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Alternative Development: A Response to Neo-Liberal De-Development from a Gender Perspective

ABSTRACT This article is a critical reflection on, and contextualisation of, the Palestinian ‘de-development’ process over the last 50 years of Israeli settler-colonial occupation. It also highlights the Palestinian Authority’s neo-liberal economic practice of structural adjustment post Oslo, that resulted in weakening the resistance economy and community development initiatives, while blocking any opportunity for steadfastness and self-reliance. It presents local community responses in a historical and gender perspective. Kuttab re-examines and re-visits ‘alternative development’ as a concept and paradigm through a case study of the women’s cooperative ‘Our Production is Our Pride’, which endorsed principles of resistance, steadfastness, independence and liberation.

KEYWORDS settler colonialism, resistance economy, empowerment, alternative development, cooperatives, self-reliance

1. Palestine within colonial setting and global economy

The Palestinian economy has been structurally distorted during the fifty years of Israeli occupation to such an extent that real opportunities for macro-economic growth and development at the national level have been limited, and to a larger extent blocked (Abed 1988; Roy 1995). Israel’s systematic objective to control the social-economic structure of the occupied area has continuously focused on ensuring that changes meet its political and economic goals of ‘de-development’ and continue to have drastic and destabilising effects on the indigenous Palestinian society and economy. Furthermore, the practice of expropriating land
to establish settlements and safeguard Israel’s security, combined with the building of the Apartheid Wall that separated the West Bank and Israel proper, have prevented the population from realising food sovereignty, economic independence, and a better livelihood. Destruction of the peasant economy and hindrance of chances to create an alternative resistance economy have become a consistent Israeli practice.

Furthermore, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993, after the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement, tied to other agreements, such as the 1994 Paris Protocol on economic relations, have deepened the control of Israel over Palestinian economy, limiting Palestinian sovereignty and control over its land, borders, human and material resources, elements that are required for free development (Sen 1999). Additionally, the imposition of the World Bank on the PA to adopt the neoliberal approach to promote its national development, dictated by the “Emergency Assistance” programme framework of 1993, has further restricted the parameters of the Palestinian economy (World Bank 1993). Ensuring the adoption of neoliberal principles by embracing the “market economy model”, and focusing on the private sector as the dynamo for economic growth, had a drastic impact on the overall population in terms of productivity and services. An intentional exclusion and marginalisation of the productive sectors, especially the agricultural sector, due to the political value of the land to Israel, resulted in the weakening and uprooting of the Palestinian household on the one hand and women’s role in agriculture on the other. Adopting a neo-liberal paradigm within a settler colonial context has been outstandingly problematic; as such, it represented an ongoing structure rather than a past historical event, or a temporary one (Wolfe 1999). As Palestine does not represent a conflict or post-conflict situation, settlers seek to control space, resources, and people, not only by occupying land but also by establishing an exclusionary regime where a political economy shapes all dimensions of life, including the gender formations (Wolfe 1999). This fact, combined with the set parameters of the World Bank, have limited the opportunity for establishing an economy with a human face. Reform and structural adjustment policies that have been introduced and endorsed by the different national development plans have severely destroyed the spaces for real development (Hanieh 2008).
These principles have become the basis for all Palestinian national development plans to follow (see Hanieh 2008; Riyahi 2010). At the same time, this new trend has created structural unemployment and poverty, as peasant families migrated to urban areas as unskilled cheap labour, leaving rural areas vulnerable and exposed (Kuttab 1995). A vision that disregarded the value of agricultural economy as an important component of resistance economy, and further marginalisation and weakening of women’s multiple roles, revealed stereotyped notion of women and their potential, which has become a major obstacle to sustainable development (Taraki 1997; Kuttab 2006).

However, the absence of sustainable development has not stopped or decreased the financial assistance or support of the international community; rather, more assistance continued to pour in unproductive sectors reaching around twenty four billion dollars since 1993, based on data from the OECD (2014) which represents around 24 – 42 per cent of the national budget disseminated in different historical stages. Whereas individual income did not exceed $500, which has put Palestine as one of the first on the world list to receive assistance. Yet, with all this support, poverty and unemployment are on the rise, as economic growth in the productive sectors is limited or even absent. More severe class polarisation within the society changes social and class structure, exposes the middle class, which is slipping, and threatens the livelihood of the working class, which either works seasonally or is unemployed. A consequence of the capitalist class which continues to invest in unproductive sectors, mainly in the service sector or in the financial and construction sectors, keeping the majority of the society unproductive, poor, unskilled and unemployed (Riyahi et al. 2010).

Adopting a neo-liberal paradigm within a settler colonial context is problematic, as such a context represents an ongoing structure rather than a past historical event, or a temporary one. As it is not a conflict or post-conflict situation, settlers seek to control space, resources, and people, not only by occupying land, but also by establishing an exclusionary regime where a political economy shapes all dimensions of life, including the gender formations. This fact, combined with the set parameters of the World Bank, have limited the opportunity for establishing an economy with a human face. Reform and structural adjustment poli-
cies that have been promoted through the different national development plans have severely destroyed the spaces for real development (Hanieh 2008). Although national plans have expressed clearly that the government should provide, ‘as best it can’, a social safety net for the poor and the disadvantaged, build a useful infrastructure, and invest in education for the future, this rhetoric has not been reflected structurally or financially in the national budgets or action plans (Kuttab 1993). One evidence is the recent social security law that was passed by the President in 2015 and then revoked later, due to the pressures of the national campaign that has succeeded in mobilising different social groups around its gender blind nature and its insensitivity to the demands of the disadvantaged and underprivileged groups. One indicator that defines the kind of society and economy promoted (Al-Marsad 2016).

Although the conditions of structurally adjusting the economy are relatively similar to other developing countries, the fact that the Palestinian economy is under siege due to the impact of the Israeli settler-colonial occupation created additional challenges on the Palestinian economy. On one level, the Palestinian leadership during the last decade has been asked by the World Bank to perform more reforms to enhance efficiency, and stabilize the economy to conform within the parameters of the global economy. After meeting the lending conditions, the PA had to decrease dependency on donor money and increase taxes to become one of the basic revenues for the PA. Analysis of the tax pyramid by the Social and Economic Policies Monitor in Ramallah indicated that the middle class employees and workers in the private and public sector were most affected negatively by the new tax reform and increase (Al-Marsad 2016).

Additionally, the PA had to cater for the Israeli security conditions related to the New Political Order, which varies from other developing countries and hence added further pressures and limitations on the Palestinians’ free choice of economic options. (Riyahi 2010)
2. Local democratic responses within structural constraints: Pre-Oslo period

There were different points of view on the possibility of developing the Occupied Territories. A minority holds a pessimistic view, believing that there is no development under colonial occupation, and such a view remains ineffective and marginal in respect to development practice and discourse. A more realistic, challenging and widespread view is the recognition of the limitations and constraints of the occupation, yet accepting the need to challenge colonial policies through different activities endorsing a slogan of ‘development for steadfastness and resistance’, or ‘development towards liberation’.

Although this exemplifies a realistic and positive approach to development in a colonial context, it should be viewed cautiously regarding its feasibility, due to the structural and political obstacles. However, a third view, which is pragmatic, supports the idea of complete integration into the Israeli economy. Here, the municipalities, village councils and Mukhtars (village representatives) who were empowered in the sixties and seventies, and who called for full integration of the national economy to the Israeli economy, can prohibit the development of a progressive approach or model as an alternative option. This trend was mainly promoted by the support of the American government (USAID) and the Palestinian Jordanian Joint Committee (Dakkak 1988).

In order to analyse the local development responses to the occupation policies, I have chosen to link these responses to different political stages beginning in 1967, until the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993, focusing mainly on the women’s responses as one of the national expressions. Such an analysis can help us to explore the challenges faced by these initiatives from Israeli policies, yet at the same time can enrich the development literature documenting the continuous struggle of the people in resisting and protecting their development heritage, and improving their economic and social well-being. The major players in this context were civil society organisations, mainly women’s grassroots, acting as an alternative popular national authority that attended to the needs of the people, providing support and promoting opportunities for the disadvantaged.
3. The destruction and integration period (1967-1976)

This period is characterised by an offensive policy on the part of the occupying Israeli forces, which immediately began with the destruction of the Palestinian economy and political infrastructure through different aggressive policies: land confiscation, home demolitions, imprisonment and integration. In this period, Israel was the main actor, focusing on achieving its political and economic goals while undermining any opportunity for creating an independent national economy. On the other hand, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) took a more defensive position; overwhelmed by the defeat of the 1967 War limited its role to a political one, undervaluing the economic and social dimensions that could have helped in facing working through the defeat (Dakkak 1988).

The PLO emphasised ‘sumud’ or steadfastness as a survival strategy, without entailing any strategy or programme that reflected a developmental trend, or any call for an active involvement of the people in challenging or defending their existence and survival. This defensive strategy had negative implications on the quality and standard of living of the Palestinian people in general, and the productive forces in particular. Funds to support steadfastness came from various Arab governments and rich Palestinians in the Diaspora through the Joint Committee, in addition to USAID. Objectives of the donor organisations were seen by many as short-term and transitional, and hence did not act as a catalyst for any fundamental economic and social development that had long-term and sustainable impact (Dakkak 1988). This meant that marginalised groups, including women, were not taken into account in the different development programmes and projects.

Donors launched programs encouraging ‘total economic integration’ within the Israeli economy, empowering the traditional social and political structures to implement the policy of integration. The Mukhtar (political representative of the village), the extended family, or ‘hamula’, as a social and political unit, and the municipalities were strengthened to play a role at this stage. A role that undermined the PLO as a political representative organisation, and blocked the development of any national and progressive leadership that could enhance and mobilise the different social groups in an alternative development strategy.
This has also affected the power relations and gender dynamics within the Palestinian society, as women and workers have been undermined. On the other hand, peasants who were neglected by the national movement became a prey to external donors, mainly USAID. Different Palestinian Voluntary Organizations (PVO’s) became active in the rural areas to improve the ‘quality of life’. For instance, the Jordanian- Palestinian joint committee created the infrastructure for the Cooperative Movement, which has expanded in the rural areas, establishing its authority and power through the traditional structures further empowering the patriarchal social and political infrastructure and marginalising progressive structures, women and producers.

During the same period, different charitable societies appeared to work under the Jordanian law from urban areas; they received fewer funds and confined their activities to social work and charity, exercising a policy of pacification through welfare (Dakkak 1988). Policies of these societies have mainly favoured the town over rural areas, as they were led mainly by the urban-middle and higher middle class women. No grass-root or outreach policies were enhanced, hence the majority of people were not served; on the contrary, they were neglected and development practice remained within the welfare approach (Ina’sh Al Usra 1976).

To conclude, all the development programs during this period ended in creating and empowering the patriarchal traditional structures of the villages and towns, which were during the sixties subordinating political tools which blocked the aspirations of marginalised groups, especially women, towards advancement and better livelihoods. At the same time, policies within this period focused on undermining the value of production, enhancing consumption through the agricultural service sector as an alternative model, instead of agricultural production that could replace Israeli agricultural goods. Hence, concepts like self-reliance and independence from the Israeli economy were not part of the development discourse at this stage.
4. Development for steadfastness and resistance

Within this phase in the late seventies, a new development practice, adopting a more grass-rooted and popular approach, focused on income-generating productive projects as a new form of economic activity. This was a phenomenon that developed mainly during the second phase of the Palestinian ‘development process’. A time when resistance as a strategy was adopted by the PLO to enhance steadfastness.

At this stage, economic deterioration and political instability facing the Palestinian population in general became threatening to their basic survival. Unemployment rates were growing due to the closure of the Israeli labour market, and the Palestinian households started searching for alternative options to manage the welfare of the family. Small income generating projects were initiated within the context of these limitations by the civil society organisations, particularly mass-based organisations which responded creatively to cope with these difficulties. This also matched the interest of some international organisations such as the European Union, which was keen in supporting the mass-based organisations in enhancing productive programmes in marginalised areas to integrate unprivileged sectors, including women, in development (Kuttab 1989).

These economic projects at the beginning derived their impetus from economic factors created by the political situation rather than the social or gender concerns. Even for the most progressive mass-based committees the national and economic factors were the main factors in promoting these ideas to face the occupation policies and enhance steadfastness. As an economic tool, the income-generating projects were first implemented by ‘traditional’ institutions such as the Union of Charitable Societies, in particular the Women’s Charitable Organizations, and members of the General Union of Palestinian Women. Their main objective was to support the needy and poor families devastated by the 1967 Arab Israeli War, either due to the killing or arrest of their main-breadwinners, or the loss of their means of production due to confiscation or destruction of their properties by the Israeli occupation (Jad 2000). The projects initiated by these organisations responded directly to the deteriorating economic situation, and thus followed a welfare approach.
On the other hand, some international organisations, such as the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA), Cooperation for Development (CD), a British non-governmental organisation, and Save the Children, an American NGO, started different credit programmes to promote entrepreneurship and self-reliance. This model on one hand responded to the economic conditions resulting from further destruction of the economic infrastructure. At the same time created a situation of female informal, unskilled labour that although helping in generating small additional income to the household and alleviating poverty, added new burdens on women’s reproductive roles, and failing to change gender roles and dynamics within the household (Dakkak 1988; Hilal/Kafri/Kuttab 2008).

4.1 Home based income-generating projects: Linking home and market

Income generating projects included individual as well as collective projects. Some projects were initiated by international organisations, as mentioned earlier, including UNRWA, Save the Children, EU and CD. Others were promoted by national organisations such as the Women’s Charitable Societies and Women’s Committees, and other specialised mass-based committees such as the Agricultural Relief Committee and Agricultural work committees (AWC 1993; 1994).

Within the international organisations, UNRWA, in its Special Hardship Assistance Program, promoted home based projects to assist needy women and men refugees to become partially self-supporting. Beneficiaries were given material and cash grants to establish their small business enterprises, which were mainly based on the woman’s traditional skills and experience, as no technical assistance was offered. In the mid-eighties, UNRWA reoriented its approach from welfare to entrepreneurship and, with the cooperation of CD, started a small scale credit programme. The aim was to provide low-cost capital as a start-up fund to enhance the expansion of small business enterprises. Women were not targeted specifically within the refugee community and when they benefited they were encouraged to maintain their conventional roles. Building on this, at the end of 1989 / early 1990 another credit programme was initiated, starting in the Gaza Strip. Women were specifically targeted and encouraged to
benefit from small grants to start a project. The initiative responded to the increasing economic needs as a result of the closure of Israeli borders, which led to a growing percentage of unemployed workers. These projects aimed at poverty alleviation rather than the empowerment of women in the development process (Kefaya 1990; PA 1999; IWS 2008).

Therefore, these projects and programmes dealt with just “the symptoms rather than the causes” (Kefaya 1990). Analysis of these initiatives stated that UNRWA’s strategy was set up to help refugee women to support the family and decrease their dependency on welfare assistance, to cope and coordinate their productive and reproductive roles, and cope with the different family problems that might arise. This strategy continued to be administered within the gender planning tradition, adopting the triple objective of maintaining the balance and coordinating the roles as an important principle of gender planning (Taraki 1997; Kandiyoti 1996).

These projects also failed to achieve self-reliance, as UNRWA maintained its welfare ideology; poverty alleviation was the main objective, and technical and managerial assistance or training was absent, as the welfare policy did not encompass the economic success or efficiency paradigm as a priority. No intervention policies reflecting gender concerns were promoted, and beneficiaries were not willing to change their status as Special Hardship cases thus risk the loss of related benefits (Kefaya 1990).

4.2 Rebirth of development consciousness: From welfare to efficiency towards empowerment

The traditional institutions and structures that were created in the sixties and seventies were unable to meet the basic requirements of survival or to improve the living conditions of the people. The Palestinian national leadership realised the deteriorating living conditions of the Palestinian people, and this realisation brought about a new stage in the development discourse and practice in Palestine.

Towards the end of the seventies, a process of ‘democratisation’ of the national movement and struggle led by the petit-bourgeois secular leadership, and supported by more secular and democratic parties of the PLO, created new tools for organisation and mobilisation (Taraki 1991; Kuttab 1993, 2006, 2008; Jad 2000). Different Palestinian grass-root and mass-based organisations took over the development process. Their main objec-
tive was to meet the vital needs of resistance more creatively and dynamically and transform it as a force for the empowerment of marginalised groups. They promoted policies to address basic needs in health, agriculture and land reclamation, and became more responsive to the needs of youth and women. They dealt with a broad spectrum of social groups in towns, rural areas and refugee camps, and their de-centralised approach reaching different sectors of society made them more sensitive to priorities of the masses. They were committed to introducing a change in the economic and social conditions of people’s lives by putting more value on their productive activities in order to address dynamically the policies and practices of the occupying forces and respond to the political agenda of the national movement. These organisations have played a significant role in transforming the existing policies of ‘steadfastness’ and ‘survival’ into a more dynamic strategy of ‘resistance and empowerment’, making the approach more offensive than defensive.

At this stage, ‘development’ took a more comprehensive meaning, accommodating economic, social, and cultural factors in addition to the political. Gender and class dimensions became more politicised and strategic, as they were linked to the future vision of the Palestinian state, opening opportunities for the productive forces, such as the working class and peasants, to regain their role and to emphasise their productive heritage (Kuttab 1993).

Although these grass-roots organisations were political expressions of the national movement, they were also developmental tools gaining their popular authority from people’s accountability and legitimacy through the services they promoted and provided. At the same time, at every level of their specialised work, they were committed to social liberation (at least rhetorically) as an integral part of national liberation. Their strategy of resistance was based on different objectives, mainly the need to establish efficient productive institutions that would enhance the Palestinian economy and decrease the degree of dependency on the Israeli market. The ultimate goal was to transform the Palestinian society from a consumer and passive recipient of foreign aid to a productive, active and dynamic economy that could respond to community needs and priorities towards self-reliance. On the other hand, they provided an accepted level of services and support for the people as a condition for steadfastness. This period
represented an enriching experience to all marginalised groups, especially women, as development became more gender sensitive and directed by a more democratic vision for a future society (Kuttab 1993, 2006; Taraki 1997).

Concepts such as liberation, equality, social justice, women’s liberation, respect for manual labour, alternative development, appropriate technology, and voluntary work were new concepts introduced to the national agenda and discourse, and different programmes and projects were designed to communicate these principles and concerns through practice, especially those issues promoted by the national movement which expressed interest in social transformation combined with national liberation. It is worth mentioning in this context that the Voluntary Work Committees which were established in late seventies were among this new formation (Taraki 1991), making voluntary work an important political and developmental concept, and a basis for the development work, especially that professionalisation of mass-based organisations that happened post Oslo, which was not an existing phenomenon.

With the outbreak of the first ‘Intifada’ (uprising) in 1987, the Palestinian popular leadership realized that the struggle for national liberation could not bear just a political agenda, but should also integrate economic independence as an integral component of the national liberation, which thereby affected the nature and scope of development programmes. New agendas during the uprising were promoted to become more compatible and relevant to the political agenda, with the realisation that the resistant economy would not be the economic basis for the future Palestinian economic infrastructure, in spite of its goal of creating a new value system that represented a prerequisite for promoting independent and sustainable development. Hence, mass-based organisations introduced projects that could not only on the one hand, enhance economic efficiency, and offer services, but, on the other integrate a social dimension that envisioned social justice and democracy as necessary principles in participatory development. This strategy came to be known as ‘development for liberation’, and was adopted by some grass-roots organisations. Some organisations chose to define it as ‘popular economy’, to give it a sense of people’s participation. It presented an alternative vision to the existing economic models, mainly the traditional market economy. Economic independence had become an
integral component of the struggle, and a basic one for mobilising the people. Although the past two periods based their economic strategies on the concept of ‘income-generating projects’ as a primary tool for promoting welfare and development, each period manifested the model differently.

The more democratic, mass-based organisations which adopted this new form of ‘development for liberation’ paradigm were inclined to express the priorities of the masses, and were more developmental in nature, stressing the collective nature of production rather than the individual or the entrepreneurial. Although they adopted the same form of income-generating projects as the earlier model, the strategy of resistance and self-reliance was integrated into ‘liberation’ as a new dimension. Their objectives were two-fold: to integrate marginalised productive forces in general and women in particular in the development process, and to activate their role in the national economy. The second objective was to create a new kind of social organisation, more productive and efficient in nature, while being responsive to people’s needs, and would serve as a tool for social and political mobilisation. This goal responded to the new political agenda of ‘democratisation’, that aimed at expanding the base of political parties and institutions by reaching the villages and refugee camps. At this time, the national movement, in a parallel approach, emphasised economic independence as a necessary dimension of the political and national struggle, encouraging the mushrooming of these projects, especially during the Intifada, when slogans stressing enhancing self-reliance and the boycott of Israeli goods became national goals.

4.3 Empowerment as resistance towards liberation

New models of economic production were introduced in 1985, before the eruption of the first Intifada in 1987. Secular democratic women’s committees representing a mass-based organisation model, created decentralised structures based on an outreach policy called the ‘new cooperative model’ expressing a unit for economic and social organisation, where economic political, and cultural dimensions were integrated endorsing a comprehensive framework of development processes, including resistance, in the struggle. ‘New’ is used here to differentiate this model from older models promoted by the Jordanian Palestinian Joint Committee. These projects, like past experiences, were governed by partisan politics and used
the ‘cooperative’ as a political tool to empower women at the political and national level, and expand the base of political parties (Kuttab 1989; 2010). This model seemed to be more gender and class sensitive, due to the managed relation between the productive and reproductive roles of women partially following the Gender and Development (GAD) paradigm, and focusing on agricultural production to maintain the value of land as a material resource for development, and to enhance the steadfastness of the Palestinian household (Kuttab 1997).

The women’s cooperative, as a social and economic organisation, represented the cumulative experience of years of learning on how to organise production collectively based on principles of traditional peasant economy called al’o’neh (cooperation), still practised in the olive harvest. It has created an institutional context that presupposes the participation of under-privileged men and women in the exercise of choice. It contributed to women’s empowerment by perceiving development as self-governance and by catalysing a process that promotes a social change where the gender power relation between men and women can transform positively.

These examples of development models promoted through local initiatives were very important in promoting wide participation in the development practice, at the same time reflecting the importance of economic independence as an organic element of political independence, which the new Palestinian Authority still fails to recognise. Women in these models were empowered, and “empowerment as resistance” (Kuttab, 2010) became the leading paradigm for liberation, which reflected the value of everyday survival strategies as acts of resistance towards liberation (Kuttab 2008).

5. Current trends in Palestinian development:
Absence of political will

Within the last decades, the PA has continued to redefine and reprioritise national priorities in partnership with the international actors, shifting and re-arranging these priorities according to global conditions and donor agendas. Reviewing some socio-economic data produced within that period of time can aid in assessing the impact of the different plans. It is acknowledged that the number of unemployed people has increased;
agricultural land has been destroyed and confiscated, either as a result of building new settlements, expanding existing ones, building the Separation Wall, or establishing the Industrial Zones which represents a regional model that has been replicated in Palestine (Hanieh 2013; Riyahi/Jaber/Kuttab 2010). On a social level, poverty levels increased, reaching almost half of the population, and unemployment was on the increase, due to the limited local market capacity in expanding labour opportunities, since Israeli labour markets were closed to Palestinians (PCBS 1999). Poor households were further exposed because of food insecurity, absence of personal security and political expression, in addition to lack of a social safety net.

Currently, with the political stalemate in the peace talks in regard to a political settlement between the Palestinians and the occupation authorities, economic arrangements ‘for the post-occupation’ stage (economic peace) will not produce a better situation for the Palestinian economy or the people than the period of direct military occupation. In this context, establishing industrial zones in the heart of the West Bank as joint projects between the Israelis and Palestinians, for example Jalama town in Jenin, in Tarqumiya in the province of Hebron, or in Jericho in order to provide employment for about 50,000 Palestinians in the early stages, continues to be doubtful as a strategy (Hamdan/Hilal 2014; Hanieh 2013).

However, the subjective conditions for promoting an alternative development that is comprehensive and participatory and that can revive the traditional heritage of development practice has failed to solve structural problems of de-development. Additionally, responsive and participatory development that is sensitive to local community requires a leadership that has the political will to delink from the Israeli economy and have trust in the capacity of local actors to promote the necessary development potential that can improve the lives of the majority and expand the space and opportunities of the community (IWS 2008).

In the early nineties of the last century, the development paradigms in the post-Oslo phase focused on post-conflict issues, as if the conflict has been resolved, thereby de-politicising development practice, and alienating original agendas in such a way that it becomes donor driven rather than community responsive. Consequently, this period witnessed structural de-linking from grassroots participation and involvement, transforming development practice into an elite and bureaucratic practice, while weak-
ening the input of local community organisations in planning, monitoring and building appropriate models. Accordingly, community priority needs have been marginalised, due to the imposition of the donor agendas which systematically and structurally needed to adjust the economy in such a way that would maintain its negative impact on developing genuine development models or truly democratic, participatory, and effective models, as the development slogans claimed.

The recent changes at the political and economic level, namely the continuous Israeli incursions and siege and closure policy, in addition to the impact of the Apartheid Wall and last but not least the wars and aggressions against Gaza, have impoverished different communities, especially in Gaza and rural areas of the West Bank. The high rates of unemployment and poverty still represent a setback for development practice and require a new look that enforces a change of strategies and programmes of civil society organisations (World Bank 2010).

6. Scenarios for alternative development

Based on the previous analysis, and taking into consideration the failure of the PA to develop the territories and promote policies with a human face, the previous modest experiences can contain elements of success if packaged in the right way to address unemployment and poverty and satisfy community needs and priorities.

At a micro level, one scenario for building an alternative model that includes factors for success can be taken from the relative successes of the ‘resistant economy’, depending on the evaluation of the development practitioners and observers. Such a model can develop people’s capacities, especially those who are marginalised in the development process, and develop collective solutions to their daily problems. Components and factors of the previous described women’s experience of cooperatives could be one example. However, this depends on the nature of the cooperative and its role and relation to the community. For instance, if the cooperative is a unit of production and also a community centre that brings positive changes to the community and help in solving their problems through engaging in collective discussions and exchanging solutions.
Here, it becomes a tool for development and not only an income generating project. If the cooperative builds a kind of self-sufficient strategy to produce what the community needs and the surplus is marketed through informal networks, then it can accumulate some capital and satisfy the financial needs of the cooperative and the family. Here, the cooperative becomes a social and economic organisation and a tool for change. This makes the women’s cooperative economically efficient and can generate additional income for the household, thus helping in satisfying the needs of the family; it will then ease the community from additional burdens and change gender relations and gender dynamics within households towards more gender equality. Only through production and income generation can gender relations be changed and women empowered. Women can find their active space and realise their social and gender identity; this cannot happen through lectures or workshop training. It becomes clear then, that through developing community based organisations or mass-based organisations, marginalised groups can be empowered and mobilised at a social, economic and political level. They can solve their daily problems through collective consultation, and satisfy their basic needs. At the same time, the cooperative as a unit for social and economic production can preserve cultural identity as one component of national and political identity.

At the same time, establishing the cooperative as a decentralised unit encourages cooperation, democratic practice and transparency, and such experience becomes a learning process for democratic practice, and a legitimate and positive culture to replicate. A cooperative can open people’s spaces and opportunities for building alternative development models that can work. This experience on the one hand utilises the strengths of the past accumulated critical knowledge and development heritage that offers important components for an alternative model, while at the same time it reflects the new political reality through creative and collective thinking that aims for the public and community good.

Through a bottom-up approach, development processes can foster inclusion and participation, a more authentic sense of community ownership, and the development of positive citizenship in practice. The lack of involvement of the community, especially that of the targeted community groups and individuals in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of community based organisations (CBOs) constrains
the organisations’ ability to be an effective community focal point. This transforms CBOs, mass-based organisations and cooperatives into passive recipients, where service provision does not in many cases lead to beneficiary empowerment, social change or democratic transformation.

At a macro-economic level, it should be noted and emphasised that Palestine has historically depended on agricultural production. What becomes required is to transform Palestinian land into a productive land, a process which needs a political will that is eager to achieve sovereignty, independence, and control over resources, mainly land and ground water wells, and the right to invest in agricultural lands based on community needs and priorities.

In addition, pilgrimages and religious tourism of various religions that have been weakened by the PA because of the different development plans, especially for East Jerusalem, represent alternative sources for economic growth. Although there are structural and political obstacles from Israel to develop this sector, an alternative pilgrimage plan, as one component of resistance, can be a partial solution if the service sector is developed and supported by the PA. Through net revenues from tourism, the economic growth and stability of the Palestinian budget is ensured. One should focus here on the fact that localising tourism means keeping it in the context of Palestinian priorities without the intervention of the international community, as this will preserve the sector of tourism and maintain its uniqueness at the political and cultural levels.

A third intervention could be creating alternative national industrial zones within the municipality level. A model that existed before 1993 and was successful, but was destroyed by Israeli forces and substituted by the joint regional industrial zones model as the only governmental model for employment generation and export-oriented production, which cannot promote a functional model for development as it lacks a human face and also does not promote or develop the local technical capacities.

To conclude, these represent some options that can create tens of thousands of safe and decent jobs, which are not subject to stock market risks. Besides, the principle of small and medium manufacturing units, which requires a labour intensive rather than capital-intensive model, is the appropriate model to follow to tackle unemployment and combat poverty (Riyahi et al. 2010).
Based on all these ideas, the previous community informal models can be pockets of resistant economy that can develop gradually within the global market and constitute an approach to developing a sustainable economy, which may gradually solve the problem of unemployment and decrease dependency of the Palestinian economy on Israeli markets and foreign aid. In addition to expanding subsidies on social sectors such as health, education and other social programmes, this is an option that needs strong political will, which is not yet forthcoming at this stage.

7. Case study: ‘Our Production is Our Pride’

In 1985, a women’s productive cooperative model called ‘Our Production is Our Pride’ was established by a team composed of sociologists from Birzeit University and members of the Union of Women Committees, supported by Norwegian partners. This initiative’s objective was mainly to respond to the limitations of development practice in localities where no improvements had been made or institutions initiated. The objective was to build an alternative model that could respond to the political, economic, and social hardships of Palestinians, focusing mainly on supporting women to become relatively economically independent, socially empowered, and politically engaged with the political situation. This model was conceptually based on different experiences from Africa and South America, using principles such as self-reliance, economic independence, empowerment, equality, solidarity, collectivity, and social justice as foundations for such model expressed in the cooperative as a social and economic organisation (Kuttab 1989).

These cooperatives were established in underprivileged communities, mainly in refugee camps and rural areas. The idea was experimental, trying to explore the various factors for a successful cooperative within the colonial context. A workable model that could on the one hand relatively satisfy the needs of the community towards self-reliance and boycott of Israeli goods, while at the same time create community projects that could benefit the community and empower women. Adopting an integrated approach to development was a framework chosen to ensure an impact on all the various dimensions of life the social, political and economic levels, in addition to touching the lives of the individuals as well as the community at large.
The cooperative started with a comprehensive training course that comprises economic, political and social dimensions. It contained development concepts, issues and problems, management of a project, principles in production, and marketing, aiming at establishing an efficient economic model that could generate income for women, improve the conditions of the family, and become a theoretical model for any successful project for the future. As this project was mainly agricultural, four villages in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were chosen, while another two centres were chosen in two refugee camps, one in Gaza and the other in the West Bank. Rural projects were agricultural, while refugee camp projects were service-oriented (textile production). The main objectives of these cooperatives were the following:

- to create an opportunity for a self-sufficient economic project that could promote respectable livelihood and enhance steadfastness of the household
- to boycott Israeli goods, as a response to the national movement programme for resistance
- to transform women’s traditional role in the domestic economy into a positive role in the national economy by providing opportunities for women’s employment as being an entry point for economic independence
- to empower rural and refugee women with new skills through training to improve their living conditions through work
- to enhance the peasant economy, which was destroyed, by creating a network of agricultural producers that are linked to the productive centre (cooperative), where both can benefit and exchange. On the one hand, women will buy agricultural produce at a cost price without a middle man, making production prices affordable, while the peasants market their produce within the village without a middle man, hence gaining the profit without sharing it, which enhances their steadfastness on the land, and protects it from confiscation by the Israeli forces.
- to establish a democratic cooperative model that becomes feasible for other parts of the country
- to maintain the conservation of the traditional Palestinian way of food production and preservation in order to safeguard cultural identity
- to produce appropriate technology in the form of simple equipment for food processing to decrease the dependency on export items and
encourage local artisans to produce appropriate and relevant equipment with lower prices
· to empower women to manage their cooperatives and become public agents and representatives

The first phase of the project started with training around 20 rural and refugee women in each site chosen by the women’s committees to participate as a pre-condition for their membership in the cooperative. The training, which took around six months, included life skills, simple management skills such as book-keeping, production, marketing, packaging, pricing, and so on. However, the training also involved a conceptual level, focusing on principles of collective work, solidarity, and cooperation as a basis for the success of a cooperative to ensure its continuity, in addition to understanding the political economy of Palestine under colonial occupation, and the structural obstacles that hindered its development.

In addition, other concepts, such as the rotation of roles, were stressed. Moving from management to production to ensure a horizontal model rather than a vertical one, to maintain its democratic nature, or preventing centralisation and hierarchical structures; the rotation of tasks to enhance new skills, creating opportunities for all women to learn and exchange tasks; or the learning of bargaining skills to develop their negotiating talents in business and household matters. These were all issues addressed in the training. At the same time, the principle of flexibility was respected in regard to the number of working hours. Women decided their own working hours based on their social conditions and situations so that this matter would not become an obstacle towards their continuity or problem with their family, knowing their traditional social conditions.

Along these lines, they started to produce different food items, such as pickles of all kinds, natural fruit drinks, jams, and dried fruits and vegetables, all based on their traditional domestic skills, but with the realisation that collective production has its own discipline and should maintain the same quality and production standards, as a rule for good marketing. At the same time, they have created a network of peasants through other agricultural mass-based organisations to buy their produce, support the peasant economy while decrease the production price to make it accessible
for lower classes. This can enhance steadfastness of the peasant households. Additionally, women were trained to package their produce in a creative way (silver vacuum bags made locally), market it themselves in a car that they purchased through the project, and distribute their food items in different shops in urban centres. At the same time, they started their cooperative shop in Ramallah. In addition, they used a network of informal centres in other villages and refugee camps, and popular food exhibitions to sell their produce at a cost price for lower middle class and working class citizens. This model has succeeded in empowering informal or alternative centres for production and marketing instead of the regular formal market, in the process limiting the level of exploitation.

As this model was established before the first uprising, it became more relevant during the uprising, responding to the national leadership slogans that focused on self-reliance and boycott of Israeli goods as part of the resistance. However, after two years of its operation, the Israeli forces raided the production sites, which were registered formally by village women as private enterprises, confiscated the equipment, and closed the cooperatives, accusing them of violating the tax rules, which they had not respected conforming with the call of the national leadership for civil disobedience.

On another level, these women have achieved other successes, as through their own production they have bought a piece of land in order to construct a larger production centre as a community centre, including a nursery where they can keep and protect their children during production and limit the interference of the extended family or even prohibit them from participation. They have become more empowered through the additional income that was generated, in the process affecting slightly and gradually the nature of gender dynamics within the household, such as decision-making and freedom of mobility that was earlier not granted to them. At the same time, they have become more empowered collectively, as they shared their experiences as women and exchanged experiences together, transforming the co-op into a women’s club where they have space to express their ideas and develop them.

As the Intifada was still in its early stages during the establishment of the co-op, women were also engaged in the national struggle and participated in the different political events which helped them to become representatives within the community. This model, if it had had the chance to
continue, had all the necessary factors for success and could have been a model for replication. However, it was closed by the occupation forces, paying testament to its success as a social, economic and political organisation for mobilisation.

The closure of the production centre by the Israeli forces indicated its success, as they understood its value, not only as a production centre, but also as an organisation that mobilised women at all levels, including the national. They made sure to disrupt the experience so that it did not continue, and could not be replicated.

It took a longer period to start the experience again. In 2010-2013 this same model was repeated in the West Bank through a grant from UN Women in New York, and implemented by the Bisan Center for Research and Development in Ramallah. I was myself involved in repeating this experience, which has succeeded in attaining a grant based on a competition among other projects in the South, as the experience was appreciated based on its concepts and past experience. Seven cooperatives were established, mainly in the areas of food processing and animal rearing. The cooperative activity started with the training course, formed mainly through transferring knowledge based on the previous experiences, in order to understand the organisational structure as well as the democratic concepts and different related issues of production and marketing. The course was based on lessons learned from previous experiences. It took around nine months to implement the seven cooperatives. They functioned for only two years, and two of them are still in operation. One is in the village of Beita and is considered to be the most successful. A study of these cooperatives was conducted in 2013, to evaluate the cooperatives, measure their achievements, define indicators of success, and expose obstacles facing them (Jaber/Hamdan 2013). The evaluation reached the following conclusions:

- Collective ownership, where women have shares based on their working hours, makes it more equitable and minimizes the chance of any internal conflicts
- Division of labour and productive roles should be decided by women themselves and not by a central committee outside the production team, as it is based on the individual choice and effort that each woman chooses to invest
- Training and developing skills to manage, produce and market is vital for the success of the cooperative
- Partnership with other community-based organisations, and informal networks with peasants, workers, artisans and other women’s networks is an inevitable component for success, as such a network creates the whole cycle of production, marketing and mobilisation.
- Focusing on production instead of profit in times of political crisis becomes an important value, as the cooperative becomes a tool for steadfastness and resistance
- Cooperatives can serve to create an alternative employment opportunity for women living on the green line instead of working in the Israeli settlements in harsh working conditions.
- The cooperative, through collective work, develops and enhances women’s personalities within the household and can affect gender dynamics within it
- Cooperatives are vital spaces for the community, as they can become educational centres for women, both within and outside the cooperative. They have learned, through various educational activities, more about strategies to cope and act against patriarchal attitudes and practices, to face Gender-Based Violence, about the denial of the right to inheritance, reproductive rights, women’s rights etc. and to exchange experiences. It is a space for women’s freedom of expression and empowerment
- The co-op can promote women’s political leadership within the community and they can become representatives of women’s issues on the various platforms. Some women’s experiences in the cooperative have been transformed into a political role in the local councils and national committees, and some women have joined the labour force, as a result of their new skills and qualifications.
- Cooperatives can become a platform for other community activities such as summer camps, children’s recreational activities etc. This will link the cooperative to the community and enhance its legitimacy

Although these represent the cooperative movement’s strengths and advantages, there are challenges, especially when such experiences develop in a colonial context where closures and oppressive practices continue to
threaten its continuity. However, compared to the prevailing economic experiences at present, the cooperative, at the economic level, has proven to be a better model, as it has limited economic risks, its capital is small, and it is a democratic model that enables and empowers women, much more than does an individual enterprise especially in giving a more stable economic opportunity and also some negotiation skills that can affect gender relations within the household. It can also solve a woman’s problem in terms of employment, as it is within the village, and hence the objection of rural male members to women working is reduced, especially if the cooperative generates income.

On the other hand, based on the follow-up study that was made, it was realised that while the idea of ‘Our Production is Our Pride’ has been maintained within the conceptual framework of the Union of Palestinian women, this took different forms. They were able to start a production centre for providing hot meals in Ramallah for working women, and this is still functioning on the same basis. At the same time, they were commissioned by Birzeit University to run the student cafeteria for two years seven years ago, and they offered healthy meals with low prices.

However, it was clear from the experience of the Bisan Center between 2009-2011 that women were pushed to engage in this experience for economic rather than national or social reasons. Taking into consideration the political environment, women were not strongly encouraged, due to the lack of political will and absence of an agenda for empowering popular initiatives in a neoliberal context, nor were they encouraged to promote agricultural cooperatives as a model. At the same time, there was a general feeling of political defeat and frustration due to the feeling of a dead-end political horizon, combined with rising rates of poverty and unemployment, which created the urge to engage in this experience.

When assessing the success factors and challenges that faced some of the cooperatives that continued, we can highlight two factors. One is that a cooperative has become family centered. Family members are pulled together in solidarity to sustain the cooperative. However, they maintained the cooperative principles, they enhanced their relationship with agricultural committees to support them with agricultural products in low prices, and they were able to stick to the production schedule, which granted stability and continuity. Here, one can conclude that family coop-
eratives that constitute family members that are not nuclear but extended can maintain a level of understanding that enhances their continuity.

Looking at other positive factors that can push further such a model for women is the current situation of geographic fragmentation that has become more severe, due to the closure policy, the Wall, and the expansion of settlements. An agricultural women’s cooperative within the village can be a functional tool for steadfastness of the household, income generating, as well as a unit for social transformation, as it empowers women within the family and simplifies their lives and reduces additional difficulties, such as commuting every day for work, which sometimes become difficult due to the closure and checkpoints policy, or because of traditional and cultural restrictions (IWS 2008).

At the same time as peasants are facing everyday challenges to farm and market their produce due to the closures, and the confiscation of land as a result of the expansion of settlements and Israeli control over water sources, the cooperative as a collective unit of production can face the challenges and find alternative ways for realising its aspirations through solidarity. The cooperative becomes a tool for resistance. Yet, as most of the rural areas are part of area C, which is a major part of the West Bank under Israeli security control, the challenge becomes bigger, especially considering that the PA does not support agricultural activities, subsidise them, or support their water use, which can also play a negative role in the continuation of this alternative model.

Yet, we also see agricultural cooperatives that are successful and have managed to solve these obstacles through different coping strategies and the exchange of experiences. This can reflect one fact: that the only way to promote an alternative model is to keep trying through resisting, challenging the structural obstacles and promoting new forms of steadfastness. It is obvious that, through all the historical periods under occupation, Palestinian people have succeeded in finding opportunities to resist and build alternative ways of surviving.
References


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