

JOURNAL FÜR ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK

vol. XXXII 3-2016

THE EU TRADE REGIME AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Special Issue Guest Editors: Jan Grumiller, Werner Raza,
Bernhard Tröster

Published by:
Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik
an den österreichischen Universitäten

**Journal für Entwicklungspolitik (JEP)
Austrian Journal of Development Studies**

Publisher: Mattersburger Kreis für Entwicklungspolitik an den
österreichischen Universitäten

Editorial Team: Tobias Boos, Eric Burton, Julia Eder, Gerald Faschingeder, Karin Fischer, Margit Franz, Daniel Görgl, Inge Grau, Markus Hafner-Auinger, Karen Imhof, Johannes Jäger, Johannes Knierzinger, Bettina Köhler, René Kuppe, Bernhard Leubolt, Jasmin Malekpour-Augustin, Andreas Novy, Clemens Pfeffer, Stefan Pimmer, Petra Purkarthofer, Kunibert Raffer, Jonathan Scalet, Lukas Schmidt, Gregor Seidl, Anselm Skuhra, Koen Smet

Board of Editors: Henry Bernstein (London), Dieter Boris (Marburg), John-ren Chen (Innsbruck), Hartmut Elsenhans (Leipzig), Jacques Forster (Genève), John Friedman (St. Kilda), Peter Jankowitsch (Wien), Franz Kolland (Wien), Helmut Konrad (Graz), Uma Kothari (Manchester), Ulrich Menzel (Braunschweig), Jean-Philippe Platteau (Namur), Dieter Rothermund (Heidelberg), Dieter Senghaas (Bremen), Heribert Steinbauer (Wien), Paul Streeten (Boston), Osvaldo Sunkel (Santiago de Chile)

Publications Manager: Clemens Pfeffer

Cover: Clemens Pfeffer

Photo: Dampfschiffahrt, Meyers Konversations-Lexikon 1893-1897, 5.
Auflage, Band 21 (1901), Verlag des Bibliographischen Instituts Leipzig

Contents

- 4 JAN GRUMILLER, WERNER RAZA, BERNHARD TRÖSTER
The EU Trade Regime and the Global South
- 16 BERNHARD ZEILINGER
Post-Doha Reorganisation of Global Trade at the Expense of the Global South
- 47 CARLA WEINZIERL
Talking Development, ‘Locking In’ Neoliberalism, Hindering Food Sovereignty: A Food Regime Perspective on the EPAs
- 71 DANIEL SCHADE
Coercion through Graduation: Explaining the EU-Ecuador Free Trade Agreement
- 91 JULIA THERESA EDER
Trade and Productive Integration in ALBA-TCP – A Systematic Comparison with the Corresponding Agendas of COMECON and NAM
- 113 Book Reviews
- 120 Editors and Authors of the Special Issue
- 124 Publication Details

Carla Weinzierl

Talking Development, ‘Locking In’ Neoliberalism, Hindering Food Sovereignty: A Food Regime Perspective on the EPAs

ABSTRACT This paper places the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific Group of States) in the context of the international trade and food regime and the EU’s geopolitical strategies, exposing the neoliberal agenda behind these so-called Partnership Agreements. Following a brief illustration of the current state of the EPAs, the hypocrisy behind the development discourse surrounding them is exposed. After a necessarily limited introduction of a series of detrimental effects of the EPAs and the regimes in which they are embedded, the paper focuses on the negative effects of food import and agricultural export dependencies for the Global South. The paper concludes with some ideas on alternative ways to organise agricultural systems and the agricultural trade regime in order to ensure the human right to food and to allow policy space for food sovereignty.

KEYWORDS *Economic Partnership Agreement, food regime, food sovereignty, neoliberalism, trade regime*

I. Introduction

Free trade has recently become a hot topic within European civil society, especially with the success of the Stop-TTIP/TISA/CETA alliance and three Million Europeans signing the largest European Citizens Initiative so far. Meanwhile, the EPAs continue to be negotiated behind closed doors without the scrutiny and pressure of social movements and NGOs.

Since 2002, the EU has been negotiating the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). These are free trade and investment agree-

ments, with seven ACP regions, namely with African, Caribbean and Pacific states. Negotiations were originally planned to last only until 2007 when comprehensive regional agreements were supposed to be reached. However, due to the resistance of the alleged ‘partners’ in the Global South, negotiations are still on-going, although a large number of interim multi-lateral and bilateral agreements have been introduced. Furthermore, in the last few years, since the conclusion of the first comprehensive EPA with CARIFORUM, the pace of negotiations appears to be picking up. The Doha standstill allows the EU to pursue a WTO-Plus agenda (entailing the inclusion of the contested issues of services, investment, intellectual property rights and government procurement in the liberalisation agenda, all beyond WTO requirements)¹. This reflects both the material and idealistic interests of the EU: Brussels is trying to ‘lock in’ neoliberalism across the seven ACP regions, meaning regulatory regimes are created in order to consolidate neoliberal reforms which reduce the policy space for alternative development strategies (Hurt 2012). The EU has aligned its policies with the Post-Washington Consensus², claiming its main goal is poverty reduction by following the international consensus on the benefits of free trade for development, while pursuing ever more aggressive strategies to penetrate overseas markets. Based on this contextualisation, and keeping other core characteristics of the corporate food regime in mind, namely the continued inequality in government support for agricultural systems between the Global South and North, as well as the increased industrialisation pressures on the Global South, the paper briefly introduces detrimental effects of the EPAs on African societies and economies from a food regime perspective. It particularly looks at the connection between the simultaneous occurrence of agricultural export and food import dependencies and its connection to food crises. Concluding, the paper introduces food sovereignty as a feasible alternative development concept, and proposes a paradigm shift towards agroecological small-scale farming, in combination with a relaxation of liberalisation pressures on developing countries and in particular LDCs.

2. Contextualising the EPAs: ‘locking in’ neoliberalism

2.1 The international food regime

The current interplay of regulation and accumulation processes regarding the production, distribution and consumption of food on a world scale is called the third³, or corporate, food regime (Holt-Giménez/Shattuck 2011; McMichael 2013). Its characteristics are the consolidation of the neoliberal trade regime, persisting large inequalities in government support for agricultural systems between the Global North and the Global South, and the increasing industrialisation pressure on agricultural systems (Weinzierl 2015). In the context of neo-liberal capitalist expansion, this regime is characterised by a supranational and global regulation structure, starting with the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s. These “reflected the growing sway of market fundamentalism in the most powerful developed countries” (Havnevik et al. 2007: 16), as they “broke down tariffs, dismantled national marketing boards, eliminated price guarantees and destroyed national agricultural research and extension systems in the Global South.” (Holt-Giménez/Shattuck 2011: III). The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and the connected Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) “institutionalized the process of agricultural liberalization on a global scale by restricting the rights of sovereign states to regulate food and agriculture.” (Havnevik et al. 2007: 37ff.). Today these policies are further embedded in international treaties and bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements, such as the EPAs.

Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011: III) concisely sum up the most problematic aspects of this neoliberal corporate food regime: “unprecedented market power and profits of monopoly agrifood corporations, globalized animal protein chains, growing links between food and fuel economies, a ‘supermarket revolution’, liberalized global trade in food, increasingly concentrated land ownership, a shrinking natural resource base, and growing opposition from food movements worldwide”.

2.2 The international agricultural trade regime

Trade in foodstuffs, or more generally trade in agricultural products, is where the international food regime and the international trade regime overlap. Since its creation, the WTO has been an important institution as

regards the regulation structures of trade in agricultural products. The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was an agreement to reduce tariffs in many sectors, but not in agriculture: the GATT provisions regarding agricultural trade were a reaction to dropping prices, and the realisation that a multilateral effort needed to be made in order to protect the signatories' agricultural sectors. However, protectionist policies were tied to the condition that production levels and exports were controlled (Choplin et al. 2011: 35). Such production controls are the only guaranteed way of eliminating overproduction (Weinzierl 2015). This, however, all changed with the beginning of the Uruguay Round in 1986, when agriculture was put on the trade-liberalising agenda of GATT. It marked the discursive shift from food being perceived as a human necessity in need of protection, to a commodity like any other good.

With the creation of the WTO, the AoA came into effect. This played directly into the hands of the agricultural trade and processing industries, as the first version of the AoA was drafted by former executives of Cargill and ADM. This resulted in an agreement that reinforces the industrialisation of agricultural systems (Murphy 2010). The AoA forced signatories to reduce all tariffs, to reduce subsidised exports, and to allow a minimum of five per cent of a country's internal demand for any agricultural product to be met by imports at reduced tariffs (Bové/Dufour 2001: 216ff.). Through this minimum import rule, WTO members are effectively denied a strategy of food self-sufficiency in line with food sovereignty, i.e. the right to govern a food system (see section 5). Furthermore, a country can only restrict the import of a product if it can prove to WTO-picked experts that the product in question poses a threat to human or animal health (Bové/Dufour 2001: 214ff.).

According to mainstream discourse, the purpose of the AoA was to discontinue the dumping practices of the US and the EU, while improving developing countries' access to their markets via the reduction in tariffs. In reality, however, the EU (and other so-called industrialised countries) protected their own markets, while increasing possibilities to exploit those of countries with weaker negotiating powers, which were effectively forced to give up protectionist instruments (Murphy 2010: 112f.). While the AoA provisions led to the opening of markets in the so-called developing countries, the EU could legally continue to keep high tariffs, especially in those

products that were domestically produced, known as ‘sensitive products’. These sensitive products, however, largely affect the exports of ACP countries, so that today some of the ACP states face on average higher EU tariffs than the rest of the world (Fontagné et al. 2010: 185).

Due to these discrepancies between rhetoric and practice, combined with the resistance of countries in the Global South, the current round of WTO negotiations, called the Doha or also ‘development’ round, has been at a stalemate since 2006. The round began in 2001, when the so-called developing countries urged the Global North to a stronger commitment to the WTO principle of ‘special and differential treatment’ (SDT) and were met with resistance. The SDT provision was designed under GATT “to acknowledge a major shortcoming of universal trade rules: the fact that they treat unequals equally” (Morgan et al. 2006: 35). It was institutionalised in the 1979 Enabling Clause, which still shapes WTO negotiations today and generally serves as the basis of the developing countries’ demands (Dicaprio/Trommer 2010: 1615). Under this SDT umbrella, developing countries suggested the introduction of a fourth⁴ WTO box called the ‘Development Box’. Such a Development Box would place the developmental needs of developing countries’ societies, and especially those of poor farmers, at the centre of WTO agricultural trade negotiations. These demands were successfully resisted by the US and the EU: “A Development Box is clearly a challenge to the system of ‘agribusiness imperialism’, in which the US is seeking to become a ‘breadbasket of the world’ through the global reach of its agri-food multinationals” (*ibid*). Due to this resistance, developing countries have restricted their proposals to greater flexibility on the so-called ‘special products’ crucial to rural development and food security (the developing countries’ equivalent of the developed countries ‘sensitive products’). However, even these restricted demands so far continue to be denied by the more powerful countries, again indicating that the Doha Round’s developmental discourse is not reflected in actions and real commitments. Instead of taking the demands made by developing countries into account, the EU and USA effectively managed to turn the so-called development round into a marketisation round (Groth/Kneifel 2007: 15) – efforts that explain the strong resistance by the Global South and the current standstill of the Doha negotiations.

2.3 EU geopolitics

The structure of the EPAs is also shaped by the EU's geopolitics and growth strategies, notably Lisbon / Europe 2020 and Global Europe. The Lisbon Strategy was formulated in 2000 with the goal of turning the EU into the most competitive, dynamic and knowledge-based economic area by 2010 (Groth/Kneifel 2007: 38), reflecting the hegemonic growth and productivity paradigm. It was in its essence reformulated in the Europe 2020 strategy, which superseded the Lisbon Agenda in 2010, although with an additional focus on environmental sustainability, for instance promoting the concept of 'Green Growth'. The growth objectives postulated in the Lisbon Agenda / Europe 2020 Strategy are complemented by the EU's foreign trade strategy Global Europe, which was formulated in 2006 and aims at improving the EU's competitiveness on a global scale. This is to be achieved via the conclusion of a large number of bilateral FTAs (Free Trade Agreements), in particular to secure access to raw materials, a stronger presence of European corporations in emerging markets, the liberalisation of lucrative markets for public procurement, and the tearing down of non-tariff barriers such as environmental and labour law standards (Groth/Kneifel 2007: 39; Choplín et al. 2011: 58ff.). This shift to bilateralism is a clear result of the Doha standstill, which allows the EU to pursue a WTO-Plus agenda, since resistance by the Global South is fragmented when negotiations take place outside of the WTO framework. In this sense, stronger players follow a 'divide and conquer' strategy when pursuing bilateral or regional agreements like the EPAs, reflecting both the material and ideational interests of the EU (Hurt 2012): the EPAs in particular can be seen as a result of the EU's loss of market shares (Fritz 2011: 11, 51), while in developing areas neoliberalism is effectively 'locked in' (Hurt 2012). WTO-Plus refers to the so-called Singapore issues, whereby liberalisation in services and investment, as well as intellectual property rights, are promoted by the so-called developed countries. The fact that these provisions are an integral part not only of the EU's more commercial FTAs (for instance EU-Korea or EU-India) but also a key component of the EPAs is problematic and stands in contrast to the original Global Europe discourse, whereby the EPAs were formulated to meet development rather than trade objectives. Heron and Siles-Brügge identify a convergence of commercial and 'development' trade policy here, and contend that the

inclusion of the Singapore issues in the EPAs reflects “a fundamental shift in EU trade policy built on a more aggressive approach towards penetrating overseas markets” (Heron/Siles-Brügge 2012: 255).

This is furthered by the shift in EU-ACP relations marked by the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. It superseded the Lomé Convention, which granted preferential access to the EU market to ACP countries unilaterally. Lomé addressed the structural problems that arise from trade partnerships between unequal partners, but these preferences which ACP countries had enjoyed were abandoned with the Cotonou Agreement, a shift that was legitimised with the argument of lacking WTO compatibility under Lomé. One of Cotonou’s explicit main goals is the gradual transition of ACP states into the global economy in a WTO compatible way. This is to be achieved by tearing down preferences formerly granted and by the conclusion of WTO compatible – interpreted by the EU as reciprocal – FTAs between the EU and ACP regions. In this context the EPA negotiations were started in 2002 with the goal of concluding comprehensive EPAs with all ACP regions by 2007.

3. Current state of EPAs: A different ending to David vs. Goliath

3.1 Progress made in negotiations

For a long time the only comprehensive regional EPA that had been concluded, was the EPA with CARIFORUM (Caribbean states), but significant progress has been made over the past two to three years (see EC 2016 for a periodically updated overview of the state of negotiations in the seven ACP regions). Where no comprehensive regional agreements have been reached yet, interim agreements have been signed by a number of individual countries and also country groups within the regions to pave the way for the comprehensive regional agreements. The EPA with CARIFORUM was signed as early as 2008, while African states largely managed to hold out for a few more years. However, in the meantime, comprehensive EPAs were negotiated with the SADC (South African Development Community), the EAC (Eastern African Community) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). These texts are currently either undergoing legal scrubbing or signature proceedings, in preparation

for their subsequent ratification. Resistance is currently strongest in ESA (Eastern and Southern Africa), where no meetings on the comprehensive EPA have been held since 2011; however, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Madagascar signed an Interim EPA in 2009, which has been provisionally applied since 2012. Similarly, no comprehensive EPA has been reached with the Central African EPA region, but Cameroon signed an interim EPA in 2009, which has been ratified and applied since 2014. Interim and comprehensive agreements on the African continent largely remain goods-only agreements for now, but not for lack of effort by the EU. The CARI-FORUM EPA opens up trade both in goods and services and intends to spur investment in the Caribbean; that is, it includes the WTO-plus issues and is therefore a free trade agreement of the so-called second generation of agreements such as TTIP, TPP and CETA, agreements much contested in the Global North because of similar anti-development provisions as the ones the EU is trying to promote in the Global South.

The difference of the EPAs to previous arrangements under Lomé is threefold: firstly, the ACP no longer negotiates as the totality of the ACP bloc, but as individual countries or country groupings – this serves to disempower states in the Global South, as can be seen in the standstill of Doha while EPA negotiations are picking up pace. Secondly, as explained above, the content of the EPAs stands in stark contrast to previous agreements, as they are based on WTO-compatible, reciprocal trade liberalisation as opposed to unilateral preferences granted by the EU; additionally, the EU is pushing for the inclusion of the Singapore or WTO-plus issues, for instance trade-related aspects such as services and investment. Thirdly, the EPAs differ in their duration, as they are permanent FTAs, while previous unilateral concessions were time limited (FAO 2006: 10).

3.2. Power asymmetries:

The inequity of treating unequals equally

The limited success developing countries have had so far in promoting their developmental interests during the EPA negotiations is due to the vast power asymmetries between the EU and the ACP. The EU has, for instance, skillfully managed to include both LDCs and non-LDCs in all seven EPA regions, thereby eroding the LDC's previously enjoyed preferences under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative (Groth/Kneifel

2007: 26). A study of the EU's relations to the ACP countries, including various policy instruments such as the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs, found that the EU's governance is not 'good', as generally there are large contradictions between rhetoric and practice leading to negative actual and potential impacts upon development in ACP states (Slocum-Bradley/Bradley 2010).

Critical voices contend that it is "only the asymmetry in power and negotiating abilities that enabled interim EPA's to be agreed" (Hurt 2012: 504). This is exemplified by the fact that the burden of adjustment will fall most heavily on the ACP and especially the LDCs, as the EPAs will not increase their market access to the EU, given the EBA initiative, but rather forces them to liberalise their EU imports. These asymmetries are furthermore illustrated by the EU's ability to include the Singapore issues in spite of the strong opposition to them from the Global South during the WTO Doha Round (*ibid*). The negotiation process furthermore reveals democratic deficiencies of the EPAs, as negotiations take place behind closed doors and do not include consultation, let alone participation of civil society organisations, and are furthermore not embedded in national democratic processes. This lack of transparency is further exacerbated by the narrow timeframe envisioned by the EU (Küblböck/Forster 2008: 9).

Hurt (2012) additionally illustrates that the EPA negotiations reflect not only the material but also the ideational interests of the EU: Brussels is trying to 'lock in' neoliberalism across the seven ACP regions, meaning regulatory regimes are created in order to consolidate neoliberal reforms which reduce the policy space for alternative development strategies: "To understand the pushing for the inclusion relationship with ACP states we must acknowledge that it operates within a context where the ideas of neoliberalism have become hegemonic." (Hurt 2012: 499) The EU has aligned its policies with the Post-Washington Consensus, claiming its main goal is poverty reduction by following the "international consensus on the benefits of free trade for development" (*ibid*).

Dicaprio and Trommer find that the CARIFORUM EPA "broadly preserves the SDT provisions that apply to all developing countries. However [...], there is significant negative modification to those provisions that apply only to LDCs" (Dicaprio/Trommer 2010: 1614). The EPA, therefore, has a clearly detrimental effect on the LDCs, as all trading partners

are treated as equally strong in economic terms, effectively removing the idea of SDT according to level of economic development. The novelty of the EPAs compared to earlier FTAs therefore lies in the expansion of liberalisation requirements to LDCs (*ibid*: 1616–1624). As a result, the LDCs will carry the heaviest burden of the EPAs, because while they stand little to gain from them, they have to make the highest concessions relative to their economic strength.

Why then do ACP countries, and especially the LDCs among them, sign EPAs in the first place? Laroche Dupraz and Postolle (2013) argue that African governments show an ‘urban bias’, and promote the well-being of the urban population rather than dealing with the marginalisation of the rural poor. While producers are clearly threatened by dumping imports, urban consumers appear to benefit from cheaper prices (although the situation is more complex, as food is hardly as cheap as it appears, due to ignored social-ecological costs and various hidden tax-financed subsidies, for everything from research into agrochemistry and biotechnology to the military expenses of keeping fossil fuels flowing). Certainly, African states and their populations are not homogenous and there are of course power asymmetries within the countries in question. But political economists warn that positive short-term effects from increased market access are unlikely to outweigh the negative long-term effects on development, and that the reasons why developing countries sign FTAs such as the EPAs are not clear-cut; instead, they paint a complex picture of economic constraints and power asymmetries on an international level.

Heron (2011), for instance, analyses the motives of Caribbean states in signing the first comprehensive EPA, which even went beyond WTO-conformity in including the much contested WTO-plus rules on services, investment, intellectual property and government procurement (Dicaprio/Trommer 2010: 1618), when all the other ACP countries to that date had at most concluded goods-only interim agreements. One of the main reasons for the states in question to have signed the EPA is not, as one might think, better access to EU markets, but the defence of existing preferences, i.e. the “objective of binding the current level of EU preferences available through the Cotonou Agreement, and safeguarding these preferences from further WTO litigation” (Heron 2011: 344). Manger and Schadlen (2013) refer to this with the concept of ‘political trade dependence’: as unilateral pref-

erences are frequently taken away, developing countries are pressured to sign North-South FTAs to ensure their future preferential access. This is doubtful, however, as the preferences granted under the EPAs are likely to be eroded by the EU's future liberalisation commitments with other countries, which especially affect the CARIFORUMs' main export products. The main justification for signing more than a goods-only EPA is the intention of improving market access for non-traditional Caribbean exports as a motor for economic diversification, and reducing the dependence on agricultural commodities exports. Again, Heron doubts this aim was achieved, and instead finds that "the EPA is more likely to achieve the precise opposite [because the] agreement mainly consists of improving market access, even if only marginally, for traditional commodities like rum, beef, and dairy products, while exposing the region to a greater level of import competition for higher-value added industrial and other processed goods" (*ibid*: 345). Additionally, the EPA rids the region of the policy tools needed to implement a successful diversification strategy. The EPA is therefore actually more likely to reinforce the Caribbean's detrimental terms of trade than to increase Caribbean non-traditional exports to the EU. CARIFORUM might have signed in the belief that showing willingness to sign a comprehensive agreement and to be the first ACP group to do so would be key in ensuring important concessions from the EU regarding product exemptions, delayed implementation schedules and especially preferential access to development finance (*ibid*: 345-349). In sum, the CARIFORUM EPA constitutes a trade-off between immediate economic benefits that are small and short-term at best, and the long-term costs of losing the policy space necessary to employ the trade and industrial policies pursued by today's developed countries (*ibid*: 28). The EPA therefore "constituted a political bargain forged in a highly asymmetrical context, wherein the EU's market and financial power was amplified by the vulnerabilities, competitive dynamics and interregional rivalries inside the ACP" (Heron 2011: 350). Mahadevan and Asafu-Ajaye (2010) found similar results for the case of Fiji.

This pattern found in the Caribbean also appears to be the reason behind African states signing EPAs: prior to the new progress on the comprehensive ECOWAS EPA, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana first signed bilateral interim EPAs in order not to lose their preferential access to the EU

market. Nigeria, on the other hand, had not signed an EPA and therefore had to fall back on less preferential GSP terms (Generalized System of Preferences) with much higher tariffs, which soon negatively impacted Nigeria's cocoa exports (Küblböck/Forster 2008: 4). Mbatha and Charalambides's (2008) findings on the case of Botswana, which signed an interim EPA in 2009, support this analysis. While it is again argued that the EPA is likely to have far-reaching, long-term negative impacts on regional economic development and institutional integration within SADC and SACU (Southern African Customs Union), the authors find that since Botswana would have fallen back on the WTO MFN (Most Favoured Nation) tariffs, the country was sensible in signing the EPA. The case of Botswana is specifically interesting, since, had it not signed the EPA, it would not have fallen back on the Cotonou GSP scheme because – even though the country would be eligible as a middle income developing country – the GSP excludes beef and beef products, the second most important export commodity for Botswana (*ibid*: 421). The country would therefore have faced tariff increases from the preferential five per cent under Cotonou to MFN tariffs ranging from 70 to 140 per cent, under which conditions Botswana could not continue to export beef into the EU (*ibid*: 421f.). In conclusion, therefore, based on “the predictable immediate gains from the new EPA to Botswana exporters, it makes sense that Botswana signed the SADC EPA with EU to avoid facing the MFN [...] tariffs” (Mbatha/Charalambides 2008: 424); however, “it is most likely that a high level of adjustment costs will be incurred in the future” (*ibid*: 426).

Overall, there is sufficient evidence to say that the ACP sign EPAs in order not to lose the preferences they currently enjoy. While this results in some positive short-term economic effects, the EPAs are likely to incur high adjustment costs in the future and have negative impacts on the socio-economic and institutional development in the respective regions. ACP countries do not sign EPAs because of any beneficial development opportunities associated with them, rather because they constitute the ‘lesser evil’ in the short-term.

4. The hypocrisy of the development discourse: Promoting dependence, ensuring food crises

According to the EU trade strategy Global Europe, the EPAs are designed to foster development. Also the current WTO Doha Round is known as the development round. Yet, when the EPAs are seen in context of the complex linkages in the globalised food regime – based on 1) the consolidation of the neoliberal free trade paradigm, 2) persisting large inequalities in government support for domestic agricultural producers between so-called developed and developing countries, and 3) increasing industrialisation pressures on agricultural systems in developing countries – their consequences from a food sovereignty perspective are clearly opposed to development. In this setting, the agreements have a series of detrimental social, economic, political, cultural and ecological effects.

The current arrangement of agricultural subsidisation in the Global North, in the case of EPAs implemented via the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), leads to dumping, and thereby the displacement of smallholders in the so-called developing countries (Weinzierl 2015; Berthelot 2012). This displacement is facilitated by increased trade liberalisation, for example in the form of EPAs, and intensified by the power and wealth concentration processes inherent in industrialisation pressures on the Global South exerted by large alliances of rich states and the oligopolistic agribusiness (Weinzierl et al. 2016). These interconnections contribute to a series of development-endangering effects: 1) the displacement of smallholder farmers leads to increasing poverty, unemployment, urbanisation and food import dependency; 2) industrialised agriculture is associated with agro-biodiversity loss, environmental degradation and climate change, as well as detrimental effects on human and animal health; and 3) the integration of smallholders in global supply chains and various WTO rules and provisions of free trade agreements engender increased vulnerability to price volatility, a loss of self-determination and policy space, as well as the loss of land and seed rights of farmers (Weinzierl 2015). Overall, the orthodox paradigm, promoting agricultural industrialisation and trade liberalisation, leads to a loss of food sovereignty in the Global South. The rest of this section focuses on the agricultural export and food import

dependencies of the Global South that are created by these regimes, and their connection to food crises.

Developing countries have been pressured to export primary commodities since colonial times. Renewed pressure from the so-called developed countries on the Global South to rely on the export of primary commodities was applied under the SAPs, which were legitimised by the neoclassical doctrine of poverty eradication via export-led growth (Choplin et al. 2011: 88). Today, the advice international development institutions such as the World Bank still give developing countries is to continue to rely on agricultural exports, although with a new face of diversification and inclusion of smallholders in global supply chains (Hoering 2007). Nevertheless, the terms of trade of developing countries exporting agricultural commodities including foods and beverages, as well as low-tech manufactures, have deteriorated relatively steadily in the second half of the 20th century (Erten 2011: 178). Critics of (this form of) globalisation have increasingly warned that liberalisation has negative consequences for smallholders if prices drop, and for developing net food importers if prices rise (Watkins 1996: 53), a fear confirmed by the 2007/08 food crisis, when the number of starving people peaked at 1.2 billion. Primary commodity dependency and policies promoting the export of agricultural commodities led to losses of food security and sovereignty, as countries that were formerly self-sufficient became net food importers, while at the same time their dependency increased on one or two commodities for a large share of their export earnings. However, due to slow market growth, adverse price trends, low value-added products and high market competition, “dependence on primary commodities offers an almost automatic route to a diminishing share of world exports and world income” (Oxfam 2002: 73). This dependence is most acute in SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), and especially in the LDCs. Most African economies still rely on traditional, low value-added exports, notably coffee, cocoa, tea and palm oil (*ibid*: 74; 15off.).

A simultaneous challenge for food sovereignty in the Global South is increased import dependency for staple foods, which paradoxically often goes hand in hand with dependency on agricultural exports: according to the World Bank, almost three quarters of all low income countries are net food importers (42 out of 58 globally, 35 out of 47 in SSA). Out of these 47 SSA economies, 32 are net agricultural exporters, yet 35 SSA states rely

on food imports (Ng/Aksoy 2008: 6-13). Agricultural resources, particularly land and water, are clearly not primarily used for food production to feed the local population, but for export promotion. Grain imports, for instance, have risen dramatically in African countries – wheat imports have increased six-fold between 1970 and 2005 (Bryceson 2010: 78). The role of liberalisation must not be underestimated here. After the conclusion of the AoA, Senegal, for instance, faced its import bills raising by 30 per cent in the second half of the 1990s, compared to the years prior to the AoA; in India they even increased by 168 per cent (Hoering 2007: 132).

This shift from self-sufficiency to import dependency, accomplished by the colonisation of developing countries' national food systems and the destruction of peasant agriculture shows a major flaw in mainstream economic thinking: "50 years ago developing countries had yearly agricultural trade surpluses of \$1 billion. After decades of capitalist development and the global expansion of the industrial agrifood complex, the southern food deficit has ballooned to \$11 billion a year." (Holt-Giménez 2010: 210)

This reliance on food imports, in combination with increased price volatility since the changes of the WTO Uruguay Round (FAO 2003: 32f.), leads to hunger crises and its associated socio-economic and political turmoil. The neoliberal policies promoted by the World Bank and the IMF during structural adjustment also eroded the productive capacities of African agricultural systems (Bello/Baviera: 41f.; Watkins 1996: 39f.).

Since the EPAs promote the same development logic, they too will reduce policy space for food self-sufficiency in Africa. The example of the EPA with CARIFORUM gives severe cause for concern in this respect. Gruni (2013) shows that the provisions of this EPA regarding export restrictions are too narrow. In a neoliberal understanding of the instrument as a market distorter, the EPA prohibits the use of export restrictions, as they can lead to price increases, which in turn have a negative impact on developing net-food-importing countries (NFICs) (Mitra/Josling 2009: 12). This understanding, however, omits the fact that during a food crisis export restrictions can, on the other hand, safeguard domestic food security (*ibid*: 3). In the case of the CARIFORUM EPA, it is not justifiable to ban export restrictions entirely, as the Caribbean has a "negligible impact on the broader development of international trade law" (Gruni 2013: 876); thus, in effect, the Caribbean countries lose their

policy space, while other, more influential, exporters preserve theirs. This constitutes a clear attack on development, as the Caribbean states are so small that their production levels are irrelevant for global food prices, and therefore do not cause the negative price volatility associated with the food crises the EU supposedly tries to prevent by a ban on export restrictions imposed on the CARIFORUM (*ibid*). Gruni therefore finds that the CARIFORUM EPA “does not contribute to the solution of the problems that export restrictions created during the 2007-2008 global food crisis”, but instead contributes to new challenges for food security, especially by diminishing the Caribbean states’ capacities to react to food shortages via export restrictions. In general, he concludes that as WTO law does not ensure the special and differential treatment of developing countries in FTAs, exactly the opposite happens: “In fact, the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and ACP countries are more restrictive than the free trade agreements between the EU and Mexico, Chile and South Korea” (*ibid*: 882).

5. Food sovereignty: Contours of an alternative food and trade regime

The current food regime is centered around the notion of ‘food security’, a concept that was formulated by Western ‘experts’, and which is based on the principle of food self-reliance; this means that it is conducive to the free trade paradigm, whereby a country’s specialisation according to comparative advantage is supposed to be beneficial for everybody, as long as it can trade freely. The concept of ‘food sovereignty’ (Via Campesina 2007), on the other hand, was La Via Campesina’s answer to the creation of the WTO and the AoA in 1994. La Via Campesina is an international peasant and landless movement with over 200 million members in 70 countries. The concept of food sovereignty puts the human communities, instead of market forces and corporations, at the centre of agricultural policy. In 2002⁵, the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), the alliance that represents the interests of small-scale food producers, with members such as La Via Campesina and the World Forum of Fishers People, defined food sovereignty as:

“[...] the right of individuals, communities, peoples and countries to define their own agricultural, labor, fishing, food and land policies, which are ecologically, socially, economically and culturally appropriate to their unique circumstances. It includes the true right to food and to produce food, which means that all people have the right to safe, nutritious and cultural [sic!] appropriate food and to food-producing resources and the ability to sustain themselves and their societies.” (Windfuhr/Jonsén 2005: 12)

The differences between food sovereignty and food security stem from the two underlying concepts of food self-sufficiency and that of food self-reliance, the former meaning the meeting of domestic demand of food by domestic production where possible (i.e. minimising food imports), the latter implying a focus on generating enough income through the export of any possible commodity in order to be able to import enough food to satisfy domestic demand (a theory blind to the absurd and dangerous outcome of agricultural export dependencies and simultaneous food import dependencies as described above) (FAO 2003: 35).

This paper exposed the hypocrisy of the development discourse surrounding the EPAs and the international agricultural and trade regime they are embedded in. The fact that the free trade paradigm has spread to agricultural markets endangers development in the Global South and is an assault on the human right to food. In order to tackle the global issue of hunger as well as the myriad of negative consequences briefly mentioned in Section 4, hunger first needs to be understood as a problem of inequality, not one of underproduction, a notion advocates of the so-called Green Revolution promote. During the world food crisis in 2007/08, financial speculation on agricultural markets and misuse of agricultural resources (agrifuels and feed before food) led the number of people suffering from hunger to spike at an unprecedented level. The food and international agricultural trade regime needs to be oriented around the concept of food sovereignty, in connection with the promotion of agro-ecological small-scale farming, which inevitably entails a relaxation of liberalisation pressures on developing countries, and especially LDCs.

The transition towards food sovereignty and agroecological smallholder farming requires not only a strong “countermovement” (Polanyi 1944: 136ff.) based on an ethical paradigm shift and strategic alliances

between food movements, farmer organisations and agroecology (Holt-Giménez/Altieri 2013), but is crucially dependent upon supportive multi-level policies. An overarching framework conducive to establishing food sovereignty and implementing the human right to food would be based on the findings of the UN IAASTD report (2009), authored by over 400 scientists and development experts from more than 80 countries. The report insists that there is an “urgent need to increase and strengthen further research and adoption of locally appropriate and democratically controlled agroecological methods of production, relying on local expertise, local germ plasm, and farmer-managed local seed systems (Holt-Giménez 2010: 214).

In this context, La Via Campesina is promoting the international recognition of the rights of peasants, based on a declaration the movement drafted in 2009 (Via Campesina 2009). Additionally to the implementation of these positive rights, Schanbacher (2013) argues for the recognition of negative rights connected to the human right to food: “Rather than contextualizing access to food as a failure on the part of affluent countries to provide a framework for securing the right to food, affluent countries (and their citizens) should recognize how we are actively exacerbating global hunger and malnutrition [by] creating and perpetuating any institutional order that denies global farmers the freedom from poverty, hunger and malnutrition.” (Schanbacher 2013: 1) This understanding of a rights-based approach is in line with the call for increased self-sufficiency (as opposed to self-reliance) regarding food production. It is about “our negative duty to not impose upon global farmers institutions and social structures that deny them the freedom to chose how they wish to organize their own local communities’ efforts to achieve food self-sufficiency” (*ibid*).

Clearly then, alternatives to the EPAs as pursued by the EU must be found. At least basic foodstuffs have to be excluded from FTAs, as food is not a commodity like any other. International trade in foodstuffs should therefore only be complementary, but never substitutive for local, national, regional and where necessary continental food production; in other words, the principle of subsidiarity should be applied to food trade. Within the current framework, there are at least two WTO-compatible alternatives to the EPAs: extensions of the GSP or the EBA initiative.

(Groth/Kneifel 2007: 68). According to Perez (2006), the solution most beneficial to the ACP states in terms of national welfare as well as regional trade, would be the extension of a GSP-plus scheme to all ACPs instead of negotiating EPAs. Such a GSP-plus framework could extend the duty-free preferences available under GSP to the 250 tariff lines on the most sensitive ACP exports to the EU. A GSP-plus scheme would not automatically imply negative developmental effects, as the GSP is non-reciprocal.

Overall, trade agreements between unequal partners conducive to development are non-reciprocal, protect and promote national and regional markets and producers, provide the required policy space to allow a country to follow its own development trajectories, do not push for liberalisation in either goods or services, resist privatisation pressures in the context of intellectual property, and do not include the WTO-plus or Singapore issues (Groth/Kneifel 2007: 78ff.). The EPAs do not follow these principles; instead, they can be seen as EU instruments for the hegemonic implementation of neoliberal strategies, while the international trade regime and the WTO liberalisation logic serve the EU in order to legitimise these anti-development deals. A revision of the WTO AoA is therefore also required in order to establish policy space conducive to food sovereignty; an option would be to implement a ‘development box’, as has been fought for by a group of developing countries.

If the various emergencies created by the current food and trade regime are to be tackled, this kind of reformism urgently needs to happen. At the same time, reformist activism needs to be complemented by long-term transformative perspectives. The social-ecological transformation towards a good life for all (Novy 2013) will require an overall shift towards corporate de-globalisation and self-sufficient economies. Such a transformation has to be understood as a collective learning and searching movement, where multi-level actors experiment with new ways of organising the way we live, decide, produce, distribute, and consume together. Will lessons from such experiments, as promoted by local, national and continental branches of the Nyéléni food sovereignty movement, be learned?

¹ The process of removing non-tariff barriers to trade, i.e., the harmonization of national regulations regarding WTO-Plus issues such as public procurement or investment, is referred to as ‘deep integration’. See also Claar/Noelke (2012).

- 2 The Post-Washington Consensus responded to the rampant failures of the hard-line neoliberalism promoted by the Bretton Woods Institutions under the so-called Washington Consensus by developing more nuanced interpretations of the role of the state, of institutions and of democracy regarding their roles in the development process. For an analysis of why this is good, but far from good enough, see Öniş and Senses (2005).
- 3 Briefly, the first international food regime was characterised by imports of cheap food and agricultural (raw) commodities from southern colonies. The second food regime was based on subsidised exports of oversupply, “reversed the flow of food from South to North [and] was characterized by the global spread of industrial agriculture [...]” (Langthaler 2010). The third regime is characterised by a supranational and global regulation structure. Policies changed from protectionist via dirigiste to neoliberal, and the organisation of production changed from farmer-based in the former two to entrepreneurial in the latter (*ibid*).
- 4 There are currently three WTO ‘boxes’ of policy instruments: the amber box includes market distorting instruments that are no longer WTO-conforming, such as direct price support, as used in the EU CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) prior to 1992. The blue box is comprised of subsidising mechanisms that are not completely decoupled from production or prices, such as the CAP payments after 1992. Members have to discontinue using the distorting instruments of these two boxes and all subsidisation instruments used should be part of the third, green box: it includes those subsidies that are perceived to be non-distorting in WTO discourse, such as the decoupled EU direct payments since 2003.
- 5 The concept has been further developed, clarified and concretized ever since its elaboration in the 1990s by La Via Campesina. The Nyéléni Movement for Food Sovereignty, for instance, met for the time first on a global level in Mali in 2007, where a joint declaration was drafted. This has since been – and continues to be – concretized by continental, national and/or regional Nyéléni Fora.

References

- Bello, Walden/Baviera, Mara (2010): Food Wars. In: Magdoff, Fred/Tokar, Brian (ed.): Agriculture and Food in Crisis. Conflict, Resistance, and Renewal. New York: Monthly Review Press, 33-50.
- Berthelot, Jacques (2012): The WTO rules have increased the distortions in agricultural trade. https://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/article_e.htm?art=14, 12.10.2016.
- Bové, José/Dofour, François (2001): Die Welt Ist Keine Ware. Bauern Gegen Agromultis. (Interview: Luneau, Gilles). Zürich: Rotpunktverlag.
- Bryceson, Deborah Fahy (2010): Sub-Saharan Africa’s Vanishing Peasantries and the Specter of a Global Food Crisis. In: Magdoff, Fred/Tokar, Brian (ed.): Agriculture and Food in Crisis. Conflict, Resistance, and Renewal. New York: Monthly Review Press, 69-84.

- Choplin, Gérard/Strickner, Alexandra/Trouvé, Aurélie (2011): Ernährungssouveränität. Für eine andere Agrar- und Lebensmittelpolitik in Europa. Wien: Mandelbaum.
- Claar, Simone/Noelke, Andreas (Hg., 2012): Tiefe Integration in den Nord-Süd-Beziehungen. *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* 28(2).
- Dicaprio, Alisa/Trommer, Silke (2010): Bilateral Graduation: The Impact of EPAs on LDC Trade Space. In: *Journal of Development Studies* 46(9), 1607-1627.
- EC (2016): Overview of EPA Negotiations. Updated May 2016.
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf
- Erten, Bilge (2011): North-South Terms-of-Trade Trends from 1960 to 2006. In: *International Review of Applied Economics* 25(2), 174-184.
- FAO (2003): Trade Reforms and Food Security. Conceptualizing the Linkages. Rome: FAO.
- FAO (2006): The Agricultural Dimension of the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements. Rome: FAO.
- Fontagné, Lionel/Laborde, David/Mitaritonna, Cristina (2010): An Impact Study of the Economic Partnership Agreements in the Six ACP Regions. In: *Journal of African Economies* 20(2), 179-216.
- Fritz, Thomas (2011): Globalising Hunger. Food Security and the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Berlin: VDCL-Verlag.
- Groth, Annette/Kneifel, Theo (2007): Europa plündert Afrika: Der Freihandel und die EPAs. Hamburg: VSA-Verlag.
- Gruni, Giovanni (2013): Going from One Extreme to the Other: Food Security and Export Restrictions in the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement. In: *European Law Journal* 19(6), 864-883.
- Havnevik, Kjell/Bryceson, Deborah/Bir gegard, Lars-Erik/Matondi, Prosper/Beyene, Atakilte (ed., 2007): African Agriculture and the World Bank. Development or Impoverishment? Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.
- Heron, Tony (2011): Asymmetric Bargaining and Development Trade-Offs in the CARIFORUM-European Union Economic Partnership Agreement. In: *Review of International Political Economy* 18(3), 328-357.
- Heron, Tony/Siles-Brügge, Gabriel (2012): Competitive Liberalization and the 'Global Europe' Services and Investment Agenda: Locating the Commercial Drivers of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements. In: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50(2), 250-266.
- Hoering, Uwe (2007): Agrar-Kolonialismus in Afrika. Eine andere Landwirtschaft ist möglich. Hamburg: VSA-Verlag.
- Holt-Giménez, Eric (2010): From Food Crisis to Food Sovereignty: The Challenge of Social Movements. In: Magdoff, Fred/Tokar, Brian (ed.): *Agriculture and Food in Crisis. Conflict, Resistance, and Renewal*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 207-224.

- Holt-Giménez, Eric/Shattuck, Annie (2011): Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation? In: *Journal of Peasant Studies* 38(1), 109-144.
- Holt-Giménez, Eric/Altieri, Miguel (2013): Agroecology, Food Sovereignty and the New Green Revolution. In: *Journal of Sustainable Agriculture* 37(1), 90-102.
- Hurt, Stephen (2012): The EU–SADC Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations: ‘locking in’ the Neoliberal Development Model in Southern Africa? In: *Third World Quarterly* 33(3), 495-510.
- IAASTD (2009): Agriculture at a Crossroads. Global Report. Washington, D.C.: IAASTD / International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development.
- Küblböck, Karin/Forster, Franziskus (2008): Die Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) mit Westafrika. Eine Zwischenbilanz. ÖFSE – Briefing Paper 2/2008. Vienna: ÖFSE.
- Langthaler, Ernst (2010): Landwirtschaft vor und in der Globalisierung. In: Sieder, Reinhard/Langthaler, Ernst (eds.): *Globalgeschichte 1800-2010*. Vienna/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau, 135-169.
- Laroche Dupraz, Catherine/Postolle, Angelle (2013): Food Sovereignty and Agricultural Trade Policy Commitments: How much Leeway do West African Nations Have? In: *Food Policy* 38, 115-125.
- Mahadevan, Renuka/Asafu-Adjaye, John (2010): The Implications of European Union Sugar Price Cuts, Economic Partnership Agreement, and Development Aid for Fiji. In: *Contemporary Economic Policy* 28(1), 52-64.
- Manger, Mark/Schadlen, Kenneth (2013): Political Trade Dependence and North-South Trade Agreements. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1), 79-91.
- Mbatha, Nhlanhla/Charalambides, Nick (2008): What Is Really in the Economic Partnership Agreements for the Southern African Region? A Perspective from Botswana’s Beef Export Markets. In: *Agrekon* 47(4), 410-432.
- McMichael, Philip (2013): Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions. *Agrarian Change and Peasant Studies Series* 3.
- Mitra, Siddhartha/Josling, Tim (2009): Agricultural Export Restrictions: Welfare Implications and Trade Disciplines. IPC Position Paper. Washington, DC: International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council.
- Morgan, Kevin/Marsden, Terry/Murdoch, Jonathan (2006): *Worlds of Food. Place, Power, and Provenance in the Food Chain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Murphy, Sophia (2010): Free Trade in Agriculture: A Bad Idea Whose Times is Done. In: Magdoff, Fred/Tokar, Brian (ed.): *Agriculture and Food in Crisis. Conflict, Resistance, and Renewal*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 103-120.
- Ng, Francis/Aksoy, Ataman (2008): Who Are the Net Food Importing Countries? *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 4457. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

- Novy, Andreas (Hg., 2013): Gutes Leben für alle: Ein europäisches Entwicklungsmodell. *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* 29(3).
- Oxfam (2002): Rigged Rules and Double Standards. Trade, Globalisation, and the Fight Against Poverty. Oxford: Oxfam.
- Öniş, Ziya/Şenses, Fikret (2005): Rethinking the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus. *Development and Change* 36, 263-290.
- Perez, Romain (2006): Are the Economic Partnership Agreements a First-best Optimum for the African Caribbean Pacific Countries? *Journal of World Trade* 40(6), 999-1019.
- Polanyi, Karl (1944): *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon.
- Slocum-Bradley, Nikki/Bradley, Andrew (2010): Is the EU's Governance 'Good'? An Assessment of EU Governance in Its Partnership with ACP States. In: *Third World Quarterly* 31(1), 31-49.
- Via Campesina (2007): Declaration of Nyéléni. <http://www.nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf>
- Via Campesina (2009): Declaration of Rights of Peasants – Women and Men. <http://viacampesina.net/downloads/PDF/EN-3.pdf>
- Watkins, Kevin (1996): Agricultural Trade and Food Security. Oxford: Oxfam.
- Weinzierl, Carla (2015): Undermining Food Sovereignty: Free Trade and the Green Revolution. Implications of the Global Food and Trade Regime for Europe and Africa. Saarbrücken: Akademikerverlag.
- Weinzierl, Carla/Forster, Franziskus/Fehlinger, Julianna (2016): Hunger nach Profiten? Konzernmacht im Agrar- und Ernährungsregime. In: Attac (Hg.): Konzernmacht Brechen! Von der Herrschaft des Kapitals zum Guten Leben für Alle. Wien: Mandelbaum.
- Windfuhr, Michael/Jonsén, Jennie (2005): Food Sovereignty. Towards democracy in localized food systems. Bourton-on-Dunsmore: ITDG Publishing.

ABSTRACT In diesem Beitrag werden die Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten (Afrika, Karibik, Pazifik) in den Kontext des internationalen Handels- und Ernährungsregimes sowie der EU-Geopolitik gestellt und die neoliberalen Agenda hinter den sogenannten Partnerschaftsabkommen enthüllt. Die Hypokrisie des Entwicklungsdiskurses, der die EPAs begleitet, wird anhand einer kurzen Einführung in verschiedenste negative Effekte der EPAs im Globalen Süden aufgezeigt, wobei auf die Ergebnisse von gleichzeitig bestehender Nahrungsmittelimport- und Agrarexportabhängigkeit fokussiert wird. Abschließend werden aus sozialen Bewegungen stammende alternative Wege vorgestellt, Agrarsysteme und das Agrarhandelsregime zu gestalten, die darauf abzielen, das Menschenrecht auf Nahrung zu sichern und Politikspielraum zur Etablierung von Ernährungs-souveränität zu gewährleisten.

Carla Weinzierl

Institute for Multi-Level Governance and Development,

Vienna University of Economics and Business

carla.weinzierl@wu.ac.at