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Pinar Bedirhanoğlu, Çağlar Dolek, Funda Hülagü
The Transformation of Internal Security and of the State in Turkey during the AKP Rule: A Class-Based Analysis

Abstract The restructuring of security relations is a neglected question in critical studies on neoliberal state transformation in Turkey. This became apparent in the 2010s, when insecurity and violence have turned into everyday practices, with paramilitarised police violence used against all sorts of social opposition. These ‘security’ practices, which are indeed the outcome of an internationally arranged ‘reform process’ in operation since the 1990s, contradict the fundamental duty of the modern state to ensure the physical security of its citizens. This paper problematises the class-based implications of this debatable security ‘reform process’ under the AKP rule. It identifies the conservative and pro-capital strategies the AKP has adopted to transform the institutional structure and ideological practices of the police in Turkey.

The neoliberal state transformation in Turkey has entered into a new phase during the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Parti, AKP) rule, the violent coercive quality of which became manifest after the Gezi uprising in June 2013. Thus, ascending police operations in poor neighbourhoods with extra-judicial executions, suppression of the social and political opposition through different forms of criminalisation, and blatant violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms have become everyday practices, leading to a heated debate on the character of the political regime in the country. It is now discussed whether Turkey is becoming a kind of ‘police state’, ‘authoritarian state’, ‘fascist state’, or a ‘constitutional dictatorship’ under Erdoğan’s de facto presidency. This negative picture is in sharp contrast with the projections made by liberals up to the mid-2000s, as they attributed to the AKP governments a historical role in the democratisation of the country (Barkey/Çongar 2007: 63). Such democratisation was
said to include progressive moves in the state’s security structures, such as the normalisation of civil-military relations, democratisation of the police forces, and increasing accountability and transparency of security institutions. Once their expectations failed, liberals started arguing that the shift from democratisation to authoritarianism was due to the consolidation of political power in the hands of Erdoğan and his cadre (Dağı 2015).

Contrary to the liberals, leftist perspectives have always criticised authoritarian state practices under the AKP rule, even though they have bent their analyses towards functionalist or voluntarist explanations by underlining respectively either the inter- and intra-class contradictions of neoliberal transformation that have required an ever more oppressive state ‘apparatus’, or the specific Islamist policy choices and reflexes of Erdoğan and the AKP cadres (Akça 2014; Bedirhanoğlu 2009; Oğuz 2012). Thus, their focus has been more on the political context of the current state of things rather than the transformations that have been taking place for a long time in Turkey’s internal security structure per se. The latter is indeed a topic that remains largely unexplored in both the relevant liberal and Marxist studies alike, though the police’s central role in the state can hardly be denied today. Sealing this gap would provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the coercion-inducing dynamics within Turkish politics and enables a critical perspective on the recent political reorientation.

This paper aims to provide a class-based analysis of the ongoing internal security transformation in Turkey, the main elements of which are not peculiar to the country itself but shaped also by global dynamics. More specifically, it will highlight the fact that the AKP’s political interventions in security have been in line with the policies applied elsewhere in the 2000s that brought forth the criminalisation of poverty, privatisation of security, militarisation and professionalisation of police forces, political centralisation of police power within the state, the adoption of practices of ‘state of emergency’ in relation to the so-called ‘war on terror’, and escalating police violence used against mostly peaceful protestors after the 2008 crisis. These policies have been hitherto duly problematised by Marxist critiques of security (Boukalas, 2008; 2015; Giroux, 2006; Hallsworth/Lea, 2011; Parenti, 1999; Scraton, 2004; Wacquant, 2009). This paper aims to make a contribution to this emerging critical literature by deciphering the class basis of developments in security through the use of the term ‘subor-
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dination by dispossession’, by substantiating its claims on the basis of the Turkish experience. Thus, David Harvey’s conceptualisation of “accumulation by dispossession” (2003: 145), which draws attention to the pervasive appeal of non-economic forms of appropriation of surplus value in the neoliberal era, is reformulated to show how the ongoing security transformations in Turkey have been practically dispossessing the labouring classes from their ‘right’ to be protected by the state, while the same process has also meant the internal security structures’ and the state’s more enhanced subordination by capital.

It is true that ‘subordination by dispossession’ in security has been a process that involves ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as well, in so far as the latter is understood as the commodification of security through its privatisation. In other words, while ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in security refers to the ever-growing exchange of personal and public security devices for profit-making and the relevant economic processes, ‘subordination by dispossession’ designates, on top of this, a more fundamental political transformation due to the central role of public security in the constitution of the modern state. Indeed, the provision of physical and property security to the labouring classes by the state as a public duty is one of the basics of “citizenship” as a modern construct, constituting simultaneously the class neutral appearance of the modern bourgeois state (Clarke 1991: 185).

Making sense of the ongoing security transformations through the concept of ‘subordination by dispossession’ is based on the Open Marxist comprehension of state-capital relations by means of form analysis. This conception introduces a methodological challenge to the Foucauldian and Poulantzasian analyses in the field through a specific reading of ‘class power’. These current debates highlight either the intensifying police state practices as new forms of governmentality (see Neocleous 2008), or the increasing power of executive apparatuses as the reflection of neoliberal authoritarianism (see Boukalas 2014), reducing ‘class power’ to market power in the former, and to struggles among capital fractions over the state in the latter. However, capital’s growing power in the organisation of social and political life is not just a matter of degree, but also a matter of form. The growing capitalist class power over the state’s coercive structure – through various problematic processes discussed below – creates a novel protective shield for the state and firmly insulates it from the possible influ-
ences of the labouring classes. This is because the current trend towards the (re)privatisation of security, which was historically put under the exclusive monopoly of the state only in the mid-19th century, signals a radical change in the organisation of the capitalist state as a whole, as this monopoly had been also an outcome of the growing working class pressure on the state to end the widely-used private policing measures (see Rawlings 2002). Thus, the more directly security relations are shaped now by capitalist interests, the more the labouring classes become practically dispossessed, not only of security, but also of their ability to contest, protest, pull and push the state within a modern bourgeois framework. The growing capitalist class power over the security field hence redefines also the labouring classes’ political association with the state authority, a process simultaneously redefining the political form of the capitalist state.

To substantiate these arguments, the paper will highlight how three specific processes – namely (1) the private provision of internal security, (2) the formation of public-private partnerships in policing, and (3) the adoption of market rationality as the norm in police operations – have been substantially restructuring social relations of security in the neoliberal era in such a way as to ensure the more direct subordination of internal security by capital. In return, these processes have deteriorated the labouring classes’ physical conditions of security by criminalising them as the ‘dangerous classes’ of the 21st century, and decreasing their practical and ideological capacity to intervene in the public form of policing. As the current state of disorder and insecurity in Turkey shows however, this has been a contested, contradictory and contingent process shaped by complex political controversies and class struggles taking place at local, domestic, international and global levels.

1. The socio-political context and the institutional content of security transformation in Turkey

Social and political dynamics within which security relations are transformed as ‘subordination by dispossession’ in Turkey have been defined by neoliberalism since the 1980s. Indeed, the transformations in state and security structures in this period have been shaped by the processes of inte-
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Immigration of the domestic capital accumulation to global capital accumulation on the one hand, and the rise of identity politics on the other. The former process resulted in a fundamental reconfiguration of class relations through *en masse* proletarianisation, deepening of poverty and deprivation, and socio-spatial segregation in urban centers in Turkey (Boratav/Yeldan/Köse 2000; Kurtuluş 2011; Şen 2011; Şenses/Koyuncu 2007), while the latter meant that these developments were intertwined with radicalisation in politics in relation to Kurdish insurgency and the rise of political Islam throughout the 1990s. In response to these ‘threats’, paramilitary forms of crisis management were introduced gradually and contingently (Öngen 2004: 94ff.), as represented by the establishment of Rapid Action Units in 1982, Special Operation Teams in 1983, the Anti-Terrorism and Operation Department in 1986, the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 1991, and the re-organisation of Special Operation Teams within a separate section called Special Operation Department in the Security General Directorate (GSD) in 1993 (Berksoy 2010; Balta-Paker 2010). Moreover, the private provision of security proliferated in the same period, with the establishment of legally ambiguous contracting companies (Hülagü 2011a; Dölek 2011, 2015).

This paramilitary form of crisis management was born into and in turn reinforced mafia-like ‘security’ networks, shaped within the armed conflict in the Kurdish-populated regions. This conflict created convenient opportunities for illegal trafficking of weapons and narcotics and the systematic engagement of state security institutions in extra-legal activities, enabling distinctive processes of capital accumulation in the country especially throughout the 1990s (see Selçuk 2010; Gingeras 2014). Coupled with the neoliberal assault on public services and institutions and the radical dislocation of class relations, these processes paved the way for the formation of the private security sector in Turkey with the active involvement of retired or incumbent public officials. For instance, Mehmet Eymur, the former head of the Special Operation Department, established one of the first private security companies in 1990. This public-private symbiosis has continued thereafter through various extra-legal practices such as ensuring privileged treatment in public procurements in the field of security, or the illegal utilisation of public services for the sake of private security interests (Dölek 2015).
Transformation of the internal security structure under the AKP rule in the 2000s had some historically specific and contextual characteristics. Firstly, in the face of its political vulnerabilities within the established republican state tradition in Turkey, the first AKP government had to play into the hands of international actors such as the IMF and the EU more than its predecessors. In terms of the transformation of internal security, this meant effective implementation of the EU-imposed ‘democratic’ reforms that arguably aimed to put an end to the military’s long-lasting tutelage over civilian politics, a policy that also served the AKP’s immediate political interests. The Party’s declared will to resolve the Kurdish problem complemented this policy. Having ensured the political support of the so-called ‘liberal left’ on these issues, the AKP systematically paralysed the military’s intervention capability in domestic politics through a series of legal changes from 2003 to 2011, as well as show trials such as Ergenekon and Balyoz, imprisoning ultimately even the incumbent Chief of the General Staff in January 2012 (Akça 2015: 49f).

What was largely neglected in this period in domestic political debates was the steady strengthening of the police organisation in the hands of the ‘internationalised’ cadres of the Gülen Cemaat in the name of ‘reform’ (Hülagü 2011b: 192, 311ff.). These police cadres were dedicated executives of the global police reform agenda in Turkey, insofar as the proposed policies empowered them within the state. In parallel with widely accepted arguments, they claimed that the police in Turkey had to turn away from being a structure of force to a ‘service body’, thus helping to dismantle the power of the Kemalist elites over the state. The new cadres were highly educated, as they had various research degrees from abroad, mostly from US-based universities. They were also active members of the transnational policing community as contributors to prominent security publications such as NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, or initiators of institutional partnerships or new institutional niches such as the Turkish Institute for Police Studies in Northern Texas, US. Moreover, these ‘reformist’ officers were appointed to UN peacebuilding missions, where they were socialised in the new global policing culture, internalising the new police discourses. These discourses posited the police as a civil power against the military, and as champions of change in the society. Not surprisingly, this new police force in Turkey helped the AKP in the preparation of judicial...
cases against the military, and all the more in the criminalisation of social opposition. It is telling that police atrocities during the Gezi events were recorded by this ‘reformed’ police organisation.7

Secondly, state strategies to criminalise poverty have been more systematically implemented in Turkey within the context of the global post-Washington agenda, comprising processes of urban restructuring and flexibilisation of labour markets. Specifically, while the criminalisation of poverty has been on the agenda since the late 1990s onwards, the AKP governments after 2002 have served to strengthen its politico-legal mechanisms. Indeed, side by side with the ever-increasing resort to conservative/populist measures of poverty relief, the AKP period has seen the almost wholesale transformation of the age-old gecekondu (shantytowns) regions in large urban areas. Large urban transformation projects in the gecekondu neighbourhoods have been put into effect by the Mass Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) under the close follow up of the AKP.

This transformation has been ensured through contradictory and contested processes of gentrification, characterised by property transfer and displacement of urban poor from the city centres, along with the elimination of the gecekondu areas. Large-scale police interventions into the gecekondu neighbourhoods with militarised means such as armed officers, helicopters, and special operation teams have accompanied these displacement processes, the legitimation of which have required the depiction of these districts as centres of disorder, narcotics, and terror. This violent strategy was systematically implemented in the 2000s in almost all the poor neighbourhoods, such as Gazi, Gülsuyu, and Zeytinburnu in İstanbul, Kadıkale and Narlıdere in İzmir, and Altındağ in Ankara; this was approved by state agencies and mainstream media as necessary for public safety, and indeed duly criticised by various academic studies (see Gönen/Yonucu 2012; Özçetin 2014; Yonucu 2008).

It was within this socio-political context that policy rationales and corresponding practices of policing the poor – operative since the 1990s have become institutionalised since the 2000s in Turkey. Thus, besides the EU-induced legislative changes mentioned below, new institutional and practical units, such as Huzur Timleri and Yunuslar were established; technologically sophisticated mechanisms of surveillance like MOBESE (the equivalent of CCTV – closed circuit television) became widespread
in urban areas; and computerised systems of information gathering and retrieval systems such as GBT (criminal record check), CBG (geographic record check) and MERNIS (population registration system) were introduced (see Berksoy 2010; Berksoy et al. 2013; Topak 2013; Topal 2005).

Thirdly, the global agenda of the ‘war on terror’ acquired legal ground in Turkish politics through the EU anchor by the legislation of the new penal and criminal laws in 2005, and the legislative changes made in the Anti-Terror Law in 2006 and the Police Law in 2007, all endowing the police with extraordinary pre-emptive powers (Akça 2015: 54f.). Up to the 2010 Constitutional Referendum, which enhanced the government’s control over the judiciary, the practical implications of these legal changes did not become manifest. However, chaotic political developments in Turkey in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, such as the Gezi uprising in June 2013, the corruption scandal in the same year in which secretly recorded tapes on the bribing activities of Erdoğan and his close circle were disseminated via social media, and ultimately the success of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (PDP) in the June 2015 elections, putting an end to AKP’s single-party parliamentary dominance, fundamentally transformed the political atmosphere in Turkey, and placed the AKP-led police violence at the centre of public debates. What followed the June elections was, however, a much more dramatic turn towards the normalisation of insecurity and violence in everyday life. This was due to the AKP’s direct involvement in the Syrian Civil War through the problematic ISIS connection, leading to the Suruç and Ankara massacres in 2015, and the de facto land war waged against the Kurdish insurgents through systematically applied curfews, bringing about two suicide bombings, which killed in total more than 50 civilians at the heart of the capital city in early 2016. Within such a radically transformed political context, the AKP managed to restore its power in the November 2015 general elections with 49.5 percent, by asking people to “vote for stability”.

It can be argued that the AKP has enjoyed the wider room of manoeuvre enabled by the ‘war on terror’ to attack the Kurdish political opposition, the ‘parallel’ organization of the Cemaat, and the leftist opposition in Turkey, rather than primarily ISIS, in accordance with its Islamist political agenda. This has been a process in which the AKP’s specific policy choices started to clash with those of its Western allies as well. Having said
this, this does not necessarily mean that this strategy has been in contradiction with the basic global trends in the transformation of security. To examine why this is so, the next part will focus on the class character of the process.

2. Transformation of security relations in Turkey as ‘subordination by dispossession’

The neoliberal transformation of security relations has been redefining the threat perceptions, self-image and loyalty of the police as well as its forms and capacities of intervention, in such a way as to ensure the security of capital directly rather than labour, a process which implies a significant change in the fundamentals of the modern bourgeois state. The modern bourgeois state is differentiated from pre-modern statehood by its apparent class-neutrality, the most convincing demonstration of which is the state’s claim to ensure the security of ‘all citizens’, regardless of their class positions. This modern bourgeois character of the capitalist state was historically constituted by class struggles in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, in a period in which the labouring classes, while they were still radically anti-systemic, were also more capable of imposing their class interests on capital (Clarke 1991: 185-189; Gerstenberger 2007: 669). Neoliberalism has been in a wholesale attack on the gains labour had ensured up to then, and as capital has started subordinating both labour and state more powerfully after the 1990s, social relations of security have also been redefined within a contradictory, contingent and contested process that works towards dispossessing the labouring classes from their right to security.

The historical significance of the AKP has laid in its ability to put into effect, as well as systematically reshape, this historical but anti-labour security transformation, by articulating it with the Party’s specific Islamist agenda. Specifically, since their rise to power, Erdoğan and the AKP elites have promoted a conservative conception of a party/state constituting an organic whole with the ‘people’ on the basis of Sunni Islamic identity, bolstered by various dosages of Turkishness from time to time. This has meant the state’s redefinition of its political constituency through sharp social divisions, and endowing those who are considered to be AKP-
followers with privileged treatment of state services. The ethical legitimation of this has been reproduced through the centre-periphery antagonism, which presents the AKP as the voice of the peripheral masses, dominated for a long time by the Kemalist elites at the centre. As the analyses below will underline, this political strategy has been articulated with the class-driven global transformations going on in internal security, and produces specific police discourses and practices.

2.1 Increasing private provision of internal security

The institutionalisation of private security was one of the initial political projects of the AKP governments in restructuring security. Relying on a particular discourse of democratisation, the AKP cadres enacted a law on private security in 2004 with the claim that the state cannot and should not provide security on an equal basis in a society where “the opportunity should be given to those who want to receive additional security for their lives and properties”.

In fact, the new law denoted the ultimate fusion of corporate interests and state strategies, which had already been formed through mafia-like networks and amidst the crises-ridden political conditions of the 1990s. Indeed, the law-making process was assertively designed by a kind of interest group formed out of the amalgamation of national and international capital, technically supervised by retired personnel of public security institutions, and politically embraced by the AKP deputies. This law-making strategy was also an attempt to restore legitimation to the sector itself, which was in operation de facto since the 1990s.

Contrary to the discourse of democratisation however, the institutional formation of the private security sector has fostered the authoritarian restructuring of the police forces. The private provision of security has always been determined in an organic relationship with the police organisation, military, and intelligence services. Moreover, through the Police Care and Donation Fund (POLSAN), the police organisation itself has started engaging in the security business after 2004. As a profit-making organisation operating in various sectors such as construction, software programming and insurance, POLSAN’s presence in the sector has been instrumental in not only deepening this organic relationship, but also incorporating the hitherto-existing capital-mafia-state nexus into a legalised and institutionalised order (Dölek 2011: 163-169). On the other hand,
the new private security law (article 1) strategically defined this new order by making private security “complementary” to public police forces. This has provided the legal grounds for the utilisation of private security guards by the public police forces if and when required. As a matter of fact, the post-2004 period has revealed that private security officers are utilised as ‘additional troops’ in the service of the police organisation, not only in maintaining daily public order, but also in suppressing social and political dissent at universities, work places, etc.

Having been established through such processes, the private security sector has experienced a boom in the post-2004 period. The sector currently generates over $3 billion, and has become one of the largest private security sectors in the EU (TOBB 2014: 2). On the other hand, there are about 1,300 companies currently employing 250,000 security guards. Moreover, over 1.2 million people have been licensed to serve as security guards; about 750,000 people have received identification cards enabling them to be formally employed in the sector (see Özel Güvenlik 2016). These numbers should be evaluated with reference to the predominant labour relations in the sector. The work of private security in Turkey has been among the severest kinds of precarious jobs, characterised by long working hours, low wages and absence of any social and collective rights. This ultimately means that private security guards have been mainly recruited from the lower social strata. That is, a considerable portion of Turkey’s working class has been employed in the security sector in one way or another to serve as guardians of private property against the potential threats coming from other sections of the urban poor (Dölek 2015).

This is one of the trends, which has gradually restructured the security provision along class lines. Sociologically speaking, the upper classes have begun receiving commodified security services from within a large and diversified sector, which has mainly relied upon lower social strata as its labour force. On the other hand, the working classes have been subjected to a strategic politics of criminalisation, which has been assertively carried out by the militarised, professionalised and technologically empowered police forces. This has ultimately meant that those who have already been proletarianised in the neoliberal labour regime have also been dispossessed from the public provision of security. In this regard, the private provision of security has been one of the most explicit mechanisms
through which ‘subordination by dispossession’ in the security sphere has been materialised in Turkey.

2.2 The formation of public-private partnerships in policing

The subordination of the security field to the power of capital cannot be reduced to the expansion of the material authority of the capitalists over it. Nonetheless, the neoliberal trend of involving various business organisations into the security practice under the rubric of civilianisation should be critically assessed. Remaking of the security field with reference to neoliberal anti-statism, for which the encompassing presence of the state signified a betrayal of 19th century liberalism (Hayek cited in Evans 2013), has been translated in practice to projects broadening the non-state civilian authority in the field of security. Consequently, various large or small projects have popped up to involve the civilian sector and business organisations in the formation of the neoliberal security pact in the society. Two different streams of projects are of demonstrative importance for the growing power of business in the immediate management of security in Turkey.

The first stream of projects is the creation of city security councils, where it is expected that the city notables will participate in order to take an active lead in the prevention of new threats. Although there is no academic research on the functioning of these councils, several media sources demonstrate that these councils try to foster the power of the dominant classes in the security governance. In these councils, the police chiefs ask participants to become “informants”; to control “domestic violence” without waiting for the state to intervene; or, to help in preventing old and disused buildings from becoming “a den of iniquity” (see Göktürk 2011; Çetin 2012; SonDakika, 26 October 2013).

The second stream of projects is in community policing, which was introduced in Turkey in 2006. Community policing is related to the desire of the neoliberal state to reach deep into the society, both to inject its conservative gist and to strengthen the already conservative elements in the society. This was formulated by the ‘reformist’ security intellectuals as the need to make the state and society closer to each other by restoring the once harmonious and graceful state-society relations in Anatolia, which were destroyed by the Republican era’s Westernised elites. Apart from their various interesting features, such as intelligence gathering, preven-
tive policing and working as a public relations instrument for the state, the community policing projects have served the business to penetrate into security institutions in Turkey. The Turkish police force has asked for concrete material support from various business organisations, which have in turn considered the offer as a kind of social and political responsibility. For instance, a reformist police intellectual states that, in the Bursa district of Turkey, the department dealing with community policing is partially sponsored by the Bursa Young Businessmen’s Association (Lofça 2007: 197). Similarly, in Gaziantep, the head of the Federation of South Eastern Industry and Businessmen recounts that, having received the advice of the city’s Security Director on taking care of children who are drug addicts, they then established the Association of Education and Social Support (cited in Ortatepe 2014: 69).

Closer relations between the police and local business representatives have been approved by eulogising the pre-Republican policing practices. It is in this way recalled that the guilds, lodges and religious sects, as places for social organisation of the Ottoman people, used to take care of their own protection and policing (Fındıklı 1992: 133), while the practice of guild organizations and bazaars (esnaf) is praised as the history of the “civil people’s participation in the police in the Turkish society” (Cerrah 2005). The reduction of the ‘civil’ to business is notable here. It is, however, also questionable whether the policiarisation of the esnaf, attacking protestors during the Gezi events, can also be considered as a form of civil participation in policing.

2.3 The adoption of market rationality as a norm in police operations

The police force in Turkey has been accommodating itself into market rationality through various processes since the 1980s.13

Firstly, the activities of police rank-and-file are evaluated on the basis of performance criteria, an already ad hoc implementation in different parts of Turkey and a recently adopted measure, as one can read in the 2009-2013 Strategy Document of the GSD. In this document, it is stated that good performance cannot be reduced to the effective implementation of the rules and legislations in the field of policing (GSD 2008-2009: 77). Good performance includes getting beyond law enforcement, via
caring for “societal satisfaction, quality of the service and other human factors” (GSD 2008-2009: 77). To undertake such a holistic mission, the Strategy Document proposes a tri-partite model, which includes efficiency, quality and competitiveness (GSD 2008-2009: 76). As shown in various field studies, such strategies turn the working and unemployed poor into obvious targets for the police (Scranton 2004). Similar tendencies are also detected by Gönen (2010), who points out that the İzmir Police in Turkey have been motivated by the promise to get extra ‘bonuses’ for each suspect they bring to the security premises, or each crime they ‘create’ themselves in order to restore public order.

Secondly, the marketisation of policing practices is legitimised on the basis of the argument that there is a need “to create a security market where various individual security demands are met with competitive providers” (Taş/Tekliş 2003). It is also argued that this market does not simply serve the individual victims of crime and criminals but also aims to eliminate dissatisfaction within the organisation. This latter process is termed ‘internal customer satisfaction’. The internal customer satisfaction includes many things, such as the training of police officers, as well as the principle that, “aside from the police works related with the general security, those who ask for further police work should pay for it” (Yılmaz 2002). Thus, proposals are now made to allow the Turkish police work in secondary jobs during their rest periods (Haber Vitrini, 12 June 2008).

3. Conclusion

As the paper has underlined, the internal security structure in Turkey has been transformed in the 2000s, a period throughout which the priorities identified by the global neoliberal project have largely overlapped, and indeed dovetailed, with those of the conservative Islamist project of the AKP. Thus, while inequalities aggravated by neoliberal processes of urban transformation and labour market flexibilisation, as well as persistent economic and financial crises, have led to social unrest in Turkey and all over the world, states – including the Turkish one – have tried to strengthen their coercive powers through more militarised and technologically well-equipped police forces. The globally declared ‘war on terror’ has
enabled a legitimate ground for this authoritarian drive by enhancing the states’ room of manoeuvre in identifying their ‘enemies’ more flexibly and in line with their immediate political priorities. The AKP’s particularity in this regard has been the Party’s successful manipulation of the society through the centre/periphery divide, representing itself as the voice of the arguably hitherto oppressed and insulted peripheral masses. This discourse has been effectively used in the transformation of the police, and produced possibly its most notable ‘success’ during the Gezi uprising by alienating the poor as well as the police from the protestors, as the latter were defined by the government as irresponsible and anarchist looters, in contrast to the people who would lose a lot by the instability in the country.

Besides underlining the role of the AKP in putting this security transformation into effect, this paper has also highlighted the class-based dynamics underlying this process, in order to understand how capital increases its capacity to intervene in the specific policy choices of the Turkish state as regards the provision of security. For, while the powerful trend towards the private provision of security and the police’s increasingly more central role in the criminalisation of poverty have been paving the way for the dispossession of the labouring classes from their right of physical security, the commodification of the job of policing, and close relations established between the police and the business, have been enhancing the subordination of capital over the internal security structure of the state at the expense of labour.

This emphasis put on the constitutive power of class struggles on the form of policing should be elaborated further to improve our understanding of the contradictory and conflicting political dynamics behind the direction of regime change in Turkey. Indeed, the largely disorganised and weakened collective power of the labouring classes decreases their capacity to preserve the gains their predecessors had sealed in the modern bourgeois state. This might mean a more fundamental transformation of the political form of the capitalist state in Turkey rather than a change merely within it.

1 For a comprehensive critical overview of Marxist studies as such, see Bedirhanoğlu/Dölek/Hülagü (2016).
2 Harvey reformulates Marx’s conception of ‘primitive accumulation’ to make sense
of a wide range of coercive neoliberal processes that aim to commodify agriculture, turn the commons into private property, or even dispossess people through the credit system (Harvey 2003: 145).

3 See Bonefeld (1992) for a comprehensive analysis.

4 The new AKP government established after the 1st of November elections had to face three scandalous challenges in its first five days in office: the shooting down of a Russian military airplane on the Syrian border, leading to Russia’s unilateral but selective severance of relations with Turkey; the detention of two well-known journalists by accusations of espionage after their publication of the photos of weapons sent to Syria under the cover of humanitarian aid; and the murder of a Kurdish human rights activist and lawyer in an armed conflict in the middle of Diyarbakir.

5 ‘Military tutelage’ is a term historically embraced by liberals, left liberals and political Islamists in the post-1980 period in Turkey to mount a critique of the predominance of Kemalist cadres in Turkish politics by means of the coercive power of the military. Having based on overlapping arguments, all these political currents have perceived the military as an independent actor with a historically constitutive role in the formation of the authoritarian Kemalist regime for the sake of the survival of the state and the indivisible unity of the nation. Throughout the 2000s, this critique became quite instrumental in legitimising the AKP-led neoliberal political reforms in the name of ‘democratisation’ and ‘normalisation’ of the political system, a stand irrespective of the fundamental class dynamics in the country.

6 The ‘liberal left’ in Turkey is made up of different figures, including academicians, intellectuals, media representatives and politicians, who aim at the transformation of the Turkish state through political reforms – mostly via Europeanisation. These political reforms are generally conceptualised within the framework of democratisation, where the main impediment to the development of human rights in Turkey is claimed to be the Kemalist state bureaucracy and the military, and the pervasive political power of both. In this respect, the liberal left has been a decisive supporter of the Islamist AKP governments, by means of the argument that Islamists represent the genuine people of the Anatolian ‘periphery’ and thus has both the power and the legitimacy to cut the power of the Kemalist ‘centre’. The liberal left thus has not only perceived the AKP as leverage to dismantle the authoritarian state in Turkey, but also as the representative of all the oppressed (Kurdish people, non-muslim minorities, women etc.) in Turkey, along with the pious muslims, whom they argued, have been alienated by the Turkish state since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. In a nutshell, the liberal left has taken the perspective of liberal rights rather than that of class conflict when conceptualising politics in Turkey.

7 Cemaat-leaning officers from the same police organisation, together with the support of the judiciary and the intelligence service, were, however, planning to launch an official corruption investigation against some AKP affiliates, including five ministers close to Erdoğan, in 17 December 2013. Erdoğan and the AKP prevented the completion of these investigations, and claimed that Gülenist police officers taking this initiative were trying to stab the AKP in the back. It was also argued that these police officers were building up an international plot against the ‘New Turkey’ and creating patronage relations within the police organisation. The resultant
AKP-Cemaat clash ultimately led to the closure of the Police Academy in 2014 and the forced retirement of various police chiefs.

8 In June 2013, Turkey witnessed a sudden and dramatic mobilisation of millions of people to save a small public park at the Taksim Square in Istanbul from demolition. The sudden proliferation of spontaneous protests turned out to be a historic event in the socio-political history of the country, while representing a radical rebuttal of the Islamist conservative-authoritarian neoliberalisation project of the AKP. The waves of protests were supressed by the systematic and aggressive mobilisation of paramilitarised police forces. For a class-based analysis of the Gezi uprising, see Gürcan and Peker (2015).

9 The June 2015 elections were historically significant, as they represented a major success on the part of the counter-hegemonic forces politically clustered around the PDP, in terms of actually challenging not only the AKP rule, but also the authoritarian political regime as established after the coup d’état in 1980. It also revealed the actual potential for a form of solidarity to be established between the Kurdish movement and socialist forces in the Western parts of the country.

10 34 students died in Suruç on 20 July, and 105 people died through suicide attacks in Ankara before a peace rally on 10 October. The government accused a ‘cocktail’ of terrorist groups, including ISIS and the PKK, for the attacks, while political opposition blamed the resurgent ‘deep’ state now controlled by Erdoğan (see odaTV 2014).

11 See the General Preamble of the Law no. 5188 on Private Security Services, 26.05.2004.

12 For a comprehensive analysis of the formation of private security sector in the pre-AKP period, see Dölek (2015).

13 This part of the article largely benefits from the unpublished PhD thesis of Hülagü (2011b) in terms of examples and empirical findings.

References


Pınar Bedirhanoğlu
Department of International Relations,
Middle East Technical University Ankara
eflani@metu.edu.tr

Çağlar Dölek
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
Middle East Technical University
caglardolek@gmail.com

Funda Hülagü
Department of International Relations and EU, Maltepe University
fundahulagu@gmail.com