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GÜLAY TOKSÖZ

Transition from ‘Woman’ to ‘Family’
An Analysis of AKP Era Employment Policies from a Gender Perspective

ABSTRACT In Turkey, women’s labour force participation and employment rates have been low, due to historical, social, cultural, and economic factors. Although a mild increase in these rates has been observed since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, the increase in unemployment rates and precarious forms of employment is striking. In government policies and programmes, together with the stated emphasis on increasing female employment rates, women’s responsibilities in the family are brought to the fore. Consequently, women are expected to join the labour market in ways that do not challenge their obligations in the household and family. The neoliberal and conservative approach to maintaining a gender-based division of labour and promoting women’s inclusion in the labour market through flexible forms of employment, is analysed, along with the concepts of private and public patriarchy within an historical context. Statistics and official documents are used to reflect on the developments in female employment in the period of the AKP governments.

1. Introduction

Evaluating the impacts of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) era policies on women’s employment is not possible without considering how the social, economic, and cultural structure in Turkey shapes the labour market. Furthermore, it is relevant to view the period between 2002 and 2015, during which the AKP was in power, as a cross section of a wider timeline, for the sake of historical
continuity. In Turkey, the labour force participation rate for women was on the decline throughout the second half of the 20th century, followed by a slim increase after 2000. This decline is uncharacteristic among developing countries, most of which experienced rising rates in female labour participation during this period. The case of Turkey therefore attracted attention from many feminist researchers in Turkey, focusing on limiting factors on the supply of and the demand for women’s labour (Özbay 1990; Özar 1994; Ecevit 1998; Özar/Günlük-Şenesen 1998; İlkkaracan 2012; Toksöz 2011, 2012).

Once women’s participation in the labour force and the resulting gender distribution in the labour market are seen as complex components of supply and demand, it is necessary to understand the socio-cultural and macroeconomic influences behind this relationship. The socio-cultural factors at hand are the power of private and public patriarchy over the family and the labour market and, therefore, over women’s labour supply in the country. The macroeconomic factors being viewed are the development strategy adopted by the country, the country’s place in the world in terms of the global division of labour, and the extent of the country’s labour demand in relation to its level of industrialisation. Different patterns of labour force and labour market participation for women emerge in developing countries, depending on the different articulations between capitalism and patriarchy. In Turkey, the emergence of a labour supply that is sufficient to meet the demand for women’s labour, and working conditions for women, is closely related to the way the patriarchal and capitalist systems operate.

According to Hartmann’s (1981) now classic definition, patriarchy is the systematic power of men over women, and the source of this power comes from all social structures that allow men to have control over women’s labour. This control takes the form of restricting women from accessing productive sources, for instance waged work in the capitalist society, and restricting their sexuality. This restriction is closely related with the changing demand for children as the prospective labour force. However, interests of men and capitalists may conflict when men request women to stay at home and serve them, while capitalists need female workers. Women’s subordinated position in the family disadvantages them in the labour market, and this disadvantaged position in the labour
market makes them vulnerable in the family. Walby (1986), while agreeing with Hartmann’s analysis to a great extent, argues that women’s disadvantaged position in the labour market, namely their exclusion from better jobs and a conciliatory role in the state within capitalist and patriarchal interests, determines women’s subordination in the household. According to her, patriarchy as a system is composed of six structures: patriarchal relations in household work, patriarchal relations in paid work, a patriarchal state, male violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions.

Walby (1996) tries to develop a definition of patriarchy that considers a wide range of criticisms from various third-world feminists and postfeminist academicians, questioning patriarchy as a reductionist concept unable to deal with cultural diversities. She develops the distinction between private and public patriarchy. In private and public patriarchy, the six structures are present but the relationship between them and their relative significance differ according to time, society, and culture. Private patriarchy explains man’s benefit from (1) the control he establishes over a woman while she is engaged in reproductive activities, and (2) from woman’s exclusion from the public sphere. In public patriarchy, all the structures in the public sphere, first and foremost the state, are the practitioners and maintainers of patriarchy. Women are not totally excluded from the public sphere, but they are subordinated and in a disadvantageous position. In western societies, different forms of public patriarchy exist, generally shifting from exclusionary to segregationist strategies. Although Walby (1997, 2002, 2009) gradually drops patriarchy as a concept in her more recent research, the notion of private and public patriarchies is still useful in analysing many developing societies.

In this article, the concept of private and public patriarchies is going to be utilised to interpret the development of women’s employment in the historical timeline, starting from the establishment of the Turkish Republic, which aimed to become a ‘western’ and ‘modern’ society. While the judicial equality between genders was largely established during this period, the strength of private and public patriarchies was not challenged by economic policies, as they did not increase women’s participation in paid work. Within this historical framework, the article
focuses on the years under the AKP administrations, namely the period from 2002 to 2015. Recent statistics and official documents of the AKP governments regarding the development of labour markets are going to be used in order to analyze their policies.

2. Women’s employment in the Republic era

With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, a market-based development model was applied, but, in the 1930s, an import-substitution model of industrialisation was institutionalised for which the state was the main actor, due to insufficient domestic capital accumulation. Turkey opened up to the international markets in the post-World War II period, while import-substitution policies continued. Public industrial investments were directed mostly towards basic consumption goods and some intermediate goods, which the private sector needed (Kepenek/Yentürk 2010). Agricultural production and employment continued to dominate the Turkish economy, and during this period, women usually worked as unpaid family workers in small-scale agricultural enterprises. Both the share of industrial employment and the share of women employed in the industrial sector were quite low. Almost all female industrial workers were in the tobacco, textile, and food-processing industries (Makal 2001). The mechanisation of agricultural production in the 1950s caused a period of intense migration from the rural areas to the cities. As a result, and due to the strong, private, household-based patriarchy, men living in urban areas were the primary ‘breadwinners’ of the family, while women were expected to stay at home and do the house and care work. In this period, which persisted until the 1980s, efforts towards raising the purchasing power of households in order to support domestic consumer demand resulted in high wages and salaries, which in turn allowed men to support their families alone, as the head of the house. A few women with high levels of education and strong qualifications participated in the labour market, mainly as professionals in the service sector in urban areas, but most women remained at home, allowing the patriarchal family structure to persist undisturbed (Toksöz 2011, 2012).
Turkey took on an export-based industrialisation strategy in the 1980s. After the military coup of September 12, 1980, the subjugation of trade union activities lowered real wage rates, providing a cheap labour force for the new industrialisation strategy (Şenses 1996). In a period characterised by global scale feminisation of the labour force (Standing 1989, 1999) in developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia, various studies by feminist researchers highlighted the importance of the development strategy adopted, and the level of industrialisation, in determining the demand for women employees (Seguino 2000a, 2000b; Moghadam 2001; 2003; Karshenas/Moghadam 2001). Interestingly, the direction of change was different in Turkey, with declining rates of female participation and no increase in women’s non-agricultural employment.

What makes Turkey different in this aspect? The answer lies within the insufficient levels of investment in Turkey’s manufacturing industries. New investments are needed to create demand for women’s labour. However, the neoliberal policies for structural adjustment and export-led industrialisation fell short in creating sufficient jobs, despite the low wage rates. As a result of structural adjustment programmes, the fixed capital investments undertaken by the public sector declined, and the private sector failed to counterbalance this trend, resulting in insufficient job creation to match the increasing supply of labour. The end result was increasing unemployment rates and unemployed people seeking low wage employment in the economy’s informal sectors (Şenses 1990, 1994, 1996; Kepenek/Yentürk 2010; Toksöz 2011). The main actors in the labour market in this period were men, since most women remained at home doing house and care work outside the labour force.

Having failed to achieve a noteworthy industrialisation trust within the scope of its export-led industrialisation strategy, Turkey entered the international markets through basic consumption goods: mainly textiles and garments. While competing with other developing countries, subcontract manufacturing with lower costs for employers became commonplace, increasing informal employment. In most of the small-scale textile, garment, and food-processing enterprises, women were typically employed informally. Their cheap labour gave Turkey a significant advantage in the global market (Eraydın 1998; Dedeoğlu 2008). In this sector, while an overall increase was evident in women’s employment, this mainly
affected young and single women. The employment ratio among married and older women remained mostly unchanged. Because of low growth rates and investments, export-led industrialisation did not automatically bring labour-force feminisation during this period (Başlevent/Onaran 2004). Women’s employment in the industrial sector was viewed as temporary, and employers preferred single women to married women, because of the care responsibilities of the latter; also, married women tended to quit their jobs due to the severe working conditions, especially after giving birth (Dedeoğlu 2008; Kümbetoğlu et al. 2012). The exclusion of married women from the labour force displayed a form of collaboration between patriarchy and a capitalist economy.

During this period—which was characterised by the very low labour force participation of women in urban areas, as well as commonplace informal employment— the question arises as to whether the government had policies or goals aiming to increase women’s employment.

In the 5th Development Plan, covering the years between 1985 and 1989, it can clearly be seen that the government had no specific goal of increasing female participation. According to the table on Labour Market Equilibrium of Turkey, the number of female labour force participants was anticipated to increase by only one thousand people (SPO 1984: 131). Women were considered for the first time in the 6th Development Plan for 1990–1994 under the heading of Family-Women-Children, with only a general note regarding the establishment of the necessary environment for women’s participation in non-agricultural sectors (SPO 1989: 287). This attitude remained unchanged in the following years. Inclusion of women in the development plans was probably a result of various international treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, signed by Turkey in the 1980s and 90s. The government’s indifference towards women’s participation in the labour market was an expression of the acceptance and maintenance of the gender-based division of labour and the unwritten compromise between private and public patriarchy.

Only after Turkey gained the status of a candidate state to the EU in 1999 did women gain a place of their own as a ‘woman’ independent from family and children in the official documents, and the low rate of participation by women in the labour force was recognised as a significant problem:
indeed, raising the participation rate was pronounced a policy goal. At the same time, gender equality gained significance in the official documentation in Turkey’s program for alignment with the acquis (Commission of the European Communities 2004: 110ff.).

3. Changes in labour force and employment in the labour market under AKP governments

The first term of AKP government witnessed a period of EU membership negotiations and rapid legislative changes. However, these changes cannot be solely explained by the alignment with the acquis, since women’s rights movements, which gained pace after 1980 in Turkey, also played a significant role in shaping the policies. The 10th article of the Turkish Constitution states that, “Everyone is equal before the law without distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such grounds” (Constitution of Turkey 1982: Article 10). In 2004, the statement that “Men and women have equal rights. The State has the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice” was added to the article (ibid. 2004: Act No. 5170) and, later, in 2010, the phrase “Measures taken for this purpose shall not be interpreted as contrary to the principle of equality” was also included (ibid. 2010: Act No. 5982). While these changes were indubitably an achievement for women in their struggle for equal rights, women still demand tangible steps to be taken on their behalf, since these statements in the legal code have so far failed to have real-life impact.

Against this background, what is the actual state of women’s labour force participation and employment across sectors in terms of being significant indicators of gender equality?
Table 1. Basic labour force indicators by gender (in thousands)

*2004 instead of 2002 is taken as the starting point, since comparable HLFS data were available only after 2004.

Before evaluating the period between 2004 and 2014, one point is worth emphasising: according to the 5th Development Plan, the total number of women in the labour force was 5.70 million in 1985 as mentioned above. After nearly 20 years, the same number is slightly smaller in 2004, at 5.67 million. The lack of increase in the number of women in the labour force is due to the rapid internal migration and dissociation in agricultural employment, and failure of the non-agricultural sectors to compensate for this decline, due to the insufficient industrialisation explained above. Between 2004 and 2014, the number of women in the labour force increased by 3 million, and the number of employed women increased by 2.6 million. As a result, women’s labour force participation rate rose from 23.3% to 30.3%, and the female employment rate increased from 20.8% to 26.7%. It should be mentioned that the female employment rate in Turkey, despite the increase, remains quite low compared to the EU-28 rate of 59.6% (Eurostat 2015). Still, these numbers suggest that the AKP governments were relatively successful in increasing female employment. But were they, really?
The question can be answered by looking at unemployment rates and the characteristics of the employment that was created. Only a slight increase was observed in the general unemployment rate of women, from 11% to 11.9%; however, analysing the non-agricultural unemployment rates is more useful: in 2004, the non-agricultural unemployment rates were 17.9% for women and 12.5% for men, revealing a five-point difference. Although the rate of unemployment among women dropped to 16.5% in 2014, the decline was greater in the rate among men, which dropped to 10.3%, enlarging the gap to six points. It is interesting to observe that the number of men both with employment and in the labour force increased by the same amount, namely 3.7 million, in this period, showing that the increase in unemployment was negligible. Meanwhile, the ratio of women outside the labour force remained quite high; even though the ratio fell from 76.7% in 2004 to 69.7% in 2014, the number of women outside the labour force increased by 1.5 million and reached 20.1 million. In other words, two out of three women remained outside the labour force due to household responsibilities, which is a clear indicator of the gender-based division of labour. At the same time, 1.3 million women (6.2%) declared that while they were not actively seeking employment, they were ready and willing to work. This number is higher than the officially recorded number of unemployed women, which is around 1 million, and the total number of 2.3 million is critical in understanding the real dimensions of female unemployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women %</td>
<td>Men %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5 047 100</td>
<td>14 585 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2 565 50.8</td>
<td>3 148 21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>784 15.5</td>
<td>3 145 21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>26 0.5</td>
<td>941 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>1 672 33.1</td>
<td>7 352 50.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Employment by sector (in thousands)
*Source: TurkStat, Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) data*
During this period, the most drastic increase in women’s employ-
ment was in the service sector. Between 2004 and 2014, the share of the
service sector in women’s employment rose from one-third (33.1%) to
a half (50.0%), while the share of the agricultural sector declined from a
half (50.8%) to one-third (32.9%). The increase in the share of the indus-
trial sector is minimal for both women and men, with corresponding ratios
of 15.5% and 21.6% in 2004 and 16.1% and 22.4% in 2014. The numerical
increase in the industrial sector is higher for men, while the opposite is
ture in the services sector. The number of women employed in the indus-
trial sector rose by 451,000, from 0.78 million to 1.24 million. For men, the
increase was double this number, increasing by 934,000, from 3.15 million
to 4.08 million. The number of women employed in the service sector
increased from 1.67 million to 3.84 million, a difference of 2.17 million.
The corresponding value for men rose from 7.35 million to 9.40 million, or
by 2.04 million. The difference between the two numbers being 126,000
shows that the increase is higher for women. The rise in the number of
women in the services sector is fivefold compared that of the increase in
the industrial sector; for men this ratio is twofold. Construction is another
important employment area for males and, therefore, it is displayed sepa-
rate in the statistics. While the number of women employed in construc-
tion is insignificant, for men, it increased twofold during this period, from
941,000 to 1.83 million.

Aside from a sluggish employment rate, a further problem in the
Turkish labour markets is informal employment. Informal employment
is defined as unregistered employment, focusing on persons who are not
registered to any social security institution because of the main job worked
in the reference week. Although unregistered work can be observed in
all statuses of employment, it is more prevalent among self-employed
and unpaid family workers. The hefty share of the agricultural sector in
women’s employment and the prevalence of the unpaid family worker in
small-scale, home-based enterprises in the sector, contribute to the fact
that the ratio of informality is significantly higher among women. Table
3 below indicates that while the informality ratio fell, regardless of gender,
the number of women employed informally increased in the period, while
the number of men decreased.
Accordingly, while the absolute numbers and ratios of informal employment are declining for both men and women, in agriculture, they remain quite high. 98.6% of women and 82.9% of men in 2004 and 94.4% of women and 71.8% of men in 2014 employed in agriculture were outside of social security coverage. However, the number of women who were employed informally in the non-agricultural sectors rose from 861,000 to 1.33 million between 2004 and 2014. For men, the number of informally employed declined from 3.85 million to 3.23 million. Therefore, it can be argued that irregular jobs outside the coverage of the social security system have made up a significant portion of the new jobs created for women during the AKP administration.

A recent study gives an insight into the characteristics of these jobs. The study by Toksöz/Memiş analyses non-agricultural informal employment between 2004 and 2013 from a gender viewpoint and raises two essential points. The first is that, in the manufacturing sector, the subsectors with the top three highest ratios of female employees were also the ones with the highest ratios of informality. Two-thirds of the women in the manufacturing sector were employed either in the textile, food-processing, or garment subsectors. The average ratio of informality in these three subsectors was 29.4% for women and 18.5% for men. In the other subsectors, the average was 11.1% for both men and women. Insufficient industrialisation has failed to open up the non-traditional subsectors for women employees, causing most women to work in subsectors comprised of mostly small-sized enterprises with high levels of informality. During this period, in manufacturing, the number of women who were self-employed and outside social

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,388</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>6,456</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2,528</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>2,609</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agriculture</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>3,847</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Informal employment by sector (in thousands)

Source: TurkStat, Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) data
security coverage more than doubled, from 64,000 to 158,000. The informality ratio of the self-employed was 96%.

The second and more striking point is about the informal employment of women in the service sector: The number of women working informally in this sector rose from 498,000 to 852,000 (a leap of 354,000) between 2004 and 2013. In contrast, the number of informally employed men decreased in the same period, from 2.40 million to 1.82 million. What are the reasons behind this asymmetry?

One cause seems to be the fact that self-employment became more and more common in the service sector among women; and, as mentioned before, self-employment frequently means informality. The number of self-employed women in the sector almost tripled, increasing from 87,000 to 248,000 during the period, consequently raising the ratio of informality among women from 54.3% to 71.7%.

Human health and social services, as well as managerial and support services, were the fastest growing subsectors in terms of female employment. The higher ratio of informality among women compared to men in these subsectors was a factor. In human health and social services, 151,000 out of 558,000 women were employed informally. Informality reached up to 81.9% (125,000 out of 153,000 women) in the “social services without providing accommodations” branch of this subsector. The same is true for domestic workers employed by a household in the managerial and support services subsector; these employees had an informality ratio of 87.2% (133,000 out of 153,000 women) (Toksöz/Memiş 2016).

4. Policies that trigger informality

It can be seen that, under the AKP administration, instead of creating decent work for women, the employment policies have increased informal jobs. Behind this is the need for cheap labour that not only supports neoliberal policies, but also policies that conserve the gender-based division of labour in a society that views women primarily as homemakers and caregivers. It is defined as a “neoliberal-religious/conservative mode of patriarchy” by Coşar/Yeğenoğlu (2011). The conservative outlook of those in government, and of their representatives in the public offices and
ministries, compels the egalitarian rhetoric in the constitution and laws to remain merely on paper. Following the slowdown in the EU membership negotiations in 2007, this egalitarian rhetoric was replaced by an emphasis on the importance of women for the perpetuity of the family unit—thereby bringing family to the foreground instead. The most palpable example is the omission of the word ‘woman’ in the title of the newly established Ministry of Family and Social Policies, which replaced the State Ministry Responsible for Woman and Family, despite protests from women’s organisations.

Conservative policies are reflected in the important official texts of the period, namely the 9th Development Plan for 2007-2013, the 10th Development Plan for 2014-2018, and the National Employment Strategy (2014-2023). In these texts, provisions for gender equality are not among the primary goals and issues related to low ratio of employment among women are not placed under the headers related to general employment as was the case in the 9th Plan; instead, they are mentioned under the social inclusion and poverty alleviation headers (Kalkınma Bakanlığı 2006). Mainly in all of these texts, two precautionary packages are mentioned: (1) Popularising flexible work options and encouraging women towards them and (2) supporting female entrepreneurship.

As mentioned above, policies that encourage women’s entrepreneurship and related micro-credit programmes lead a number of women to become self-employed in manufacturing and services and, therefore, informality surges. The state transfers the responsibility of creating proper jobs to the labour market and to individual initiatives. Small-scale, unstable, and low-income work activities fail to generate enough income to afford proper social and healthcare coverage, regardless of gender. Most women in these activities produce goods or services in a home-based fashion (Ecevit 2007). Such activities are undervalued and usually seen as ‘small contributions to the family budget’, and they also contribute to the gender-based division of labour by allowing women to perform care and housework activities simultaneously. The coalition between private and public patriarchies is therefore preserved.

Another issue regarding the 10th Development Plan is the fact that women do not have a subheading of their own, and are dealt with under the “Women and Family” subheading of the “Qualified People, Strong Society” main header. In the plan, the greater emphasis is on the protection and fortification of the family unit, rather than the betterment of
the conditions women find themselves in. Gender equality is mentioned in the article 249: “In the context of gender equality, the main objectives are to empower women in all aspects of social, economic and cultural life, to improve the status of family while preserving the institution and to strengthen social integration.” (Kalkınma Bakanlığı 2013: 52) Once again, women are not considered as individuals but as a part of the family. The 10th Development Plan aims to increase the labour force participation and employment ratios of women to 34.9% and 31% respectively by 2018, as well as to popularise flexible forms of employment among women, for the sake of efficiency in the labour market (ibid. 2013: 164). These are quite modest targets indeed, considering that, in 2014, the labour force participation ratio was 30.3% and the employment ratio was 26.7%

Flexible forms of employment as a miracle cure for low labour force participation by women appear in both the 9th and 10th Development Plans and the National Employment Strategy (2014-2023). As a solid expression of the neoliberal policies, flexible forms of employment include part-time work, fixed-term contract work, temporary work through private employment agencies, telecommuting, working on-call, working from home, work sharing, and flexible timetable employment (Kalkınma Bakanlığı 2006, 2013, Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı 2013). These forms of employment are considered irenic in terms of the conflict women face between their home and work lives, and they aim to encourage women to participate in the labour force without abandoning the traditional role they are assigned by the gender-based division of labour. However, participation in these flexible forms, instead of in full-time employment with full social security coverage, means that women will be stuck in precarious positions that are easily disposed of in times of economic crisis and that women will be least likely to earn social security benefits.

Flexible forms of employment are also considered as a strategy to reverse the decreasing trend in fertility and to encourage women to have at least three children. In Turkey, infant care services are insufficient, and the main obstacle facing women who want to work is the lack of low-cost public childcare facilities. The draft law for the ‘Protection of Family and Dynamic Population Structure’ that was prepared according to the 10th Development Plan by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, then proposed to the Grand National Assembly in 2015, and enacted in 2016,
aims to solve this problem within this context. The resolution’s target group is the female workers and civil servants, who are encouraged to have more children through regulations that allow part-time work (Başbakanlık 2015). However, in the Turkish private sector, working overtime is the norm, and there is no demand for part-time labour by employers. These employers view such regulations as ones that raise costs, and under these conditions, they prefer not to employ women at all. Therefore, the law carries the risk of further diminishing the already low demand for women’s labour and completely confining women within their homes and families.

In Turkey, care work for the elderly, the sick, and the disabled, is generally provided within the family, and almost exclusively by women. There is a well-established social consensus that unpaid care work is female. The government exaggerates the risk of an aging population and designs policies to increase the total fertility rate, but it does not view not only child, but also elderly and sick, care as a public responsibility and does not take necessary precautions to increase the institutional capacity for it. Since 2007, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies has granted a wage near the minimum wage to caregivers of severely disabled persons in low-income households (Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı 2015). Most of these care givers, who prove to be mainly women (88.7%), have not been covered under the social security system. While the provision of such a form of support to poor households is an improvement, the exclusion from the social security network of people who provide care services all their lives, and the negligence of institutional and public care services, are both unacceptable from the perspective of gender equality and equal access to social rights and services. Meanwhile, the integration of paid caregivers into the employed population has contributed to reported increases in female employment since 2011, according to the Household Labour Force Surveys. Between 2011 and 2013, in the service sector, 30% of the increase in employment of middle-aged urban women with low levels of education was due to the inclusion of those providing social services without accommodation (Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı 2014: 42). Women employed in these positions (82%) are mostly informally employed, which leads to an increase in informality within the services sector. Through these statistics, the quality of urban employment created in the services sector under the AKP administration has come to light.
5. Conclusion

During the 20th century, labour demand in Turkey increased in a limited fashion due to the development strategies adopted by successive governments. Thus, the share of women’s employment, in particular, remained quite low. As a result, no strong conflict between capitalism and patriarchy has occurred, and private patriarchy has remained mostly uncontested. Undoubtedly, the severity of private patriarchy differs depending on class, ethnicity, and religious sect; occasionally, educated and qualified women in the upper income level are able to attain opportunities to shake up and weaken private patriarchy. However, women who belong to the vast majority, beset by low levels of income and education, have to struggle over social and economic barriers in order to come out of the house and claim an existence in the public sphere. Public patriarchy is shaped by two opposing trends: one involves legal, egalitarian regulations; the other consists of regulations supported by a sexist rhetoric that encourages women either to remain in their homes or participate in the labour force with an inferior status, through flexible forms of employment that focus on fertility rates rather than on the women themselves.

1 The Labour force comprises all employed persons and all unemployed persons; the Labour force participation rate indicates the ratio of the labour force to the non-institutional working age population; Employment: persons economically active during the reference period as a regular employee, a casual employee, an employer, a self-employed worker, or an unpaid family worker; Employment rate: indicates the ratio of the employed persons to the non-institutional working age population; Unemployed: persons who were not employed during the reference period, who have used at least one channel for seeking a job during the last three months, and who were available to start work within two weeks; Unemployment rate: the ratio of the unemployed persons to the labour force; persons not in the labour force are persons who are neither unemployed nor employed due to various reasons, such as household chores, retirement, education or training, seasonal work, disability or illness, or not seeking a job even if available to start.

2 The then prime minister Erdoğan declared his views during his Democratic Ascension meeting (18 July 2010) with the women’s organisations by saying: “I do not believe in the equality between genders. I prefer to talk about equal opportunities. Men and women are different. They are complementary to each other.” http://bianet.org/kadin/siyaset/123540-gulbahar-basbakan-kadinlarin-taleplerini-gormezden-geldi, 15.9.2015
According to the Ministry of Family and Social Policies’ 2013-2016 Strategic Plan, there were 15 active elderly care and rehabilitation centers. The ministry aims to lower this number to 13 by 2014, and 7 by 2015, which means that they want to totally retreat from institutional service provision (Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı 2012: 142).

References


Gülay Toksöz
Department of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations,
Ankara University
gulay.toksoz@gmail.com