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Hofbauer, Hannes/Komlosy, Andrea (2000): *Capital Accumulation and Catching-Up Development in Eastern Europe*. In: *Review* 23 (4), 459-502.
- Jones, Eric L. (1987): *The European Miracle. Environments, Economics, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Komlosy Andrea (2005): *Weltzeit – Ortszeit. Zur Periodisierung von Globalgeschichte*. In: Grandner Margarete/Rothermund, Dietmar/Schwentker, Wolfgang (Hg.): *Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte*. Wien: Mandelbaum, 83-115.
- Landes, David (1998): *Wohlstand und Armut der Nationen. Warum die einen reich und die anderen arm sind*. Berlin: Siedler.
- Mitterauer, Michael (2003): *Warum Europa? Mittelalterliche Grundlagen eines Sonderwegs*. München: Beck.
- Nolte, Hans-Heinrich (1969): *Religiöse Toleranz in Rußland 1600-1725*, Göttingen.
- Nolte, Hans-Heinrich (1997): *Von Andalusien bis Tatarstan. Innere Peripherien in der Frühen Neuzeit im Vergleich*. In: Boskovska Leimgruber, Nada (Hg.): *Frühe Neuzeit in der Geschichtswissenschaft*. Paderborn u.a.: Ferdinand Schöningh, 127-144.
- Nolte, Hans-Heinrich (2005): *Weltgeschichte. Imperien, Religionen und Systeme*. 15.-19. Jahrhundert. Wien/Köln/Weimar: Böhlau.
- Pilz, Erich (2004): „Warum nicht China?“ Fragen zum „Niedergang“ des Reiches der Mitte nach 1800. In: Sepp Linhart/Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (Hg.): *Ostasien 1600 - 1900. Geschichte und Gesellschaft*. Wien: Promedia, 229-244.
- Pomeranz, Kenneth (2000): *The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sugihara, Kaoru (Hg., 2005): *Japan, China, and the growth of the Asian international economy 1850-1949*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vries, Peer (1998): *Should we really ReOrient?*. In: *Itinerario. European Journal of Overseas History* 20 (3), 19-36.
- Vries, Peer (2003): *Via Peking back to Manchester: Britain, The Industrial Revolution, and China*. CNWS Publications 121, *Studies in Overseas History* 4. Leiden: Research School CNWS, Leiden Univ.
- Vries, Peer (2006): *Early Modern China: The Global Silver Sink and the Most Competitive Economy of the World* (in Vorbereitung).

- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1998-2004): Das moderne Weltsystem Bd. 1-3. Wien: Promedia.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1999): Frank Proves the European Miracle, in: *Review* 22 (3), 355-371.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (2002): Utopistik. Historische Alternativen des 21. Jahrhunderts. Wien: Promedia.
- Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne (2004): Zentrum und Peripherie in China und Ostasien. In: Sepp Linhart/Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (Hg.), *Ostasien 1600 - 1900. Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, . Wien: Promedia, 81-98.
- Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne (2005): Weltgeschichte und chinesische Geschichte: Die chinesische Historiographie des 20. Jahrhunderts zwischen Universalität und Partikularität. In: Grandner Margarete/Rothermund, Dietmar/Schwentker, Wolfgang (Hg.): *Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte*. Wien: Mandelbaum, 139-161.
- Wong, Bin R. (1997): *China Transformed. Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Abstracts

Der Beitrag zeigt entlang der wichtigsten Veröffentlichungen Andre Gunder Franks seine Entwicklung von der Erforschung des „europäischen Weltsystems“ zu einem globalistischen Erklärungsansatz. Frank postulierte mit seinem Buch *ReOrient* die Existenz eines frühneuzeitlichen Weltsystems mit weltumspannendem Charakter, in dem Ostasien (insbesondere China) die führende Kraft dargestellt habe. Als Triebkraft der weltwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung ortet Frank allerdings nicht die innere Stärke Chinas, sondern den globalen Wirkungszusammenhang. Demzufolge sei der Aufstieg der nordwesteuropäischen Seemächte zum Zentrum der Weltwirtschaft, den Frank erst an der Wende vom 18. zum 19. Jahrhundert ansetzt, nicht Ausdruck eines „europäischen Sonderweges“, sondern Resultat veränderter Kräfteverhältnisse in der Weltwirtschaft. Der Beitrag greift die Einwände auf, die das Franksche Konzept eines „Single World System“ hervorgerufen hat und diskutiert abschließend Konsequenzen seines globalistischen Anspruchs für die globalhistorische Forschung.

Considering his most important publications, the article describes Frank's intellectual development from an European World System to a globalist approach. In his book *“ReOrient”*, Frank postulated the existence of

a World System in the early modern era, in which East Asia (particularly China) was the dominant force. This does, however, not imply that China's inner strength was the driving force in the development of the world economy. Frank explains this development in terms of global patterns of cause and effect. Thus the rise of the north-western European naval powers to the centre of the world economy – which according to Frank did not take place before the turn of the 19th century – did not constitute a peculiar European development but resulted from changing balances of power within the world economy. The author also looks at the criticism provoked by Frank's concept of a "Single World System" and finally discusses the consequences of his globalist approach for research on global history.

Andrea Komlosy

Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, Universität Wien

Dr. Karl Lueger Ring 1, 1010 Wien

Andrea.Komlosy@univie.ac.at

RONEN PALAN

Andre Gunder Frank's Legacy in Contemporary International Relations

1. Introduction

Andre Gunder Frank had more than a passing interest in the study of International Relations. He was a member of the International Studies Association as well as the British International Studies Association, and attended their annual conventions regularly. That Frank maintained throughout his life close association with the field of International Relations should come as no surprise. Although known primarily for his seminal contribution to development studies, he was interested in the capitalist system as a planetary socio-economic phenomenon and in the role of states in maintaining this system. Yet, Frank was no friend of traditional International Relations. From realism, to constructivism to so-called post-structuralism, he was a vocal critique of those theories that sought to reduce the field of International Relations to the study of the relationship between states.

Considering that Frank was a prolific writer, and most of his writing is concerned with issues that could be classified under the international studies heading, a comprehensive and systematic treatment of his contribution to International Relations scholarship is beyond the scope of an article of this size. I would like, therefore, to return to his seminal work on underdevelopment and ask whether it had any lasting impact on contemporary theories of international relations. The argument I put forward is controversial – not least, I believe, it would not have been approved by Frank himself. My argument is that dependency theorists generally, and Frank specifically, had a lasting contribution to International Relations because more than any other approach, they have instigated a process that has led to questioning the very

meaning of “international relation”. Frank demonstrated persuasively that the division of the world into sovereign nation-states is not necessarily the most important factor in the study of International Relations. Frank not only sought to combine a theory of capitalism, as a general theory of exploitation, with a theory of the state system, but he added crucially, a third element to the mix, the geo-economic factors that sustain, he argued, a world wide system of exploitation. Contemporary International Relations, particularly in the shape of the sub-field of International Political Economy, radicalises Frank’s ideas and develop a novel geo-economic conceptualisation of the relationship between capitalism and the state system.

2. Theoretical Spaces

Notwithstanding debates in the philosophy of the social sciences, most scholars tend to assume that academic disciplines arise in response to some pre-existing reference point that provides a natural boundary of their discipline. Sociology, for example, is viewed as the study of society, or social order; political science is the study of political society or the state, psychology is the study of the subject and the mind. International Relations is considered by the same token to be the study of relationship between states. This naturalising attitude is typical of Anglo-Saxon positivism. As Guy Oakes notes: “On this view, all science is concerned with the explanation of data, the status of which may be regarded as unproblematic and given. Thus the only interesting and important methodological issue is the question of the conditions that must be satisfied by the explanation of these data” (Oakes 1988: 25).

In opposition to this, “common sense” positivism, the hermeneutics traditions considers the historical constitution of the spatio-temporal given as one of the key theoretical (and ideological) underpinnings of a world-view. A discipline, it argues, must be self-reflective and enquire about the origins of the very terms it uses. For a good example of such hermeneutic treatment of the spatio-temporal reference point treated normally as a natural reality, it is worth dwelling briefly on Martin Heidegger’s brilliant essay on the emergence of modernity, a process that he identifies closely with Newton’s

theories. For Heidegger, the key to the Newtonian revolution was the introduction of the concept of “every body” – a truly momentous epistemological break, as he demonstrates, in Western thought: “Newton axiom being with ‘every body’. That means the distinction between earthly and celestial bodies has become obsolete. The universe is no longer divided into two well-separated realms [...] all natural bodies are essentially of the same kind” (Heidegger 1993: 286).

The key to Newton’s theory, then, was a theoretical proposition, an axiom that could not be proven this way or that, which removed the conventional distinction between the heavenly and earthly bodies, placing all of them on one homogenous spatio-temporal plane. The results are that “[T]he distinguishing of certain places also disappears. Each body can in principle be in any place. The concept of place itself is changed; place no longer is where the body belongs according to its inner nature, but only a position in relation to other positions” (Heidegger 1993: 286). The Newtonian epistemological break constituted nature “now [as] the realm of the uniform space-time context of motion” (Heidegger 1993: 292). This proposition, in turn, opened new avenues for the investigation of movement and place.

Now, if the very uniformity of nature is founded on theoretical propositions, the same must apply *ipso facto* to secondary theoretical spaces such as the realm that constitutes what we call, International Relations. And indeed, it is not difficult to discern the theoretical assumptions that constitute the reference point that make up modern International Relations. Why, after all, the discipline is called, “Inter-national relations”? And not, say, “inter-state” or “global” relations? The nationalist terminology was not introduced, as often thought, in a fit of absent-mindedness. On the contrary, it reflects a development in thought which occurred in specific historical circumstances which became evident towards the end of the eighteenth century, and which gave rise to the belief that nations are the ‘real’ actors in international affairs (Mairé 1997). The French revolutionary armies, which appealed to national sentiments, proved the most powerful force in European history, persuading social philosophers such as Hegel and Fichte in the reality of the nation as a force in human history (Palan/Blair: 1993). Conventional International Relations is founded, therefore, on the belief that nations and

people, organised as states, are the historical entities that make up the fabric of international affairs.

It is worth noting that modernisation theory which has dominated development thinking prior to the rise of dependency theory, arose precisely within the same nationalist epistemology. Ignoring largely the historical circumstances that gave rise to the so-called developing states, modernisation theory takes the view that development is fundamentally the private affair of each nation constituted as state. In a typical nationalist sentiment it assigns an important role to government in the construction of a nation and national spirit in the new post-colonial era. It also takes the view that parliamentary democracy is the best method for ensuring that the “sovereign people” – a new construction that can as well be traced back to the French revolution – manage to rule themselves. Modernisation theory perpetrates, therefore, the myth that the world is naturally divided among people, or nation-states.

3. The Capitalist World Economy

In order to debate the policy prescriptions of modernisation theory, dependency theorists had to question therefore not only its prognosis and suggestions, but more importantly, its epistemology, the naturalising reference point that derives from the nationalist perspective on which it was founded. Dependency theorists had to re-imagine, in other words, the very space that is called International Relations to be able to conceptualise an alternative to modernisation theory. Alain Lipietz understood very well this epistemological shift when he notes in *Mirages and Miracles* (1987) that the unique contribution of Cardoso was to demonstrate that: “[T]here is no metaphysical distinction between internal and external conditions. In other words, the dynamic of dependent countries is one particular aspect of the more general dynamic of the capitalist world” (Lipietz 1987: 18). The use of the term “metaphysical distinction” by Lipietz is entirely apt in this case. Lipietz alludes to the metaphysics which underpins the nationalist perspective, the idea that nations are naturally constituted spiritual entities – and hence that the world is divided most naturally into nations. Once a particular metaphysics is questioned, another one replaces it, again alluded to by Lipietz as

the “general dynamic of the capitalist world”. Indeed, we need to appreciate that the idea of a unified capitalist world is also a theoretical construction, metaphysics if you like – which is at the heart of the legacy of dependency theory to International Relations.

It may be argued with some justification that dependency theory was not the originator of the epistemological shift that gave rise to this critique. Marxism certainly contained the seeds of a holistic view of a capitalist world economy. Furthermore, a “nationalist” perspective on international affairs, which may have appeared “natural” to Europeans in the late eighteenth century, was less likely to persuade Latin American writers, where the notion of an Argentine or Brazilian nation is far more difficult to uphold. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that prior to dependency theory, the dominant Marxist tradition in International Relations was an odd synthesis of nationalism with class theory. The idea was that each state is dominated by a certain ruling class, and international relations is an expression of inter-ruling class relations.

This odd synthesis between nationalism and Marxism was questioned elsewhere as well. Bertrand Gross, for instance, captures the problem well when describes the “peculiarities” of the US “imperium”: “If this be empire, it is very different from [...]any previous empire [...]. What has often happened, is that the local capitalists have supplanted the old land-owning oligarchies in trying to co-operate with, rather than break with, foreign capital. Instead of ‘ugly Americans’ and Europeans meddling in their affairs, many Third World regimes are increasingly manned by Americanised Brazilians, Anglicised Indians and Nigerians, and Westernised Saudi Arabians and Egyptians [...]. In fact, external controls are now internalised in domestic institutions, and the new infrastructure may be more powerful than any previous colonial apparatus” (Gross 1980: 37). Gross is at pains to show that things are not what they seem: that a nationalist perspective on the world can be very misleading; Brazilians are not necessarily Brazilians; Indians and Nigerians are better understood in terms of class positions and not their national affiliation or citizenship. It is this gap; the awareness that national affiliation or citizenship does not necessarily provide guidance to politics, which attracted the attention of dependency theorists.

But if the world is not divided naturally into nations, if nations (and states) are historical constructs, as many believe, and the nature of boundaries between societies is also changing, are there any universal characteristics of an international system? In his classic *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967), Andre Gunder Frank puts forward precisely such spatio-temporal universals: “Metropolitan centre peripheral satellite relationships, like the process of surplus expropriation/appropriation, run through the entire world capitalist system in chain-like fashion from its uppermost metropolitan world centre, through each of the various national, regional, local and enterprise centres” (Frank 1967: 10). This is a powerful vision! In fact, a new metaphysics capable of sustaining, at least in principle, altogether a different theory of International Relations. Frank’s metaphysics contains two important propositions. First, he radicalises the anti-nationalist trend in international relations scholarship and proposes in its place a geo-economic theory of equivalence of the processes of accumulation, the latter understood in fairly conventional Marxist terms as process of expropriation/appropriation. In Frank’s depiction the processes of exploitation/appropriation in the economy produce a geographical equivalence in the form of the centre and periphery chain-like pattern of relationships. So that capitalist exploitation is replicated in these centre-peripheral satellite relationships. Exploitation and accumulation generates, in other words, an institutional matrix that sustain a geography of exploitation.

This parallel geography serves, then, like a gigantic infrastructure channelling capital from the periphery to the centre, or as it is often depicted, a world-wide process of accumulation – a world system if you like. Superficially, evidence to this “accumulation process” abounds – although Frank’s metaphysics renders the argument a tautology. For as long as there are differences in wealth between regions and states, the spatio-temporal depiction of a world as chains of centres and peripheries relations can lead the reader to no other conclusion but that they are expressions of a globally-spanning process of accumulation. By the same token, since the two parallel worlds are of equivalent architecture, the worldwide system of exploitation appears extremely powerful and robust. For, in addition, to the centrality of accumulation and centralisation of power – it produces an equivalent geo-political institutional matrix that maintains and sustains it. Second, in Frank’s ori-

ginal formulation, the centre-peripheral satellite relationships run through the entire capitalist system in chain-like fashion – meaning, exploitation is a worldwide process. Although Frank is associated with the theory of “underdevelopment”, the gist of his argument is that there are no fundamental differences between centre and periphery; they are both subjects of the same type of forces and dynamics that make up the capitalist system. The implications of his theory are that only if we take a global perspective on accumulation we are able to capture the basic dynamics of the system. He depicts the entire world capitalist economy as consisting of a hierarchical unilinear power structure replicated again and again to build up into a planetary system of exploitation.

But this “molecular” image of global power raises a number of questions: First, are the centre-peripheral satellite relationships the only universals in this system? Are there any counter-veiling or any other forces that should have been taken into consideration? Second, are these, indeed, universals? Can we say that capitalism always establishes such chain-like links? What, in fact, is the role of the state in this configuration? And perhaps most importantly, does the theory of expropriation/accumulation hold water?

Frank never addresses any of these issues in a satisfactory manner. Li-pietz has already pointed out that the universals in Frank theory are not universals at all. Dependency theory, he feels, took the example of the world wide division of labour that emerged in the 1930s and survived until the 1970s, whereby “third world” countries exported raw materials and foodstuff in exchange for manufactured goods, and assumed it was a universal characteristic of the capitalist world economy – which it was not. There is a considerable body of evidence to suggest that things have changed dramatically since the 1980s. Why is that?

4. Theories of Capital and the World Capitalist System

Frank’s notion of expropriation/appropriation derives from one particular, rather literal interpretation of the labour theory of value as expressed by Marx in *Capital Volume One*. The labour theory of value presents the ac-

cumulation process as a mechanical process of extraction. The implication of Frank's theory is that the extraction that takes place in "production" is replicated in a parallel world called "circulation" whereby exchange-value is obtained. According to this view, the capitalist system is not fundamentally different from say, the feudal system. The feudal system was founded on the principles of direct expropriation, whereby bonded labour either worked so many days in the year on the landlord's land, in his mines or factories, or alternatively gave the landlord a portion of its crop. Thus, the lord was able to avoid engaging in manual labour because he expropriated effectively a portion of the labour time of his dependants. The seigneur's wealth was founded, therefore, on the "extraction" and "accumulation" of so many hours and days of labour time of his dependants, passing on certain portion of the "extracted" labour in the form of goods and services to the next lord in the feudal chain. The feudal system of lord/vassal interpersonal relation could be described, therefore, as a pyramidal structure of expropriation and accumulation on a European scale. A whole cosmology, or what Marxists call, ideology, evolved to explain why this system is good and just and, in fact, represents nothing less than God's will on earth.

Marxist theory suggests that a new mode of expropriation represented by capitalism replaces feudalism and operates more cunningly through the money economy. In Marx' words, the wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an "immense collection of commodities" (Marx 1970: 125). But this is only an appearance, if we "disregard the use value of commodity", he reckons, "only one property remains, that of being products of labour" (Marx 1970: 128). So that "[a]s exchange value, all commodities are merely definite quantities of congealed labour time" (Marx 1970: 130) and "the total labour power of society, which is manifest in the values of the world of commodities, counts here as one homogenous mass of human labour power, although composed of innumerable individual units of labour power" (Marx 1970: 129). Since the entire capitalist world economy amounts to an accumulation of definite quantities of congealed labour-time, it follows that the wealth and resources in the "centre", compared with the poverty in the "periphery", could possibly mean only that the centre has managed somehow to accumulate more "congealed labour time" than its due. This means, in turn that the centre

manages to “extract” congealed labour time from the periphery. Frank’s theory of the development of underdevelopment provides a lively illustration of the mechanism by which this might happen. He notes, in effect, that just as the feudal pyramid-shaped political economy extracted and accumulated congealed labour time and transferred it to the top of the feudal pyramid of Christendom: so the capitalist world economy is a pyramidal-shaped system, consisting of a series or a chain of centres and peripheries relationships. Since the whole process is profit motivated, and profit is purely a money-value, the world of “circulation” unfortunately requires the mechanical process of extraction.

The labour theory of value is a product of classical economics, and it produced in a dialectical fashion its own alternative, Marxism. The latter considers itself a critique of (classical) political economy. But neo-classical economics was the product of different circumstances that called for a different understanding of capital, and again, in a typical dialectical fashion, it also gave rise to its own critique in the shape of the evolutionary economics of Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons. The argument of the latter is simple but compelling: capitalism never really “matures”, and capital itself undergoes profound changes from time to time. Whereby the labour theory of value may have provided an appropriate approximation of the processes of capital formation during a certain period, Veblen believed the period might not have been the nineteenth century as Marx thought, but the eighteenth century craft economy. By the late nineteenth century, capitalism has undergone another one of those profound transformations, which resulted in capital becoming primarily, *but not exclusively*, anticipated future earnings.

The relevant context to the transformation of capitalism in the late nineteenth century appears to be changes associated with two sets of interrelated developments. First, it was the advent of the new type of corporation capable of mobilising huge resources at great distances (Chandler 1990). The new corporations spearheaded a transformation of the economy towards a system standardisation, mass production, industrial research, and scientific management. The second, less discussed aspect of the transformation, was an important development in the legal status of contractual relationships

and private property in the U.S. As demonstrated by John Commons, following the business practice, the U.S. Courts have begun to accept towards the end of the nineteenth century the principle of “intangible property” (Commons [1924]1959). The concept of intangible property supplements the traditional corporeal concept of property – ownership of things, and incorporeal concept of property – ownership of debts, securities and so on. Here ownership is of intangible values such as “goodwill”, “brand”, “knowledge” or even “leadership”.

The concept of intangible property assigns pecuniary value not only to intangibles such as trademark and patents, but also to concepts such as “goodwill”. “Goodwill” is a nebulous concept: when Michael Jordan lends his name to a Nike product, he lends his “good will”, something he owns, to the company. Companies who borrow Jordan’s “good will” without his permission will be ruthlessly persecuted. There is a value, an “exchange value”, as Marxist would call it, to Jordan’s “good will” and that value changes over time. When Andrew Carnegie or Bill Gates lends their “business skills” to their respective corporations, US Steel and Microsoft, there is a measurable value attached to their goodwill. The value of such intangible properties is what the market anticipates to be their future profits earning potential (Nitzan 1998). The value of such properties is, therefore, ‘subjective’ in a sense that it derives purely as a function of potential or anticipated future earnings that may be accrued to the owner. The latter is measured, ultimately, in the ability of business to make business, an ability that in and by itself obtains a pecuniary value. How is this potential for future profits assessed? The critical point is that intangible property is “the kind of property whose value depends upon right of access to a commodity market, a labour market, a money market, and so on” (Commons 1959: 19). The value of ‘intangible property’ is assessed in terms of the ability of the possessor to exact monopolistic access to any of these markets, whatever the manner the possessor achieves such monopolies. It is the ability to manipulate or “disturb” and “sabotage”, as Veblen calls it, any of these markets, which becomes a source of enormous profit. For instance, in today’s economy the ability of companies, such as Microsoft, to place their product strategically as the market standard is the principal source of their profits. Brand name, advertisement, corporate alliances, formal and informal “deals”, government regulations,

etc., are all typical methods for obtaining such monopolistic access. Once intangibles are recognised in law, capital becomes for all intents and purposes, the anticipation of future profits.

These ideas are reflected (or rather refracted) in the marginalist theory, which, in turn, had important implication to a theory of development. The theory is founded on an implicit assumption that (a) capital is anticipated future earning, and consequently (b) anticipated future earnings must be potentially larger where margins are bigger. Combine the two, the theory is that rather than investing in the centre, capital would naturally be interested in the “periphery” because of the heavier margins there. It is a simple equation: If, for instance, I sell a manufactured product in the “centre” but manage to produce it in the “periphery”, where wages are low, I can reward myself with higher margins. That there is something in the theory can be seen very clearly with what may be described as the China effect today. Investors are interested in China primarily because of the potential for future earnings its market provide, and only secondarily, because of anticipated short-term profits due to differential wages.

Neo-classical development economics was faced, therefore, with a puzzle: Why capital fails to grasp the great opportunities for profits in the periphery? The answer of the traditional “hydraulic” model of Frank, Arrighi or Wallerstein was that the failure of development had to do with the fact that as capital “invests” in the periphery, at the same time it “extracts” and shifts capital from the “periphery” to the “centre” – so that, paradoxically, greater investment in the periphery results in greater decline. The reason is that as a product of an extraction process, and as an aggregation of commodities in the form of a huge heap of congealed labour-time, there must be “so much capital in the world”. If there is more capital in one place, it stands to reason that there is less in another. If capital now pours into China, then it must leave a certain vacuum in the centre. The centre surely would not be happy about its emerging capital deficit and will defend its position in the world. (Indeed, the mere fact that so many people believe in this scenario, in and by itself may lead to an entirely unnecessary but bloody conflict.)

But the theory of development of underdevelopment is no answer to the marginalists. It fails to take account of the mutation of capital and the impacts of intangible properties on capital formation. If capital had become primarily anticipated earnings, then the key issues for development are not how to 'steal' the centre's heap of congealed labour time, but how to ensure the growth of capital through new channels of anticipated future earnings in the periphery. The world credit market is not a closed hydraulic system whereby flow of capital from one place to another generates deficit investment. It is not a case of capital shifting from one place to another, as much as about the creation of capital. In this theory differentials are not so much a hindrance, but a potential source of dynamism and change.

The marginalist answer to the puzzle of underdevelopment consists, therefore, of two components. First, global development is hampered by the lack of real global markets, particularly efficient and open credit market, allocating resources globally. The answer to the lack of development is market integration and market openness. Second, as a global financial market, the so-called Euromarket was established already by the early 1960s, and as trade barriers declined in the 1980s, the marginalists argue that the problem of development has to do with a lack of stable and supportive political and legal infrastructure in the periphery. Hence, the formulation of the so-called Washington consensus, leading eventually to the debate on governance and quality of the state in developing countries.

5. The Evolutionary Answer

Marx stresses on a number of occasions the importance of the national debt to the growth of capitalism. But he was unaware, as John Commons was, of how the future shapes the present. Arguably this is not due to some failing on the part of Marx, but because the system of capital formation as anticipated earnings was still far too rudimentary in his time. In contrast to Marx who sees wealth as an apparent heap of commodities, Veblen notes that in modern times: "Men count their wealth as money-values. So much so that by settled habit, induced by long and close application to the pursuit of net gain in terms of price, men have come to the conviction that

money-values are more real and substantial than any of the material facts in this transitory world” (Veblen 1932: 88). Wealth, in other words, no longer necessarily an “immense collection of commodities”, modern “capital accumulation” is expressed in pecuniary value, while the actually accumulated commodities (factors of production, manufactured goods, etc.) can turn within five to six years cycle into junk, rather costly to get rid of (Nitzan 1998). This is not to mean that capital growth is purely abstract. Indeed, the somewhat rosy picture painted by the marginalists is pretty much far from the reality on the ground once we probe deeper into the nature of anticipated earnings.

First, we need to bear in mind that labour, as a factor of production and as consumer, plays a critical role in the modern processes of capital “accumulation”. To begin with, the cost of labour, or rather, anticipated labour costs are an important component in the calculation of anticipated earnings of any enterprise. As states now play an important role in development, both in the centre and in the periphery, they intervene directly and comprehensively in labour markets. True, intervention is by no means aimed always at reducing labour cost, but traditional class struggle has not been superseded. I am not the first to note that while the markets for goods, services and capital markets are increasingly open, labour markets are not. The continuing salience of a state system serves, therefore, to ensure differentials labour costs between different territories. Differentials are supported by an appeal to nationalism and patriotism, but they are sustained not only, as dependency theorists believed, in order to maintain the wealth of the centre as opposed to the poverty of the periphery, but to maintain profit margins in both – so that diverging wage structures and regulations offer business a real “stick”, so to speak, to wave with and threaten both states and labour. How often do we hear that unless labour laws and/or taxation are relaxed, business is likely to relocate to cheaper and more welcoming locations? This means, however, that Frank’s basic model was correct on at least two counts. First, there is no fundamental difference between the centre and periphery; they are both part of the same system and are subject to similar types of dynamics. Second, his intuition about the role of politics and vested interests should not be ignored – there are powerful vested interests that gain from the differentials in

development between countries – and that is something that marginalists conveniently forget.

Second, anticipated earnings is founded on some sort of rough approximation of the market realisation of goods and services – and that market is more static than the financial market. There can be difficulties of synchronisation between the potential growth in consumption and the market's anticipation of future earnings and hence capital cannot simply grow on future optimism forever. That is why the “rise of China”, for instance, may spell problems to its neighbours; the world market, after all, can sustain only so many manufacturers of toys and shoes. Growing competition due to so-called “overcapacity” in production and manufacturing, which results from miscalculation in anticipated earnings, leads to revised anticipated earnings. For Veblen the concept of “overcapacity” is a business concept, it has only meaning in terms of realisation of pecuniary value (Veblen 1932). Nitzan and Bichler (1996) point to the importance of the last wave of merger and acquisition during the era of “globalisation” as evidence to the same rationale. Business (in the Veblenian meaning of the word) is not concerned with growth but with anticipated earnings, and there is a powerful tendency to try and control markets to ensure profit margins. Merger and acquisition which is, therefore, an expression and manifestation of one of the “sabotaging” techniques exercised by business aimed at ensuring that the rose-tinted picture painted by the marginalist is misleading: even if all countries in the world “put their house in order”, they are unlikely to attract capital as promised. There is no, nor is there likely to be, a competitive, open and efficient global market. Business makes certain of that.

6. The New Theory of Capital and the State

All this suggests that the state plays an important role in development. But not the role, I am afraid, anticipated by Frank. The state is often treated by dependency theorists as if it was purely an instrument in the hands of the dominant classes. Instrumental state theory has great difficulties explaining some of the most significant events of the past years. For example, as far as I can tell, dependency theorists have never predicted that countries such as

Luxembourg, Ireland, Bermuda or the Cayman Islands would occupy some of the highest positions in the world's ranking of GDP per capita. Yet, each of these states achieved its lofty position by employing its sovereign right to write law, to create a successful offshore economy (Palan 2003). It may be argued with some justification that these are specifically small states and of no great interest or value to the theory of development. The question is, however, how come some states have managed to develop whole new sectors in the economy? How come states that are supposedly ruled by certain alliances of vested interests managed to dream up new sectors from which the existing vested interests do not necessarily benefit? How countries such as Ireland hit upon a new idea and transform themselves into tax havens?

There is an issue that dependency theory has to answer for both with regards to the theory of the state and the theory of capital. As long as we assume that capital is attached to economic sectors, that there are differences between industrial, commercial and financial capital, we will have great difficulties explaining policy innovation. But if capital, or business, is not attached to a particular sector, but is concerned with profit and pecuniary value, than we can allow for the possibility that the "ruling classes" may turn up to be far more agile and versatile than we have anticipated. The absentee owners of 'industrial' corporations are not attracted to a particular sector and there is no particular reason for us to believe that the state they dominate would be attached to some industrial sectors as well. States dominated by business interests and business value is beginning to make them behave like business. In a system of pecuniary value, it may be the case, therefore, that the State perpetuates vested interests not necessarily by sustaining existing patterns of exploitation, but by devising new schemes. It is entirely feasible that the State perpetuates vested interest by innovating in the realm of policy. There seems to be a good measure of evidence for the proposition. In the realm of International Political Economy, the argument about dependency has been replaced by the theory of the Competition State. The idea is that states are increasingly concerned with market competition and market share (Cerny 1991; Strange 1994).

7. Conclusion

The new theories suggest that not only are there no metaphysical distinctions between societies, but holistic theories of the capitalist world economy yield a very different picture from the one presented by Frank. The world as viewed from a business perspective consists of different states that are experienced as “bundles” of regulation, taxation and institutional and political variations. Business, particularly large business, takes advantage of a differentiated world by typically re-allocating production, manufacturing, research, financing, managerial and marketing tasks to different locales. So that, for instance, many of the financial and managerial tasks, such as international lending, bond issuing, self-insurance, holding companies, are placed nowadays in tax havens. The supposedly national character and cultural variations among societies is viewed from a business perspective as simply another opportunity for profit making, as business tries and makes itself appear both global and yet local, and adapts its product and services to cultural variations. Business encounters, therefore, a differentiated world and variations are viewed as opportunities for extracting pecuniary value. States are responding, in turn, by devising strategies for attracting capital to their territory, in other words, like business, they too seek to accentuate the differential advantages and provide business with opportunities for profit making.

This is not a world, I am afraid, that can be reduced to a centre-periphery chain-like relationship of extraction and exploitation; the great dependency scheme of things, which divided the world into core areas surrounded by a vast periphery and buffered by a vulnerable semi-periphery simply does not hold anymore. On the contrary, the dependency model can be seen from today's vantage point as representing a transitory moment in the development of global capitalism – but as global capitalism deepened its hold, it generated differentiated outcomes exploding the very myth of a “Third World”. We should acknowledge, nonetheless, that our ability to ‘see’ the world in these terms is a product, to a certain extent, of the important theoretical work instigated by dependency theory. Once dependency theory questioned in a profound manner the nationalist perspective of world politics, and once it raised the issue of the geo-economics of exploitation, a space

was created in which other scholars began to explore the empirical reality of statehood in a context of globalising capitalism.

References

- Bichler, Shimshon/Nitzan, Jonathan (1996): Putting The State In Its Place: US Foreign Policy and Differential Accumulation In Middle East "Energy Conflicts." In: *Review of International Political Economy* 3(4), 608-661.
- Cerny, Philip (1991): *The Changing Architecture of Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- Chandler, Alfred (1990): *Scale and Scope*. Harvard University Press.
- Commons, John (1959) [1924]: *The Legal Foundations of Capitalism*. Madison Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1967): *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Gross, Bertrand (1980): *Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America*. Cambridge: Ma: South End Press.
- Heidegger, Martin (1993): *Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics*. In: Farrell Krell, David (ed.): *Basic Writings*. London: Routledge.
- Lipietz Alain (1987): *Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism*. London: Verso.
- Mairet, Gérard (1997): *Le Principe de Souveraineté: Histoires et Fondements du Pouvoir Moderne*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Marx, Karl [1867] (1970): *Capital Vol(I)*. London: Penguin.
- Nitzan, Jonathan (1998): *Differential Accumulation: Toward A New Political Economy of Capital*. In: *Review of International Political Economy* 5(2), 169-216.
- Oakes, Guy (1988): *Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation In The Cultural Sciences*. Cambridge Mass.: MIT.
- Palan, Ronen/Brook, Blair (1993): *On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations*. In: *Review of International Studies Vol (19)*, 385-399.
- Palan, Ronen (2003): *The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.
- Strange, Susan (1994): *Wake Up, Krasner! The World Has Changed*. In: *Review of International Political Economy Vol (1, 2)*, 209-20.
- Veblen, Thorstein (1932): *Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America*. New York: Hurbsch.
- Veblen, Thorstein (1961): *The Place of Science in modern Civilization and other essays*. New York: Russel & Russel.

Abstracts

Der Artikel geht dem Vermächtnis von Andre Gunder Franks Werk im Feld der internationalen Beziehungen nach. Frank entwickelte eine Theorie des kapitalistischen Systems als weltumspannendes Ausbeutungssystem, das auf den Beziehungen zwischen Zentrum und peripheren Satelliten beruht. Ausbeutung und Akkumulation schaffen demnach eine „parallele Geographie“, die als mächtige Infrastruktur betrachtet werden kann und die Kapital von den Peripherien in die Zentren kanalisiert. Der Autor diskutiert zentrale – in Franks Denken als universell geltende – Merkmale des kapitalistischen Weltsystems und gelangt zum Schluss, dass seine Theorie nicht in der Lage war, wichtige Veränderungen im Wesen des Kapitals zu erfassen. Zeitgenössische Theorien im Feld der Internationalen Politischen Ökonomie haben, Franks Ansätze zuspitzend, ein neues geoökonomisches Konzept entwickelt. Diese Beiträge zeigen, dass das Zentrum-Peripherie-Modell ein Übergangsphänomen in der Entwicklung des globalen Kapitalismus darstellt.

The article explores the legacy of Andre Gunder Frank in International Relations. Frank developed a theory of the entire capitalist system as a planetary wide system of exploitation replicating centre-peripheral satellite relationships. Exploitation and accumulation generate a parallel geography that serves like a gigantic infrastructure channelling capital from the periphery to the centre. The author discusses some characteristics of the capitalist world economy assumed as universals and arrives at the conclusion that Frank's theory, however, failed to take count of important changes in the nature of capital as anticipated future earning. Contemporary International Relations, particularly in the sub-field of International Political Economy, have radicalised Frank's ideas. Contemporary International Political Economy has developed a novel geo-economic conceptualisation demonstrating that the core-periphery schema of relationship was a transitory moment in the development of global capitalism.

Ronen Palan

International Relations and Politics Department, University of Sussex
Brighton, BN1 9RH, United Kingdom

R.P.Palan@sussex.ac.uk

RICARDO DUCHESNE

Globalization, the Industrialization of Puerto Rico and the Limits of Dependency Theory

1. Introduction

Puerto Rico occupies a peculiar status within the American political system. This Caribbean island was ceded to the United States in 1898 in settlement of the Spanish American War. After an initial two years of military rule, the United States, under the Foraker Act, established a civil government in 1900. This Act provided for local government of Puerto Rico's House of Representatives and a resident commissioner to the American Congress. All other political and administrative offices, including Governor, were appointed by the American president. Congress had the right to overrule any Puerto Rican legislative acts; there was no bill of rights and all federal legislation was binding on Puerto Rico. In 1917 the Jones Act was passed, making Puerto Ricans American citizens, and allowing the island to elect its own legislature. Finally, in 1948 the island was permitted to elect by popular vote its own Governor, and in 1952 the famous "commonwealth" status was created, changing the status of Puerto Rico from a "territory" to a "free associated state" (Pico 1986; Clark 1975). With commonwealth status came a common monetary system and a common defence as well as free mobility of goods, labour and capital between the island and the mainland. Puerto Rico, to be sure, is an anomaly in the American political system: as American citizens Puerto Ricans are subject to the US military draft, but because Puerto Rico is not a state of the Union, it cannot vote in presidential elections and does not have voting representation in the Congress. Puerto Ricans pay no federal taxes yet they are eligible for federal expenditure programs. While the island has its own domestic judicial and legislative system, this legal structure is subject to ultimate validation by the American Supreme

me Court. Finally, Puerto Rico has its own flag, although it is always raised together with the US flag.

It is obvious that contemporary Puerto Rico is not a sovereign nation: the American Congress has the prerogative to legislate for the Puerto Rican people without their consent. Puerto Ricans have no control over citizenship, immigration and emigration, foreign relations, bankruptcy laws, mail and currency. Yet, on the other hand, Puerto Rico's colonial experience is unique and does not fit the usual historical experiences of colonization. For one, Puerto Rico has long ceased to be an undeveloped colony. Already in 1967 a World Bank Report classified it as a "developed nation", the first Latin American state to be officially given that designation. And there is economic evidence to support this claim – in 1976 the island's per capita income was \$ 2,328 in contrast to other Caribbean islands: Cuba, \$ 860, Dominican Republic, \$ 780; Haiti, \$ 200; Jamaica, \$ 1,070 (Johnson 1980: 150). Indeed, many countries today, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, are still "undeveloped" although they are politically independent.

As a "prosperous" colony, Puerto Rico is a historical anomaly, insofar as colonies have traditionally served as sources of slave labour and cheap raw materials, and have not been able to modernize. But if the status of the „undeveloped“ countries is neo-colonial (formal political independence but economic dependence and control by foreign capital) what is the status of Puerto Rico? Is present day Puerto Rico a classic colony, a neo-colony?, or an industrial country? Clearly by virtue of its political status this island is a colony. Yet in terms of its per capita income and labour productivity, this colony, as will be shown in greater detail below, is an industrial country. On the other hand, in its one sided economic dependency on the United States, this industrial country is a neo-colony. Thus, 85% of Puerto Rico's export goes to the United States, 80% of all manufacturing assets and retail trade are controlled by the U.S., and 80% of new investments funds come from the mainland (Dietz 1978: 21). Yes, however paradoxical it may seem, Puerto Rico is a political colony, an industrial country, and a neo-colony *at the same time*. No wonder this island faces a profound identity crisis!

It is this articulation of colonial, neo-colonial, and industrial status that I would like to investigate in this paper. There are two historical contraries here: (i) the combination of political colonialism and industrialization, (ii) the combination of neo-colonial exploitation and development. I want to assess this double paradox in terms of the two major contending schools of Third World development: the classical Marxist theory and dependency theory. Taking Puerto Rico's industrialization in the period between 1948 and 1980, I shall argue that this experience serves as a paradigmatic case suggesting that the export of capitalism, in the age of globalization, does not block development in the periphery, but rather stimulates it. In this respect, I will be leaning towards the classical Marxist ("diffusionist") school, because it fits better with the existing empirical evidence, and because it provides a more rigorous set of concepts than dependency theory. Nevertheless, I will attempt to assimilate aspects of the world-historic perspective of dependency theory, and the way it illuminates the specific role Puerto Rico's economy has played in the international division of labour, and some peculiar aspects of colonial industrialization.

But the overall view proposed here is that both classical Marxist and dependency theory have tended to give a one-dimensional picture of the history of capitalism globalization, in that they do not differentiate clearly any stages of imperialist accumulation. I believe that the world market has been punctuated by three distinct forms of accumulation: independent merchant's capital, "free trade" expansion, and global finance capital. Underdevelopment is not a result of the globalization of capitalism as such - or so I will argue. Underdevelopment represents a particular moment in the history of capital accumulation, namely, independent merchant's capital. Once the centre-periphery exchange relation takes place or occurs within the context of the full globalization of capitalism - the export of multinational branches and scientific and managerial expertise - the "development of underdevelopment" in the periphery will be broken, for, in this globalized form, capitalism has the capacity to cultivate full capitalist-wage relations and institutions in the periphery. Contrary to what dependency (or "world systems") theories insist, what matters is not the *quantity* of surplus transferred from satellite to metropolis - or the difference between the inflow of

capital and the outflow of profits; what matters is the *quality* of capitalist global expansion and accumulation.

2. Classical Marxist Theory

According to Simon Kuznets, a leading exponent of diffusion theory in the 1950s and 1960s, “the mass application of technological innovation [...] constitutes much of the distinctive substance of modern economic growth” (Kuznets 1968: 7). Economic development, Kuznets reasoned, is a function of the application of scientific and technical knowledge to the process of production. The more science is applied to production, the higher the rate of growth. Underdevelopment, from this perspective, is simply caused by the failure to introduce modern-scientific technology into the economy. To overcome underdevelopment one needs to diffuse modern science and apply it to the production of goods.

This idea of growth through diffusion of science resembles Marx’s argument that the development of instrumental and/or technical knowledge was at the heart of the development of the productive forces. The growth of technical knowledge, as Marx put it, “means merely that less direct labour is required in order to make a larger product” (as cited in Cohen 1980: 55). But there is more to Marx than this. In Marx “technical innovation” and “economic growth” are not fully autonomous factors: there are certain institutional or social relations which either act as “fettters” or as stimulants to the development of the productive forces. For instance, Marx believed that the class structure of capitalism, i.e., the wage labour/capitalist relation was more conducive to technical innovation than non-capitalist relations. He reasoned that once labour and the means of production were exchanged freely in the market, the productive forces would expand through increasing “relative surplus value” by raising the productivity of labour. As the factors of production were turned into commodities, and the needs of human reproduction had to be bought and sold in the market, there would be a constant competitive pressure to create new markets and maximize profits. Those industries that failed to meet standard prices and social levels of productivity would be driven out of business. To step up accumulation capitalists would

constantly increase productivity by reducing labour costs per unit of production (relative surplus value; in Dobb 1968; Brenner 1977). Capitalism, as Marx wrote, “cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production and thereby the relations of production” (in Tucker ed. 1972: 338). In contrast, in a non-capitalist society, this pressure was non-existent since the means of production were tied to a fixed structure of social and natural relations. A feudal lord, for example, when striving to maximize the surplus product, would do so by extending the existing scale of agricultural operations, conquering new lands, and increasing the quantity of rents and labour services from the peasantry, as opposed to introducing innovations or increasing labour productivity.

Now, Marx believed that capitalism, in its search for higher profits, would spread throughout the world. He also believed that wherever capitalism was present development would occur, and that “the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.” In his famous article, “On Imperialism in India”, Marx was quite explicit about the growth promoting nature of global capitalism. He observed that the imposition of British rule in India had set the stage for a revolutionary advance of the productive forces in that colony, when you have once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country which possessed iron and coal, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. The railway system will therefore become, in India the forerunner of modern industry (in Tucker ed. 1972: 586).

Colonialism would lead to industrialization. Marx however envisioned the breakdown of pre-capitalist relations of production, institutions, and traditions within India as a result of the spread of British capital. If capitalism was to develop, Marx argued, England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia (in Tucker ed 1972: 583).

3. Dependency Theory

In retrospect we know that Marx was too optimistic regarding the diffusion of capitalist development in India. Indeed it was the very failure of development in the colonial world which called into question Marx's "diffusionist" vision, leading in the 1950's and 1960's to the formation of a new paradigm on development widely known as Dependency Theory. For the purposes of this paper, I will make no distinctions between the many, conflicting approaches and conclusions that have emerged within the dependency school since its inception in the early 1960s. I will be evaluating the earlier, stronger version of dependency theory associated primarily with the work of Andre Gunder Frank. In the conclusion of this paper, however, I will acknowledge the contributions of the so-called "weaker version" of dependency theory associated with the works of scholars such as Enrique Cardoso (1979), Dos Santos (1970), and Paul Evans (1979)¹.

Dependency theory was quite different from the classical Marxist approach; indeed, it was a direct inversion of Marx's original thesis: the integration of the colonial world into the world capitalist economy was now seen as the cause of backwardness. Paul A. Baran's book, *The Political Economy of Growth* (originally published in 1957) was the first exposition of this thesis in the English speaking world. Baran's argument, based largely on the British-India experience, was that imperialism, by extracting a surplus, had stifled the development of an indigenous capitalism (Baran 1973). It was this argument was later taken and elaborated by A.G. Frank in his seminal works, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967), and *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (1969).

The essence of Frank's thesis was that capitalism generated development in some areas at the cost of underdevelopment in others. Frank rejected the diffusionist view that Latin America's backwardness was due to the existence of a feudal subsistence economy that was isolated from the more advanced capitalist economies of the world. He argued, to the contrary, that Latin America was capitalist from the moment it was incorporated into the world market in the sixteenth century. He defined capitalism as a *system of monopolistic exchange*, characterised by the transfer of resources and profits

from satellite regions to metropolitan centres. The slave sugar plantations, the mineral mines of the 16th and 17th centuries, and the multinationals of the 20th century were all equally identified by him as capitalist enterprises. Thus, because the backward latifundia economy in Latin America arose in response to market opportunities, it was capitalist, not feudal. Likewise, because the peasants were part of a hierarchic chain of metropolis-satellite exchange relations, they belonged to capitalist relations. Plantation economies using slave labour, profit remittances by multinationals, and interest payments on debt were to Frank but different mechanisms of the same capitalist process by which the centre extracted a surplus from the periphery, and generated the process of the “development of underdevelopment” (Frank 1967; 1969).

4. Puerto Rico: Diffusionism or Underdevelopment?

Evidently, the fact that Puerto Rico managed to achieve a „developed“ status by the 1970s seems to contradict Frank’s argument that integration into the world capitalist system acts to retard economic development. In fact, much evidence had been mounting since the 1960s indicating that development was occurring in so-called satellite countries of the world, despite economic dependency. In 1973, for example, the Marxist Bill Warren published a highly controversial article, “Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization”, which persuasively demonstrated, through the use of a large amount of empirical data, that capitalist development was rapidly taking place in at least some Third World countries. Warren explained that even if remitted profits exceeded foreign capital, development was possible (and real) since economic change was generated „in between“ the inward flow of investment and the outward flow of repatriated profits. After all, he asked: isn’t increasing the rate of surplus value the condition for the advance of the productive forces under capitalism?

Is Puerto Rico, then, just another case of Third World industrialization? Although Warren believes that “direct colonialism implanted the elements of capitalism” in the Third World, he is quite clear that *political independence* is a crucial factor in attaining industrialization and diversifica-

tion of exports towards manufactured goods. He writes, "Independence has permitted industrial advance by breaking the monopoly of colonialist power and creating the conditions in which Third World countries can utilize inter-imperialist and East-West rivalries. Independence has been a direct cause (not just a permissive condition) of industrial advance in that it has stimulated popular pressures for a higher living standard where these have been a major internal influence sustaining industrialization policies" (Warren 1973).

In this sense, Warren implicitly divides the history of imperialism into two periods: the colonial stage and the post-Second World War period, when nationalist states were established in the Third World. And indeed argues that during the first period the gap between advanced and colonial countries was widened because of the monopoly restrictions which *colonial rule* placed on industrial diversification. Only with national independence in the post WW II period were these restrictions removed, allowing capitalist development in the periphery to take full effect, with support from the state, which was now able to exert pressure on foreign businesses to limit the back-flow of repatriated profits and promote local industry. For Warren, then, in contrast to Frank, foreign capital per se does not impede development, in particular when this development is complemented by a national programme of import substitution.

Evidently, Warren's theory, too, does not explain adequately the experience of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico, under the popular Governor Louis Munoz Marin (1944-1968), abandoned political independence precisely in the name of the industrialization programme "Operation Bootstrap". The Commonwealth constitution (1952), which in essence preserved the colonial status of Puerto Rico, was indeed designed to promote capitalism through foreign private investment. In approaching American capital, Munoz and his party emphasized Puerto Rico's *colonial* relationship with the United States as providing highly profitable opportunities in the island. They argued that Puerto Rico had the same monetary, postal, and juridical system. That there were no tariff barriers, and that the U.S. constitution and most federal laws were applicable in Puerto Rico. As one American official said at the time. The political stability of the island is a significant advantage in at-

tracting foreign capital, and this also appears to be linked to its *political status*. Because it is part of the U.S. and the people are American citizens, U.S. constitutional guarantees of civil and property rights are fully applicable. As a result, owners of foreign capital have no fear of being unable to repatriate their profits or having their property expropriated (cited in Duggal 1975: 99). Moreover, they pointed out that wage rates were lower in Puerto Rico than on the mainland because Puerto Rico was *not a state* and therefore was exempted from federal minimum wage regulations, including control over industrial labour relations, and environmental quality (Caban 1990: 10). But more important, they indicated that U.S. firms would pay no taxes in Puerto Rico since the island was also exempted from federal tax laws under the principle of no taxation without representation (in the Congress). The role assumed by the local government would be simply that of promoting and assisting American private investment. This meant minimizing risks and *widening* profit margins for American firms.

The development strategy thus consisted of an emphasis on Puerto Rico's colonial status as serving to *attract* foreign capital, and allowing for complete *repatriation* of profits. Indeed the political guarantee of *remitting* tax-exempted profits was a key incentive in *attracting* American capital into the island. By 1953, four years into Operation Bootstrap, 300 manufacturing plants had settled in the island, creating more than 25,000 new jobs (Lewis 1974: 170). By 1961 new factories were opening at an average rate of five per week, and by 1970 there were 2,000 foreign enterprises located in the island (Johnson 1980: 39). And it was this inflow of foreign capital, not any programme of economic nationalism, which brought about a steady expansion in Puerto Rico's economy from 1950 to 1970. The annual percentage rate of growth reached the impressive figure of 8.4% during the 1950's, and of 10.6% during the 1960's, at current prices (Wells 1977: 173). In real terms, these figures are as follows: a 7.6% growth rate in the 1950s, 6.8% in the 1960s, and 9.7% in the 1970s (Gautier-Mayoral, 1990, 21). But even more important, this growth, contrary to dependency theory, was achieved together with an upward trend in remitted profits. This is clearly illustrated in the following table².

Table 1: Industrial Net Income Generated by Foreign Capital and Total Net profits and Interests Appropriated by Foreign Capital. 1950-1979

	Net Income	Net Foreign Profits and Interests
1950	3.5%	9.1%
1960	53.8%	22.1%
1970	81.7%	42.2%
1976	89.2%	65.1%
1979	91.8%	68.0%

The extent to which profits were remitted abroad is high-lighted by the pharmaceutical industry. This industry – the largest centre in the world at the time – made over \$ 2,000 million in profits in Puerto Rico between 1967 and 1977 (of which nearly half were due to tax-exemption), re-investing all the profits in Europe (Gautier-Mayoral 1977: 41)! This is not an isolated case. Since 1960's the difference between GNP and GDP, which is a rough measure of the volume of profits, interests, and dividends flowing out of the island to firms and creditors in the U.S., has been widening. While in 1963 there was no gap between the GNP and GDP, in 1970, the GDP exceeded the GNP by 7.4%; in 1975 the difference rose to 15%; and in 1980 to 25.3% (Dietz, 1982: 500). Weiskoff, for his part, has estimated that, from 1947 to 1983, \$ 17.1 billion invested in Puerto Rico gave rise to \$33.3 billion in net profits, of which \$16.0 billion were remitted (Weiskoff 1985: 59).

Yes, this Caribbean colony has been a profit paradise for American businesses. Since the 1950s, it has been one of the major areas of U.S. investments in the world. Whereas in 1935 Puerto Rico was the 9th market for the U.S. in the world and the first in Latin America, in 1974 it was the 5th market of the U.S. in the world (Gautier-Mayoral 1990: 22). In 1978, 34% of total U.S. direct investment in Latin America was concentrated in Puerto

Rico, of that 42.4% of profits came from Puerto Rico (Campos 1981: 140; Campos 1982: 559). These are impressive figures, the more so considering that Puerto Rico is a small island of 100 by 35 miles, with a population not yet exceeding four million. Now, let us compare (Table 2) Puerto Rico's level of industrialization, by the year 1979, with the major neo-colonial and politically independent economies of Latin America.

Table 2: Selected Countries and Economic Indicators 1979

	Argentina	Brazil	Mexico	Venezuela	Puerto Rico
Popula- tion	26.7	229.6	64.4	13.6	3.1
GDP (millions)	53.5	156.7	84.3	32.8	11.7
Per capita GDP	2004	1310	1215	2429	3752
Real GDP growth ra- te, 1960- 1979	3.6	7.1	6.0	5.4	6.6
Real per capi- ta GDP, growth rate 1960- 1979	2.3	4.5	2.5	2.3	5.0
Gross K formati- on as % of GDP	24.4	25.5	26.8	41.2	9.6

This table (Aponte 1981) shows that, by 1979, Puerto Rico vis-a vis these countries had (1) a higher domestic product per capita; (2) the second highest growth rate next to Brazil; (3) the highest per capital growth rate,

higher than that of Brazil. Yet, at the same time, it shows that Puerto Rico's gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP was exceeded by all these countries - that the inward flow of capital has been lower than outward flow. In other words, although Puerto Rico had the lowest level of *indigenous* capitalism, it had the highest level of industrialization. (Certainly this is not to deny that import substitution programmes in the other Latin American countries played an invaluable role at least in bringing some degree of sovereignty over economic and cultural affairs). The issue is that what this *foreign* capital did „in between“ this inflow and outflow (without political independence) was sufficient to industrialize the island. Why?

The industrialization of Puerto Rico was no doubt influenced by its unique political relationship with the United States. There are no tariffs on goods traded between the mainland and the island; the U.S. dollar is the currency, and U.S. capital is free to move into and out of Puerto Rico. Thus, the Puerto Rican economy has no exchange problems like those which trouble poorer countries competing in the dollar-dominated world of international trade. Furthermore, not being a nation state, Puerto Rico does not have to spend on its defence, its postal system, or its diplomatic relations, and therefore can spend more on education, welfare, health and housing. It would be wrong, however, to conclude, as Raymond Carr (1984) has, that Puerto Rico's economy is simply a poor regional economy of the U.S. First, Puerto Rico does tabulate a balance of payments account, unlike any other state. Second, Puerto Rico is not a state; its status is periodically under review, and Puerto Ricans have the option, in the future, to decide whether they want to become a state, reform the Commonwealth arrangement, or become independent – again unlike any other state. Puerto Rico, to use Dietz words, is “a *part* of but not *of* the United States” (Dietz 1987: 233).

Let us not forget that it is precisely this commonwealth status that permits American firms to repatriate huge profits. American companies located in the island have enjoyed, throughout this period of rapid American investment, an average ratio of profits of 15.5% in textiles, as compared to 1.9% in the mainland; 26% in electrical machinery, compared to 3.9% in the U.S.; and 28.4% in the tools industry, compared to 7.3% in continental firms (Lewis 1974: 228-229). On average American investors reaped higher

profits in Puerto Rico than anywhere else in the world: in 1974, U.S. direct capital investment in Puerto Rico constituted 5.5% of U.S. investment in the rest of the world. Yet this 5.5% produced profits equal to 10% of U.S. profits in the rest of the world (Gautier-Mayoral 1977: 41). Or, to use another set of numbers, in 1980 direct investment in Puerto Rico represented 35% of total U.S. investments in Latin America, and for 44% of profits (Melendez 1990: 48).

As I see it, what Puerto Rico's political status did was to facilitate and augment the investment of American capital, resolving the key economic problem facing any undeveloped economy: how to amass sufficient savings to invest in productive capacity for the future growth of national income. We should not lose sight of the active force at play here: American capitalism by the 1950s had achieved a global potential; it had a large surplus of finance capital, technology and managerial skills to resolve this key problem. Capitalism is bound to the law of accumulation; and nationality is circumstantial to this law. Wherever there is a good supply of cheap labour, political stability and tax incentives, capital will go – as it went to Puerto Rico, where annual flows of direct foreign (mostly American) increased from \$ 276.8 million in 1950 to \$ 14 billion in 1980 (Melendez 1990: 48). And the greater the amount of capital invested, the higher the level of industrialization.

Now, while Warren recognizes the role of foreign capital in the industrialization of the Third World, he provides no analysis of different stages of capitalist globalization in terms of banking, science, and technology. The theoretical basis upon which he distinguishes the “colonial” from the post-Second World War period is solely according to the type of political relationship between centre and periphery, with little or no attempt to analyse the different types of circuits of capital operating in these two periods: whether it was merchant's capital or finance (global) capital? In this sense, Warren is in company with Frank in seeing a homogeneous continuity in the world market since the „export of commodities“ began sometime in the mercantile era. Of course Frank goes to the extreme of identifying any type of commercial exchange in the Third World with capitalism so long as there is unequal exchange on the world market. (Warren traces the beginnings of capitalism in the Third World only in the nineteenth century).

5. Three Stages in the Imperialist Accumulation of Capital

Since the expansionist upsurge of Europe in the 16th century until about the 1970's we can delineate three stages in the international division of labour, reflecting three types of accumulation: mercantile imperialism, free trade imperialism, and finance imperialism (Dos Santos 1970). Let me first portray some of the basic features of these three stages, then I will show how Puerto Rico's colonial experience until the late 1970's can be read in terms of these three stages.

The first stage of the world economic system refers to the mercantile period (1500-1800), exemplified by the triangular trade, when manufacturers were exported to Africa in return for slaves, and the slaves in turn were shipped to the Americas and the West Indies in exchange for sugar. This trade was not capitalism on a world scale. Neither in the periphery nor in the centre did capitalist (wage-labour) relations dominate the market. The transatlantic and east Asian trade network was a system of pre-capitalist societies linked and organized by merchant-capital. The centre exploited the periphery through unequal exchange by buying cheap raw materials in the periphery and selling dear manufactured commodities in the periphery. Following A. Emmanuel's line of reasoning in his book, *Unequal Exchange, A Study of the Imperialism of Trade* (1969), we could argue that a regular transfer of value from A to B was possible since this was an exchange of commodities containing unequal quantities of labour, for there was no equalization of prices or of social costs in the world market. Exploitation was possible as well through the more powerful trading position of the metropolis, in terms of access to natural resources, military power, and marketing techniques.

Yet the centre was not simply skimming-off a part of the existing mass of the periphery's surplus-product, it tended, in the very act of exchange, to enforce a higher rate of exploitation upon the direct producers by subjecting non-capitalist production to the rationality of the market. Mercantilism was more than a system of unequal exchange; it was also a simultaneous process of primitive accumulation. Merchant capitalists did not need to seize control of production directly and reorganize it on a commodity basis. The thing required was that part of the colonial social product be turned into com-

modities, which could be done by imposing “types of labour control” like slavery, peonage, and forced cash-crop labour (Wallerstein 1974). Witness the native Indians in the Peruvian mines, the black slaves in the Caribbean sugar plantations, and the small peasantry in the Mexican haciendas. Whether by restricting their mobility, expropriating their land, or reducing their time devoted to reproductive needs, the merchant (via the intermediate action of the landlords and slave-owners) could maximize profits, indirectly, without improving the technical methods of production (relative surplus value). Now, it was this combination of unequal exchange and primitive accumulation, not the mere transfer of a surplus, that resulted, at least temporarily, in a process of underdevelopment, of the reinforcement of pre-capitalist relations (Laclau 1971; Kay 1975).

The second stage, which consists of two phases, was marked by the development of capitalist/wage relations in the centre. The first phase (1750-1875) covered the so-called classic era of *laissez-faire* capitalism and its doctrine of the free circulation of goods, which in reality meant the ‘mass’ *export of commodities* to the periphery. The classic case being England’s export of cheap cotton goods to India, destroying India’s own handy-craft industry. Nevertheless, even at this stage, the relation and type of accumulation *between* the centre and the periphery was not capitalist. International trade was essentially an exchange of commodities between a capitalistic and a non-capitalistic mode of production. The exchange itself between the centre and the periphery continued to be dominated by merchant capital; the periphery continued to export primary goods produced within pre-capitalist relations, and the centre continued to export manufactured *commodities*, as opposed to capital goods.

It was only in the second phase of this second period (1875 and 1914), sometimes known as the age of the “New Imperialism”, that the centre started an aggressive policy of exporting *capital*, at first in the form of loans to governments, but increasingly as direct investments in resource-based industries, i.e., mining, harbour installations, or in plantations. As free competition gave way to the formation of syndicates, trusts and monopolies combining large industry and large banks, a new type of capital accumulation emerged in the centre: finance capital. Still, during this period the export of

capital was mostly limited to the mining and agricultural sectors, and the tertiary sectors linked with these such as banking, railways and ports. Consequently, the internal economic and social structure of the periphery were left relatively untouched. In fact, the landed classes were strengthened since they had ownership rights over land and raw materials. The traditional international division of labour remained more or less the same: the periphery continued to export primary goods in exchange for metropolitan manufactures (though now it not only consumed luxuries but also some capital.)

Actually it was during this period that the world system came to be crystallized into “developed” and “underdeveloped” areas. Because the link between the periphery and the centre continued to be dominated by commodity exchanges, the “development of underdevelopment” process persisted, with non-capitalist relations in the periphery still predominant. This was, I think, the historical conjuncture which provided the empirical basis for dependency theory. Since this second phase lasted until the end of the Second World War, and since extensive study on the poverty of the Third World was first conducted during the 1950’s and 1960’s, it seemed obvious at the time that integration into the world capitalist economy ensured the underdevelopment of the periphery. Having an inadequate comprehension of capitalism, and the various types of capital accumulation, dependency theory failed to see that the export of capital and the transformation of the productive relations in the late 19th and 20th centuries was much less extensive than it appeared.

Only in the third period, after the Second World War, did “the export of capital greatly affect(ed) and accelerat(ed) the development of capitalism in those countries to which it (was) exported” (Lenin 1973: 69). With the rise of multinationals and their vertically integrated operations in the periphery, the internationalization of capitalism reached new heights. Before the 1950’s, foreign capital was attached to a small exporting enclave of the colonial economy which turned out raw materials and agricultural products, complemented with some means of transportation for their export. But after 1950 foreign investments were gradually diversified into the manufacturing sector, making the periphery an exporter of manufactured goods. With the consolidation of family firms into cartels, trusts, etc., and the formation of

finance capital, the centre was able to mobilize its capital on a world-wide scale with relative ease, something which the small enterprise of the 19th century were hardly capable of doing. It was this massive export of capital after 1950 which finally had the effect of destroying the old modes of production in the colonial countries, and of introducing the capitalist mode of production at the international level.

6. Puerto Rico and the Three Stages of Imperial Accumulation

This theoretical sketch on the stages in the history of imperialism since 1500 conforms to the historic experience of Puerto Rico's link with the world economy. The mercantile period came late to Puerto Rico. Once its precious metals were extracted and its native population decimated, Puerto Rico had little connection with the world economy: from 1500 to 1750 the island was used mainly as a military outpost for the defence of the Spanish Empire, and as a port where ships could garner new supplies. The inhabitants depended on small-scale subsistence agriculture and some contraband trade.

Spain began to concern itself with Puerto Rico's economic role in the Empire only after the mid-18th century. But it was really in the second period of imperialist accumulation that an export-economy developed in the island, first in sugar, and later, after 1850, in the coffee sector. As slaves were brought in for the production of cash crops, the island experienced a transformation from a small holding peasant subsistence economy to a predominantly seigneurial economy producing for export. But the presence of export-oriented agriculture did not mean that Puerto Rico had a capitalist mode of production. First, this economy depended upon the colonial regime: the bureaucracy of the colonial administration and, most important, the merchants. The merchants, mainly Spaniards, controlled the credit that the slave owning/seigneurial classes needed for their commercial production, as well as the marketing. Moreover, the relations of production between owners and producers were based on either outright slavery or servile ties, in which a farm labourer was handed a plot of land for subsistence with the obligation to devote a given time to the cultivation of the commer-

cialized seigneurial land (Scarano 1984; Quintero 1971; 1986). There was commodity exchange but no wage-labour, and no market in the factors of production, and thus very little scope for the capitalist to innovate and accumulate.

The use of a non-market mechanism to mobilize and allocate labour and land in this plantation economy explains why no technical development (except for the importation of a few steam engines and other machines for grinding, curing and boiling sugar) was experienced during the nineteenth century. For one, the slave/seigneurial owners had no incentive to innovate since labour was relatively cheap and obtainable by extra-economic coercion. Sugar production could be maximized by bringing fresh land under cultivation, enforcing stricter control over labourers, or simply by buying new slaves. For another, there was hardly a home market in which free agents would exchange and compete amongst themselves to satisfy their needs³. Essentially Spain was a feudal state whose links with Puerto Rico were purely commercial, imposing a set of mercantilist policies which prevented the island from producing goods for their own consumption. Apart from Spanish manufactures, only those European goods which had been shipped to the island through Spanish ports were allowed in the colony. Thus, in Puerto Rico the second stage of imperialism did not involve a “laissez faire” type of accumulation.

The history of the colony in the first 50 years of American rule (1898-1948) does correspond quite well to the pattern of economic domination of the “new imperialism”. Already through the last half of the nineteenth century, before formal colonial rule, Puerto Rico was increasingly connected to, and dependent upon, the pressures of the U.S. economy in the form of “free trade imperialism”. From 1850 to 1898 the island saw a rising influx of U.S. manufactured commodities, resulting in a deadly competition for local shoemakers, tailors, carpenters, and other independent artisans, who were thereby turned into sugarcane wage workers or cigar makers. But it was after the invasion of 1898 that the Puerto Rican economy, in sugar plantations, in cigar production, in needle-work operations, became integrated into the U.S. economy. The manufacturing sector in the U.S. demanded a broader influx of raw products to be processed in the metropolis. Thus, the

sugar, coffee, and tobacco industries in Puerto Rico were oriented toward exports to serve as sources of raw products to be elaborated in the American economy. For example, no refineries (the final stage in the processing of sugar) were allowed on the island. In fact, Puerto Rico was turned into a classic monocultural colony, with sugar accounting for 60% of all export value in 1935. This sugar was sold virtually in one market as raw sugar to be processed in the metropolis. By 1940 four U.S. corporations controlled more than 50% of the sugarcane land, so that many small subsistence producers were forced to abandon their plots and become hired labourers (Duggal 1975: 93; Quintero 1971; 1986).

Nevertheless despite the formation of this proletariat, capitalism did not develop in this period because there was no supply of *capital and scientific knowhow*. American capital flowed primarily into the agricultural export-sector, i.e., sugar, tobacco, and coffee. The investment directed into new technologies was for larger mills to produce higher quality sugar and for the tobacco processing units (Quintero 1986: 275). Indeed, as late as 1948 Puerto Rico was a classic primary exporting colony dominated by the production of sugar. It was a prototype underdeveloped economy in A.G. Frank's sense. Per capita net income was \$ 278 (1954 prices); the gross produce was \$732.3 millions (1954 prices); illiteracy was 32 percent; and life expectancy was 46 years (Duggal 1975: 109; for slightly different numbers, see Tata 1980).

Not until the so-called third period of imperialist accumulation, in the 1950's, did the island industrialize, as American corporations, controlling large stores of capital, finances, and expensive technology, began a dramatic and rapid export of capital into the island in response to the "industrialization by invitation" programme. Within the short time-span of 15 years Puerto Rico's economy, to use W.W. Rostow's terms, combined the "preconditions for take-off", "take-off", "maturity", and "mass consumption" stages (Rostow 1960). Per capita income increased from \$ 278 in 1948 to \$ 3,479 in 1980 (current prices.) Life expectancy increased to 73 in 1980; the illiteracy rate dropped to less than 10% by 1976; 3 out of 4 families owned their own homes and 93 percent of the population had running water by 1977 (Aponte 1981: 138; Tata/Lee 1977: 19; Dietz 1987: 33). Known in the

1930's as the "poorhouse of the Caribbean", Puerto Rico became known in the 1960's as one of the first postwar world's "economic miracle". No doubt, as the following table shows (Passalacqua-Garcia 1984; Wasow 1978: 109), the results, at least in narrow economic terms, were quite astounding.

Table 3: The National Product (in million of dollar)

	1950	1960	1970	1974	1980
current	754	1,676	4,622	6,706	11,105
constant 1954 pri- ces	879	1,473	2,901	3,594	--

This is not to say that the export of capital per se resulted in the automatic industrialization of Puerto Rico once it broke down procapitalist relations. This translation of external capitalism into internal development was mediated by very specific superstructural factors. If in Latin America the anti-imperialist national movement of the post-war period forced the centre to incorporate local capital as a junior partner in development; in Puerto Rico, the function of the superstructure was the exact opposite: The colonial status was preserved to serve as the juridical-political framework *facilitating* the entrance of American capital. In this sense, the superstructure or the "political" level accounts for the timing of industrialization, and the fact that a *massive* influx of American capital entered the island as soon as "Operation Bootstrap" was launched in 1948. It does not explain the *fact* of industrialisation, which should be connected to global capacity of American capitalism, but it does explain the *rate and intensity* of industrialization in Puerto Rico.

No doubt regarding Puerto Rico the case can be made that the role of the superstructure extended as far as the world political order itself. I am thinking of the ideological rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United States, or the Cold War. Puerto Rico was not only of strategic-military interest

to the United States, it was a propaganda tool in the heat of the Cold War. The significance of this point is evident. One of the most pressing international issues emerging out of the Second World War was the problem of the distribution of wealth between advanced and underdeveloped countries, a problem which became connected with the Cold War as a struggle between the capitalist and the socialist model of industrialization. If Puerto Rico, as a “commonwealth state” of the United States, could be industrialized at a fast pace through private investment, then the island could be presented to the rest of the Third World as an example of a successful road to prosperity via private capital (Friedrich 1959). In fact, the Puerto Rican “Commonwealth” was advertised to the world in the 1960s as the capitalist response to communism, “the showcase of democratic government, international cooperation and fraternal countenance in the free world” (as cited in Lewis 1963: 19). There can be no denying, then, that the meeting of political colonialism with the ideological confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union was a key *politico-ideological conjuncture* behind Puerto Rico’s rapid industrialization.

7. Globalization and the Limits of Dependency Theory

The question remains whether Puerto Rico’s external industrialization can be considered, from the standpoint of dependency theory, as a true break from “blocked development”, and whether this type of development can lead to the “mature self-reliant” form of capitalism that exists in the advanced industrial economies. By self-reliant I am referring to Samir Amin’s term of “autocentric development” – that is, an economy with the internal capacity for extended reproduction, possessing its own producers’ sector (Amin 1974). The centre is said to be self-reliant, although not economically self-sufficient, with a diversified economy of exports, and not dependent on a single country, or a few exports, for its foreign earnings. The question, then, is whether Puerto Rico has managed to generate its own producers’ sector, its own savings and technology? So far this is not the case in Puerto Rico, which has always imported its technology, and has always depended on external financing. This lack of an internal reproductive sector implies continued dependence on foreign investment and technology for extended

reproduction. The local elite planners had expected that a rise in living standards would translate into a higher rate of internal savings leading to less dependence on external financial source. But this hope failed to materialize. Instead the average domestic net savings rate decreased from 6.6% in 1966 to 4.3% in 1969 to 1.7% in 1972 and to -1.3% in 1974 (Wasow 1978: 126). Capitalism brought “mass consumption” to Puerto Rico without bringing any internal productive forces to sustain that consumption.

Now, to the extent that the Puerto Rican economy failed to generate its own producer’s sector and technological capabilities, would it not be more accurate to define Puerto Rico’s industrialization, to use Enrique Cardoso’s term, as “associated dependent development”? Certainly, without a producers’ sector there are no conditions for self-sustaining growth and the industrialization process will always remain precarious. Hence should wage rates go up on the island or the tax exemption offered by the U.S. Treasury be abolished, foreign capital will most likely dry out. In fact in 1982 the U.S. Congress came close to reducing drastically these exemptions, and did raise taxes, although much less than the original proposal. In this sense, capitalist development in Puerto Rico, rather than being an “image” of capitalist development in the United States, is an *externally* oriented development. Marxists and dependency theory like to conclude, therefore, that Puerto Rico inherited a type of “extraverted capitalism” that is subject to different laws or tendencies than “self-reliant capitalism”.

Yes, on the surface we can accept a dependency perspective on the industrialization of Puerto Rico: the essence of this island’s development has consisted in the import of raw materials to be processed in the island and then shipped out as finished or semi-finished products. The island, as the saying goes, “produces what its people don’t consume and consumes what it doesn’t produce”. Multinational branch plants are mainly export oriented with few economic ties to the island. What Puerto Rico acquired were industries whose linkages, both backward and forward, ran mainly to the U.S. economy. The overall export orientation of the economy has remained unchanged since the 1950s. From the start, American branch plants have been operationally integrated with the mainland parent companies. Thus the multiplier effects of American plants within the local economy have been

less than they would have been if these companies had direct, national links to the rest of the Puerto Rican economy rather than the American economy. Although a wider range of manufacturing and service industries have replaced the traditional sugar refineries, the low linkages of the earlier staple industries persist, and the ultimate destination remains the export market. Industrialization has brought greater integration of the local economy not with itself but with the American economy. Indeed, both exports and imports as a percentage of GNP have tended to increase (Weisskoff 1975; 1977; 1985). In 1950, half of total income was spent on imports; by 1980, that figure had risen to about 74%. Over the same period, the value of GNP exported increased from 32% to 64% (Dietz 1982).

Still, in light of what we know about today's global economy, the relentless trend towards economic integration across national boundaries, the development of world-wide systems of communication, the intensification of the diffusion of goods, investment, finance, peoples, and ideas across frontiers, and the fact that national states have less and less power to regulate their local economy, has made the whole idea of "self-reliant capitalism" sound obsolete. I would prefer to conceptualize the industrialization of Puerto Rico as a case that anticipated the future economic reality of many "developed" nation-states in the world today. Trade agreements such as the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), designed to remove tariff barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the United States, including other "multilateral" agreements on investment, the creation of "Export Processing Zones" in developing countries, designed to exempt transnational corporations from national taxes, tariff duties, and other domestic regulations, not to forget the "dollarization" of currencies in Latin America – were all anticipated by Puerto Rico and its "commonwealth" policies of no tariffs on goods traded between the mainland and the island, the retention of the U.S. dollar as its currency, and the exemption of profit remittances by American subsidiaries on the island from federal taxes. This is not to deny the dependency perspective that the impact and opportunities afforded by globalization is deeply affected by a state's position in global political, military, and economic hierarchies. Statistical data do show, however, that the most globalized developing economies of the last two decades, East Asia and India, experienced the highest GNP per capita growth rates, whereas much of

Sub-Saharan Africa, which hardly participated in globalization, faced negative income growth rates. Between 1990 and 1999, India's GDP increased by about 2.4 percent a year, and China's by an unprecedented 6.4 percent.

There are, however, other features to the Puerto Rican model of colonial industrialization that cannot be easily seen as inherent attributes of the globalization of capitalism per se – or at least not yet. Two features in particular stand out: the transfer of massive welfare benefits from the U.S. federal government to the island, and the mass migration of Puerto Ricans to the American mainland. Lack of space prevents a proper analysis of these features, which are well documented by many of the scholarly works cited here, and which become particularly acute through the 1970s and into the 1980s (Weisskoff 1985). Suffice it to say that, by 1980 more than a third of all Puerto Ricans were living on the United States! Yet, in spite of this huge emigration, average unemployment remained much higher in Puerto Rico than in the States. This unemployment – which increased from 11 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 1977 – was a result of the fact that in Puerto Rico, from 1970 to 1980, the contribution of labour intensive industries (textiles, apparel, leather products, furniture, paper products, glass) to total manufacturing output declined dramatically from 63 to 31 percent, while the contribution of the capital-intensive sector (chemicals, machinery, metal products, oil, rubber and plastics) increased from 35 to 67 percent (Weisskoff 1985; Dietz 1987; Grossfoguel 2003: 59-60). The US federal government, worried about the potential social unrest in this capitalist “showcase” and strategic military location, thus decided to expand its federal transfers. Federal transfers increased from \$ 517 million in 1973 to \$ 2.5 billion in 1980, and to \$ 4 billion in 1989. In 1973, federal aid represented 8 percent of the island's GNP, and federal transfers to individuals in the form of food stamps represented 10 percent of personal income. By 1980, these numbers had increased to 23 percent of the GNP, and to 22 percent of personal income. In 1980, food stamps were used by about 60 percent of Puerto Rican families (Grosfoguel 2003: 59). Whether these features – consider in this context the mass migrations of Mexicans across the American border – are peculiar to Puerto Rico's unique colonial status is a subject worthy of a future paper.

References

- Amin, Samir (1974): *Accumulation on a World Scale*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Aponte, B. Juan (1981): The Lash of Inflation on a Developing Economy: Puerto Rico, A Case Study. In: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, July, 132-153.
- Baer, Werner (1959): Puerto Rico: An Evaluation of a Successful Development Program. In: *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 73.
- Baran, Paul [1957] (1973): *The Political Economy of Growth*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Baver, Sherrie (1987): Puerto Rico: Colonialism Revisited. In: *Latin American Research Review* 22 (2), 227-234.
- Bergad, Laird (1983): *Coffee and the Growth of Agrarian Capitalism in Nineteenth Century Puerto Rico*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Bloomfield, J. Richard. (Ed., 1985): *Puerto Rico: The Search for a National Policy*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Brass, Tom (1986): Free and Unfree Labor in Puerto Rico during the nineteenth century. In: *Latin American Studies* 18, 55-67.
- Brenner, Robert (1977): The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism. In: *New Left Review*, July-August 104, 25-92.
- Caban, Pedro (1990): Reworking The Colonial Formula. In: *Radical America*, 23, 9-19
- Campos, Ricardo/Frank, Bonilla (1981): A Wealth Of Poor: Puerto Ricans in the New Economic Order. In: *Daedalus* 60, 133-176.
- Campos, Ricardo/Frank, Bonilla (1982): Bootstraps and Enterprise Zones. In: *Review* 5 (4), 556-591.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (1973): Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications. In Alfred Stepan, ed.: *Authoritarian Brazil*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (1979): *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Carr, Raymond (1984): *Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Castor, Suzy. (Ed., 1979): *Puerto Rico, Una Crisis Historica*. Mexico: Editorial Nuestro Tiempos, S.A..
- Clark, Truman (1975): *Puerto Rico and the United States 1917-1933*. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press.
- Cohen, Gerald, (1980): *Karl Marx's Theory of History*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Dietz, James L. (1978): Imperialism and Puerto Rico. In: *Monthly Review* 29, 20-33.

- Dietz, James L. (1979): Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Theoretical Perspective and a Case Study of Puerto Rico. In: *Review of Radical Political Economics* 11, 16-32
- Dietz, James L. (1982): Puerto Rico in the 1970's and 1980's Crisis of the Development Model. In: *Journal of Economic Issues*, 16 (2), June, 497-506.
- Dietz, James L. (1987): *Economic Development of Puerto Rico: Institutional Change and Capitalist Development*. Princeton University Press.
- Dobb, Maurice [1946] (1968): *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers.
- Dos Santos (1970): The Structure of Dependency. In: *American Economic Review* 60, 231-236.
- Duggal, P. Ved (1975): Industrialization of Puerto Rico Till 1970. In: *Horizons*, 19 (37), 93-106.
- Emmanuel, A. (1969): *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Evans, Peter. (1979): *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil*. Princeton University Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1967): *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1969): *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Friedrich, J. Carl (1959): *Puerto Rico Middle Road to Freedom*. New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc..
- Gautier-Mayoral, Carmen (1977): Interrelations of the United States Poor Relief, Massive Unemployment and Weakening of 'Legitimacy' in Twentieth Century Puerto Rico. In: *Caribbean Studies*, 19 (3/4), 5-46.
- Gautier-Mayoral, Carmen (1990): The Puerto Rican Socio-Economic Model: Its Effects on Present Day Politics and the Plebiscite. In: *Radical America*, 23 (1), 21-32.
- Goldsmith W./Vitorisz, Thomas (1979): Operation Bootstrap, Industrial Autonomy, and a Parallel Economy for Puerto Rico. In: *International Regional Science Review*, 4 (1), 1-22.
- Grossfoguel, Ramon (2003): *Colonial Subjects: Puerto Ricans in a Global Perspective*. University of California Press.
- Johnson, R. Ann (1980): *Puerto Rico: Commonwealth or Colony?* New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Kay, Geoffrey (1975): *Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis*. London: Macmillan.
- Kutznets, Simon (1968): *Toward a Theory of Economic Growth*. New York: The Norton Library.
- Laclau, Ernesto (1971): Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America. In: *New Left Review* 67, 19-38.

- Lenin, Wladimir Iljitsch [1917] (1973): *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Lewis, Gordon, (1963): *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Lewis, Gordon, (1974): *Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Maldonado-Denis, Manuel (1972): *Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Interpretation*. New York: Random House.
- Maldonado, Rita (1972): Two Case Studies: Canada and Puerto Rico. In: Gray Peter: *The Economics of Business Investment Abroad*. New York: Crane, Russak.
- Maldonado, M. Rita (1974): The Economic Costs and Benefits of Puerto Rico's Political Alternatives. In: *The Southern Economic Journal* 41 (85), May-June, 267-282.
- Marx, Karl [1867] (1987): Preface to the First German edition. Capital I. New York: International Publishers.
- Melendez, Edwin (1990): Politics and Economic Reforms in Postwar Puerto Rico. In: *Radical America*, 23 (1), 47-56.
- Passalacqua-Garcia, Manuel (1984): *Puerto Rico: Equality and Freedom at Issue*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Pico, Fernando (1986): *Historia General de Puerto Rico*. Ediciones Bucaran: Rio Piedras.
- Quintero, Angel G. (1971): Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism in Puerto Rico. In: *Caribbean Studies*, 13 (3), 31-63.
- Quintero, Angel G. (1986): *Puerto Rico, 1870-1940*. Cambridge Latin American History: Cambridge University Press.
- Ross, F. David (1976): Political Status and Economic Development: Will the Dependent Variable Please Stand Up? In: *Revista/Review Interamericana* 6 (1), 7-17.
- Rostow, Walt Whitman (1960): *The Stages of Growth*. Cambridge University Press.
- Scarano, Francisco A. (1984): *Sugar and Slavery in Puerto Rico: The Plantation Economy of Ponce, 1800-1850*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Silen, Angel (1971): *We the Puerto Rican People: A Story of Oppression and Resistance*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Tata, Robert (1980): *Structural Changes in Puerto Rico's Economy 1947-1976*. Ohio: Latin American Series.
- Tata, Robert/Lee, David (1977): Puerto Rico: Dilemmas of Growth. In: *Focus*, 27 (2), November-December, 17-29.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974): *The Modern World System, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.
- Wanniski, Jude (1978): *Experiment in Puerto Rico*. In: *The Way the World Works. How Economics Fail and Succeed*. New York: Basic Books.
- Warren, Bill (1973): Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization. In: *New Left Review*, 81 (September-October), 3-44.

- Warren, Bill (1985): *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.
- Wasow, Bernard (1978): *Dependent Growth in a Capital-Importing Economy: The Case of Puerto Rico*. In: *Oxford Economic Papers*, 30 (1) (Winter), 117-128.
- Weisskoff, Richard/Wolff, Edward (1975): *Development and Trade Dependence: The Case of Puerto Rico, 1948-1963*. In: *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 57, 470-477.
- Weisskoff, Richard/Wolff, Edward (1977): *Linkages and Leakages: Industrial Tracking in an Enclave Economy*. In: *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 25 (4), (July), 607-628.
- Weisskoff, Richard (1985): *Factories and Foodstamps: The Puerto Rico Model of Development*. John Hopkins University Press.
- Wells, Henry (1977): *Development Problems in the 1970's in Puerto Rico*. In: *Revista/Review Interamericana*, 7 (2), 169-192.
- Wolff, Edward (1975): *The Rate of Surplus Value in Puerto Rico*. In: *Journal of Political Economy*, 83 (5), 935-949.

Abstracts

Der Beitrag greift Aspekte des Weltsystemansatzes innerhalb der Dependenztheorie, insbesondere die Thesen von Andre Gunder Frank, auf und diskutiert, inwiefern diese zum Verständnis der spezifischen Rolle Puerto Ricos in der internationalen Arbeitsteilung beitragen. Der Autor argumentiert, dass die Industrialisierung Puerto Rico's zwischen 1948 und 1980 als klassisches Beispiel dafür dienen kann, dass die Ausbreitung des Kapitalismus im Zeitalter der Globalisierung Entwicklung in der Peripherie nicht blockiert, sondern im Gegenteil sogar fördert. Die Ausführungen legen weiterhin nahe, dass die Industrialisierung Puerto Rico's innerhalb des Kolonialsystems, zusammen mit einer Politik der Zollfreiheit für die zwischen den USA und der Insel gehandelten Güter, der Beibehaltung des US-Dollar als nationale Währung und der steuerfreien Gewinnrepatriierung seitens der US-amerikanischen Tochtergesellschaften die künftige wirtschaftliche Realität „entwickelter“ globaler Ökonomien in der heutigen Welt vorweggenommen hat.

This paper assimilates aspects of the world-historic perspective of dependency theory, especially the work of Andre Gunder Frank, and the way it illuminates the specific role Puerto Rico's economy has played in the in-

ternational division of labour. The paper argues that the industrialization of Puerto Rico in the period between 1948 and 1980 can be studied as a classic case suggesting that the export of capitalism, in the age of globalization, does not block development in the periphery, but rather stimulates it. It also suggests that Puerto Rico's industrialization within a colonial framework, including its policies of no tariffs on goods traded between the United States and the island, the retention of the U.S. dollar as its currency, and the exemption of profit remittances by American subsidiaries on the island from federal taxes, anticipated the future economic reality of "developed" global economies in the world today.

Ricardo Duchesne

Department of Social Science, Faculty of Arts, University of New Brunswick

PO Box 5050, Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada

E-mail: rduchesn@unbsj.ca

- ¹ Excellent surveys which show the intellectual richness of the Dependency perspective are: Magnus Blomstrom and Bjorn Hettne, *Development in Transition. The Dependency Debate and Beyond: Third World Responses* (Zed Books, London, 1984); Cristobal Kay, *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment* (Routledge, New York, 1989); Alvin So, *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-Systems Theories* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990).
- ² This table is an abbreviated version of the same table in Campos and Bonilla (1981, 142). Campos and Bonilla do not use this table to make the argument I do.
- ³ Bergad (1983) contends that rural labourers were not free until about the 1870s, but that, during the coffee expansion years of 1875-98, a rural proletariat did emerge in the island. However, Brass (1986) insists that non-wage labour persisted right until the end of the 19th century, not in the forms of slavery, but as "debt bondage," which involved a payment in the form of tokens redeemable only at the store of the hacienda, and in which debts were cancelled only with compulsory labour services.

MARCOS AGUILA, JEFFREY BORTZ

Andre Gunder Frank: The Limits to the Latin American Lumpenbourgeoisie

The work of Andre Gunder Frank appears like the vast and magnificent output of Francisco Goya, especially his "black painting". Shooting from the hip, engaging his capricious view of society, Goya sketched the Spanish people, the upper nobility and the Church of the early 19th century. Refraining from any delicacies, he was a partisan with a sharp social. His view was so cutting that today we can view his paintings and drawings as a repertoire of the vices, defects, intrigues, superstitions, fanaticisms, and hopes of his time. We can also see them, to a certain degree, as a critique of the human condition. A century and a half later, Frank painted a similar picture, though from the perspectives of the social sciences. Like Goya, his output was vast, but for this essay we have chosen just a single element, part of a much larger work which, taken as a whole, creates a series of reflections on Andre Gunder Frank's world just as Goya's work pictured his. We will focus on the idea of the Latin American lumpenbourgeoisie.

Today it is not quite so common to employ the term bourgeoisie in most English-speaking countries, but the concepts of lumpenbourgeoisie and lumpendevlopment play a critical role in Frank's ideas about Latin American development. He used them to tie together backwardness and underdevelopment with development and modernization, as he saw them as part of the same and simultaneous world process. In the advanced countries, development did not occur by stages in isolated, autarchic regions, as some authors maintained, instead the world market developed by creating poles of development and underdevelopment, bourgeoisie and lumpenbourgeoisie. By linking the low and the high, lumpen and development, lumpen and

bourgeoisie, Frank authored a critique that was both ethical and historical. It denied the possibility that the national bourgeoisies of the various Latin American countries might lead processes of political independence, or any form of development with greater equity for the popular classes. His critique employed a caricature of the weak national bourgeoisies, who lacked a viable road to economic growth and autonomous development. The disdain he felt was not a simple or dogmatic one, nor did it lack basis. He scoured the historical records of the political behaviour of the Latin American dominant classes, in particular, the importance of their ties to the land and their permanent dependence on state favours. He also searched through the different forms of foreign intervention and domination in the region, from the Spanish and Portuguese Viceroyalties through the period of English hegemony until the relatively recent control of the region by the United States and its great multinational corporations. In what follows, we will look at Frank's argument with its political and economic suggestions, concluding with a reflection on the possibility that Frank remains relevant for understanding current political changes in the regions.

Towards the end of 1969, while he prepared the small book that serves as central reference for these notes, *Lumpenburguesía: lumpendesarrollo* (1971), Frank announced with a certain disgust that the concepts of dependency and development of underdevelopment, on which he had worked tirelessly for years, had become common currency among the sociological establishment. Frank, an incorrigible rebel, found the appropriate terminology to separate himself from what he considered linguistic reformism. As he noted in his autobiography, "[F]rom the production of Dependence to its Consumption Dependence 'theory' prospered, despite early and continued rejection, resistance and attacks. This 'alternative' approach found little favor with the orthodox right, some of the structuralist reformist left, the Soviet aligned Communists, Trotskyists, and soon also the Maoists. Nonetheless, dependence was 'consumed' in Latin America and elsewhere." (Frank 1996: 10).

The concept of lumpenbourgeoisie will not have the same fate as dependence or the development of underdevelopment because it captures the spirit of the phenomenon, just as Goya sketched more than one noble or courtesan with the ears of a burro or the face of a pig to underline aspects of character. Andre Gunder Frank's fundamental critique of the transfor-

mative capacity of the national bourgeoisies is part of his characterization of Latin American dependency. As he notes, "If dependency was only external, one could argue that the national bourgeoisie has objective conditions in order to lead a nationalist or autonomous exit from underdevelopment. But such an exit does not exist [...] precisely because dependency is integral and make the bourgeoisie itself dependent." (Frank 1971: 14). Frank's statement about the degradation of the Latin American national bourgeoisie leads also to his charge of historical responsibility for their submission to foreign economic power. By treating underdevelopment as a consequence of both external and internal forces, he does not take the internal forces as mechanical with regard to the foreign, but rather takes into account the role of Latin American dominant classes as partners in their own submission. He accuses them of disdaining the struggle for hegemony within their own countries. One might say that he denationalizes them. "It is thus that, the national and class structure of underdevelopment in place during the free trade of the colonial period in Latin America, became more profound with the commerce and the imperialist capital of the 19th century. *They became a satellite bourgeoisie acting through the corrupted state of an anti-country.*" (Frank 1971: 79, emphasis added)

Of course, Andre Gunder Frank was not the only one to have similar thoughts about the virtually non-existent revolutionary capacity of the bourgeoisie in the backward countries. Lenin had already developed the theory, carried into practice, of the "weakest link." It was the underpinning of the Bolshevik assault on power in the Soviet Union, and to a certain degree, the inspiration for similar revolutionary movements in the rest of the Third World. To a certain degree, the Chinese and Cuban revolutions came about because of the intrinsic weaknesses of their national bourgeoisies, and as in Russia, the victorious revolutionaries liquidated the "satellite" bourgeoisie.

In 1971, the same year that *Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment* appeared, Eduardo Galeano published another work that had a notable impact on resistance movements on the continent. An ambitious academic work, *Las venas abiertas de America Latina* (Open Veins of Latin America, 1971/1987) demonstrated the strong influence of the *dependentista* school, one of whose central figures was Andre Gunder Frank. Written with a literary quality highly unusual for the works on the sociology of development, *Las venas abiertas* underwent fifty reprintings by 1987. It is filled with references

to the structural limitations of the Latin American dominant classes. Writing at the end of the period of import substitution industrialization, supposedly the high point of local development efforts, Galeano characterized the process like this: “The Latin American bourgeoisie is a trading bourgeoisie without any creative capacity. Tied by the umbilical cord of the control over the land, they bow to the altars of the goddess technology.” (Galeano 1971: 405). Galeano pointed out another characteristic of Latin American capitalism, growing technological backwardness, and as a consequence, an increasing productivity lag. Unable to compete with more productive foreign enterprises, he noted local ruling groups survived by participating in mixed business enterprises within the modern sector, that is, businesses with state investment. Profitable and protected by the coffers of the government, such businesses provided them a safe haven, but did not allow them to develop their own leadership in the productive sphere. Galeano, following Frank, argued that local ruling groups since independence, “associated itself with foreign investment [...] the industrial growth in Latin America that has characterized our century has come from the outside [...] the Latin American bourgeoisie was born from the insides of the agro export system [...]” (Galeano 1971: 344-345). Thus local ruling groups sometimes reinvested their fortunes in industry for external reasons rather than because of any industrial vocation. By and large they did not develop local technologies nor did they initiate new projects. Railroads, the 19th century symbol of economic progress, were designed and built by the English and Americans, almost never by nationals. Oil, industrial mining, even the textile industry were developed by foreign capital.

During the 20th century, the crisis of foreign commerce during the great depression brought industrial advances to the region. But the national bourgeoisies did not achieve these advances without help. They did it behind elevated tariffs and with state subsidies. “The state occupies the place of a social class whose appearance history demands, without much success.” (Galeano 1971: 346). Even so, the protectionism that characterized Latin America’s industrial response to the depression, then continued through the post war economic boom, could not avoid imperialist competition. Paradoxically, it made the imperialists and their foreign capital participants in the feast. Foreign investment passed through the tariff barriers like a modern Trojan horse and continued to expand its presence in the protected markets,

usually from a technological horizon deliberately mediocre. Galeano, citing Frank, offers the example of the *General Motors* plant in Toluca, Mexico. He quotes Leo Fenser, an American union delegate, who visited the plant in July 1969, and considered it “worse than archaic”: “Worse, because it was deliberately archaic, with carefully planned obsolescence [...]. The Mexican plants are deliberately equipped with low productivity machinery” (Frank quoted in Galeano 1971: 410).

Obsolete equipment in the advanced countries is not necessarily obsolete in the backwards countries, where they are often the best machines employed in the protected market. The effect is to postpone their obsolescence, thus prolonging the value of the initial investment in equipment. Thus the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s was good for local ruling groups, but even better for the multinationals that came to dominate in this period.

Today of course, with the emphasis on globalization and regional organizations like the North American Free Trade Agreement signed by Mexico, Canada, and the United States in 1994, the nature of commerce, trade, and foreign investment has changed, although some analysts contend that NAFTA contains a certain regional protectionism as its goal. Whether that is the case or not, today Mexico is inundated with second-hand clothes for popular markets that enter the country in railroad wagons filled with boxes of used items. Many of the items of clothing are sizes that mostly don't fit Mexicans, thus the streets are filled with the poor wearing shirts and other items truly exaggerated for their bodies, much like a modernized Goya painting. Meanwhile, the Mexican textile industry has migrated to China. Once again, local ruling groups lack a plan for autonomous or equitable development.

Andre Gunder Frank carried out pioneering work in order to refute the idea, then dominant among orthodox economists and governments, that the lack of economic and social development in Latin America was due to a relative scarcity of capital. It is not that capital is abundant in the region but rather that the flows of capital into the region were less than the flows outwards in payment for profits and other concepts. “I was the first person” – wrote Frank in his autobiography – “to publish an accounting of Latin American external payments and receipts which distinguished between services and goods. With this new accounting I clearly demonstrated that the

Latin American current account deficit was due to a large deficit on service account, especially from financial service payments” (Frank 1996: 9). The early drop-by-drop decapitalization that Frank described became a torrent in the 1980s with the massive foreign debt crisis. The crisis led to the fall of various governments. While the dominant orthodoxy blamed oil prices, non-mainstream economists had learned enough from Frank, Galeano, and others to find the culprit elsewhere (Bortz et al. 1987). The mechanisms for surplus extraction from Latin America via the financial system towards the end of the 20th century began to redefine the lumpenbourgeoisie.

The crisis that originated in the imperialist countries in the 1970s and exploded in Latin America in the debt crisis of the 1980s, led to the current process of globalization. With a dominant ideology that the state is bad and the private is good, local groups have followed foreign pressures to privatize state-owned enterprises. The result has allowed a tiny minority of the lumpenbourgeoisie to acquire great volumes of state wealth at ridiculous prices. The paradigmatic case is that of Carlos Slim of Mexico, who from his base in the formerly state-owned *Teléfonos de México* with its virtual monopoly over the country’s telephone service, has extended his economic power to Colombia, Brazil, and even the United States. He is now one of the ten wealthiest men on earth, so that the category lumpen hardly applies to him at all. On the other hand, the majority of national capitals, both small and medium, became more fragmented and weaker than ever. As a group, the lumpenbourgeoisie became polarized and lost its capacity to negotiate. Meanwhile, the great transnational corporations continued their advance in the Latin American economies, with many European firms joining the race, particularly Spanish companies. The always weak Latin American banking systems slowly ceded to the advance of Spanish and other foreign financial enterprises.

The intrinsic weakness of the national bourgeoisie in Latin America contrasts with the relative strength of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, most notably with the historical trajectory of the United States. The ruling class in the United States quickly extended its hegemony over the entire region. In distinct phases from the Monroe Doctrine, a proclamation of intent rather than actual capacity, through the Cold War and up until the current War Against Terror, the U.S. never abandoned its dream of controlling Latin America. In 1912, President Taft affirmed, “[T]he day is not far in which

three flags carrying the stars and stripes show the three equidistant sites the extension of our territory, one in the North Pole, the other in the Panama Canal, and the third in the South Pole. The entire hemisphere will be ours, in fact, just as by virtue of our racial superiority, it is already ours morally” (quoted in Galeano 1971: 172).

From the beginning, American elites used their state to further their goals of growth, development, and domination. After the independence of the thirteen colonies, and even more after the victory of the northern industrialists during the civil war, the state applied a policy of protectionism, following the example of Great Britain. Ulysses S. Grant, victorious general carried to the presidency, pointed out, “[W]ell gentlemen, the knowledge I have of my country makes me believe that within two hundred years, when America has obtained all that it can from protectionism, it will then also adopt free trade.” (quoted in Frank 1971: 68). Within the time frame set by Grant, the United States now demands free trade from others. Before then, however, in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, the United States considerably widened its frontiers and strengthened state institutions favorable to private enterprise. Meanwhile, Latin America experienced the development of underdevelopment. Liberal governments in the region, under pressure from Great Britain in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th, dogmatically approved free trade policies that essentially undermined their capacity to industrialize. There were some modest exceptions of course. Some individuals and groups pursued an interest in strengthening the nation. To a certain degree, the larger Latin American states created businesses and businessmen, rather than businesses and businessmen creating the state. Nonetheless, most these efforts were in vain. A business history of Latin America, still incomplete, would shed great light on the essential correctness of Frank’s characterization. In recent years, business historians have focused on two important aspects of this problem, the lack of a banking system and the lack of protection for private property rights (Haber/Razo/Maurer 2004). While they can be seen as causes of Latin American backwardness, they can also be seen as symptoms of a lumpenbourgeoisie.

Meanwhile, other historians traced the development of local ruling groups, Daniel Cosío Villegas, Alan Knight and Friedrich Katz in Mexico, Tulio Halperin Donghi (1972) in Argentina, Richard Graham (1990) in Brazil, and numerous others. Frank and Galeano never denied that La-

tin America had ruling classes. But even in the most radical case, Mexico during the *Reforma* in the mid 19th century, what did they achieve? Today few historians would question the profound nationalism of Porfirio Díaz, but his highly successful economic policies strengthened foreign elites more than locals and resulted in a massive social revolution. Nationalism played an important role in that revolution but the victors, some of whom tried to lessen the burdens of underdevelopment on the lower classes, eventually succumbed to the ills of lumpendevelopment, increasingly depending on foreigners to develop the national economy for their own benefit and to the detriment of Mexico. In Argentina and Brazil, as in most of the rest of the Continent, dominant elites could never consolidate their hegemony without the brutal rule of the army, with whom they collaborated in the bitter years of military rule and mass torture of civilians. Collaboration with the Americans was fundamental during the years of military repression that swept the continent as the armies in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay attempted to crush popular movements, often singling out dependentista intellectuals for particularly brutal treatment. In Central America, American puppets like Somoza and the Guatemalan military after Arbenz tried similar policies, but the Sandinista revolution, partly inspired by dependentista writings, shook the region to the core and brought direct and indirect U.S. military response.

Through all of this, Frank never claimed to be a professional historian. His work is basically interpretative rather than the discovery of new data because, as he stated, being a historian “is a task that is not mine” (Frank 1971: 18). However he had a strong intuition even when he lacked the data. He was a powerful interpreter who repudiated reformism with a strength that was as much visceral as intellectual. When he evaluated the process of Latin America’s industrialization oriented towards the internal market during the postwar period, he considered it nothing but “an efficient instrument for growing dependence and underdevelopment [...] by the same bourgeoisie represented first by Getulio Vargas and later by Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva; by Justo and Peron [...] but also by a Cárdenas that appointed as his successor Ávila Camach” (Frank 1971: 98).

As often happens with historical synthesis, there is perhaps too much simplification in these characterizations. It was probably Frank’s way of swimming against the current of the reformism. He wrote, “some of the

principal political problems of the present result from the survival of that deformed offspring and of the efforts by certain people to revive it by producing another like it" (Frank 1971: 98). Other contemporary Latin American dependentistas like Theotonio Dos Santos (1978), a Frank student, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, authors of the influential essay, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina* (1969), maintained a more optimistic vision of the Latin American bourgeoisies. Against this, Frank argued that the birth of a nationalist bourgeoisie was impossible during the rise of neo-imperialism, "and to dream to start it in the future is utopian; that is to say, utopian for the bourgeoisie but politically suicidal for the people" (ibid.). Frank further added that such political suicide was possible not only for Latin America but also for Asia, Africa, and particularly Indonesia. He had a wide vision, as subsequent works would demonstrate.

What would Andre Gunder Frank think, just months after his death, that an Indian leader would become President of Bolivia? Is Evo Morales actually a representative of his country's bourgeoisie? Has the bourgeoisie chosen one of its opposites as its representative? At the beginning of the 21st century, Morales represents a new wave of democratization sweeping Latin America on the ashes of the social and economic destruction of globalization. There is a kind of civic indignation because of a barbarism worthy of the scenes that Goya painted after the French invasion of Spain between 1808 and 1814. It is a supranational movement with deep national and even local roots.

Today, two thirds of the Latin American population is governed by regimes that characterize themselves as leftist. There is a declared opposition to the social and economic results of the pro-capitalist regimes that made the 1980s the "lost decade", with zero growth, followed by very slow growth and a decline in living standards in the 1990s. The two very difficult decades, the 1980s and 1990s, had a serious impact on the electorate in Latin America, who looked to the left to stop the sharp fall in living standards.

Perhaps not unrelated to globalization, the conservative American sociologist Samuel Huntington has attempted to measure cycles of political democratization in the world since the 19th century. He notes a democratic increase in the period between the 1974 revolution in Portugal until the close of his study in 1990. By then, of 130 countries in which he divided the political map, 59 or 45 per cent fell in the democratic list, against only 24

per cent in 1973 (Huntington 1991: 24-26). Latin America of course suffered its share of anti-democracy, beginning with Pinochet's coup in Chile in 1973, after which the general became the most notorious symbol of military dictatorship in the region. Frank was one of the thousands of intellectuals who suffered from the repression of that time, wandering in a long exile in Europe, the United States, and Canada (Frank 1996). In the 1980s, the ideological inclination of the civilian governments that emerged from those dark days was decidedly pro-market and pro-American. Their policies, however, contributed to the pauperization of the middle and lower classes, which eventually led to the present movement of popular governments displacing conservative ones. In almost every case, a popular resistance movement preceded the electoral shift. This is what happened in Chile with the *NO movement* against Pinochet, in Brazil with the *Partido del Trabajo* leading general strikes, in Argentina with its urban rebellion against a corrupt party system, in Uruguay which followed the Argentine example, and in Venezuela with a movement whose beginning was the struggle to end the corruption of Christian Democracy. It is what is happening today in Bolivia, after a difficult popular struggle against the privatization of water and gas. Thus the left swing of the Latin American electorate did not take place in a vacuum but developed after mass struggles against dictatorships, then against conservative civilian government.

The question for the electoral left was whether it could really make a substantial impact. On the one hand, in Argentina Néstor Kirchner repudiated the foreign debt and successfully negotiated new terms with foreign lenders, leading to an initial recovery of the Argentine economy. In Chile, the electorate has placed the first socialist in the presidency since Allende, and the first woman ever. On the other hand, in Brazil, the ex-union leader, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, moves on the razor's edge within an institutional structure still dominated by conservatives, although the president favors redistributive policies that would expand the domestic market and help the poor.

Within the rise of the left, the most widely discussed and most fragile process has been that led by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. He originally led a military coup, for which he was sent to prison. Released, he became president after an unquestionable electoral victory. His triumph opened the door to increasing popular organization. Meanwhile, Chavez exercises an autho-

ritarian personal rule based on radical rhetorics financed by high prices for Venezuela's oil. Whatever the consequences internally, the political ascent of Chavez has helped Cuba recover its influence in the region.

Do these partial victories signify that the left is truly ascendant in Latin America? What is the relationship of this left to local ruling groups? Is there a new geopolitics led by the growing weight of China in the world market and its insatiable demand for raw materials, which might benefit Latin America? Can a regional market in Latin America serve as a counterweight to the traditional domination by the United States? Will the electoral left be strengthened in the near future by upcoming elections in Mexico, the Andean countries, and Central America?

Frank always argued that the lumpenbourgeoisie could never lead a process of equitable development. It is interesting that the greatest success today in the world market has been China, where the Communist Party has led a process of massive industrialization. To what degree Chinese economic growth will benefit the mass of the Chinese people, however, remains an open question. What is not in question is that the Party carried out its economic development policies only after liquidating the old lumpenbourgeoisie. This never happened in Latin America, except in Cuba after 1959, and somewhat in Mexico during and after the revolution. In the rest of Latin America, as the electoral left grows stronger, there is the reminder of what happened in the past when elections swung in that direction. The Americans quickly overthrew the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 and worked with the military to overthrow Allende in Chile in 1973. There was also the long secret war in Central America following the Sandinista victory in 1979. Can anyone be certain such military interventions would not happen again in Latin America? Does Iraq make anybody believe that the United States will not use the military to defend its geopolitical interests?

The nature of the lumpenbourgeoisie, today polarized between a few magnates who have benefited from globalization and the majority of smaller capitals displaced by brutal international competition, has further weakened the state. Meanwhile, it seems to have opened the door to other classes and groups such as marginal urban workers, poor *campesinos*, rebel ethnic minorities, and women, many of whom are participating in a movement of relative regional autonomy, perhaps little conscious of itself yet. This resistance

to neoliberal globalization has the indispensable support of the new leftists in government, at least for the moment.

The question is whether any of this represents a true transformation of the lumpenbourgeoisie and its lumpendevlopment. In his autobiography, Frank remembers a long letter of twelve pages written in July of 1964 to friends in the United States in which he explained his ties to the political struggle for development in Latin America. He hoped for an outcome that would eventually “de-link from the system externally and transit to self-reliant socialism internally (or some undefined international socialist cooperation) in order to make in- or non-dependent economic development possible. I hardly considered [...] how such post revolutionary economic and social development would then be promoted and organized, not to mention guaranteed” (Frank 1996: 9). It is hard to imagine the current process, brutal globalization on the one hand, governments of the left who refuse to break with the system on the other, changing the nature of either Latin America’s ruling groups or its lack of development. The most telling sign is that almost nobody in the leftist governments talks of socialism, and even the most radical, Chavez, bases his politics on the market price of oil. In the short run, it would appear that Andre Gunder Frank is as relevant as ever.

References

- Bortz, Jeffrey/Castro, Fidel/Mandel, Ernest/Wolf, Winfred (1987): *Schuldenkrise. In der Dritten Welt tickt eine Zeitbombe*. Frankfurt: ISP Verlag.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique/Faletto, Enzo (1969): *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina*. México: Siglo XXI.
- Dos Santos, Theotonio (1978): *Imperialismo y dependencia*. México: ERA.
- Galeano, Eduardo (1971, 1987): *Las venas abiertas de América Latina*. México: Siglo XXI.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1969): *Desarrollo del subdesarrollo*. México: ENAH, Comité de Lucha (Suplemento de la revista Tlatoani).
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1969): *América Latina: Subdesarrollo o revolución*. México: ERA.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1971): *Lumpenburguesía : lumpendesarrollo*. México: ERA.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1977): *Sobre el subdesarrollo capitalista*. Barcelona: Anagrama.
- Frank, Andre Gunder (1979): *Acumulación dependiente y subdesarrollo*. México: ERA.

- Frank, Andre Gunder (1996): The Underdevelopment of Development. In: Chew, Sing/ Denmark, Robert: The Underdevelopment of Development. Essays in Honour of Andre Gunder Frank (Chapter 2). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. <http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank/underdev.html>, 10.1.2006. Auf Deutsch: Frank, Andre Gunder (in Zusammenarbeit mit Marta Fuentes-Frank, 1990): Die Unterentwicklung der Entwicklung. In: Hofbauer, Hannes/Komlosy, Andrea (Hg.): Widerstand im Weltsystem. Kapitalistische Akkumulation, staatliche Politik, soziale Bewegung. Wien: Promedia, 92-133.
- Graham, Richard (1990): Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Haber, Stephen/Razo, Armando/Maurer Noel (2004): The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Halperin Donghi, Tulio (1972): Revolución y Guerra: Formación de una élite dirigente en la Argentina criolla. México: Siglo XXI.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1991): The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma: Norman.

Abstracts

Der Artikel setzt sich mit einem Buch Franks auseinander, das 1969 publiziert wurde und den Titel: *Lumpenburguesía: lumpendesarrollo (Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpenentwicklung)* trägt. Frank stellt in diesem Buch die transformative Kraft der nationalen Bourgeoisie in Lateinamerika in Frage. Er argumentiert, dass der Mangel an revolutionärer Energie der Bourgeoisie Teil der Bedingungen von Unterentwicklung ist. Unterentwicklung ist folglich nicht nur ein externer Faktor; indem die nationale Bourgeoisie an ihrer eigenen Unterwerfung mitwirkt und so zur "satellite bourgeoisie" wird ist Unterentwicklung auch ein endogener Prozess. Im zweiten Teil des Papers diskutieren die Autoren jüngere politische Entwicklungen in Lateinamerika. Diese ist auf der einen Seite von einer Polarisierung der Lumpenbourgeoisie in eine kleine Gruppe erfolgreicher Unternehmer, die von der Globalisierung profitieren, und dem Großteil kleinerer Kapitalgruppen, die durch die internationale Konkurrenz verdrängt werden, gekennzeichnet. Auf der anderen Seite hat die politische Linke in den letzten Jahren in zahlreichen Ländern Lateinamerikas Wahlerfolge erringen können. Die Autoren bezweifeln allerdings, dass diese Regierungen eine soziale Dynamik entfachen können,

die zu einer wirklichen Transformation der Lumpenbourgeoisie und der Lumpenentwicklung führen könnte.

This article takes issue with a small book published by Frank in 1969, *Lumpenbuesía: lumpendesarrollo*. In this book, Frank firmly questions the transformative capacity of the national bourgeoisies in Latin America. The lack of any revolutionary capacity of the bourgeoisie in backward countries is, according to Frank, part of the condition of dependency. As a consequence, underdevelopment has to be perceived not only as an external force. Rather, the dominant classes in Latin America are partners in their own submission, becoming thus a “satellite bourgeoisie”. In the second part of the paper the authors discuss the recent political development in Latin America, characterized, on the one hand, by a polarization of the “lumpenbourgeoisie” into a small group of magnates who have benefited from globalization and the majority of smaller capitals displaced by brutal international competition and, on the other hand, by electoral victories of the political left in many Latin American countries. The authors question, however, that these governments of the left can engender a social dynamic leading to a true transformation of the lumpenbourgeoisie and its lumpen-development in Latin America.

Jeffrey Bortz

Appalachian State University, History Department

Boone, NC 28608

bortzjl@appstate.edu

Marcos T. Aguila

Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Xochimilco

Departamento de Producción Económica

Calzada del Hueso 1100, Colonia Villa Quietud

México, D.F. 04960, México

mtaguila@correo.xoc.uam.mx

Ausgewählte Bibliographie von Andre Gunder Frank

Es wurde in dieser Zusammenstellung versucht, alle wichtigen Arbeiten Andre Gunder Franks zu berücksichtigen und zugleich einen überschaubaren Rahmen einzuhalten.

Für Texte, die in mehreren Auflagen und Überarbeitungen unter leicht variierendem Titel erschienen sind, wird nur je eine Veröffentlichung angeführt. Dabei wurde nach Möglichkeit auf die umfassendste und früheste Veröffentlichung zurückgegriffen.

Aufsätze und Artikel, die in ihrer Grundthematik und nach ihrem Erscheinungszeitraum sehr große Überlappungen zu umfassenderen Texten aufweisen, konnten aus Platzmangel ebenso wenig aufgenommen werden wie Buchbesprechungen, politische Kommentare zum Tagesgeschehen, Interviews, *Working Papers* und Vorträge.

Die Publikationen werden in englischen oder (in einigen wenigen Fällen) spanischen oder portugiesischen Originaltiteln und, soweit vorhanden, in der deutschsprachigen Übersetzung angeführt. Letztere werden direkt nach dem Originaltitel gelistet (in kursiv). Leider konnte nicht in allen Fällen überprüft werden, ob von derselben Quelle übersetzt wurde bzw. eine andere, hier nicht angeführte Überarbeitung des jeweiligen Basistextes als Grundlage diente.

Die Veröffentlichungen sind chronologisch aufsteigend geordnet, beginnend mit den frühesten Monographien und Editionen. Darauf folgt eine Liste der Artikel und Beiträge in Sammelbänden. Am Ende stehen autobiographischen Texte und eine kleine Auswahl von Artikeln über Leben und Werk von A.G. Frank.

Monographien, Reader

1957

Growth and Productivity in Ukrainian Agriculture from 1928 to 1955 (unveröffentlichte Dissertation).

1967

Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Historical studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press. [Veränderte Neuauflage: 1969]
(1968): *Kapitalismus und Unterentwicklung in Lateinamerika*. Übersetzt von Inge Presser und Horst Stenzel. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

1969

Latin America. Underdevelopment or Revolution. Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy. New York: Monthly Review Press.
(1969): *Latein-America. Unterentwicklung oder Revolution*. Offenbach, Sozialistisches Büro [Kopierdruck].

Chile. El Desarrollo del Subdesarrollo. Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria.

Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology. Lund: Zenit (Reprint: London: Pluto Press 1971).

1970

Lumpenbürgersia: lumpendesarrollo. Caracas: Editorial Nueva Izquierda.
(1972): *Lumpenbourgeoisie. Lumpenddevelopment. Dependence, Class, and Politics in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

1972

Dependence and Underdevelopment. Latin America's Political Economy. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books (Gemeinsam mit Janes D. Cockcroft, Dale L. Johnson).

Dependencia. Santiago: Cuadernos Universitarios (mit Paul Sweezy, Theotonio Dos Santos, James O'Connor).

América Latina. ¿Feudalismo o Capitalismo? Bogotá: Ediciones Oveja Negra (mit Ernesto Laclau, Rodolfo Puiggró).

1973

Aspectos de la Realidad Latinoamericana. Santiago: Quimantu Editora (mit O. Caputo, R. Pizarro, A. Quijano).

1974

Quien es el Enemigo Inmediato? Buenos Aires: Editorial Centro de Estudios Políticos.

1975

On Capitalist Underdevelopment. Bombay: Oxford University Press.

Raíces del Desarrollo y del Subdesarrollo en el Nuevo Mundo. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales.

1976

Economic Genocide in Chile. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

Reflexiones Sobre la Crisis Económica. Lisboa: Iniciativas Editoriais.

(1978): *Weltwirtschaft in der Krise. Verarmung im Norden, Verelendung im Süden. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt (mit 3 Beiträge aus dem spanischen Original).*

(1981): *Reflections on the World Economic Crisis. London : Hutchinson (revised version).*

No Esperar a 1984. *Quale 1984? Madrid: Ediciones Zero (mit Samir Amin, Hosea Jaffe).*

1978

Crítica y Anti-Crítica. Madrid: Ediciones Zero.

World Accumulation, 1492-1789. London: Macmillan.

Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. London: Macmillan.

(1980): *Abhängige Akkumulation und Unterentwicklung. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.*

1979

Mexican Agriculture 1521 – 1630: Transformation of the Mode of Production. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1980

Crisis: In the World Economy. London: Heinemann.

1981

Crisis in the Third World (Reprint: Aldershot: Gower 1992).

1982

Dynamics of Global Crisis. London: Macmillan (Herausgegeben gemeinsam mit Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Immanuel Wallerstein).

(1986): *Dynamik der globalen Krise. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.*

1983

The European Challenge: From Atlantic Alliance to Pan-European Entente for Peace and Jobs. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

(1983): *Die europäische Herausforderung. Friede und Arbeit durch europäische Entspannung. Politökonomische Alternativen. Stuttgart: Alektor.*

1984

Critique and Anti-Critique: Essays on Dependence and Reformism. London: Macmillan.

1988

El Desafío de la Crisis. Madrid: IEPALA Editorial.

1989

The Cumulation of Accumulation: Theses and Research Agenda for 5000 Years of World System History. In: Dialectical Anthropology 15 (1), 19-42 (Herausgegeben gemeinsam mit Barry K. Gills).

1990

Widerstand im Weltsystem: Kapitalistische Akkumulation, staatliche Politik, soziale Bewegung. Übers.: Horst Friessner, Wien: Promedia (mit Marta Fuentes-Frank; Hg. von Hannes Hofbauer, Andrea Komlosy).

Transforming the Revolution. Social Movements and the World-System. New York: Monthly Review Press (Herausgegeben gemeinsam mit Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Immanuel Wallerstein).

1991

The Underdevelopment of Development. Series in International Political Economy, Vol. 2, Stockholm: Bethany Books.

1992

The Centrality of Central Asia. Amsterdam: VU University Press for Center for Asian Studies Amsterdam (CASA), No. 8.

1993

The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? London: Routledge (Herausgegeben gemeinsam mit Barry K. Gills).

El Sistema Mundial Tras la Guerra del Golfo. Alicante: Instituto de Cultura Juan Gil-Albert (Herausgegeben gemeinsam mit Immanuel Wallerstein, Johan Galtung, Silviu Brucan).

1998

ReOrient. Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University of California Press.

2000

Reorient Histography and Social Theory. Ålborg: Development Research Series, Working papers No. 94, Ålborg University.

2005

Orientierung im Weltsystem. Von der Neuen Welt zum Reich der Mitte. Wien: Pro-media (Hg., Übersetzung und Vorwort: Gerald Hödl).

Artikel und Aufsätze in Sammelbänden**1955**

The Economy. In: Hurwicz, A. (Ed.): Aspects of Contemporary Ukraine. New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 340-490.

The Economy. In: Hurwicz, A. (Ed.): Aspects of Contemporary Belorussia. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 270-380.

The Economic Development of Nicaragua. In: Inter American Economic Affairs 8(4), 559-568.

1957

Policy Decision and the Economic Development of Ceylon. In: *Economia Internazionale* 8 (4), 797-809.

The Organization of Economic Activity in the Soviet Union. In: *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 78 (1), 104-156.

1958

General Productivity in Soviet Agriculture and Industry. The Ukraine 1928-1955. In: *Journal of Political Economy* 66 498-515.

1959

Introduction to Social Structure and Organization. In: Frank, A.G./Cassidy, Sally u.a.: *Social Science Readings*. Detroit: Monteith College, Wayne University.

1963

Mexico: The Janus Faces of Twentieth Century Bourgeois Revolution. In: Sweezy, Paul/Huberman, Leo (Eds.): *Whither Latin America?* New York, Monthly Review Press, 57-63.

The Varieties of Land Reform. In: Sweezy, Paul, Huberman, Leo (Eds.): *Whither Latin America?* New York, Monthly Review Press, 72-90.

Not Feudalism: Capitalism. In: *Monthly Review* 15 (8).

Administrative Role Definition and Social Change. In: *Human Organization* 22 (4), 238-242.

1964

Brazil. Aid or Exploitation? In: *The Anatomy of Foreign Aid*, Foreword Lord Boyd Orr. London: Peace News, 13-22.

A agricultura brasileira: capitalismo e o mito do feudalismo. In: *Revista brasiliense* 51, 45-70.

On the Mechanism of Imperialism. The Case of Brazil. In: *Monthly Review* 16 (5), Sept. 1964.

1965

Estructura social rural. In: *Manual para Institutos de Líderes*. Montevideo: Iglesia Sociedad en América Latina, 55-68.

La Política de Sustitución de Importaciones. Un Callejón sin Salida en el Brasil. In: *Investigación Económica*. Época 2, (Nr. 97) 1er trimestre, 63-80.

México: modelo „tipo“ de la revolución burguesa. In: *Arauco* 5 (62), 11-25.

1966

O custo das importações da América Latina. In: *Revista civilização brasileira* 1 (5/6), 49-57.

La inestabilidad urbana en América Latina. In: *Cuadernos americanos* 25 (1), 55-73.

Functionalism, Dialectics and Synthetics. In: *Science and Society* 30 (2), 136-148.

The Development of Underdevelopment. In: *Monthly Review* 18 (4), 17-31.

(1966): *El Desarrollo del Subdesarrollo*. In: *Desarrollo Indoamericano* 1 (2).

(1975): *Die Entwicklung der Unterentwicklung*. In: *Haftendorn, Helga (Hg.): Theorie der internationalen Politik. Gegenstand und Methoden der Internationalen Beziehungen*. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 171-182.

1967

La Inversión Extranjera en el subdesarrollo Latinoamericano desde la Conquista hasta la Integración Neo-Imperialista. In: *Desarrollo Indoamericano* 2 (5), 25-34.

Latinoamérica. Subdesarrollo Capitalista o Revolución Socialista? ¿Quién es el enemigo inmediato? In: *Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico* 15, 55-82.

(1972): *Latin America. Capitalism, Underdevelopment or Social Revolution?* In: *Halper, S.A./Sterling, J.R. (Eds.): Latin America Theory and Dynamics of Social Change*. London: Allison & Busby, 119-156.

(1969): *Lateinamerika. Kapitalistische Unterentwicklung oder sozialistische Revolution?* In: *Echeverría, Bolívar/Kurnitzky, Horst (Hg.): Kritik des Bürgerlichen Anti-Imperialismus*. Berlin: Wagenbach, 91-132.

La Inversión Extranjera en el Subdesarrollo Latinoamericano. In: *Pensamiento Crítico* 27, 67-99.

1968

Class, Politics, and Debray. In: Huberman, Leo/Sweezy, Paul (Eds.): Régis Debray and the Latin American Revolution. In: Régis Debray and the Latin American Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 12-17 (mit Said Ahmad Shah).

(1970): *Klasse, Politik und Debray*. In: Huberman, Leo/Sweezy, Paul: *Debray, Brasilien, Linke in den Metropolen*. Berlin: Wagenbach, 18-22.

Science and Underdevelopment in the Third World. In: Scientific Research and Politics. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 152-190. Auch in: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 6-19.

1969

What Is the Scientific Value of the Study of the Development of Underdevelopment? None! In: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 3-5.

1970

On Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology. In: Current Anthropology 11(1). Auch in: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 42-57.

Walt Whitman Rostow. Ode zur Unterentwicklung. In: Wolf, K.D. (Hg.): Tricontinental 1967-1970. Eine Auswahl. Frankfurt: Marzer, 282-299.

Even Heretics Remain Bound by Traditional thought in Formulating Their Heresies. In: Economic and Political Weekly 5, 1171-1186. Auch in: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 87-103.

Urban Poverty in Latin America. In: Horowitz, I.L. (Ed.): Masses in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 215-234.

1971

Modelos de Reformas Agrarias. In: Agraria 1 (2), 2-8.

1972

La política económica en Chile: del Frente Popular a la Unidad Popular. In: Punto final 6 (Nr. 153), 23 pp.

An Answer to the Communist Party of Chile which went unpublished in its newspaper. In: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 161-166.

Politics and Bias. A Critical Review of Rostow and Hirschman. In: Economic and Political Weekly. Bombay 7 (38). Auch in: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 113-124.

1973

Latin American Economic Integration. In: Sociological Readings in the Conflict Perspective, 406-410.

Reflections on Green, Red and White Revolutions in India. In: Economic and Political Weekly 8.(3). Auch In: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 62-73.

On the Political Study of New Nations. In: Current Anthropology 14, 5. Auch in: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 20-24.

Functionalism and Dialectics. In: Chambliss, W.J. (Ed.): Sociological Readings in the Conflict Perspective. Reading: Addison-Wenley, 62-73.

The Political Economy of the Economic Policy of the Communist Party of Chile. In: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 155-160.

1974

Dependence is Dead. Long Live Dependence and the Class Struggle - An Answer to Critics. In: Latin American Perspectives 1 (1), 87-106.

On the Roots of Development and Underdevelopment in the New World. Smith and Marx vs. the Weberians. In: International Review of Sociology 2 (2-3), 109-155.

1975

The Lessons of Chile. In: Gittings, John (Ed.): The Lessons of Chile. Nottingham: Spokesman Press.

Anthropology = Ideology, Applied Anthropology = Politics. In: Race & Class 17, 1.

Zur Krise des Kapitalismus und die Zukunft Lateinamerikas. In: Tibi, Bassam/ Brandes, Volkhard (Hg.): Handbuch II - Unterentwicklung. Frankfurt/M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 264-270.

Über die Begrenzung des Binnenmarkts durch die internationale Arbeitsteilung und die Produktionsverhältnisse. In: Herrschaft und Befreiung in der Weltgesellschaft, 161-211.

World Crisis, Class Struggle and 1984. In: Radical Perspectives on the Economic Crisis of Monopoly Capitalism. New York: Union for Radical Political Economics, 82-87.

(1976): *Weltkrise, Klassenkampf und 1984*. In: Andersen, Uwe (Hg.): *Die Zukunft der Wirtschaft. Analysen und Prognosen*. München: List, 235-245.

1976

Multilateral Merchandise Trade Imbalances and Uneven Economic Development. In: The Journal of European Economic History 5 (2), 407-438.

On Commercial Imbalances in the Third World. In: Journal of European Economic History 5 (2). Auch in: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 77-81.

On So-called Primitive Accumulation. In: Dialectical Anthropology (2).

(1979): *Über die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation*. In: Senghaas, Dieter (Hg.): *Kapitalistische Weltökonomie. Kontroversen über ihren Ursprung und ihre Entwicklungsdynamik*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 68-102.

Economic Crisis, Third World and 1984. In: World Development 4 (10/11), 853-861.

(1978): *Weltwirtschaftskrise, Dritte Welt und 1984*. In: Frank, A.G. (1978): *Weltwirtschaft in der Krise*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 35-56.

On some questionable Questions about Marxist Theory and International Capital Flows. In: Review of Political Economics, New York, Summer 1976.

1977

Friedmanism in Chile, Equilibrium on the Point of a Bayonet. In: Australian Broadcasting Commission (Ed.): Political Economy of Development. Sydney, 71-85 (mit Ted Wheelwright).

Long live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor. In: Review 1 (1), 91-140.

Reflexiones sobre la Crisis Económica. Barcelona.

(1978): *Weltwirtschaft in der Krise*. *Verarmung im Norden, Verelendung im Süden*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.

1978

The Economics of Crisis and the Crisis of Economics. In: Critique, Bd. 9, 85-112.
Eurocommunism. Left and Right Variants. In: New Left Review 108. Revised version:
Is a Left Eurocommunism Possible? In: Critique and Anti-Critique(1984), 170-175.

1979

Unequal Accumulation. Intermediate, Semi-Peripheral, and Sub-Imperialist Economies. In: Review 2 (3), 281-350.
Retórica y realidad del Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional. In: Desarrollo Indoeuropeo 14 (51), 63-69.

1980

Development of Crisis and Crisis of Development. Living in the Real World. In: Economic and political weekly 15 (5/7), 229-244.
World System in Crisis. In: Journal of Social Studies 10.
(1981) *Weltsystem in der Krise*. In: Fröbel, Folker/Heinrichs, Jürgen/Kreye, Otto: *Krisen in der Kapitalistischen Weltökonomie*. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 19-34.
Arms Economy and Warfare in the Third World. In: Third World Quarterly 2 (2), 228-250.
North-South and East-West Keynesian paradoxes in the Brandt report. In: Third World Quarterly 2 (4), 669-680.
(1983): *Nord-Süd und Ost-West. Keynesianische Paradoxe im Brandt Report*. In: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Hg.): *Unfähig zum Überleben? Reaktionen auf den Brandt Report*. Frankfurt: Ullstein, 269-284.
Third World Manufacturing Export Production. In: The South-East Asian Economic Review 1 (2), 83-105.
Economic Crisis and the State in the Third World. In: Desarrollo Indoeuropeo 55.
(1980): *Wirtschaftskrise und Staat in der Dritten Welt*. In Max-Planck-Institut (Hg.): *Strukturveränderungen in der kapitalistischen Weltwirtschaft*.

1981

Kampuchea, Vietnam, China. Observations and Reflections. In: Alternatives, 7 (2).
The World Crisis. Theory and Ideology. In: Alternatives 6 (4), 497-523.
After Reaganomics and Thatcherism, What? From Keynesian Demand Management via Supply-side Economics to Corporate State Planning and 1984. In: Contemporary Marxism, 1981/82 (4), 18-28.
(1982): In: *Moderne Zeiten, Hannover, Februar 1982*.

1982

Crisis of Ideology and Ideology of Crisis. In: Arrighi/Frank/Samir/Wallerstein: *Dynamics of Global Crisis*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 109-166.

1983

Crisis and Transformation of Dependency in the World-System. In: Chilcolte, R.H./Johnson, D. (Eds.): *Theories of Development*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 181-200.
World System in Crisis. In: Thompson, W.R. (Ed.): *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 27-42.

From Atlantic Alliance to Pan-European Entente. Political Economic Alternatives. In: Alternatives 8 (4), 423-482.

Global Crisis and Transformation. In: Development and Change 14 (3), 323-346.

Real Marxism is Marxist Realism. In: Socialism in the World. Belgrad 1983. Auch in: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 279-289.

Die gegenwärtige Krise und die Perspektiven des Weltsystems. In: Blaschke, Jochen (Hg.):

Perspektiven des Weltsystems. Materialien zu Immanuel Wallerstein, „Das moderne Weltsystem“. Frankfurt: Campus, 230-255.

Policy ad Hockery. Unemployment and World Crisis of Economic Policy Formation. In: Economic and Political Weekly, 28.5.1983. Also in: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 230-242.

1984

Political Ironies in the World Economy. In: Studies in Political Economy 15, 119-149. (1990): *Politische Ironien in der Weltwirtschaft*. In: Hofbauer, Hannes/Komlosy, Andrea (Hg.): *Widerstand im Weltsystem*. Wien: Promedia, 13-45.

The Unequal and Uneven Historical Development of the World Economy. In: Contemporary Marxism 9, 71-95.

Introduction, Contents, and Requiem for a Reader on Underdevelopment. In: Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), 293-322 (mit Said Ahmad Shah).

Can the debt bomb be defused? In: World Policy Journal 1 (4), 723-743.

(1988): *Kann die Schuldenbombe entschärft werden?* In: Laaser, Ulrich, H. (Hg.): *Schuldenkrise und Armut in der Dritten Welt*. Hamburg: Argument.

1985

Defuse the Debt Bomb? When Apparent Solutions Become Real Problems. In: Development & Socio-economic Progress 9 (3), 38-68 (revised version of 1984).

The Political Challenge to Socialism and Social Movements. In: Socialism on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century. London: New Left / Verso Books, 58-71.

(1985): *Die Weltwirtschaftskrise als Herausforderung an den Sozialismus und die sozialen Bewegungen*. In: Nikolić Milos (Hg.): *Sozialismus im 21 Jahrhundert*, Bd. 1, Berlin: Argument, 26-36.

1987

World Economic Crisis and Policy Perspectives in the Mid-1980s. In: Singer, Hans W./Tandon, Rameswar/Hatti, Neelamber (Eds.): *Economic Theory and New World Order*. New Delhi: Ashish Publishers, 507-530.

Nine Theses on Social Movements. In: Economic and Political Weekly 22 (35), 1503-1510 (mit Marta Fuentes Frank).

(1990): *Von der Revolution zur sozialen Bewegung*. In: Hofbauer, Hannes/Komlosy, Andrea: *Widerstand im Weltsystem*. Wien: Promedia, 163-194 (Übersetzt nach einer Überarbeitung).

1988

American Roulette in the Globonomic Casino. Retrospect and Prospect on the World Economic Crisis Today. In: Research in Political Economy 11, 3-43.

(1990): *Amerikanisches Roulette im globalen Kasino*. In: Hofbauer, Hannes/Komlosy, Andrea: *Widerstand im Weltsystem*. Wien: Promedia, 46-91.

The World Economic Crisis Today. Retrospect and Prospect. In: *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives* 7 (2-3), 181-215.

1989

Ten Theses on Social Movements. In: *World Development* 17 (2), 179-191 (mit Marta Fuentes Frank).

World Debt, the European Challenge and 1992. In: *ENDpapers* 19. Nottingham, 22-29.

(1989) *Weltverschuldungskrise, Europäische Herausforderung und 1992*. In: *Das Argument* 31 (5), 759-766.

1990

A Theoretical Introduction to 5,000 Years of World System History. In: *Review* Vol. 13 (2), 155-248.

Revolution in Eastern Europe. Lessons for Democratic Social Movements (and Socialists?). In: *Third World Quarterly*, 12(2), 36-52.

(1990): *Die osteuropäische Revolution von 1989. Zwölf Lehren für demokratische soziale Bewegungen (und Sozialisten?)*. In: *Das Argument* 180, 191-203.

Civil Democracy. Social Movements in World History. In: Amin/Arrighi/Frank/Wallerstein: *Transforming the Revolution. Social Movements and the World-System*. New York: Monthly Review Press (mit Marta Fuentes Frank).

1991

The Underdevelopment of Development. In: *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives* 10 (3), 5-72.

(1990): *Die Unterentwicklung der Entwicklung*. In: Hofbauer, Hannes/Komlosy, Andrea (Hg.): *Widerstand im Weltsystem*. Wien: Promedia, 92-133 (gekürzte Übersetzung).

A Plea for World System History. In: *Journal of World History* 2 (1), 1-28.

Transitional Ideological Modes. Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism. In: *Critique of Anthropology* 11 (2), 171-188.

Latin American Development Theories revisited. A participant Review Essay. In: *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives* 10(3), 133-50.

No escape from the Laws of World Economics. In: *Review of African Political Economy* 50, 21-32.

Holier Than Thou in the Gulf. A Curse on Both Your Houses. In: *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* 7 (1), 91-105.

Marketing Democracy in an Undemocratic Market. In: Gills, Barry K./Rocamora, Joel (Eds.): *For Low Intensity Democracy. Elite Democracy in the Third World*. London: Pluto Press.

1992

Economic Ironies in Europe. A World Economic Interpretation of East-West European Politics. In: *International Social Science Journal* 44, 41-56.

The Five Thousand Year World System. An Interdisciplinary Introduction. In: *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 18 (1), 1-79.

- World System Cycles, Crises, and Hegemonial Shifts 1700 BC to 1700 AD. In: Review 15 (4), 621-698 (mit Barry K. Gills).
- Third World War. A Political Economy of the Gulf War and the New World Order. In: Third World Quarterly 13 (2), 267-282.
- Fourteen Ninety-Two. In: Political Geography 11 (4), 336-385.
- On the Significance of 1492 II. 1492 once again. In: Political Geography 11 (4), 386-393.
- The Centrality of Central Asia. In: Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars 24 (2), 50-74.
- Nothing New in the East. No New World Order. In: Social Justice 19 (1), 34-61.
- Latin American Development Theories Revisited. A Participant Review. In: Latin American Perspectives 19 (2), 125-139.
- 1993**
- Bronze-Age World-System Cycles. In: Current Anthropology 34 (4), 383-430.
- World System Economic Cycles and Hegemonial Shift to Europe, 100 BC to 1500 AD. In: Journal of European Economic History 22 (1), 155-183 (mit Barry K. Gills).
- The World Is Round and Wavy. Demographic Cycles and Structural Analysis in the World System. In: Contention 2 (2), 107-112.
- 1492 and Latin America at the Margin of World System History. East > West Hegemonial Shifts (992-1492-1992). In: Comparative Civilizations Review 28, 1-40.
- 1994**
- The World Economic-System in Asia Before European Hegemony. In: The Historian 56 (2), 259-276.
- A World Economic Interpretation of East-West European Politics Transcending the State-Global Divide. A Neostructuralist Agenda. In: Gills, Barry K/Palan, Ronen (Eds.): International Relations. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 145-168.
- Approaches from a World-Systems Analysis Tradition. In: International Studies Quarterly 38 (Supplement 2), 361- 376 (mit C. Chase-Dunn, P. Taylor, G. Arrighi, R. Cox, H. Overbeek B. Gills, G. Modelski, D. Wilkinson).
- On Studying the Cycles in Social Movements. In: Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 17, 173-196 (mit Marta Fuentes Frank).
- Inside Out or Outside In? In: Review 17 (1), 1-5.
- Soviet and East European "Socialism". A Review of the International Political Economy on What Went Wrong. In: Review of International Political Economy 1 (2), 317-343.
- The "Thirdworldization" of Russia and Eastern Europe. In: Mesbahi, M. (Ed.): Russia and the Third World in the Post-Soviet Era. Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 45-72.
- 1995**
- The Modern World System Revisited. Re-reading Braudel and Wallerstein. In: Sanderson, Stephen K. (Ed.): Civilizations and World Systems. Studying World-historical Change. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 163-194.

1996

India in the world economy, 1400-1750. In: Economic and Political Weekly 31 (30), 50-64.

1997

Asia Comes Full Circle with China as the "Middle Kingdom". In: Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 23 (1-2), 7-19.

1998

The Dynamic Society. Exploring the Sources of Global Change. In: Journal of World History 9 (1), 107-115.

Naked science. Anthropological inquiry into boundaries, power, and knowledge. In: Economic and Political Weekly 33 (42-43).

What Went Wrong in the "Socialist" East? In: Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 24 (1-2), 171-193.

1999

Abuses and Uses of World Systems Theory in Archaeology. In: Kardulias, P. Nick (Ed.): World-Systems Theory in Practice. Leadership, Production, and Exchange. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 275-295.

NATOs Kosovo Political Bomb. http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank/kosovo_bomb.html, 15.02.2006.

Die politische Bombe der NATO im Kosovo. In: Hofbauer, Hannes (Hg.): Balkankrieg. Die Zerstörung Jugoslawiens. Wien: Promedia Verlag, 251-262.

2000

Around the World in Eighty Years. In: Journal for the Comparative Study of Civilizations 5, 45-98.

2002

A Structural Theory of the Five Thousand Year World System. In: Chew, Sing C./ Knottnerus, J. David (Ed.): Structure, Culture, and History. Recent Issues In Social Theory. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 151-176 (mit Barry K. Gill).

World System History and the World after September 11. http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank/after_9_11.html, 15.02.2006

(2005).; *Das Scheitern der Sowjetunion und Osteuropas. In: Frank, A.G. (2005): Orientierung im Weltsystem. Wien: Promedia (Ausschnitt).*

2003

Paper Tiger, Fiery Dragon. In: Revista Electronica „Historia Actual On-Line“. <http://www.hapress.com/haol.php?a=n05a08&id=uk>.

Papiertiger und Feuerdrache. In: Frank, A.G. (2005): Orientierung im Weltsystem. Wien: Promedia.

Our Crisis in the World Crisis. <http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank/crisis1.doc>, 15.02.2006.

2004

ReOrient World History, Social Theory, and the 19th Century. <http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank/2004es03.html>, 15.02.2006.

Geschichtswissenschaft und Sozialtheorie „Re-Orientieren“: In: Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte 5 (1), 9-42.

Globalizing "Might Is Right". Spaghetti Western Law of the West Is No Solution. In: *Development and Change* 35 (3), 607-612.

2005

Afro-Eurasian Bronze Age Economic Expansion and Contraction revisited. In: *Journal of World History* 16 (2), 115-172 (mit William R.Thompson).

Meet Uncle Sam – without Clothes – Parading around China and the World. Observed from the Top of the Great Wall through the Eyes of the Innocent Boy. <http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank/noclothes.html>, 15.02.2005.

Uncle Sam, ohne Kleider, auf dem Parademarsch rund um China und die Welt. In: Frank, A.G. (2005): Orientierung im Weltsystem. Wien: Promedia, 117-157.

Universal History. Sizing Up Humanity in Big History. In: *Journal of World History* 16(1), 83-97.

Einige Texte über Andre Gunder Frank

Chew, C. Sing/Denemark, Robert A. (Eds., 1996): *The Underdevelopment of Development. Essays in Honor of André Gunder Frank*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Dos Santos, Theotônio (1996): *El desarrollo latinoamericano. Pasado, presente y futuro. Un homenaje a André Gunder Frank*. In: *Problemas del Desarrollo* 27, Nr. 104, 143-172.

Foster-Carter, A. (1976): *From Rostow to Gunder Frank. Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment*. In: *World Development* 3, 167-180.

Hein, Wolfgang (2000): *André Gunder Frank. Metropolen, Satelliten und das Weltsystem*. In: *E+Z - Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*, 3/2000, 80-83. <http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/1997-2002/ez300-8.htm>, 31.01.2005.

Hödl, Gerald (2005): *Produktive Renitenz. Anmerkungen zu Leben und Werk von André Gunder Frank*. In: Frank, A.G. (2005): *Orientierung im Weltsystem*, 7-16.

Kay, Cristóbal (2005): *André Gunder Frank. From the "Development of Underdevelopment" to the "World System"*. In: *Development and Change* 36 (6), 1177-1183.

Autobiographische Essays

1991

The Underdevelopment of Development. In: *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives* 10 (3), 5-72.

1995

The Underdevelopment of Development. In: Chew, Sing C./Denemark, Robert A. (Eds.): *The Underdevelopment of Development. Essays in honor of André Gunder Frank*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 17-56 (Revised Edition).

1998

The Cold War and Me. In: *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 29 (3), 79-84. Online-Version: <http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank/syfrank.htm>, 15.02.2006.

Der Kalte Krieg und ich. In: *Prokla* 112, 487-500.

The Soviet Union and Me. A sort of Sequel to “The Cold War and Me”. http://www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank/soviet_union_and_me1.doc, 15.02.2006

Internetressourcen

Homepage mit Bibliographien, Texten und Informationen zu A.G. Frank:
www.rrojasdatabank.org/agfrank

ZUSAMMENGESTELLT VON BERNHARD WERNITZNIG

Frank, Andre Gunder: Orientierung im Weltsystem. Von der Neuen Welt zum Reich der Mitte. *Wien, Pro-
media 2005, 160 Seiten.
11,90 Euro.*

Auf hundertfünfzig Seiten durch Zeit und Welt – so könnte die vor kurzem und bereits posthum erschienene Sammlung von vier, bislang nur verstreut erschienenen oder zugänglichen Aufsätzen aus der Feder von Andre Gunder Frank charakterisiert werden. Die keineswegs zynisch gemeinte Formulierung bezieht sich unmittelbar auf die Franksche Darstellung der Wanderung des Zentrums der globalen wirtschaftlichen Dynamik rund um die Welt: beginnend mit der asiatischen Weltökonomie der frühen Neuzeit, über die sich im 18. Jahrhundert vorbereitende Wanderung des Zentrums von Asien zunächst nach Europa (19. Jahrhundert), dann in die USA (besonders kurzes 20. Jahrhundert), und schließlich in unseren Tagen zurück nach Asien. Damit ist auch schon ein zentrales Element der Argumentation im weitaus längsten und gewiss bedeutendsten Beitrag des Büchleins, *Geschichtswissenschaft und Sozialtheorie „re-ORIENTieren“* angeschnitten. Der Text stellt

zunächst ausführlich die theoretischen Prämissen und zusammenfassend die historisch-ökonomische Argumentation von Franks letztem großen monographischen Hauptwerk *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (1998) vor. Es folgt ein Ausblick auf die Verhältnisse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Die Darstellung läuft letztlich auf eine zentrale Behauptung hinaus: Die Geschichte des ökonomischen Auf- und Abstiegs einzelner Weltregionen war und ist vor, während und nach dem „europäischen Zeitalter“ eine Geschichte gegenseitiger Beziehungen. Der Aufstieg Europas ergab sich weder aus irgendeiner Form der Überlegenheit oder Einzigartigkeit (eurozentrischer Internalismus), noch lässt er sich adäquat aus der Geschichte der europäischen Expansion, also der Unterordnung und Einverleibung nicht-europäischer Regionen (eurozentrischer Externalismus) erklären. Richtig beleuchten lässt sich dieser Aufstieg demgegenüber erst dann, wenn er als Teil einer Beziehungsgeschichte erklärt wird, deren anderen Pol die Vormachtstellung Asiens und dann dessen Abstieg bildete. „Der ‚Aufstieg des Westens‘ gelang nicht aus eigener Kraft und auch nicht durch die Ausbeutung seiner Kolonien. Vielmehr muss

man ihn vor dem Hintergrund der damaligen Weltwirtschaft bzw. des damaligen Weltsystems begreifen, als europäische ‚Schwellenländer‘ durch Importsubstitution und Exportförderung auf die Schultern der asiatischen Ökonomien kletterten. [...] Die ganze Frage nach dem damaligen ‚Aufstieg‘ des Westens, und dem heutigen des Ostens muss ausgehend vom gesamten Welt(wirtschafts)system – und nicht nur von irgendwelchen britischen, europäischen, westlichen oder heute auch ostasiatischen Teilen – rekonzeptualisiert werden“ (S. 43).

Diese Sicht der Dinge mag, ungeachtet aller Auseinandersetzungen mit Freund und Feind über die (wirtschafts-)geschichtliche Korrektheit, Vollständigkeit und Stichhaltigkeit seiner Ausführungen, in die Frank bald unvermeidlich geriet, erst einmal einleuchtend und schlichtweg logisch bzw. zumindest nachvollziehbar klingen. Doch der einleitende theoretische Teil des Texts, der die verschiedensten Schulen der Global- und Beziehungsgeschichte, des historischen Vergleiches, und der historischen Makrosoziologie Revue passieren lässt, belehrt die LeserInnen auf fast schon dramatische Weise eines schlechteren. Betroffen müssen sie

feststellen, dass die wissenschaftliche Szene seit dem 19. Jahrhundert dermaßen von der Phalanx der eurozentristischen Internalisten und Externalisten beherrscht ist, dass die von ihnen entwickelten Kategorien und Perspektiven schlichtweg die unvoreingenommene Sicht auf alle anderen Weltregionen versperren, und deren gleichberechtigte Einbeziehung in eine holistische (S. 43) Analyse wie die von Frank versuchte verunmöglichen. Der Grund dafür: Die Wissenschaft selbst ist ein Kind des europäischen Aufstiegs. Das Kind mit Namen Wissenschaft hat die Ablösung von der alles andere überstrahlenden Elterntugend Europa, die ihren Sprössling im Geiste einer hermetischen Abschottung von der Außenwelt und Totalisierung der familiären Innenwelt erzog, noch nicht vollzogen – aber mittlerweile doch gute Chancen darauf, wie Frank durch seine eigene Arbeit und unter Verweis auf eine beträchtliche und wachsende Anzahl von Gewährleuten zu zeigen versucht. Will die Wissenschaft diesen schwierigen Ablösungsprozess tatsächlich überstehen, so wird zu diesem allerdings wohl auch die Einsicht gehören müssen, dass Franks Holismus einen ebenso unbelegbaren Glaubenssatz darstellt, wie jene Wahrheiten, nach denen

sie selbst in den zwei Jahrhunderten ihrer eurozentristischen Kindheit gesucht hat. „Nur eine holistische Perspektive auf das globale Ganze und vom globalen Ganzen her – das mehr ist als die Summe seiner Teile – kann ein angemessenes Verständnis irgendeines Teiles bieten, und wie oder warum er sich von einem anderen unterscheidet“ (S. 35). Erst und genau die Tatsache, dass sich Frank um den methodologischen und epistemologischen Status derartiger Bekenntnisse schlichtweg nicht schert, befähigt in zu seinen unbequemen wissenschaftlichen Hochleistungen im Zeichen eines globalen Holismus – dessen Reiz durch das Einbekenntnis, dass verschiedene Regionen „noch durch die Lücken unserer Analyse [...] fallen“ (S. 64), durchaus nicht verringert wird.

Im Zeichen dieses Holismus reist Frank in den hier vorgelegten Schriften in der Folge tatsächlich noch viel weiter durch Zeit und Welt. Es geht ihm dabei an keiner Stelle um eine aus seiner Sicht unangemessene Vergrößerung des jeweiligen Lokalen, sondern stets um eine angemessene Beleuchtung von dessen jeweiliger „Funktion“ – er selbst verwendet diesen Begriff in Anführungszeichen (S. 34) – im globalen Beziehungsnetz. Der

zweite Text beschäftigt sich mit der Epoche des sog. Staatssozialismus in Osteuropa. Hier findet sich eines der Axiome der Weltsicht des Autors in besonders komprimierter Form: Der sog. Staatssozialismus sei nichts anderes gewesen als eine der möglichen Strategien im „Wettrennen mit dem Ziel der Kapitalakkumulation [...] Wie dies auch bei anderen Wettläufen der Fall ist, gewinnen nur einige wenige, und auch das nicht auf unbegrenzte Zeit. Die überwiegende Mehrheit verliert“ – und zu dieser gehörte die staatssozialistische Region (S. 83).

Die beiden folgenden Beiträge beschäftigen sich ganz in diesem Sinne mit der USA in der Welt von heute, mit China in Ostasien, und mit den Beziehungen zwischen dem längst im Abstieg begriffenen oder gar auf einen Zusammenbruch zu steuernden „*Uncle Sam*“ einerseits, und dem chinesischen „Feuerdrachen“ andererseits. Eines der zentralen Anliegen von Frank ist es in diesem Zusammenhang nachzuweisen, „dass es keine spezifische institutionelle Form oder polit-ökonomische Strategie gibt, auf die sich der Erfolg [...] im Wettbewerb auf dem sich ständig verändernden Weltmarkt zurückführen lässt“. Dieser Erfolg hänge sehr viel weniger von der jeweiligen „institutionellen Färbung“

der am Wettbewerb teilnehmenden bzw. „ökonomische Mäuse“ jagen. „Katze ab als davon, wie günstig ihre Position in der Weltwirtschaft am jeweiligen Ort und zur jeweiligen Zeit ist“ – davon also, ob sich die Katze den jeweils vorfindlichen Bedingungen und Veränderungen erfolgreich anzupassen vermöge oder nicht (S. 104-105).

Zugleich aber finden sich, über die verschiedenen Beiträge des Buches verstreut, in doch beharrlicher Wiederkehr Bemerkungen Franks über die langfristige Konstanz bzw. die historische Wiederkehr bestimmter Positionierungen verschiedener Räume bzw. Regionen in der ungleichen Arbeitsteilung im Weltsystem. Die extrem ungleiche ost/westeuropäische Arbeitsteilung sei „seit mehr als 1000 Jahren“ in wesentlichen Grundzügen die gleiche geblieben (S. 83). Die heute besonders dynamischen Regionen Ostasiens seien „wieder genau dieselben, die es vor 1800 waren“ (S. 113). Diese Hinweise auf geographische Fixierungen im ungleichen System der globalen Beziehungen stehen in einem wenig ausgearbeiteten Spannungsverhältnis zur Grundidee der Fluidität, des sich gegenseitig bedingenden Auf und Ab der verschiedenen Weltregionen über die Zeit hinweg, die ansonsten durch-

gängig den Kern der Frankschen Analyse auszumachen scheint. Warum ist Asien in der Lage, aus den bzw. trotz der lokalen und regionalen Folgen weltwirtschaftlicher Marginalisierung im 19. Jahrhundert Konsequenzen zu ziehen, die einen Wiederaufstieg ermöglichen, während dies in Osteuropa nicht der Fall ist? Welche Rolle spielt der Faktor Zeit, die historische Dauer der Unterordnung? Frank selbst weist beispielsweise wiederholt auf die „relativ kurze Zeitspanne“ der Unterbrechung der globalen Vorherrschaft Asiens (S. 106) einerseits, und die lange Dauer der innereuropäischen Arbeitsteilung andererseits hin. Oder sollte es am Ende etwa doch (auch) darum gehen, zumindest eine Serie von Katzentypen angeben zu können, die in einer doch begrenzten Anzahl von Variationen der Weltmarktkonstellation größere oder kleinere Potentiale zum Mäusefangen besitzen? Die Darlegungen Franks allein in diesem schmalen Band bieten in Hülle und Fülle Material und Argumentationsweisen, die zur Grundlage derartiger Bemühungen gemacht werden könnten. Frank bezieht dabei die „verschiedenen institutionellen Formen, zu denen die Organisation des Staates, des Finanzsystems, der Produktion und des Handels“ gehö-

ren (S. 105), ein. Die Rezensentin fühlt sich allerdings, und zwar keineswegs aus Platzmangel, sondern insbesondere aufgrund beschränkter Kenntnisse der Finanzökonomie sowie der frühneuzeitlichen globalen Wirtschaftsgeschichte außerstande, zu einer diesbezüglichen Diskussion substantiell beizutragen – und wünscht statt dessen der vorliegenden Aufsatzsammlung viele kompetente und lernfähige Leserinnen und Leser.

Überdies ist der Band auch verlegerisch sehr sorgfältig gemacht. In seinem detaillierten und interessant zu lesenden Vorwort schreibt Herausgeber Gerald Hödl eine kurze Geschichte der Verbindung von intellektuellem, politischem und persönlichem Lebensweg im Falle Frank. Auf diese Weise gelingt es (nur) scheinbar leichterhand und wissenschaftlich präzise, in das Denken dieses „produktiv Renitenten“ (S. 7) einzuführen. Frank hat zu Lebzeiten mehrfach selbst diese Methode der retrospektiven Analyse gewählt. In Hödls Darstellung entsteht, auf der Grundlage von durchaus sorgsam zusammengetragenen Fakten z.B. über die Zusammenhänge zwischen den existentiellen Sorgen und der überbordenden bzw. überlappenden intellektuellen Produktion von Andre Gun-

der Frank, das Bild eines mehrfach Getriebenen. Inwieweit eine solche Sicht der Dinge von einer erst noch zu leistenden systematischen Analyse von Franks Sozio-Biographie der-einst bestätigt werden wird bleibt abzuwarten. Einige zusätzliche Angaben zu Andre Gunder Frank, Kurzbiographien aller an der Edition Beteiligten, sowie präzise Quellenangaben zu den Originaltexten runden das Buch ab.

SUSAN ZIMMERMANN

Schwerpunktredaktion

Karin Fischer ist Lehrbeauftragte an der Universität Wien und verantwortliche Redakteurin des JEP.

Christof Parnreiter ist Professor für Wirtschaftsgeographie am Institut für Geographie, Universität Hamburg und Mitglied der JEP-Redaktion.

Autorinnen und Autoren

Marcos Aguila ist Professor für Ökonomie an der Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Xochimilco in Mexico City. Sein jüngstes Buch *Economía y Trabajo en la Economía Mexicana: La emergencia de un nuevo pacto laboral entre la Gran Depresión y el Cardenismo* erschien 2004.

Jeffrey Bortz ist Professor für Geschichte an der Appalachian State University, Boone, North Carolina. Sein letztes Buch *The Mexican Economy, 1870-1930: Essays on the Economic History of Institutions, Revolution, and Growth*, hat er 2002 mit Stephen Haber herausgegeben.

Ricardo Duchesne ist Außerordentlicher Professor für Soziologie an der University of New Brunswick in Saint John, Kanada. Seine jüngste Veröffentlichung erschien 2005 in *Palgrave Advances in World Histories* (Hg. Marnie Hughes-Warrington) unter dem Titel *Centres and Margins: The Fall of Universal History and the Rise of Multicultural World History*.

Andrea Komlosy ist Außerordentliche Universitätsprofessorin am Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte der Universität Wien. Zu ihren aktuellen Veröffentlichungen zählt der mit Joachim Becker herausgegebene Band *Grenzen weltweit. Zonen, Linien, Mauern im historischen Vergleich*, der 2004 erschienen ist.

Colin Leys ist emeritierter Professor für Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften an der Queen's University in Kingston, Kanada. *Underdevelopment in Kenya* (1977) war einer der einflussreichsten Texte jener Zeit. Eine seiner letzten Veröffentlichungen ist *The globalisation decade: a critical reader* (2001; gemeinsam mit Leo Panitch).

Ronen Palan ist Professor und Vorstand des International Relations Department an der University of Sussex, Großbritannien. Zu seinen aktuellen Veröffentlichungen zählen *The Offshore World* (2003) und *The Imagined Economies of Globalisation* (2004; gemeinsam mit Angus Cameron).

Die letzten Ausgaben

- 4/02 Südostasien zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts / South-east Asia at the Brink of the 21st Century
- 1/03 Landreformen in Afrika / Land Reform Policies in Africa
- 2/03 Neue Internationale Armutsprogramme: Neoliberalismus mit menschlichem Gesicht? / New International Poverty Programs: Neoliberalism with a Human Face?
- 3/03 Drei Jahrzehnte Neoliberalismus in Lateinamerika. Bilanz und Perspektiven / Three Decades of Neoliberalism in Latin America. Outcome and Perspectives
- 4/03 Wem gehört das Wasser? Die Kommodifizierung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen / Who owns the Water? The Commodification of Public Services
- 1/04 Junge Zugänge / Young Approaches to Development Studies
- 2/04 Gender & Peacebuilding, Frauen und Geschlechterverhältnisse in Post-Conflict Situationen / Gender & Peacebuilding, Women and Gender Relations in Post-Conflict Situations
- 3/04 Kunst - Kultur - Entwicklung / Art - Culture - Development
- 4/04 Multikulturelle Autonomie in Lateinamerika / Multicultural Autonomy in Latin America
- 1/05 „Entwicklung“ im Schulunterricht / “Development” in School Education
- 2/05 Alternative Entwicklungen in Lateinamerika/ Alternative Developments in Latin America
- 3/05 Recht auf Nahrung / Right to Food
- 4/05 WTO at the Crossroads. Stand und Perspektiven des Welthandelsregimes / WTO at the Crossroads. State and Perspectives of the Global Trading System

Die kommenden Hefte

- 2/06 Regionale Integration - Tendenzen und Alternativen
- 3/06 Konflikttransformationen und Friedensprozesse
- 4/06 Entwicklung und Bildung

Informationen für AutorInnen

Manuskripte sind per e-mail zu senden an jep@mattersburgerkreis.at bzw. auf Diskette oder CD-ROM per Post an: Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, Berggasse 7, A-1090 Wien. Der Beitrag darf komplett den Umfang von 20 Seiten (2-zeilig) nicht überschreiten. Legen Sie je ein kurzes Abstract in Deutsch und Englisch (je ca. 100 Worte) sowie eine Kurzcharakteristik Ihrer wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit bei. Am Ende des Beitrags sollte ein Verzeichnis der gesamten verwendeten Literatur stehen. Zitierweise im Text: Geben Sie bitte den Namen, das Jahr und bei wörtlichen Zitaten die jeweilige Seite an.

Das Manuskript muss als Word-Dokument oder in einem anderen Windows-kompatiblen Dateiformat eingesandt werden. Grafiken und Abbildungen sollten in schwarz/weiß gestaltet sein und als TIFF bzw. EXCEL-Datei extra abgespeichert werden.

Redaktionsschluss für das Heft Nr.1 ist der 31.12., für das Heft Nr.2 der 31.3., für das Heft Nr.3 der 30.6. und für das Heft Nr.4 der 30.9.

Information for Contributors

Manuscripts should be submitted electronically to jep@mattersburgerkreis.at or by mail on a disc/CDRom to Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, Berggasse 7, A-1090 Wien. The complete manuscript should not exceed 20 pages (double spacing). All submissions must contain an abstract in German and English (each should not exceed 100 words) and a short curriculum vitae. The author's name, affiliation and e-mail address should be clearly indicated. A complete bibliography listing every work referenced in the text must be included at the end of the submitted text.

References should have the following format: Name, year of publication and the pagination for text references.

The document must be submitted in Word or another word processing program for windows. Graphs and tables/figures should be designed in black/white and saved as TIFF or EXCEL files.

The deadlines for submitting manuscripts are as follows:

Issue no. 1: 31.12., issue no. 2: 31.3., issue no. 3.: 30.6., issue no. 4: 30.9.

Gefördert aus öffentlichen Mitteln der

Österreichische

Entwicklungszusammenarbeit

Journal für Entwicklungspolitik (JEP)

ISSN 0258-2384, Erscheinungsweise: vierteljährlich

Heft XXII, 1-2006, ISBN 3-85476-187-2

Preis des Einzelhefts: Euro 9,80, sFr 17,50

Preis des Jahresabonnements: Euro 39,80, sFr 69,-

Abonnementbezug: über die Redaktion:

Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, Berggasse 7, A-1090 Wien,

e-mail: office@mattersburgerkreis.at

Das Abonnement kann zum Jahresende unter Einhaltung einer dreimonatigen Kündigungsfrist gekündigt werden.

1. Auflage 2006

© Mandelbaum Verlag Wien

Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Jede Verwertung bedarf der vorherigen schriftlichen Zustimmung der Redaktion. Namentlich gekennzeichnete Beiträge geben nicht in jedem Fall die Meinung des Verlages wieder.

Satz: Julia Löw, Wien

Druck: Interpress, Budapest

Offenlegung nach § 25 Mediengesetz

Medieninhaber: Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik an den Österreichischen Hochschulen, Berggasse 7, A-1090 Wien

Grundlegende Richtung des JEP: Wissenschaftliche Analysen und Diskussionen von entwicklungspolitischen Fragestellungen und Berichte über die entwicklungspolitische Praxis. Verantwortlich für Inhalt und Korrekturen sind die AutorInnen bzw. die Redaktion.